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In THe AfTerMATH  of the July 2009 Uyghur riot in Xinjiang, the far northwest province of China with a large concentration 
of ethnic minority people, foreign correspondent Howard French 
suggested in a special column in the New York Times that the Chi-
nese government take note of the Kerner Commission that Presi-
dent Johnson appointed to investigate the causes for the 1967 race 
riot in Detroit. Instead of clinging to the “fiction that areas where 
ethnic minorities have predominated . . . are ‘autonomous regions,’” 
French argued, the Chinese government should openly acknowl-
edge the magnitude of the country’s ethnic tensions.1 Only then 
would the social causes underlying the repeated riots in such areas 
as Xinjiang and Tibet start to be addressed. French’s criticism of 
China’s nationalities policy is certainly not unjustified, but his invo-
cation of the Kerner Commission is ironic. The federal initiatives 
that the commission’s final report recommended for improving 
educational and employment opportunities for urban blacks, after 
 1. Howard W. French, “Letter from China.”
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all, were implemented only in a partial and diluted way under Nixon and 
directly attacked during the Reagan years, and the commission has become 
a synonym, for many, of social goals not yet met. If the Chinese policy of 
ethnic autonomy is a fiction that consolidates national unity at the expense 
of minority interests, then the idea that the U.S. has set an example for other 
countries, especially China, in resolving ethno-racial conflicts through legis-
lation and government policy can only be described as a competing fiction. 
The Times piece illustrates a common way in which China’s ethnic policy 
and measures against ethno-racial tensions in the U.S. are compared in the 
American popular imagination.2 It is a solipsistic kind of comparison, where 
the other country is used as a foil for one’s own.
 This mode of comparison, unfortunately, reproduces itself on the Chi-
nese side. In reaction to the unfavorable coverage of the Uyghur riot abroad, 
the Chinese media quickly adopted a counter strategy, scolding the Western 
media for being tendentious toward the rioters, downplaying their violence, 
and, more important, failing to place ethnic riots in China in the context of 
presumably worse ones in Western countries, including the LA riots of 1992.3 
Such exchanges between the two countries have become a recurrent scene in 
the post–Cold War era, when the disintegration of the Soviet Union turned 
the U.S. and China into the world’s two remaining multiethnic “empires.”4 
The term “empire” is commonly invoked in cultural and political commen-
taries on both the United States and China in the current era to convey criti-
 2. For a similar example, see Michael Wines, “A Strong Man Is China’s Rock in Ethnic 
Strife.” Wines compares the July 2009 Uighur riot in China to race riots in 1960s America. He 
argues that, while the latter led to the Civil Rights Movement, the former would likely further 
legitimize the government’s hard-line positions on discontent minority groups, including ac-
celerated economic development in minority regions, aggressive Han settlement, and cultural 
makeovers.
 3. See Qin Feng, “Cong wulumuqi 7–5 shijian kan xifang meiti shuangchong biaozhun” 
[The July 5 Urumqi incident reveals double standards in Western media]. 
 4. Many studies have emerged since the early 1990s that examine U.S. culture and his-
tory in relation to the country’s imperialist expansion across the North American continent 
and beyond through military, territorial, legal, economic, and cultural means. This focus on 
American imperialism updates W. J. Pomeroy’s argument in his 1970 American Neo-colonialism 
that U.S. activities in the Philippines and Asia constituted a nonterritorial kind of colonialism, 
or “neo-colonialism.” Also see Donald Pease and Amy Kaplan, ed., Cultures of United States 
Imperialism; Chalmers Johnson, Sorrows of Empire. Pease and Kaplan lay down important con-
ceptual frameworks for studies of the U.S. as a new kind of empire. Johnson surveys the history, 
since the early nineteenth century, of how the U.S. became an empire that “dominates the world 
through its military power” (1). For discussions of the Chinese side, see Ross Terrill, The New 
Chinese Empire: and What It Means for the United States. Terrill’s basic argument is that the PRC 
is “an autocratic Chinese state ruling a land nearly half of which was historically inhabited by 
non-Chinese people” and can be seen as “an empire of our time” (3). This view is typical of those 
critical of the current Chinese state’s policy toward its minorities. 
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cisms of the ways in which the two countries maintain order among their 
diverse populations at the expense of the interests of ethno-racial minorities, 
while expanding their influence and power globally. The U.S. government 
has largely ignored or suppressed such criticisms, disclaiming racial and eth-
nic tensions at home while projecting them onto non-Western countries 
deemed to be “authoritarian” or “dictatorial,” including China, in particular. 
The Chinese government, for its part, has opted for a tit-for-tat strategy. 
Consequently, each side has frequently accused the other for perpetuating 
racial and ethnic inequality.
 Following a major disruption due to the 1989 Tiananmen incident, 
U.S.–China relations returned to the general principle of “comprehensive 
engagement” in the early 1990s.5 Nevertheless, the U.S. government, espe-
cially members of Congress, has consistently expressed strong condemna-
tions of China’s record on human and civil rights, including minority rights.6 
The State Department ritualistically castigates China for failing to amelio-
rate “racism against minorities” in such areas as Xinjiang, Inner Mongo-
lia, and Tibet, in its annual reports on human rights in China.7 Since 2000, 
the Chinese government has sought to rebuke such remarks with its annual 
reports on human rights in the U.S., where race relations invariably figure as 
a prominent target for criticisms.8 The new millennium has witnessed a few 
turns in U.S.–China relations, ranging from the tactical alliance on the “War 
on Terror” that the two governments formed immediately after 9/11 to the 
expanded U.S.–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue following the global 
 5. Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, 328. After the Tiananmen incident, the first 
President Bush sought to restore the U.S.–China relationship, “persevering against growing 
congressional hostility” (Suettinger, 93). Clinton continued this policy and “enthusiastically 
adopted the idea of improving relations with China as one of the key foreign policy goals of his 
second term” (Suettinger, 283).
 6. As Suettinger points out, individual members in Congress took the lead on efforts to 
adjust the White House’s policy of “comprehensive engagement.” For example, Nancy Pelosi 
and Frank Wolf headed a congressional caucus called the Working Group on China, from 1997 
to 2006. They “drafted letters, circulated information, and developed legislation” to pressure 
China into making significant improvements in its human rights (Suettinger, 328). Also, in the 
years following the Tiananmen incident, Congress voted every year on legislation disapproving 
of extending China’s MFN (most favored nation) status; not until 2000 did Congress pass H.R. 
4444 extending normal trade relations treatment to China, in anticipation of China to entry to 
the World Trade Organization. Also, the State Department sponsored a resolution critical of 
China’s human rights practices at the annual meetings of United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees up until 1998, prior to President Clinton’s China trip. 
 7. U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, 
and Macau).
 8. Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2008 nian meiguo renquan baogao 
[2008 report on human rights in the United States].
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financial crisis of 2007–9. Mutual accusations of minority rights violations, 
however, have remained a constant theme.
 The solipsistic, accusatory mode of comparison that characterizes the 
political exchanges between the two countries is also mirrored in the sphere 
of popular culture, often in surprising and subtle manners. One good exam-
ple is the Disney movie Mulan, released in 1998, which tells the story of a 
young girl in feudal China who enlists in the imperial army to protect her 
aged father from conscription. Very few were troubled at the time by the 
movie’s portrayal of Shan Yu, the sinister head of the “army of the Huns” at 
war with China. Covered with an unnatural, gray tint, Shan Yu cuts a hulk-
ing, beastly figure, almost twice as big as the Han Chinese characters in the 
movie. For all his size, he comes across froglike, with a small head, a reced-
ing forehead, and beady eyes, surrounded by subordinates who are simply 
altered versions of him. One might see Shan Yu as just another typical Disney 
villain, but he is too closely based on real historical figures to be brushed 
aside as a fantastical embodiment of pure evil. Shan Yu, after all, is a phonetic 
transliteration of the title for the chiefs of the Xiongnu, a nomadic people on 
the steppes of central Asia who became such a threat to the early Chinese 
dynasties that the Great Wall was built to defend China. The movie refers 
to Shan Yu and his army as the Huns, who are sometimes believed to be 
descendents of the Xiongnu, to make its villains recognizable to the Western 
audiences. Attila the Hun pillaged the eastern and western Roman Empires 
during the fifth century a.d., and the Huns have served as a symbol of mili-
tary and cultural threat to Western civilization ever since. Invoked during 
World War I and World War II as an epithet for the Germans, the Huns are 
not in a strict sense racial figures in the West. However, they pick up clear 
racial overtones in Mulan, complete with a different skin color and physi-
ological abnormalities. Why did Disney get away with racializing the army 
at war with imperial China, when it would be pretty much unimaginable, for 
example, to portray the Native Americans in Pocahontas in the same way?9 
When Mulan first came out, much critical attention was drawn toward the 
staging of the Han Chinese (the ethnic majority in China) in the movie. To 
the delight of many, Mulan, a girl from feudal China, struck one as a credible 
embodiment of proto-feminism who defied the stock figures of submissive 
Asian women in Western cultures. Few, if any, however, took offense at the 
portrayal of the “Huns” in the movie.
 9. Pocahontas’s romanticization of the Smith–Pocahontas relationship and, symbolically, 
the white–Indian relationship, is not without problems. Nonetheless, the difference between 
Pocahontas and Mulan remains clear. In the former, it is Governor Ratcliffe, leader of the En-
glish settlers in the movie, rather than the Native American figures, that is overtly caricatured.
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 One has to acknowledge that the figure of Shan Yu, as a throwback to the 
blatant racism characteristic of political cartoons of the World War II era, 
poses a few interesting questions. Did China provide Disney with an outlet to 
let loose, or at least leave uncensored, racialist sentiments that are culturally 
forbidden in the U.S.? Or was Disney simply trying to present Chinese his-
tory from a “native” point of view, with the implication that a racialist view 
of nomadic peoples on the borders of ancient China (some of whom were 
incorporated into PRC territories and identified as “minority nationalities”) 
remained normative in contemporary China? I believe that the answer to 
both of these questions is yes. In other words, one can read the “Huns” in 
the movie Mulan as a revelation of the racialist attitudes lingering in Ameri-
can culture against a Chinese backdrop and as a (conscious or unconscious) 
hint at the ways in which Chinese culture remains in the grip of racial dis-
crimination. In either case, the movie demonstrates that representations of 
ethno-racial issues in the two countries are intimately connected: A movie 
ostensibly about China can betray racialist sentiments in the U.S., while at 
the same time suggesting that China (ancient or modern), unlike contem-
porary America, is a place where racialist attitudes can be taken for granted. 
The political correctness mandated in the multicultural U.S. is both joyfully 
jettisoned and slyly bolstered (by being subtly contrasted against “Chinese” 
racism) in a Disney movie about China. Mulan, then, prompts us to reflect 
on the unconscious of American multiculturalism, the persistent racialist 
mindset beneath the “postracial” rhetoric that requires a Chinese back-
ground to simultaneously uncensor and purify itself. Just like the political 
exchanges between the two countries, Mulan reveals an unproductive and 
often unconscious pattern of comparison that reduces the other country to a 
foil onto which one’s own can project the evil of ethno-racial prejudice.
 What this book does is counter this negative, incriminating mode of 
comparison by offering a few alternatives. It not only critiques the limita-
tions of both U.S. multiculturalism and China’s ethnic policy during the 
post–Cold War period but also shows the unexpected continuities and con-
nections between the two projects, placing them in a shared context of the 
global experiment in viable structures for multiethnic nations. The genesis of 
my thoughts on these questions lies primarily in my involvement with Asian 
American literary studies. Diasporic Chinese American narratives, including 
works by Maxine Hong Kingston, Alex Kuo, and Yan Geling, provide impor-
tant material and viable conceptual models for a new form of transnational 
or comparative critique. Addressing both Chinese and American histories 
and literary traditions and at times obtaining an “afterlife” through actual 
translation into a different language, these narratives provide perspectives 
xiv P r e f A C e
on U.S.–China connections that are rarely glimpsed in other forms of cul-
tural production. They also comment suggestively on how these connections 
can be drawn. Kuo, in particular, ruminates on the conflicting implications 
of metaphor to propose a model of critical comparison that draws linkages 
between two disparate political and cultural contexts without positing an 
easy symmetry. Chinese American narratives, thus, enable me to construct 
the kind of comparative critique that I enact here. Grappling with such nar-
ratives, I contend, helps propel Asian American studies into more active 
collaborations with contiguous fields, including American studies and East 
Asian studies, thus furthering its transformation from a field organized 
around a group of embodied subjects into a loosely associated set of provo-
cations in existing discourses about the conditions and implications of sub-
jectivation and identity formation in different but related national contexts. 
The intellectual sizzle that comes from crossing Asian/Chinese American 
literary studies with comparative multiculturalisms is what my project seeks 
to capture.
A note on the Text
Most Chinese names (not including Chinese American names) are given 
in the order of family name followed by given name. Exceptions include 
names of Chinese writers and scholars that customarily appear in the West-
ern style. The pinyin Romanization system is used for all Chinese proper 
names. Unless otherwise noted, quotes from Chinese-language material are 
my own translations.
MOST Of THIS bOOk  was written at Columbia University,  but the seeds for it were sown many years ago, when I was 
still a confused undergraduate. My most important mentors from 
that period of my life, Chu Xiaoquan of Fudan University and 
Donna Richardson of St. Mary’s College of Maryland, introduced 
me to the life of the truly exceptional mind and the possibilities that 
life might open.
 This book can be seen as a new version of the dissertation 
I completed at Northwestern University, even though most of 
the dissertation has been discarded or transformed beyond rec-
ognition. At its heart, this book addresses the central questions 
intimated, though not well formulated, in that earlier work. My dis-
sertation committee—Dorothy Wang, Betsy Erkkila, Paul Breslin, 
and David Eng—placed me on a promising track. Dorothy, in par-
ticular, put much of herself into helping me adapt to graduate edu-
cation and the academic job market. Many others at Northwestern, 
both faculty and fellow graduate students, shared time, friendship, 
and ideas with me and to this day evoke warm feelings in me. I can 
name only a few of them here: Brian Edwards, Christopher Lane, 
a C k n o w l e d g m e n t s
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Jules Law, Coleman Hutchison, Peter Jaros, and Katy Chiles. Special appre-
ciation must go to Shuji Otsuka, whose companionship and wisdom were 
indispensable for my well-being in graduate school.
 Since I started working on this book in my second year as an assistant 
professor, I have received consistent guidance and help from my wonderful 
colleagues at Columbia. Bruce Robbins’s everyday cosmopolitanism—his 
open-mindedness toward everything global and unknown—added a well-
needed dose of optimism to my teaching and research as a junior profes-
sor. Rachel Adams, Ross Posnock, Brent Edwards, Joey Slaughter, Marianne 
Hirsch, Nicole Horejsi, and many others also offered important advice.
 Richard Jean So deserves a special place in my acknowledgments. An 
incredible interlocutor over many years, Richard has always inspired me with 
his devotion to intellectual rigor and ambition. I also benefited a great deal 
from the feedback I received from a reading group that James Kim organized 
over the years 2008–10, during which time I conducted workshops on parts 
of my manuscript. Jeffrey Santa Ana, Thuy Linh Tu, and Elda Tsou, along 
with James, tolerated and critiqued my earlier drafts. Xiao-huang Yin served 
as an informal mentor for me since I was a Ph.D. student. Sau-ling Wong 
kindly provided me with several of her insightful articles on Kingston, in 
addition to advice and support. My colleagues at other institutions, including 
in particular Steven Lee and Stephen H. Sohn, introduced me to resources 
and ideas of which I was not previously aware, giving me a warm sense of 
long-distance camaraderie. Thanks also to Evelyn Hu-dehart, Colleen Lye, 
Crystal Parikh, Allen Isaac, and Victor Bascara for giving me advice and sup-
port despite their own demanding careers. I shall not forget the inspiration 
I received from excellent graduate students, especially Brandon Ruben and 
Tim Gunatilaka.
 I must also mention my colleagues in the Department of East Asian Lan-
guages and Cultures at Columbia, who sent along their work and conversed 
with me about their projects. Eugenia Lean invited me to the Modern China 
Seminar, an invigorating intellectual home outside my own department. 
Weihong Bao spent much time comparing notes with me on the process of 
writing academic books. Lydia Liu shared with me her thoughts on Chinese 
ethnic cultures, among many other topics. For me, she personifies the mean-
ing of intellectual agility and expansiveness. Thanks also to her partner Li 
Tuo for scintillating conversations.
 One normally does not need to acknowledge the labor of anonymous 
readers for one’s work, but over the years I have really come to appreciate 
the generosity of many fellow academics, who always remind me of why I 
entered this profession in the first place. My readers at The Ohio State Uni-
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versity Press were particularly exemplary in their understanding of produc-
tive criticism.
 Even more unforgettable is my debt to the authors I write about in this 
book. Alex Kuo and his wife Joan Burbick graciously hosted me and granted 
me an extensive interview. They have continued their investment in me since 
then. Yan Geling also made time for me, even when I was myself unclear 
about what to accomplish through my questions for her. I also contacted Zha 
Jianying and Su Wei when researching my book. I was not able to write about 
them extensively in the end, and I hope they will forgive me for that failure.
 A version of chapter 5 was originally published as “Transnational Criti-
cism and Asian Immigrant Literature in the U.S.: Reading Yan Geling’s 
Fusang and Its English Translation,” Contemporary Literature 47, no. 4 (2006): 
570–600. Part of chapter 3 was originally published as “Toward a U.S.–China 
Comparative Critique: Indigenous Rights and National Expansion in Alex 
Kuo’s Panda Diaries,” American Quarterly 62, no. 3 (2010): 739–61. I would 
like to thank the University of Wisconsin Press and Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press for the permissions to reprint my articles. I am also grateful for an 
NEH Summer Stipend (2010) and two Summer Research Grants from the 
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Columbia.
 Finally, a personal note. My parents have never once told me what to do 
with my life, yet none of what I have done would have been possible without 
them. They not only have taught me to work hard and depend on myself but 
also have shown me what it means to practice the ethic of generosity. This 
book is dedicated to them. Liu Daxian proved that it is possible to combine 
intellectual stimulation and the simple matter of having a good time. For 
that, I remain deeply grateful.

P lurAlIst unIvErsAlIsm  provides a comparison of U.S. liberal multiculturalism and China’s policy toward minor-
ity nationalities that does not ascribe a fundamental otherness 
to either side. It argues that U.S. liberal multiculturalism and 
China’s policy toward minority nationalities are two increas-
ingly intertwined components of contemporary multicultural-
ism, which we do well to conceive of as a global movement that 
draws upon different intellectual and political traditions and 
responds to different local conditions. They are two different but 
not entirely incongruous forms of pluralism that have increas-
ingly come to bear on each other, through translation (with China 
at the translating end for the most part) and other kinds of dis-
cursive mediation, since the end of the Cold War. A number of 
historians and cultural critics have intervened in the Cold War 
discourse of the ideological rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union by demonstrating that, throughout the twentieth century, 
notions of racial and ethnic equality in the U.S. were affected by 
I n t r o d u C t I o n
Whatever the explanation, Asia is witnessing the rise of “identity 
politics.” People are mobilizing along ethnic, religious, racial, 
and cultural lines, and demanding recognition of their identity, 
acknowledgement of their legal rights and historic claims, and a 
commitment to the sharing of power.
—baogang He and Will kymlicka, multiculturalism in Asia
A double critique, “an other thinking,” would lead to the openness 
of the “unforeseeable diversity of the world” and of “unheard and 
unexpected” forms of knowledge, as argued by glissant (1998).
—Walter d. Mignolo, Border thinking
1
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U.S.–Soviet relations and American perceptions of the Soviet nationalities 
policy.1 The similar task of complicating the U.S.–China binary in the post–
Cold War era, which inevitably requires different approaches, has not been 
seriously attempted.
 Using the term “multiculturalism” to describe conceptions of racial and 
ethnic relations in both the U.S. and China does not flatten the differences 
between the two contexts; rather, it entails a plea for a globalized, nonnorma-
tive understanding of this very familiar idea. In political and social theory, 
“multiculturalism” has picked up different and sometimes conflicting mean-
ings since the early 1970s, when it became the name for Canada’s official 
policy of promoting immigrant languages and cultures. Most conceptions 
of multiculturalism in existing literature presume that it is a phenomenon 
peculiar to Western liberal democracies and are thus too narrow to accom-
modate the multiplicity of cultural pluralisms in the world. I detach multi-
culturalism from political ideology, defining it as a corrective to what one 
may call unitary nationalism, which predicates itself upon a homogeneous 
conception of national culture and interests. Embodied in state legislation, 
government policies, social programs, and cultural and political movements, 
multiculturalism promotes group-specific rights that aim to help ethnic and 
racial minorities sustain their societal cultures and counter the effects of their 
forced integration into the majority nation or, alternatively, exclusion from 
it. These rights often include, understood differently in different contexts, 
political autonomy, fair political representation, preferential treatment in 
education and employment, and institutional support for certain languages 
and cultural practices. Multiculturalism, to borrow from Bhikhu Parekh, can 
be seen as a form of “pluralist universalism”—it acknowledges simultane-
ously the importance of cultivating common values and practices as a basis 
for a functional national identity and that of addressing the particular needs 
of historically disadvantaged ethno-racial groups.2 It is a profoundly political 
 1. See Mary Dudziac, Cold War Civil Rights; Kate Baldwin, Beyond the Color Line and 
the Iron Curtain; Steven S Lee, “Cold War Multiculturalism” and “Borat, Multiculturalism, 
Mnogonatsional’nost’.” Dudziac explains the way in which the Cold War both helped produce 
and placed severe limits upon the civil rights reform in U.S. from 1946 through the mid-1960s. 
Baldwin focuses on black American intellectuals’ interactions with the Soviet Union between 
1922 and 1963 to reassess at once the impact of Soviet internationalism on the political visions 
of black America and U.S. black modernism. Lee’s work, still in dissertation form, proposes 
that U.S. multiculturalism experienced a turn away from internationalism in the era following 
the Civil Rights Movement in part because of the pervasive disillusionment with the Soviet 
nationalities policy. 
 2. Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, 126–36. Parekh uses the term to define 
a conception of human cultures that departs from both hegemonic universalism and unprin-
cipled relativism. I use it to describe an attitude toward cultural differences within a nation-state 
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project that serves to mediate between the imperative of national coherence 
and assertions of minority difference, so that their conflicts do not come to 
a head. Most states in the world today are multiethnic, via colonization and 
voluntary or involuntary migration, and many have been compelled, by the 
pressure of minority insurgences or the international promotion of group 
rights, to implement a certain form of multiculturalism, redefining national 
identity in a way that accommodates minority demands for autonomy or 
equality.
 As it functions to counter, or at least contain, ethno-racial tensions, 
multiculturalism cannot simply be equated with narrow identitarianism or 
communitarianism.3 That it oftentimes seeks to contain, rather than funda-
mentally confront, the political conflicts among different ethnic and racial 
groups subjects multiculturalism, not unjustly, to the criticism that it accords 
merely formal or symbolic recognition to minorities, masks structural 
inequalities, and distracts from the goal of social redistribution.4 However, 
the limitations of certain configurations of multiculturalism should not be a 
reason for rejecting the entire idea. Even superficial forms of multicultural-
ism open the door to broad discussions, in scholarly circles as well as the 
public sphere, of multiple understandings of national solidarity—social dem-
ocratic vs. culturalist, for example—and possible ways of making it compat-
ible with the goals of equality and justice. This point is particularly important 
to emphasize, given that the victory of multiculturalism over the arguably 
bigger evil of overtly oppressive or exclusionary forms of nationalism is by 
no means clear. As Anne Phillips points out, there has been much talk of the 
“death of multiculturalism” in recent years in Britain and continental Europe, 
among other parts of the world. 5 Even though U.S. liberal multiculturalism 
 3. This view that multiculturalism equals communitarianism was more prevalent in the 
theoretical discussions of multiculturalism in the 1990s, and it remains a popular understanding 
in both conservative and radical quarters. See Slavoj Žižek, “Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural 
Logic of Multinational Capitalism,” 26. The author warns leftist intellectuals against subscribing 
to the dominant fiction of group identity and modeling progressive movements upon the logic 
of communitarianism or popularism, which, for Žižek, always entails pernicious practices of ex-
clusion and easily slides into ethnic fundamentalism. Instead he urges them to shift their focus 
from the cultural to the political, to offer a program for égaliberté that seeks to transform the 
public space of civil society and active responsible citizenship—the fight for human rights, ecol-
ogy, and so forth. Pace Žižek, I do not reduce multiculturalism to a narrow particularism but 
instead emphasize the political, dynamic nature of contemporary multiculturalisms, defining 
them as discursive and political battles that continue to reshape the configurations of national 
identity and political universalism. 
 4. For two of the most oft-cited criticisms of multiculturalism’s neglect of structural in-
equalities, see Iris Young, Justice and the Politics of Identity; Michael Waltzer, “Multiculturalism 
and Individualism.”
 5. Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism without Culture, 5. One can make a similar argument 
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and China’s policy toward ethnic minorities are both severely constrained, 
working more often to conceal deep-seated social tensions than to openly 
address them, both have provoked or helped fuel alternative conceptions of 
pluralism in their respective context.
 Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka, one of the most influen-
tial and prolific theorists of multiculturalism, has most consistently written 
about this subject in relation to nationalism, defining it expressly as a project 
integral to the process of “nation-building.”6 It is not a coincidence that Kym-
licka and his collaborators are also major proponents of a global, compara-
tive approach to multiculturalism. The understanding of multiculturalism as 
an instrument of nation formation both necessitates and enables a collection 
of case studies from states other than Western liberal democracies. As Jacob 
T. Levy points out, Kymlicka is an important practitioner of “contextualist 
political theory” who remains sensitive to the specific circumstances sur-
rounding different instances of pluralism.7 Kymlicka’s work emphasizes the 
undiminishing urgency of the project of nation-building in the contempo-
rary era of globalization, pointing out that states with drastically different 
histories and political systems, ranging from the post-Communist states in 
Central and Eastern Europe to the various postcolonial societies in Asia, 
Latin America, and Africa, share the task of forging national identities while 
addressing minority demands for autonomy and equality. Liberal multicul-
turalism has spread its influence around the world, especially among intel-
lectual elites, but the actual policies addressing minority needs vary widely 
from country to country.8 Kymlicka and his collaborators, among others, 
have produced a substantial amount of work that constitutes an emerging 
discourse on comparative multiculturalisms.9
for post-9/11 America as well, with renewed outcry against “political correctness” and the 
vaunted rhetoric of a “postracial” society. 
 6. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, 23–27. Kymlicka believes that academic debates 
around multiculturalism have undergone three stages. The first stage revolves around the merit 
of the perceived communitarianism of minority groups, the second stage focuses on the im-
plications of multiculturalism for traditional political liberalism, and the third, current stage 
emphasizes the relationship between multiculturalism and nation-building. The three stages, of 
course, do not have to be seen as a linear sequence. 
 7. Jacob T. Levy, “Contextualism, Constitutionalism, and modus Vivendi,” 183.
 8. Will Kymlicka provides a vivid testimonial to this growing interest among global elites 
in liberal models of multiculturalism. See Multicultural Odysseys. The author has been par-
ticipating in “seminars, workshops, and advisory groups” on the formulation of international 
norms of minority rights in “some two dozen countries, from Ethiopia to Estonia, from Syria 
to Sri Lanka, from Mexico to Moldova,” where he watched the diffusion of liberal concepts and 
discourses “through academia, civil society, and the bureaucracy” (7).
 9. See Grant H. Cornwell and Eve Walsh Stoddard, Global Multiculturalism; Ella Shoha 
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 Extrapolating from this emerging discourse, I contend that, as a politi-
cal project central to the process of nation-building, multiculturalism does 
not have to be grounded in liberal theories of rights and justice. Political 
liberalism provides a particular set of conditions and challenges for multi-
culturalism, but it does not define multiculturalism. The liberal emphasis on 
individual rights has been conceived as both a foundation for and impedi-
ment to the promotion of group rights in multiculturalism, but these rights 
can also derive from other political and cultural traditions.10 As I point out 
in more detail later in this Introduction, although Kymlicka’s work gestures 
clearly toward an expansive view of multiculturalism through his various 
case studies, it remains invested in using these case studies to test the feasibil-
ity of the global diffusion of conceptions of liberal justice. For Kymlicka, in 
other words, a global perspective on multiculturalism entails, to a large part, 
understanding the conditions for and means of transplanting liberal multi-
culturalism into various local contexts. By contrast, I see multiculturalism 
as an inherently global phenomenon with many interrelated components 
that compete with and influence one another. I elaborate in chapter 1 that 
U.S. and Chinese multiculturalisms can be seen, respectively, as a liberal 
and a socialist version of cultural pluralism that have come into increasing 
contestation and contact in the post–Cold War era. I adopt this expansive 
understanding of multiculturalism not to erase all distinctions between U.S. 
liberal multiculturalism and China’s nationalities policy but to provide a con-
ceptual basis for the comparative project that I undertake here, which aims 
to illuminate the different but related ways in which nation-building projects 
affect racial and ethnic minorities in the two countries, thus unsettling the 
habitual practice, espoused by both, of elevating one system over the other.
 This is not to say, however, that my study inaugurates a way of mediat-
ing between U.S. and Chinese ethno-racial politics across a chasm of mutual 
misconceptions. Rather, it builds on the comparative perspectives articulated 
in the literary writings produced in the two countries since the early 1990s, 
including, in particular, Chinese American fiction (defined broadly, includ-
ing texts written in both English and Chinese). These writings constitute a 
rare alternative to the common practice of pitting U.S. liberal multicultural-
and Robert Stam, Multiculturalism, Postcoloniality, and Transnational Media; Milan Mesic, Per-
spectives of Multiculturalism. 
 10. In regard to how multiculturalism both derives from and challenges the tenet of indi-
vidual rights and that of the common rights of citizenship, see Joseph Raz, “Multiculturalism”; 
Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism; Kimlicka, Multicultural Citizenship. For forms of multicultural-
ism outside the liberal framework, see N. Ganesan’s discussion of Malaysia’s consociationalism 
and Chua Beng Huat’s discussion of Singapore’s communitarian model of multiculturalism. 
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ism and China’s nationalities policy against each other by illustrating the 
interlinked social contexts to which they respond in the post–Cold War era 
and reflecting upon the political functions and structural limitations they 
share. If, as I have argued, it is both important and intellectually viable to 
study the two systems as two related components of the global movement 
of multiculturalism, this study must give a crucial role to fictional narratives 
from Chinese America. They provide a crucial but overlooked source of 
insights into the relations between U.S. and Chinese multiculturalisms. My 
book reveals, analyzes, and structures itself on the basis of the logic of these 
narratives.
 Narrative fiction and fictionalized narratives, then, constitute a supple-
ment to social science discourses, allowing us to question and dislodge the 
liberal biases built into normative definitions of multiculturalism. If multi-
culturalism’s mediation of the conflicts between national unity and minority 
differences continuously changes the connotations of both terms, the ways 
in which this very mediation proceeds should not be a fixed matter either. 
As a form of pluralist universalism, in other words, multiculturalism is best 
reconceived in a way that simultaneously universalizes and pluralizes it. Mul-
ticulturalism, indeed, is itself in need of being “multiculturalized.” Through 
an analysis of the narrative texts included in this study, I project a fluid con-
ception of multiculturalism that is more encompassing and more accurate 
than the normative liberal conception. I do not subsume heterogeneous eth-
nic policies under one coherent model but instead make the idea of multi-
culturalism more accommodating to actually existing, competing modes of 
ethnic and racial integration. In the meantime, as I trace how multicultural-
ism has played out in related ways in Chinese American, and Chinese and 
American, narratives from the post–Cold War period, I offer a comparative, 
dual critique of the contemporary American and Chinese nations.
Strategic Doubling
In 2006, the prolific but underdiscussed Chinese American author Alex 
Kuo published his novel Panda Diaries, which he drafted in 1991 and 1992, 
when he visited China as a foreign teacher. In the novel, Kuo juxtaposes 
the Indian policies of the nineteenth-century U.S. with the Chinese gov-
ernment’s efforts to integrate ethnic minorities into the project of socialist 
modernization during the Cultural Revolution. This comparison involves 
time–space configurations that are apparently distanced from the post–Cold 
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War moment in which the novel was written and published. It is, however, 
a comparison that can be read as a response to the later moment, when the 
U.S. and China both claim a genuine form of cultural pluralism, often over 
and against each other. Kuo’s juxtaposition of the two unsavory historical 
moments throws these claims into question by highlighting the coloniza-
tion of minority space that occurred in the process of national expansion in 
both countries. His comparison also intervenes in the emerging discourse in 
China that parallels the Chinese government’s ongoing campaign to develop 
its western regions, which have a high concentration of minorities, with the 
American westward expansion, a parallel that largely serves as a justification 
for prioritizing the state’s conception of economic and social development 
over minority interests.
 Chinese immigrant writer Yan Geling, one of the best known of her gen-
eration, provides another example of a simultaneous critique of U.S. and 
Chinese multiculturalisms. Her 1996 Chinese-language novel Fusang, set 
in nineteenth-century San Francisco, portrays a Chinese prostitute as an 
embodiment of a new form of subjectivity by turning sexual slavery into a 
voluntary act that disturbs the regimes of race and gender in nineteenth-cen-
tury America. Widely read among Chinese-speaking audiences in both the 
U.S. and China, this novel reached an English-speaking audience through a 
translation in 2001. The capacious, amorphous subjectivity embodied by the 
character of Fusang, thus, came into conflict with the logic of mainstream 
multiculturalisms in both the U.S. and China. The story of Fusang departs 
drastically from the familiar narrative of Asian American female empower-
ment that operates as a testimonial to the dissolution of racial barriers in the 
U.S. At the same time, the ambiguous characterization of the female protago-
nist also resists appropriations by Chinese readers and critics, who habitually 
read Asian American characters like Fusang as a symbol of a united, though 
ethnically diverse, Chinese nation grappling with the legacies of Western 
imperialism and racism.
 The examples of Yan and Kuo, both of whom are studied in all their com-
plexity in my book, demonstrate that Chinese American and Chinese immi-
grant fiction plays a crucial role in modeling a conceptual framework within 
which one can study U.S. and Chinese multiculturalisms as two compara-
ble, interrelated processes of mediation between the imperative of national 
coherence and minority demands for autonomy and equality. The model, 
to borrow from Argentinian critic Walter Mignolo, can be called “double 
critique.” Mignolo uses the term largely in relation to Moroccan philosopher 
Abdelhebir Khatibi’s critique of both “the domain of Western metaphysics” 
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and the “theological realm of Islamic thought.”11 It is a critique that grapples 
with the legacy of French colonialism in Maghreb and Arabic nationalism 
simultaneously. For Mignolo, Khatibi’s double critique signals the practice of 
thinking from multiple discursive lineages and yet none of them, thus gener-
ating subaltern knowledge that did not previously exist before the very act of 
mediation. It does not constitute a transcendent vision, but a site of irreduc-
ible epistemic difference. The concept of double critique, along with its vari-
ous critical cognates, resonates strongly with the logic of Panda Diaries and 
Fusang.12 Studying these works helps illuminate the shared limitations of U.S. 
and Chinese conceptions of ethnic and racial difference and the connections 
between the two (for example, the relationship between China’s official and 
popular nationalism and the translation of postcolonial theory from the U.S. 
to China). The logic of double critique in their works is naturally affiliated 
with the emerging discourse of comparative multiculturalisms in that it also 
engages in comparisons that are sensitive to both parallels and differences, 
but it challenges the latter by refusing to establish, even implicitly, a norma-
tive conception of ethno-racial justice against which others are measured. 
Kuo and Yan address both the U.S. and Chinese contexts so as to allow them 
to decenter and defamiliarize each other, holding up a distorting mirror to 
each other so that neither figures as a model or positive exception.
 Double critique is not an idea extraneous to Chinese American writings. 
In 1943, Lin Yutang published a collection of essays titled Between Tears 
and Laughter with John Day. Having written a string of books, including My 
Country and My People, that made him the first best-selling Chinese author 
in America, Lin waded into international politics in the new book. In the 
essays, he critiques the Allies’ neglect of struggles for decolonization and 
national liberation in Asia, pointing out that their wartime rhetoric of free-
dom contradicted their begrudging of freedom to their colonies in Asia. In 
contrast to lopsided, imperialist views of the world, Lin advocates for a “bin-
ocular vision,” a comparative, transnational perspective that traces how such 
ideas as freedom pick up different meanings in different national contexts.13 
Lin’s venture into political commentaries hurt his popularity in the U.S., but 
the idea of a “binocular vision” survived, re-emerging in Chinese American 
narratives of later eras.
 Double critique does not assume that the two things being organized 
 11. Walter Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs, 68.
 12. Mignolo cites Dubois’s double consciousness, Anzaldúa’s new mestiza consciousness, 
and Glissant’s creolization, among others, border thinking as concepts akin to double critique. 
See Mignolo, 77, 84. 
 13. Lin Yutang, Between Tears and Laughter, 40.
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into one critical framework occupy symmetrical positions in their respective 
cultural and political contexts. There are no such neutral grounds in any 
comparative projects. I do not assume, that is to say, that the question of race 
and ethnicity has the same resonance for readers on both sides of the Pacific. 
Instead, I consider double critique as a form of “strategic doubling,” along the 
logic of strategic essentialism. Strategic essentialism reappropriates existing 
identity categories, including racial and ethnic ones, to transform the disci-
plinary force inherent in them into subversive energy. Likewise, “strategic 
doubling” responds critically to the conventional manners in which racial 
and ethnic issues in the two countries are compared, explicitly or implicitly, 
in popular culture and official political rhetoric.
 I not only study how Chinese American authors such as Kuo and Yan 
mediate between two different national contexts but also extend the logic of 
“strategic doubling” embodied in their narratives. Comparative insights into 
U.S. and Chinese multiculturalisms can derive not only from transnational 
narratives that straddle different national spaces but also from the critical 
practice of juxtaposing and comparing narratives that emanate from within 
these spaces. Both U.S. and Chinese authors have addressed the relationship 
between national identity and minority difference in the form of fictional 
narratives, a genre that allows for more diverse and nuanced perspectives 
than the more overtly political genres. Some of them demonstrate that, over 
the past two decades, U.S. liberal multiculturalism and China’s ethnic policy 
have been conceived and questioned in related ways. Clive Cussler’s Treasure 
of Khan (2006, translated into Chinese as kehan de baozang in 2008) and 
Jiang Rong’s Lang Tuteng (2004, translated into English as The Wolf Totem 
in 2008), both bestsellers when first published, illuminate some of the com-
mon denominators of the popular views of nation and ethnicity in the two 
countries. Hui Muslim writer Zhang Chengzhi’s Xinling Shi (1991) and Arab 
American writer Rabih Alameddine’s Koolaids: The Art of War (1998), on the 
other hand, call our attention to the ways in which these popular views are 
questioned in Muslim writings. Double critique, then, is a mode of critique 
embodied both in the Chinese American fictional narratives I study and 
in the connections I draw between previously unrelated Chinese and U.S. 
narratives.
Rereading The Woman Warrior, Yet Again
Authors like Kuo and Yan, of course, do not work in a vacuum. Double cri-
tique is not an exclusive product of the post–Cold War period, though it 
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is particularly important for this period, one that has seen increased U.S.–
China cultural relations, the ascent of both Chinese nationalism and U.S. 
global hegemony, and the resurgence of the question of ethnicity on a global 
level. This section studies Maxine Hong Kingston’s The Woman Warrior as 
an earlier example of what double critique may look like as a literary practice. 
Kingston has often been thought of as one of the first to “create in literature 
a sui generis [Chinese American] reality.”14 She breaks the silence imposed 
upon Chinese in America not by acting as a cultural informant but by offer-
ing consciously subjective, personalized narratives of Chinese history and 
cultural traditions. In other words, Kingston disavows conventional notions 
of narrative authority that customarily deny access to marginalized social 
groups. I endorse this reading of Kingston but believe that more attention 
is to be paid to exactly how she handles her Chinese sources and how the 
descriptions of China and the U.S. interact in The Woman Warrior. If the 
book bodies forth a singularly Chinese American reality or consciousness, it 
contains surprising dimensions that are yet unexplored.
 About thirty years before Disney’s Mulan came out, Kingston drew upon 
Mulan’s story in her 1976 work The Woman Warrior. Kingston’s version of the 
story carries much more nuance than the one from Disney. Unlike the movie, 
Kingston’s book interweaves the experiences of the protagonist-narrator, a 
Chinese American teenage girl, in the postwar U.S. and Chinese folklore and 
culture that the narrator reconstructs from a familial oral tradition. Whereas 
the Disney movie Mulan contains an expression of the unconscious of con-
temporary multicultural America, which requires China to uncensor and 
purify itself, The Woman Warrior is a much more conscious exploration of 
the formal and political implications entailed in juxtaposing notions of race 
and ethnicity from the two countries. Kingston’s subtly presented critique of 
what is amiss in both countries’ ethnic and racial dynamics foreshadowed 
the later Chinese American writings that I study, gesturing toward a history 
of Asian American critical comparativism that dates back to at least the Cold 
War era.
 The Woman Warrior, the most widely read and taught work in Asian 
American literature, incited a long-standing debate in Asian American lit-
 14. For the best-known article on this topic, see Sau-ling Wong, “Autobiography as Guid-
ed Chinatown Tour?” 48. Wong makes a case for the claim of artistic freedom, as we see in 
Kingston’s imagining of China, as an antiracist narrative strategy. Also see Robert G. Lee, “The 
Woman Warrior as an Intervention in Asian American Historiography”; Mark Chiang, The 
Cultural Capital of Asian American Studies, chapter 3. Both Lee and Chiang argue that the 
anxiety of representation in The Woman Warrior, its constant move to question its rendering 
of Chinese history, constitutes a major impulse underlying much Asian American literature. 
Chiang ascribes the same impulse to Asian American literary criticism as well. 
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erature. The debate centers on the cultural work performed by the represen-
tations of Chinese history and culture in Kingston and Chinese American 
writings in general. As Colleen Lye points out in a recent essay, Chinese 
American literature, unlike other subcategories of Asian American literature, 
has been characterized by an “exoticist presentation of ancestral culture” 
since at least the 1930s.15 This phenomenon, which Lye sees as a formal cor-
relative of the “unevenness of Asian American panethnicity,”16 has largely 
been discussed as either a symptom of U.S. orientalism, which authorizes 
a set of racial stereotypes that permeate the Asian American imaginary, or 
an effort to “displace” or undermine these stereotypes.17 My reading of The 
Woman Warrior takes the discussion into a new direction.18 I argue that 
Kingston’s incorporation of redacted Chinese folklore into a narrative about 
growing up in the Cold War U.S. prefigured the comparative, doubly critical 
politics of post–Cold War Chinese American narratives, even as it attests to 
the bewilderment with which Chinese Americans struggle with the “mass 
of unexplained cultural data” about Chinese culture and customs transmit-
ted from their parents.19 Read closely, the novel that marked a watershed 
moment in Asian American literature turns out, surprisingly, to have her-
alded the project of comparative multiculturalisms undertaken in this study.
 The second chapter of The Woman Warrior, “White Tigers,” centers on an 
extended fantasy on the part of the Chinese American girl narrator, in which 
a Chinese girl follows a bird into the mountains and meets an old couple, 
who adopt her and train her in martial arts. After she returns to her birth vil-
lage as a young woman, she protects her father from being conscripted by the 
imperial army and then leads an army of rebels toward Peiping, the capital, 
where they overthrow the emperor and install a peasant, one of their own, on 
the throne. Having accomplished the impossible, the warrior woman returns 
to her village to confront the baron who has been oppressing the villagers. 
She beheads him and metes out well-justified punishment to his family and 
servants who had been involved in evil deeds. Inspired by the Chinese folk-
 15. Colleen Lye, “The Sino-Japanese Conflict of Asian American Literature,” 43.
 16. Ibid., 45.
 17. David Leiwei Li, “The Production of Chinese American Tradition,” 319.
 18. One must qualify this statement by pointing out that Sau-ling Wong offers a useful 
discussion of how “a few traditional Chinese literary sources have been altered to serve as com-
mentary on the narrator’s Chinese American reality,” though she does not touch on the issues 
I discuss here. See her “Kingston’s Handling of Traditional Chinese Sources,” 28. Also see Feng 
Lan, “The Female Individual and the Empire.” Lan traces the permutations in the figure of 
Mulan through the several renditions of her story in Chinese literature, finding that Kingston’s 
portrayal of the heroine embraces the Confucian and Communist doctrines about women’s 
social position in some ways while deviating from them in others. 
 19. Sau-ling Wong, “Autobiography as Guided Chinatown Tour?” 45. 
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lore that the narrator’s mother passes down to her as an oral tradition, the 
figure of the warrior woman is clearly the narrator’s expression of her desire 
for empowerment, confronted as she is with socially debilitating injustices: 
prejudice against girls within the Chinese American community, racism 
against Chinese in America (which has gendered implications as well), and 
the Communist rule in China (which the narrator believes had robbed her 
family of their farm).
 Critics have found this fantasy troubling for various reasons. Those 
familiar with the Chinese sources of the mother’s stories that the narrator 
reinvents in the fantasy have pointed out that, in creating the figure of the 
young warrior woman, Kingston blends together two of the most beloved 
folk heroes in Chinese history. The more obvious one is Fa Mu Lan (Hua 
Mulan), whom the narrator refers to in the beginning of “White Tigers” as a 
figure she has heard about from her mother. Fa Mu Lan is a household name 
in China, the protagonist of the “Ballad of Mulan,” commonly believed to 
have originated during the Northern Wei period (386–534 a.d.). Mulan is 
known for being in the imperial army for more than ten years disguised as a 
man to protect her aged father from conscription.20 A less overt subtext for 
the narrator’s fantasy is the story of Yue Fei (1103–42 a.d.), a general during 
the Southern Song Dynasty (1127–79 a.d.) celebrated for his unwavering 
loyalty to the emperor and his valiant but failed attempts to recover north-
ern China from the Jin Dynasty (1115–1234 a.d.), ruled by the Jurchens. 
Although Yue Fei is more of a verifiable historical figure than Mulan, the 
lives of both have been mythologized in various stories and legends in China. 
The narrator’s fantasy invokes Yue Fei with the detail that the swordswoman’s 
parents carved words of resolve and revenge into her bare back before she 
leads the army of rebels to the capital. Yue Fei is known for having borne 
the tattoo “Jinzhong baoguo” [Serve the country with utmost loyalty] on his 
back. The conflation of the two unrelated folk heroes in Kingston seems 
simply disrespectful to some of her critics,21 but more pernicious to others. 
 20. The date of the composition of the “Ballad of Mulan” is uncertain. Today it is most 
commonly introduced (to Chinese students and common Chinese readers) as a ballad from the 
Northern Wei Dynasty, composed in a folk style called “yuefu.” Some point out, however, that 
the ballad, like many folk songs, were collective creations. The basic form of the ballad we see 
today was most likely to have emerged during the Northern Wei, but it probably derived from 
earlier sources and continued to be revised through the subsequent dynasties. See He Yuping, 
“‘Mulanci’ chuangzuo shidai yu zuozhe zhi tanjiu” [A study of the composition and authorship 
of the “Ballad of Mulan”].
 21. Zhang Ya-Jie, “A Chinese Woman’s Response to Maxine Hong Kingston’s The Woman 
Warrior.” As a Chinese professor who visited the U.S. at one point, Zhang writes that she first 
reacted negatively to the stories in The Woman Warrior, finding them “somewhat twisted” (17). 
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Frank Chin’s famous parody of the fantasy section of “White Tigers” com-
pares the liberties Kingston takes with Yue Fei, by fusing him with a female 
figure, to defiling Joan of Arc by portraying her as a lesbian to a Chinese 
audience.22 For Chin, Kingston’s disregard for the authenticity of Chinese 
history and folklore perpetuates the “Christian social Darwinist stereotype” 
of Chinese culture as despicably misogynistic, and additionally, the trans-
mission of the deed of a male hero onto a female one promotes an Asian 
American feminist agenda at the expense of Chinese American men, who 
are deprived of a chance to connect with the powerful male archetypes in 
the Chinese folk tradition.23 The Kingston–Chin debate sparked a series of 
critical responses, which mostly seek to establish a common ground between 
Chin’s search for viable models for Asian American masculinity and Kings-
ton’s critique of the structural causes for the various challenges facing Asian 
American women.24 Both, in other words, are seen as deeply concerned with 
the implications of racialization for the configurations of gender and sexual-
ity in Asian America.
 These responses, however, do not address directly Chin’s argument for 
more authentic, faithful representations of Chinese culture and history. It 
is perhaps because the notion of authenticity, when understood as factual 
accuracy, sounds inherently naïve and unsupportable. For Chin, however, 
authenticity matters because Chinese folklore, understood in its own con-
text, does not figure Chinese patriarchy the same way as Kingston does in 
her novel but instead contains a range of admirable male figures who can 
provide important cultural resources for Chinese American men as they 
struggle against exclusion from the prevailing model of masculinity in main-
stream American society.25 Chin’s point will sound more interesting to Asian 
Americanistists if one just reframes it slightly, as an argument against Asian 
American writers’ employment of China as a source of cultural material 
that can be taken out of context and transformed at will to fit the themes at 
hand. Understood this way, Chin is calling for authenticity not in terms of 
 22. See Frank Chin, “The Most Popular Book in China.” 
 23. Frank Chin et al., The Big Aiiieeeee, 29.
 24. King-kok Cheung, “The Woman Warrior versus the Chinaman Pacific”; David Eng, 
Racial Castration. Cheung summarizes the debate as one that construes a dichotomy between 
“feminism and heroism,” between “Chinese American women and men” (113). She believes 
that this dichotomy can be deconstructed when Chinese American woman writers “find a way 
to negotiate the tangle of sexual and racial politics in all its intricacies” (127), and Kingston, 
she argues, does just that not only in The Woman Warrior but in her subsequent works as well. 
Eng revisits this debate, agreeing that “Asian American activists and critics must refrain from 
seeking antifeminist solutions to predicaments of Asian American masculinity” (16). 
 25. Chin et al., The Big Aiiieeeee, 30–52. 
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mere factual accuracy but in terms of adequate contextualization. Implicit 
in Chin’s critique of Kingston is an argument that, even as Asian American 
writers insist justly on the distinctions between Asia and Asian America and 
reject the demand for “authentic” representations of Asia, they need to avoid 
mystifying Asia in a way that perpetuates existing stereotypes in American 
culture. In light of Chin’s challenge, then, how does one rethink Kingston’s 
novel? Does she take the stories of Mulan and Yue Fei out of context and 
blend them together irresponsibly? Or does she recontextualize their stories 
in “White Tigers” according to a certain narrative logic? Reading carefully, 
we can see that Kingston is not simply using the story of the warrior woman 
to make a point about the empowerment of Asian American women; she 
also places the story within the context of the historical relationship between 
the Han Chinese and the nomadic peoples on China’s northern borders, 
some of whom were eventually incorporated into the administrative struc-
tures of China and identified as “minority nationalities” after the founding 
of the PRC. Existing criticisms of The Woman Warrior completely overlook 
Kingston’s representations of ethnic dynamics that affected both feudal and 
modern China, which are in fact intertwined with the author’s commentaries 
on race relations in Cold War America.
 In the passage right before her army scores its final victory over the 
emperor, the warrior woman surveys the capital from the top of a hill: 
“Between roads the woods and plains move too; the land was peopled—the 
Han people, the People of One Hundred Surnames, marching with one heart, 
our tatters flying. The depth and width of Joy were exactly known to me: the 
Chinese population.”26 The warrior woman’s adoration for the Han people 
here is certainly at odds with the historical circumstances surrounding the 
figure of Mulan in Chinese folklore. The Northern Wei Dynasty originated 
from the nomadic Xian Bei tribe. While it was subsequently influenced by 
Han culture and eventually subsumed under the Sui Dynasty, ruled by the 
Han, the Northern Wei Dynasty was certainly non-Han in its origin. The 
original “Ballad of Mulan,” in fact, contains both Han and non-Han elements 
as a result of the mutual penetration of different cultures during the North-
ern Wei. The draft call answered by Mulan is issued by “ke han” (khan), the 
title for the leaders of a number of nomadic peoples that destabilized China’s 
northern frontiers throughout history. One can certainly argue that, by com-
bining the story of Mulan and that of Yue Fei, Kingston erases an important 
distinction between the two figures in terms of their ethnic affiliation, as 
well as their gender. To be fair, this distinction has been all but erased even 
 26. Kingston, The Woman Warrior, 42.
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within China. The Northern Wei was eventually incorporated into China 
and the Chinese today hardly remember the non-Han identity of the “khan” 
that Mulan serves in the ballad. Nevertheless, one may find Mulan’s emphatic 
love for and identification with the “Chinese population” in “White Tigers” 
out of place.
 One way of explaining this passage is that it fits well into a pattern of 
romanticization that runs through the entire fantasy section in “White 
Tigers.” Kingston not only transforms Mulan from a loyal soldier of the khan 
in the original ballad into a leader of a peasant rebellion, a warrior against 
feudalism and patriarchy. She also diffuses the ethnic elements of the origi-
nal story, suppressing not only the differences between Mulan and the Han 
and but also the war in which Mulan enlists to fight in the original ballad, a 
war that has been identified as a successful campaign against a neighboring 
confederation of nomadic tribes, the Rouran.27 Kingston’s Mulan, therefore, 
is cleansed of any involvement in violent encounters among the various peo-
ples inhabiting China’s northern borderlands. By extension, Kingston also 
alters the Han-centric tone of Yue Fei’s story, distancing the general from the 
war against the Jurchens that makes him a celebrated hero in the Chinese 
national imaginary. We can argue that Kingston consciously merges Mulan 
into the “Chinese population” as a gesture toward rejecting rigid ethno-racial 
or cultural divisions. She recontextualizes Chinese folklore to stage a kind of 
romanticization, or critical romanticization, that challenges ethnicity-based, 
as well as gender- and class-based, hierarchies in Chinese history.
 Kingston’s critique of Chinese history, moreover, is also an implied cri-
tique of Cold War America. The narrator’s fantasy in “White Tigers” contains 
an intriguing dream scene, where the Chinese girl, at the end of a survival test 
(part of her training under the old couple) that exhausts her, sees a vision of 
“two people made of gold dancing the earth’s dances.”28 The dancers appear 
to be “Chinese lion dancers,” but then morph into “African lion dancers in 
midstep,” and their dance is accompanied by “Javanese bells,” which deepen 
“in midring to Indian bells, Hindu Indians, American Indian.”29 At this point 
in the fantasy section, the Chinese girl becomes a conduit for an ideal form of 
cultural pluralism that the novel’s Chinese American narrator derives from 
and wishes for Cold War America. This illogical detail can be read as an 
instance of deliberate conflation that punctures the fantastical nature of the 
entire middle section of “White Tigers” and the author’s conscious disavowal 
 27. Zhong Jialian and Ye Xinyuan, “‘Yanshan huji’ dang zhishui?” [What does the “Yan 
Mountain Barbarian Calvary” refer to?], 147. Also see Feng Lan, 231. 
 28. Kingston, 27.
 29. Ibid.
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of factual accuracy. In light of the overall structure of The Woman Warrior—
the girl narrator’s memories of her and her family’s experience of settling in 
America interwoven with redacted folktales from China—the easily missed 
detail hints at an emerging Chinese American consciousness that simultane-
ously rebukes the racial injustice that silences the narrator’s “‘chink’ words” 
in the Cold War U.S. and the Han-centrism that motivates the lionization of 
Yue Fei at various points in Chinese history.30 It suggests that both American 
and Chinese cultures are burdened with a history of racism or ethnocentrism 
that might be counterbalanced by imaginings of a fluid kind of pluralism, 
which allows all cultures to converge with and infiltrate each other.
 Kingston amplifies this point at the end of the novel’s last chapter, “A Song 
for a Barbarian Reed Pipe,” projecting a full-blown vision of how the racial 
and ethnic boundaries might be made porous in both Chinese and American 
contexts. She presents an imaginary moment of ethnic amalgamation during 
imperial China as a comment on the possibility of racial reconciliation in 
Cold War America. Kingston ends the last chapter, and the entire text of The 
Woman Warrior, with the story of Ts’ai Yen (Cai Yan), a Han noblewoman 
who was captured by the Hsiung-nu (Xiongnu) in her twenties. Ts’ai Yen is 
a real historical figure, documented to have been born circa 177 a.d. She 
was eventually ransomed by the Han people, though forced to leave her two 
young sons behind. Upon return, she composed long poems based on the 
rhythm of the Hsiung-nu music with which she became familiar, expressing 
the sorrow of having had to choose between homeland and motherhood. As 
with all the other folk material she invokes, Kingston takes liberties with this 
story, rendering the encounter between Ts’ai Yen and the Hsiung-nu into a 
process of mutual understanding. Though Kingston refers to the Hsiung-nu 
as “barbarians,” invoking the common English translation of hu (the epithet 
that the Han people used historically to refer to the Xiongnu), she works to 
deconstruct the self–other split entailed in both the Chinese term and its 
English translation. When Ts’ai stays with the “barbarians,” she listens to the 
sound of their flute, eventually learning to imitate this sound in her own 
songs about her life back home. Although the “barbarians” cannot follow her 
words entirely, they catch a few “barbarian phrases about forever wandering” 
and become mesmerized by her voice.31 Before too long, the “barbarians” 
join Ts’ai in an invented ritual of mourning, sitting in a ring around her 
as she sings to their music in a hybridized language. When Ts’ai returns to 
the Han people, she brings them an appreciation of a different culture by 
 30. Ibid., 53.
 31. Ibid., 209.
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composing songs in the “barbarian” style, the most famous of which is titled 
“Eighteen Stanzas for a Barbarian Reed Pipe” (a literal translation of “Huqia 
shiba pai,” reputed to have been authored by Ts’ai). The song “translate[s] 
well,” the narrator points out in the very last sentence of the novel, suggesting 
that Ts’ai had turned her experience of captivity into a condition for cultural 
mediation.32 Kingston’s reappropriation of Ts’ai Yen’s story can certainly be 
read as a continuation of her romanticization of historical Han–“barbarian” 
relations in “White Tigers,” but it also comments on contemporary American 
culture. The chapter concluded by the Ts’ai Yen story contains the oft-dis-
cussed passage where the girl narrator tortures another Chinese American 
girl at school and then falls mysteriously ill. If that passage emblematizes the 
psychic and physical symptoms of the racial trauma sustained and transmit-
ted by Asian Americans, then the Han–“barbarian” reconciliation that Ts’ai 
Yen helps broker models an idealized solution to it.
 We can argue at this point that, although Kingston does not address the 
political conditions in the PRC or its nationalities policy in significant ways 
in The Woman Warrior, she does present a few moments from an imaginary 
historical China, inherited by the PRC in 1949, that was shaped in the midst 
of continuous contact and conflicts between the Han and other peoples 
around them. Weaving together the ethno-cultural dynamics in imperial 
China and the experiences of racial minorities in the contemporary U.S. in 
her narrative, Kingston stages a critique of both histories while mining them 
for imperfect but valuable models of ethno-racial reconciliation. With The 
Woman Warrior, therefore, Kingston offers a uniquely Chinese American 
perspective on U.S.–China relations, a perspective that was unusual during 
the Cold War and remains so today. Although the novel has been canonized 
as the classic of Asian American literature, almost no attention has been paid 
to its impulse toward thinking about the issues of race and ethnicity in U.S. 
and Chinese contexts comparatively.
 The comparative impulse in The Woman Warrior is continued in Chinese 
American writings that emerged in the 1980s, especially writings by Chinese 
students and intellectuals who came to the U.S. for study during the decade. 
Many of them articulate a kind of skepticism toward national identifications 
that results from their exposure to racial discrimination in the U.S. and disil-
lusionment with official nationalism in China. They frequently invoke the 
sociological concept of the “marginal man” in explaining the social condition 
and literary sensibilities of new Chinese immigrants in the U.S.33 Oftentimes, 
 32. Ibid.
 33. In 1987, a number of PRC intellectuals and students based mainly at Columbia Uni-
versity formed a literary group, called the Morningside Society. Some of its members held a 
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their renunciation of the idea of a cohesive Chinese nation to which they owe 
their primary allegiance is accompanied by an understanding of the nation’s 
internal ethnic and regional divisions. Zha Jianying’s novella, Congling xia de 
binghe [The ice river in the jungle] (1988), for example, tells the story of a 
female Chinese student in the U.S. who slowly realizes the irreversible disso-
lution of her comforting, if blinkered, attachment to the idea of the Chinese 
nation, even as she navigates the well-concealed racial code in American 
social life. In a key part of the novella, the female protagonist returns to 
China for a vacation and goes on a trip to the northwest region to trace the 
footsteps of her former lover, who had chosen to work in the underdeveloped 
area upon graduation and died in an accident while there. The small north-
western cities that she visits have an ethnic and cultural mix that she finds 
alienating, forcing her toward a mental and literal diarrhea. Unable to fit in 
there, the protagonist feels as if she is stuck in a “neither–nor state,” neither 
dead like D nor alive like the others around her.34 This feeling of alienation 
replicates the tone of her experiences in the U.S., where she looks in vain for 
friendships and relationships that transcend racial and class barriers. The 
state of double marginality explored in writings like Congling xia de binghe 
can be seen as the affective corollary of the practice of double critique.
Asian American and east Asian Studies
To tease out the comparative insights in Asian American literature, one 
needs, as Kingston does in the structure of her narrative, to transgress a few 
borders and build a few bridges. The comparative approach that my book 
studies and employs is not simply an antidote to political and popular dis-
courses that polarize the two countries; it is also a challenge to the traditional 
disciplinary divides that separate Asian American studies, and American 
studies in general, from East Asian studies. To fully understand the complex 
models of double critique that authors like Kingston, Zha, Kuo, and Yan 
engage in, it is imperative that Asian American critics reconstruct, and bring 
roundtable discussion on the development of “overseas student literature” in New York City in 
1987, and the transcript of the discussion was published in a 1988 issue of Xiaoshuo jie [Fiction 
world], a prestigious literary journal based in Shanghai. Yu Renqiu, a central member of the 
literary society, started the discussion by examining the historical positions of Chinese students 
in the West. The concept was also brought up in a parallel discussion held in Shanghai. See 
“Ninyue chenbianshe ‘liuxuesheng wenxue’ zuotan jiyao” [Minutes from New York Morning-
side Society’s roundtable on “Overseas Student Literature”] and “‘Liuxuesheng wenxue’ zuotan 
jiyao” [Minutes from the Shanghai roundtable on “Overseas Student Literature”]. 
 34. Zha Jianying, Congling xia de binghe [The ice river in the jungle], 68.
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into dialogue, the various histories and literary and political discourses they 
address through robust collaborations with both American studies and East 
Asian studies. My study shows the critical possibilities that can be gener-
ated through such interdisciplinary work, mimicking the mediating role that 
many Asian American authors assume through their writings. In so doing, it 
argues that Asian American studies should be conceived, on an intellectual 
level, as a multiply located field, or a set of provocations in nation-based 
fields that have long been kept apart.
 Asian American studies and U.S. ethnic studies in general have taken the 
critical examination of race and ethnicity into a comparative direction. It is 
important to note here that, as an invented category that did not exist prior 
to the 1960s, “Asian American” entails a comparative orientation inherently. 
By virtue of its inception, Asian American studies contributed significantly 
to a heterogeneous conception of race in the U.S. by disrupting the familiar 
black–white binary. The recent comparative turn extends the founding logic 
of the field, with a focus on the interconnected patterns of racialization in the 
U.S. and the resonance, as well as dissonance, among the oppositional politi-
cal and cultural tactics that different minority groups employ to negotiate 
the “institution of citizenship” or “racial power.”35 Asian Americanists’ ven-
ture into comparative racialization and comparative ethnic studies has borne 
much fruit.36 My study, however, involves a type of comparison that is equally 
important but rarely attempted, namely, a binational comparison that places 
U.S. ethno-racial dynamics in the unfamiliar context of their counterpart in 
an Asian nation.
 Although there has not been much critical attention to what might be 
called U.S.–Asian comparative ethnic studies, Asian American literature, as 
 35. Helen Jun, “Black Orientalism”; Claire Jean Kim, Bitter Roots. Jun argues that nine-
teenth-century black discourses on the “institution of citizenship” employed orientalism to 
ground black opposition to segregation (1049), and Kim argues that black–Korean conflicts in 
contemporary America is a symptom of and response to “racial power” (9).
 36. Such comparative projects fall within a range of disciplines. In history, see Mae Ngai’s 
Impossible Subjects. In literary and cultural studies, see James Kyung-Jin Lee’s Urban Triage, 
Crystal Parikh’s An Ethics of Betrayal, and Allan Punzalan Issac’s American Tropics. Lee brings 
together Asian American, Latino, and white American novels in his discussion of the failure 
of multiculturalism’s fantasy of a “parallel movement of more equitable representation and re-
sources” during the Reagan era (xiv). Parikh juxtaposes Asian American and Latino narratives 
in her exploration of the ethics of betrayal in “emergent U.S. literatures and culture.” Isaac sets 
out to “[supplement] the project of comparative ethnic studies” with a postcolonial perspective, 
by demonstrating the linkages between the various U.S. territorial acquisitions outside of the 
North American continent. The book brings together Filipino American, Puerto Rican, and 
Hawaiian writers who articulate a “postcolonial” consciousness, while comparing them with 
mainstream U.S. representations of the American empire in the first part of the twentieth cen-
tury (19).
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we have seen in the example of The Woman Warrior, has long been invested 
in bringing into dialogue the different ethno-racial politics of the U.S. and 
Asian countries. Chang-rae Lee’s A Gesture Life juxtaposes the veneer of 
racial harmony in suburban America during the 1990s with the racial hier-
archy constructed under the Japanese empire in East and Southeast Asia 
during WWII. Wendy Law-Yone’s Irawaddy Tango opens and closes in a fic-
titious dictatorship (based on Burma) embroiled in ethno-religious conflicts 
(based on the Karen-led insurgency against the military dictatorship in Ran-
goon), with a middle section that lampoons American culture’s obsession 
with capitalizing on the gruesome experience of Third World refugees and 
exiles. Meena Alexander’s Manhattan Music, yet another example, interlaces 
the experience of Indian immigrants in the culturally volatile Manhattan of 
the 1990s with the history of East Indians in the West Indies and Muslim 
insurrections in contemporary India. These writings, like the work of Kings-
ton, Zha, Kuo, and Yan, can be described as diasporic. Discussions about 
the meaning of “diaspora” in Asian American literary and cultural critique 
flourished throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.37 I invoke this term here 
to describe a type of narrative text, as well as interpretative approach, that 
pays particular attention to the ways in which Asians in America, due to a 
history of exclusion from U.S. legal and cultural citizenship, occupy what 
 37. The cultural nationalist politics that locates Asian Americans fully within the domes-
tic sphere of the U.S. started to share its stage with the critical framework of diaspora in the 
early 1990s. See Sau-ling Wong’s “Denationalization Reconsidered.” There, Wong analyzes a 
set of related frameworks that emerged in Asian American studies in the early 1990s, defining 
cultural nationalism and diaspora as two distinct discursive and political positions. Diasporic 
subjectivity is characterized by “a perpetual turning of one’s gaze toward the lost homeland” 
while cultural nationalism focuses on the conditions of living in the place of residence (10). 
But her argument contains its own antithesis. She notably acknowledges that the longing for 
the “lost homeland” might be read as a correlative of the racialized exclusion of Asians from 
the U.S. mainstream, thus linking diasporic impulses to U.S. domestic issues. In the context 
of Asian American cultural politics, in other words, the diasporic approach should not be 
equated with being oriented toward Asia or defined as the binary opposite of the U.S.-centered 
cultural nationalism. It provides a set of conceptual tools with which to examine the formation 
of racial, ethnic communities within specific locales in relation to both national and transna-
tional processes, including state racism, postcolonial migration, and global capital. See Oscar 
V. Compamanes’s “Filipinos in the United States and Their Literature of Exiles” and David 
Palumbo-Liu’s Asian/American. Campomanes’s idea of “a literature of exile and emergence,” 
which he uses to describe literature about Filipino nation-building by Filipinos in America, 
best captures the ironic doubleness (the displacement from and imaginary return to nation-
states) characteristic of the concept of diaspora (Campomanes, 51). Palumbo-Liu uses the term 
“Asian/American” to suggest that the teleological narrative of Asian immigrants settling in the 
United States, symbolized by the U.S.-centered term “Asian American,” is “yet incomplete and 
unsettled” (227). The hyphen and the slash symbolically disrupt the nationalist approach to 
Asian Americans and gesture toward an indeterminate map of diaspora.
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David Eng refers to as a state of “suspension” between competing structures 
of citizenship, modes of belonging, and patterns of cultural experience.38 The 
emphasis on diaspora in Asian American studies, however, has not translated 
into systematic reflections upon how Asians in America, in their cultural 
expressions or embodied experience, straddle and mediate between differ-
ent conceptions of race and ethnicity in the U.S. and Asia. Critical inter-
pretations of Chinese American diasporic writings, for example, have so far 
largely focused on how these writings present the condition of diaspora and 
complicate nation-based literary categories.39
 To pave the way for projects in transnational ethnic studies, then, Asian 
American studies needs to further its collaborations with not only other 
fields in American studies but also Asian studies (or, more specific to this 
study, East Asian studies), where much of the knowledge of ethnic and race 
relations in Asian countries is produced. These collaborations do not simply 
involve gathering exotic knowledge. Their more profound implication lies 
in enabling and emphasizing a broad conceptualization of the intellectual 
location of Asian American studies.40 Since its beginning at the end of the 
1960s as a revolt against Cold War, exceptionalist conceptions of Ameri-
can history and culture, Asian American studies, along with other compo-
nents of U.S. ethnic studies, has effected important paradigm changes within 
American studies.41 While Asian American studies has played a subversively 
constructive role within American studies, standing apart while taking an 
active part in the transformation of the latter, the field’s relationship with 
East Asian studies is much more tenuous and tense. Asian American scholars 
who began their careers in East Asian studies often tell stories of how their 
interest in Asians outside of Asia or Asian migration to the West was not 
 38. David Eng, Racial Castration, 211.
 39. Sau-ling Wong, “The Stakes of Textual Border-Crossing”; Xiao-huang Yin, Chinese 
American Literature since the 1850s. Wong offers an important discussion of the position Chi-
nese-language writings in the U.S. in relation to exiting literary taxonomies (modern Chinese 
literature, Taiwan literature, immigrant literature, world literature, etc.).
 40. One should certainly add “institutional” here, but it exceeds the scope of the present 
book.
 41. For a memorable discussion of how minority insurgence has unsettled American stud-
ies as an institutionalized discipline since its Cold War origin, see Donald Pease and Robyn 
Wiegman, eds., Futures of American Studies, 1–42. Their argument is that the various social 
movements in the 1960s played a crucial role in restructuring academic politics, including the 
politics of American studies, opening it to an uncertain, unbounded futurity. Ethnic Studies 
has also been instrumental in fostering the transnational turn in American Studies, which has 
recently been theorized. See the presidential addresses for the American Studies Association in 
2007 and 2005, respectively, namely, Emory Elliott’s “Diversity in the United States and Abroad” 
and Shelley Fisher Fishkin’s “Crossroads of Cultures. 
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sufficiently supported. Asian American studies, therefore, has become the 
main intellectual home for an impressive array of studies, in the humanities 
as well as social sciences, that focus on Asian migration as a site for inquiries 
into processes of globalization and transnational patterns of power that link 
America to Asia.42 More recently, however, East Asian studies has become 
more receptive to projects focusing on Asian subjects and Asian-language 
writings in the U.S., giving an impetus to research that speaks to Asian 
Americanists’ concerns.43 These developments make the current moment 
an auspicious one for more exchanges between Asian American studies and 
East Asian studies aimed at synthesizing, while transforming, the knowledge 
produced in both fields. Comparative Literature scholar Eric Hayot argues 
in his recent essay “The Asian Turns” that “the encounter between Asian 
American studies and East Asian Studies” through a mutual focus on “sub-
national locations” and “ethnic matrices” can set in motion the “becoming 
that reconstitutes the fields,” neither of which will return from this encounter 
unchanged.44 Similarly, I propose that an active engagement with East Asian 
studies will allow Asian American studies, comparative and transnational all 
along, to broaden itself further into a field with multiple intellectual loca-
tions, consisting of not a bounded body of knowledge, but a series of provo-
cations in the more established, nation-based fields.
 Pursuing the kind of interdisciplinary encounter that I promote, my 
study draws extensively on the histories of China’s minority nationalities 
constructed by scholars in Chinese studies. Chapter 1 provides a detailed 
account of the development of both U.S. and Chinese multiculturalisms 
 42. Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires; Yong Chen, Chinese San Francisco, 1850–1943; 
Catherine Ceniza Choy, Empire of Care; Gayatri Gopinath, Impossible Desires; Madeline Hsu, 
Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home.
 43. See Shu-mei Shih, Visuality and Identity; Eric Hayot, Haun Saussy, and Steven G. Yao, 
Sinographies: Writing China. Shih theorizes the “Sinophone Pacific” in her study of the circu-
lation of visual images between Chinese America and other sites of the Chinese diaspora. In 
2007, this project gave rise to a three-day conference at Harvard, “Globalizing Modern Chinese 
Literature,” where international scholars from both China and Chinese American Studies gave 
papers on Chinese-language writings across the Pacific. Sinographies brings together essays that 
deal with the perceptions of Chineseness in American culture and Chinese-language writings 
in the U.S.; both of these topics broaden the traditional concerns of the scholars of Chinese lit-
erature. One can perhaps go back a bit further. Also, in 2005, a two-day conference at Wesleyan 
University, “Traffic and Diaspora: Political, Economic, and Cultural Exchanges between Japan 
and Asian America,” occasioned a dialogue between scholars in Japanese studies and Japanese/
Asian American studies. Though not an entirely fruitful dialogue, it did signal that studies 
of Asian cultures and literatures were beginning to show interest in the extension of Asia in 
America.
 44. Eric Hayot, “The Asian Turns,” 910.
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since the mid-twentieth century, but it is useful to offer a brief account of 
existing studies of the latter here. The ethnic policy in the PRC was fash-
ioned after the Soviet model of a multinational federation, though it resisted 
explicit invocations of the term “federation”.45 During Republican China 
(1911–49), both the ruling GMD (Chinese Nationalist Party) and the CCP 
(Chinese Communist Party) ascribed paramount importance to the unity 
of the nation-state in formulating and implementing their respective policy 
toward minorities. While the GMD exercised only weak control over minor-
ity regions, many of which were ruled by semi-independent warlords, the 
CCP eventually seized and held on to these regions with a combination of 
military force and an appealing policy of minority autonomy. In the early 
1950s, upon the founding of the PRC, a system of regional autonomy for eth-
nic minorities was established, consisting of autonomous areas at provincial, 
prefectural, and county levels. The 1952 General Program for the Implemen-
tation of Nationality Regional Autonomy of the Chinese People’s Republic stip-
ulated that these areas were “inalienable parts of the motherland.”46 Under 
the overriding principle of state sovereignty, the central government was to 
recruit cadres from minorities so as to increase their political representation 
in autonomous areas and on the state level, as well as encourage minori-
ties to develop their own language scripts and cultural traditions. The 1954 
Constitution reiterated that the state would “pay full attention to the full 
features” of minority groups in implementing its economic policies.47 The 
ethnic policy has since then fluctuated in the degree to which it accommo-
dates minority rights, in ways particular to the specific areas involved.
 The 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century have seen a 
slew of anthropological and historical studies of one or more of the fifty-five 
officially recognized minority nationalities.48 The past two decades has also 
witnessed important efforts to link China’s minorities to Western concep-
tions of race and ethnicity. Pamela Crossley’s important essays at the turn of 
the 1990s trace the meaning of minzu (“nationality” or “nation” in English) 
 45. Terry Martin, Affirmative Action Empire. Martin argues that the Soviet nationalities 
policy did not involve federation in a rigorous sense. Although the term “federation” was used 
in the 1922–23 constitution settlement, it “concentrated all decision power in the center” (13). 
Lenin’s rehabilitation of this word in 1917, according to Martin, to “describe what amounted to 
a much more ambitious version of ” ethno-territorial autonomy (14).
 46. June T. Dreyer, China’s Forty Millions, 105.
 47. Ibid., 126.
 48. Gru Gladney, Muslim Chinese; Stevan Harrell, Way of Being Ethnic in Southwest China; 
Louisa Schein, Minority Rules; Ralph Litzinger, Other Chinas; Katherine Kaup, Creating the 
Zhuang; Tsering Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows; Uradyn Erden Bulag, The Mongols 
at China’s Edge; Colin Mackerras and Michael Clarke, China, Xinjiang and Central Asia. 
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in contemporary China to multiple intellectual traditions, including the dis-
course on lineage that emerged during the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), and 
notions of race and ethnicity developed in Western history.49 Some of the 
more recent studies of minority nationalities in contemporary China have 
sought to borrow useful critical tools from critical race studies and postco-
lonialism. One approach is to rework the idea of orientalism, turning it into 
an analytical framework for understanding the power dynamics between the 
Han Chinese and non-Han minorities. Louisa Schein, for example, argues 
that the early 1990s saw a proliferation of “otherness” in China, with the 
feminization and fetishization of cultures in rural, ethnicized areas mimick-
ing the structure of orientalism.50 Schein’s argument about what she calls 
“internal Orientalism” casts the PRC’s incorporation of ethnic others, not 
implausibly, as a form of colonialism and racialization.51 Another approach 
that has emerged is comparing the oppositional cultures of minority nation-
alities in China with those of racial minorities in the West. Steven Venturino 
explores this approach in a recent essay, which takes the initiative of linking 
the subversive tactics in Tibetan literature, produced both inside and outside 
China, with those found in African American literature.52 The comparative 
approaches employed in studies of China’s ethnic minorities have produced 
critical visions similar to those embodied in Chinese American diasporic 
narratives. They challenge, rightly, the fiction of a pluralist Chinese national-
ism by implicating it in the enterprises of colonialism and institutional rac-
ism, suggesting that, while we must acknowledge the West’s preponderance 
in constructing the social categories, including race, ethnicity, and nation, 
central to global modernity, it is also necessary to consider regional or local 
patterns of power that complicate Western-centric narratives of modern his-
 49. Pamela Kyle Crossley, “Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China,” “The Qian-
long Retrospect on the Chinese-Martial (hanjun) Banners.” Crossley’s early projects were ex-
tended later in a collected edition, which traces the vicissitudes of ethnic identities during the 
Ming Dynasty and Qing Dynasty through dynamic interactions between the imperial state and 
the human subjects of the state. See Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton, 
Empire at the Margins. Studying the earlier meanings of ethnicity in China, the authors argue, is 
indispensable to integrating the investigations of “various frontiers” and minority nationalities 
in contemporary China (17).
 50. Louisa Schein, “The Consumption of Color and the Politics of White Skin in Post-Mao 
China.” Also see Schein’s Minority Rules; Chih-yu Shih, Negotiating Ethnicity in China. Shih ar-
gues that some minority groups in China, such as the Miao, actively cash in on the Orientalized 
images created by “the dominant state and market forces,” in a move that Shih calls “reflective 
Orientalism” (66–67).
 51. Schein, “Consumption of Color,” 478.
 52. Steven J. Venturino, “Signifying on China.” 
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tory.53 To claim that we can find racial and ethnic politics outside of the West 
that do not result completely from Western colonialism and imperialism is 
not to espouse a reductive form of universalism that implicitly naturalizes 
race and ethnicity as inevitable givens, just as proposing a global perspective 
on multiculturalism does not indicate that there is anything natural to it. 
Rather, it is to promote a strategic, antihegemonic universalism that rebels 
against the safety of the conventional ideological and political mappings of 
the world as well as the traditional division of labor among different aca-
demic fields.
Multiculturalism and Comparative Multiculturalisms
Based on interdisciplinary work, my book provides a comparison of U.S. 
liberal multiculturalism and China’s nationalities policy as interconnected, 
competing means of nation formation, both seeking to forge a coherent 
national identity by containing minority dissent from or revolts against 
structural inequalities. By organizing these two different systems into one 
conceptual framework, my argument both resonates with and departs from 
the emerging discourse of comparative multiculturalisms, founded by Will 
Kymlicka and his collaborators, among others. Having occupied a promi-
nent position in the study of multiculturalism since Liberalism, Community, 
and Culture (1989), Kymlicka’s work not only has played a frame-setting 
role for other scholars but also has displayed the eclectic character of the 
field as a whole. It registers a mixed theoretical impulse, wavering between 
a normative approach to multiculturalism and a contextualist one. He is 
clearly invested, as he puts it in Multicultural Odysseys, in examining and 
helping advance the efforts, on the part of international organizations, to 
promote “a distinct liberal form of multiculturalism and minority rights” 
on a global scale through the codification of international legal norms and 
the diffusion of best practices of liberal multiculturalism.54 This normative 
commitment, however, is implicitly undercut by his acknowledgment of the 
 53. One can argue that this dual perspective arose from an encounter between Area stud-
ies and postcolonialism. Discussions of Chinese nationalism have been an especially fertile site 
for the development of such a dual logic. For a concise summary of these discussions and an 
argument for this dual perspective, see Timothy Brook and Andre Schmid, Nation/Work. The 
authors simultaneously recognize that the history of modern nations in Asia is “inseparable 
from the history of imperialism” and calls attention to “sets of fissures internal to Asian nations” 
(2–3). 
 54. Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, 18.
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historical circumstances and “larger field of power relations” in which liberal 
multiculturalism developed in the West and the implausibility of duplicating 
these conditions in other parts of the world.55 The contextualist side of Kym-
licka’s thought is what my book emphasizes and amplifies. Multiculturalism 
assumes a different shape in each given context and should not be limited 
to its liberal manifestations. To be sure, non-Western nation-states, includ-
ing China, have often borrowed consciously from Western liberalism, its 
concepts if not institutional apparatus, in articulating their official policies 
toward ethnic and racial minorities.56 However, these articulations also hark 
back to theoretical traditions outside of liberalism, including, in the case of 
China, the Lenin–Stalinist conception of nationalities and Confucian eth-
ics. The Chinese government’s goal to build “hexie shehui” (“a harmonious 
society”), announced at the Sixth Plenum of the Sixteenth CCP Congress in 
2006, borrows selectively from the Confucian attitudes toward cultural dif-
ference, especially the idea of “he er butong” [harmony without sameness], 
as well as the rhetoric of liberal multiculturalism from the West.57 We see in 
chapter 2 the ways in which the notion of national harmony, and by exten-
sion that of world harmony, are echoed and promoted in a 2004 popular 
novel, Jiang Rong’s Lang Tuteng.
 Official or dominant formulations of ethno-racial policies, it must be 
noted, are not the only component of any particular multiculturalism. A 
case in point is minority challenges to the Confucian approach to cultural 
difference. Although the Chinese government’s interpretation of Confucian 
ethics emphasizes its toleration of other cultures, Zhang Chengzhi’s 1991 
work Xinling Shi [A history of the soul] implicitly rebukes this view by offer-
ing a reconstructed history of Hui Muslim rebellions in eighteenth- and 
 55. Ibid., 109. Kymlicka clearly voices his opposition to imposing liberal multiculturalism 
on non-Western parts of the world, because, for one thing, theories of ethnic relations are under 
debate in the West and, for another, geopolitical and historical factors in other parts of the world 
(including paramount security concerns and the absence of a liberal tradition) also make apply-
ing Western principles inviable. See in particular chapters 6 and 7 of Multicultural Odysseys.
 56. India is probably the most notable example. See Selma Sonntag, “Self-Government in 
the Darjeeling Hills of India.” Sonntag offers a history of what she calls “linguistic federalism” in 
India upon its independence, as encoded in the Indian Constitution drafted by the Nehruvian 
liberals, and its contemporary manifestation in the 1988 establishment of self-government in 
the Nepali-speaking area in northern Bengal (181).
 57. Some scholars in China have teased out the liberal echoes in the CCP’s articulation of 
its vision of a “harmonious society.” See Yin Wenjia and Yu Li, “Xifang duoyuan zhuyi ji dui 
zhongguo de jiejian yiyi—zai hexie wenhuaguan de shiyu zhong,” 165–67. The authors offer an 
introduction to the history of multiculturalism as public policy in the West, especially white-
settled countries, including the U.S., Canada, and Australia, since the mid-twentieth century, 
and argue that this liberal tenet of equality between different cultures is manifest in the Chinese 
government’s plan for building a “harmonious culture” in a multiethnic context (166).
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nineteenth-century China. Zhang’s history critiques the ways in which the 
Confucian conception of social and cultural hierarchies failed historically to 
accommodate the resistance to secular political power among the Hui Mus-
lims, an ethno-religious group, and continues to limit their spiritual expres-
sions in the contemporary era. If, as I have argued, multiculturalism should 
be understood as a global movement with a fragmented basis and a shift-
ing contour, each particular component of this movement is also a dynamic 
process, through which the power relations among, as well as within, dif-
ferent ethnic and racial groups in a particular nation-state are continuously 
reconstituted.
 The complex dynamics of multiculturalism are articulated in the distinc-
tions often drawn between its “official” and “critical” versions. Legislation 
and government policies providing for group-specific rights and compen-
satory, or preferential, treatment toward minorities are often referred to as 
official multiculturalism (as in Canada and Australia, and one might add 
China) or managed multiculturalism (as in the U.S.), which David Theo 
Goldberg critiques as a “centrist” strategy that the state employs to project an 
image of national solidarity without working concretely toward this goal by 
tackling the political, cultural, and psychic causes for the inequalities among 
different ethno-racial groups.58 A competing version of multiculturalism, 
often prefixed with “critical,” advocates for broad social recognition of the 
distinct histories and identities of minority groups as a means of advancing 
the larger struggle for an equitable distribution of economic, political, and 
cultural opportunities.59 Critical multiculturalism assumes the form of an 
insurrection, diffused among the political initiatives of minority organiza-
tions, academic research, and cultural articulations, against the domination 
of majority cultures and interests. The official and insurgent versions of mul-
ticulturalism, always intertwined in any given context, encompass a range of 
competing perspectives on how national identity should be conceived so as 
to accommodate minority demands and how minority groups can enhance 
their social positions through what Goldberg calls a “transformative incor-
poration” into the “mainstream” of a national culture.60 In each particular 
national context, therefore, multiculturalism should be seen as a series of 
political contestations that are manifest in and mediated by law, social policy, 
as well as cultural practices and production.
 In his essay “Culture/Wars: Recoding Empire in an Age of Democracy,” 
 58. David Theo Goldberg, ed., Multiculturalism, 7.
 59. Ibid., 19. 
 60. Ibid., 9.
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Nikhil Pal Singh argues that it is unproductive to discuss “American plural-
ism” as a “singular, embattled term,” or a static set of values and public poli-
cies that can be hijacked by various political forces.61 For Singh, the history of 
U.S. liberal multiculturalism is the history of the various battles between dif-
ferent conceptions of equality and justice in the U.S. since at least the 1940s, 
an era marked by the simultaneous “emergence of state-driven efforts to 
engineer a ‘Second Reconstruction’ within the United States” and “the mas-
sive mobilization of anti-racist initiatives.”62 To paraphrase Singh, while this 
multiculturalism undeniably exhibits the tendency of “aestheticizing” power 
differentials, its more radical incarnations focus on structural inequalities and 
become a credible form of progressive politics that combats racism, colonial-
ism, and capitalism as interlinked and mutually constitutive processes.63 The 
understanding of multiculturalism as a process of change and an unceasing 
series of political battles pertains to the Chinese context as well. The official 
policy toward minority nationalities in China is profoundly state-centric, 
seeking to uphold the legitimacy and unity of the party-state through the 
rhetoric of ethnic amalgamation. The minority nationalities have responded 
to the official policy in different ways, ranging from active endorsement 
to violent resistance. The government has often changed its conception of 
amalgamation since the founding of the PRC, partly in response to minority 
reaction, oscillating between a hard-line position favoring a forced integra-
tion, on both economic and cultural levels, of the various nationalities and 
a more liberal one allowing minority groups to preserve distinct economic, 
social, and cultural institutions.
Fiction of (Comparative) Multiculturalism(s)
Taken together, the fictional texts I study here capture the dialogic, constantly 
changing nature of particular varieties of multiculturalism, suggesting that 
the encounters and contestations between different conceptions of national 
identity and social equality unfold like an extended narrative consisting of 
competing impulses and patterns of meaning. They do not just allude the-
matically to particular issues shaping or confronting the ethno-racial politics 
in contemporary China and America, but also illustrate, or propose concep-
 61. Nikhil Pal Singh, “Culture/Wars,” 471–72.
 62. Ibid., 474.
 63. Lisa Lowe argues, for example, that muliticulturalism, in its official or managed version, 
operates to “aestheticize ethnic differences as if they could be separated from history.” See Lisa 
Lowe, “Immigration, Citizenship, and Racialization,” 9.
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tual alternatives to, the underlying logic of official or managed multicultur-
alism, which seeks to contain ethno-racial tensions without addressing the 
structural causes of these tensions. As a group, they encapsulate the instabil-
ity of U.S. and Chinese multiculturalisms and are crucial to understanding 
their internal dynamics and interconnections in the contemporary era. They 
can therefore be loosely grouped together under the term “fiction of multi-
culturalism.” I use this term to mean two things at once: what is normally 
thought of as “multicultural fiction”—fiction written by minority writers 
and/or focused on minority perspectives—and fiction that provides exten-
sive reflections on multiculturalism as a political project.
 Among the authors I study, Clive Cussler and Jiang Rong are aligned 
most closely with the logic of official or managed multiculturalism. Formally, 
they hew close to the conventions of certain genres of popular fiction in the 
contemporary U.S. and China. Cussler’s Treasure of Khan continues his Dirk 
Pitt series, a typical product of the Cold War, that revolves around an antito-
talitarian American superhero who spreads liberal-democratic and multicul-
tural values around the globe. Jiang’s Lang Tuteng builds on the familiar plot 
of the immersion of Han Chinese intellectuals in minority cultures in remote 
areas, which signals a form of ethnic amalgamation. Both authors modify the 
generic conventions that they appropriate, but their modifications, for the 
most part, function to salvage, rather than transform, these conventions and 
the particular variety of multiculturalism that they support. Their works are 
discussed first, therefore, setting a context against which the other authors 
studied here, Kuo, Yan, Zhang, and Alameddine, can be read as a revision or 
rejoinder.
 All of these four authors draw our attention to the continuation of ethno-
racial conflicts in the two countries, thus undercutting the logic of official or 
managed multiculturalism. Their narratives are invariably nonlinear, moving 
between the current post–Cold War moment and various points in the past, 
as a way of placing these conflicts in a deep historical context and suggesting 
that this history continues to bear on the present. In addition to invoking and 
reconstructing the past as a rebuttal to the rhetoric of national progress and 
harmony that official or managed multiculturalism generates, these authors 
also set out to locate in the past a few tactics for survival and subversion that 
can be reappropriated as tools of renewing the multicultural nation in the 
contemporary era. Based on these tactics, including “dissenting national-
ism” (Kuo), oppositional faith (Zhang and Alameddine), and “impersonal 
intimacy” (Yan), they actively propose ways of mediating between national 
identity and minority demands for autonomy and equality without sacrific-
ing the latter to the shibboleth of unity.
30 I n T r O d U C T I O n
 Taken together, then, these narratives are in conversation not only with 
Mignolo’s concept of double critique but also with Homi Bhabha’s theoriza-
tion of the multicultural nation as a “double narrative movement,” where the 
“people” are both the “historical ‘objects’ of a nationalist pedagogy” and the 
“‘subjects’ of a process of signification that must erase any prior or originary 
presence of the nation-people.”64 For both Bhabha and the authors I study, 
the multicultural nation moves in time like an internally fractured narrative 
in which the “signs of a coherent national culture” are continuously recreated 
by various elements of the “people,” especially those inhabiting the margins 
of a projected national space, including ethno-racial and other minorities.65 
The process of narration that constitutes the modern nation can be cap-
tured metonymically in individual fictional narratives and in their mutual 
interactions. Bhabha’s theorization of the nation as narration has long been 
criticized, rightly so, for eliding the material constraints upon and condi-
tions for the formation of national identity.66 One can argue, however, that 
the pervasive concept of doubleness in Bhabha can be read as a metaphor for 
the multiplicity of forces, material as well as symbolic, that intervene in the 
meaning and structure of a particular national identity at a given time–space 
conjunction. Bhabha’s ideas remain useful for understanding the  ways in 
which contemporary fictional narratives, including those studied here, both 
encapsulate and propel the process of becoming and transformation that is 
the multicultural nation.
 Indeed, the conception of modern nationalism as a “double narrative 
movement” has had a strong impact on American studies. Amritjit Singh 
and Peter Schmidt describe the U.S. as the world’s first “postcolonial and 
neocolonial” country.67 This defining doubleness plays out in the inseparable 
intertwining of a nationalist pedagogy—the myth of a perennially inclusive 
national identity—and minority critiques of this pluralist myth. The two 
authors construct a long genealogy of cultural wars from the progressivists of 
the 1890s–1920s through the development of various minority social move-
ments, along with their cultural articulations, since the 1960s, which have 
been fully invested simultaneously in struggles over civil rights in the U.S. 
 64. Homi Bhabha, Location of Culture, 145.
 65. Ibid.
 66. Pheng Cheah, “Given Culture.” Cheah criticizes Bhabha’s theory of historical agency 
as narrative energy (as well as Marxist theories of material dialectics) for projecting a notion 
of human freedom that can overcome the limits of material history. Instead he calls on us to 
assume our “responsibility to given culture” (321), arguing that the postcolonial national body 
is a “nontranscendable moving ground extending across the globe in which political, cultural, 
and economic forces are brought into relation” (324). 
 67. Amritjit Singh and Peter Schmidt, eds., Postcolonial Theory and the United States, 5.
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and in antiracist and anti-imperialist struggles on the global scale.68 These 
movements rarely aim to redraw the administrative structure of the U.S. 
state, and yet they offer a series of representational and political tactics for 
mobilizing minority communities around multiple political allegiances, over 
and beyond the nation, while advocating for their fuller integration into the 
institution of U.S. legal and cultural citizenship.
 In China, in comparison, challenges to the official rhetoric of pluralism 
are more circumscribed and muted, as a result of the government’s control 
over the nation’s political and cultural life and the popular notion that China 
remains a developing, postcolonial country in need of uniting and strength-
ening itself against foreign sabotage and intervention. Nevertheless, minority 
writings and representations of minority cultures have often rebelled quietly 
against state power. Liu Daxian, a scholar of ethnic literature in China, points 
out that, since the end of the Cultural Revolution, minority writers have 
increasingly turned away from celebrating the unification of the Chinese 
nation under state socialism and toward constructing ethnic consciousness 
and identification. Liu describes their works as part of the many “little tradi-
tions” that have taken shape alongside of and under the shadows of “main-
stream” contemporary Chinese literature.69 Eminent critic Chen Sihe raises 
the same argument from a slightly different angle, theorizing that much of 
the Chinese literature since the 1980s has consciously accentuated the idea 
of minjian, which translates literally as “the sphere of the people.” Part of this 
body of work excavates cultural forms and practices in ethnic areas that are 
submerged or marginalized under the official ethnic policy.70 The Chinese 
writers included in my study, especially Zhang Chengzhi, engage in this work 
of excavation, and so does Chinese American author Yan Geling, from a 
different angle. U.S.-based Comparative Literature scholar Lydia Liu points 
out rightly that minjian was partially manufactured by the state—in fact, the 
Chinese government supported and sponsored the collection of ethnic and 
folk art during the 1950s and 1960s, in keeping with its liberal policy toward 
ethnic minorities during that period. The more recent upsurge of minjian, 
in light of this history, can be seen as a “sentimental turn” to state-sponsored 
 68. For an account of the internationalist commitment constitutive of the beginning of the 
Asian American Movement, see Sucheta Mazumdar, “Asian American Studies and Asian Stud-
ies”; David Eng, Racial Castration, 211–15.
 69. Liu, Daxian, “Zhongguo shaoshu zuyi de rentong yu zhuti wenti,” [Identification and 
subjectivity among China’s minorities], 7.
 70. See Chen Sihe, Zhongguo dangdai wenxueshi jiaocheng [A history of contemporary 
Chinese literature], 12–14. For a more detailed explanation of the notion of minjian, see chapter 
5.
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folk culture.71 Nevertheless, the literary homage to minjian over the past three 
decades puts pressure on official conceptions of the folk, suggesting an eager-
ness on the part of Chinese cultural workers to reimagine the Chinese nation 
on eclectic, unstable grounds, as a “double narrative movement.”
Organization of the Book
Before delving into the literary texts, I offer in chapter 1 a history of U.S. lib-
eral multiculturalism and the policies and discourses around China’s minor-
ity nationalities since the mid-twentieth century. The chapter first clarifies 
the meanings of “minzu” (the Chinese term for “nationality”) and establishes 
a basic continuity between the concept and notions of race and ethnicity in 
Western traditions. It then argues that the two multicultural projects are inte-
gral to the construction of dominant forms of nationalism in the two coun-
tries—civic nationalism in the U.S. and official nationalism in China—while 
being constrained by the imperative of national identity. Both are contin-
gent upon assigning contrasting meanings to the ideas of race and ethnicity 
(and their Chinese counterparts zhongzu and minzu). The mobilization of 
the notion of ethnicity, or minzu, as a repudiation of the politicization of 
genealogical and cultural differences (for either oppressive or subversive pur-
poses), has facilitated, in both the U.S. and China, the project of casting what 
Goldberg terms a “racial state” into a multicultural nation.72 The chapter then 
highlights a few specific ways in which the two multiculturalisms have inter-
sected over the past two decades. The parallels and intersections between 
American and Chinese multiculturalisms reviewed in this chapter forecast 
the themes of the literary texts that the following chapters study.
 The four chapters that follow analyze specific fictional texts with a focus 
on how they help bridge U.S. and Chinese multiculturalisms. Each places its 
central text(s) against a backdrop of popular, political, and critical discourses 
on the subject of ethnic and race relations in the two countries. These chap-
ters show that, compared with the other discourses, the fictional narratives 
that they study encompass a much broader range of political perspectives 
and impulses, thus implying, collectively, an exceptionally sinuous argument 
about what limits the official or dominant modes of multiculturalisms in the 
two countries and what may enable them to change. They offer an indispens-
able supplement to the other discourses by mimicking, on a formal level, the 
process in which ethnic and racial issues are negotiated in the multicultural 
 71. Lydia Liu, “A Folk Song Immortal,” 571.
 72. David Theo Goldberg, The Racial State.
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nation. More important, they offer a valuable alternative to the negative mode 
of comparison customarily employed between these two multiculturalisms, 
whereby one is invoked only to bolster or justify the other.
 Chapter 2, “How Not to Be an Empire,” juxtaposes two popular nov-
els, one American and one Chinese, with converging themes and imagery. 
Clive Cussler’s Treasure of Khan (2006) and Jiang Rong’s Lang Tuteng (2004), 
translated into English in 2008 as The Wolf Totem, were bestsellers in their 
respective country when first published. They project an imaginary recon-
ciliation between the two countries’ pursuit of natural resources and political 
influence around the world and their commitment to protecting the weaker 
peoples both within and outside state borders. In so doing, the novels illus-
trate and reinforce the logic of official or managed multiculturalism, or what 
I term “conciliatory multiculturalism,” as it manifests itself in the contempo-
rary U.S. and China. They thus help deflect international criticisms over the 
imperialist excess of the two countries’ domestic and foreign policies in the 
post–Cold War era. Cussler imagines a culturally diverse, energy-indepen-
dent, nonexpansive America to re-elevate the country’s moral standing in the 
world in the wake of its open embrace of expansionism after 9/11, solidifying 
it further by juxtaposing the fantasized America against an illiberal China 
where minority nationalities are exploited and deprived of their natural envi-
ronments. Jiang Rong’s call for the Han Chinese and the Chinese government 
to embrace a toned-down version of the military tradition of the historical 
Mongols, ancestors of the ethnic Mongols in contemporary China, projects 
a past and future of ethnic amalgamation that, for the author, distinguishes 
Chinese nationalism from Western, and in particular, U.S., imperialism. The 
popularity of the two novels is an indication of their rhetorical proximity to 
conciliatory multiculturalism in the two countries.
 Chapters 3, 4, and 5 study authors who stage a conscious critique of con-
ciliatory multiculturalism. All these authors rewrite particular histories of 
ethno-racial conflicts to recuperate from these histories the political, cultural, 
and psychic resources for building forms of nationalism that are more inclu-
sive. They do not treat ethnic and racial conflicts arising from the histori-
cal workings of power and social formation as what needs to be contained, 
privatized, or placated but as an impetus for new ways of imagining national 
unity. They propose their own models of “pluralist universalism,” to borrow 
from Bhikhu Parekh’s term for multiculturalism again, by allowing the ideas 
of unity and difference to challenge and transform each other, rather than 
project a false reconciliation of the two. 
 Chapter 3, “Toward a Comparative Critique,” offers a discussion of Alex 
Kuo’s prose and poetic writings, especially the generically ambiguous Panda 
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Diaries (2006). Panda Diaries draws an analogy between the history of Native 
Americans and that of the Oroqens (a small minority nationality) in China. 
This analogy echoes the parallel that a number of Chinese intellectuals have 
recently drawn between China’s campaign to develop its western regions 
in the new millennium and the U.S. westward expansion in the nineteenth 
century. While the Chinese intellectuals use the history of U.S. expansion 
as a rationale and a model for China’s own modernization, Kuo launches a 
double critique through his analogy. He shows that both the U.S. and China 
have engaged in the construction of a modernized, integrated national space 
through the colonization of minority and indigenous space, a process with 
human as well as environmental implications. In conjunction with this dou-
ble critique, Kuo also offers important reflections on the political implica-
tions of metaphor as a conceptual and rhetorical tool. While it comments 
explicitly on the conceptual violence entailed in metaphor, the novel proceeds 
metaphorically, yoking together disparate histories as inexact replicas of one 
other. In so doing, Kuo suggests that drawing comparisons between asym-
metrical patterns of power is a productive hazard that must be embraced. The 
logic of metaphor also allows Kuo to serialize, in his various works, minority 
struggles to promote “dissenting nationalism” in different parts of the world, 
thus proposing an antidote to the impulse toward homogenizing national 
space that lingers in both contemporary America and China, despite the 
rhetoric of ethno-racial harmony that they espouse.
 Chapter 4, “A New Politics of Faith,” turns to one of the most glaring fail-
ings of the two multiculturalisms, namely, the racialization and suppression 
of Muslim communities in both the U.S. and China before and after 9/11. It 
juxtaposes Hui Muslim author Zhang Chengzhi’s Xinling Shi [A history of 
the soul] (1991) and Arab American author Rabih Alameddine’s Koolaids: 
The Art of War (1998). These works show the imbrication of religious and 
ethno-racial differences and the severe limits of conciliatory multicultural-
isms by reconstructing little-known histories of Muslim and Arab communi-
ties in the two countries from the perspective of these communities. At the 
same time, Zhang and Alameddine set out to imagine, by reworking religious 
concepts, forms of pluralism that can accommodate radical ethno-religious 
differences. While Zhang recasts the Jahriya teaching of the autonomy of the 
soul as an ethical condition for fostering competing collectivisms in China, 
Alameddine points toward the potential of reworking the idea of universal 
love (as opposed to that of moral law) embodied in Christ as grounds for a 
kind of oppositional politics that mends, rather than exploits, ethno-religious 
divisions. Both authors, then, simultaneously puncture the myth of ethno-
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racial harmony or unity constructed in the popular novels discussed in chap-
ter 2 and recuperate the idea of multiculturalism on renewed grounds. In 
dialogue with contemporary intellectual discussions in the two countries on 
religious activism and political religiosity, Zhang and Alameddine demon-
strate that religion is not a divisive force that forecloses genuinely expansive 
multiculturalism, but a shifting constellation of values that should be allowed 
to participate fully in the discursive negotiation that constitutes the project of 
multiculturalism.
 Finally, chapter 5, “Impersonal Intimacy,” discusses a literary critique of 
the patronizing nature of conciliatory multiculturalism, which groups minor-
ities under a number of somewhat arbitrary labels and turns them into ben-
eficiaries of the majority state or culture. It offers a reading of Yan Geling’s 
novel Fusang (1996), which depicts a Chinese prostitute in the nineteenth-
century U.S., and its English translation in 2001, titled the Lost Daughter of 
Happiness. It argues that the novel resists symptomatic readings, often seen 
in existing criticisms of both versions of the novel, that identify its main 
character, Fusang, as a victim of the gendered workings of racialization. The 
English translation, through a form of bowdlerization (removing and short-
ening certain passages in the original), preinterprets the novel for the West-
ern audience, anticipating and reinforcing the Anglo-American criticisms 
of the novel. Pace existing criticisms, I argue that the novel’s depiction of 
Fusang’s all-accepting resilience under sexual servitude constitutes a utopian 
statement of the possibility of a borderless and yet sustainable subjectivity 
that actively embraces the experience of being penetrated by difference. This 
conception of subjectivity provides a basis, as well as a model, for group iden-
tities (ethno-racial as well as national) that maintain a level of coherence 
without striving for uniformity. The novel, in other words, explores the psy-
chic conditions for an ideal form of pluralist universalism. In defiance of the 
expectations of most segments of her audience, Yan reconstructs the expe-
rience of nineteenth-century Chinese American prostitutes not simply to 
reveal historical forms of racial injustice but also to picture a possible future 
for both U.S. and Chinese multiculturalisms. In so doing, she speaks to some 
of the most exciting psychoanalytical and cultural theories from both the 
U.S. and China, including Leo Bersani’s theory of “impersonal intimacy” and 
Chen Sihe’s conception of minjian as a quotidian web of relations that resists 
the disciplinary power of the collective identities constructed by the state.
 This book does not attempt to provide an exhaustive study of U.S. and 
Chinese fiction of multiculturalism from the post–Cold War era. It selects 
a few absorbing moments from two deep repertories that illuminate their 
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overlaps and interconnections. In Alex Kuo’s short story “10,000 Dildoes,” a 
Chinese American physicist navigates his transnational experiences as if he 
were “dancing in a tangled story.”73 And that may just be a fitting metaphor 
for the ways in which this study and the authors that it includes mediate 
between the two multiculturalisms.
 73. Alex Kuo, “10,000 Dildoes,” 263.
T He fIrST PArT of this chapter offers a survey of the histo-ries of U.S. liberal multiculturalism and China’s official eth-
nic policy. The survey extends back to the rise of racial minority 
movements in the U.S. in the 1960s and the institutionalization of 
the CCP’s ethnic policy in the early 1950s, though it also touches 
on some of the relevant history prior to these two moments. Like 
all historical surveys, this one is not simply descriptive. It contains 
the argument that these projects can be seen as two interconnected, 
competing forms of conciliatory multiculturalism, which generate 
and contend with alternative visions of the relationship between 
national identity and ethno-racial differences in their respective 
context. The term “conciliatory” signals the myth of easy recon-
ciliation that both projects promote and depend on, the idea that 
the conflict between the drive toward national unity and persis-
tent racial and ethnic inequalities can be reconciled without radical 
C h a P t e r  1
Bridging the Chasm
A Survey of U.S. and Chinese Multiculturalisms
[The] major variants of pluralism are fundamentally assimilationist.
—Christopher newfield and Avery f. gordon,  
mapping multiculturalism
Although the origins and histories of ethnic groups in China are dif-
ferent, the overall trend of their development was to form a unified, 
stable country with multiple ethnic groups.
—White Paper on China’s ethnic Policy (2009), Section I
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interventions in the economic, political, and psychic conditions of these 
inequalities. The defining formal characteristic of conciliatory multicultural-
ism, therefore, is its simultaneous recognition and disavowal of ethno-racial 
tensions. Chapter 2 elaborates on this conciliatory logic as it is illustrated 
in popular fiction from both countries. The present chapter underscores a 
central component of this logic, namely, the ways in which race and eth-
nicity are assigned contrasting meanings. In the U.S. context, it is no news 
to point out that race and ethnicity are socially constructed categories, but 
it is important to remember that, in the mainstream and everyday politi-
cal imagination, they signify two different modes of construction. While 
race is tied to a form of essentialization, the attribution of group differences 
to factors that are considered to lie beyond the realm of history, ethnicity 
has largely come to signal the construction of group identity on the basis of 
historical patterns of interaction and conflict, a mode of construction that 
entails an understanding of difference as situated, mutable, and adaptable to 
circumstance. The Chinese concepts of zhongzu and minzu, both with a par-
ticular, complex history, can be loosely mapped onto the notions of race and 
ethnicity in the contemporary United States. The construction of concilia-
tory multiculturalism in the two countries, a process integral to their nation-
building practices, depends on collapsing race into ethnicity and confining 
racism—discrimination based on the essentialized category of race—to the 
past or other nations. This parallel, to be sure, should not obscure impor-
tant differences between the two contexts, which I explain in detail in my 
survey. Nevertheless, without recognizing this loose continuity, we have no 
grounds for meaningful conversations about racial and ethnic politics across 
the pre-existing ideological and political lines that divide the two countries. 
These conversations, I believe, will ultimately make productive transforma-
tion more likely on both sides. The second part of this chapter discusses the 
ways in which U.S. and Chinese multiculturalisms have come into contact 
over the past two decades through translation and other forms of mediation.
 The story of China’s official multiculturalism begins, in part, in the 
nationalities policy of the Soviet Union. A metaphor that the Soviet state 
used to describe the result of this policy is a large communal apartment with 
separate rooms.1 The various ethnic minorities under the former Russian 
empire were organized by the new state into culturally homogenous repub-
lics with “characteristic institutional forms of the nation-state.”2 When the 
 1. Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promot-
ed Ethnic Particularism.” She takes the phrase “communal apartment” from a Soviet publication 
from 1924 (415).
 2. Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, 1.
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Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the republics’ demands for independence 
were seen as the last straw on the unwieldy state teetering on the brink of col-
lapse due to the simultaneous processes of marketization, democratization, 
and decolonization that occurred under Gorbachev.3 The “earnestness of 
bolshevik efforts on behalf of ethnic particularism” and its delayed, alarming 
percussions triggered much heated discussion around Soviet ethno-politics 
in Slavic studies in the 1990s and early 2000s.4 One might see the Soviet 
nationalities policy as the earliest and the most important form of nonliberal 
multiculturalism. With the passing of the Soviet Union, the PRC’s ethnic 
policy has come to embody a major example of socialist multiculturalism.5 
Partially modeled on the example of the Soviet federation, the Chinese policy 
provides ethnic minorities—known until fairly recently as minority nation-
alities—with the right to regional autonomy. As many have pointed out, the 
definition of autonomy under the Chinese system differs significantly from 
standard liberal understandings of minority rights even as it overlaps with 
the latter.6 As it was instituted upon the founding of the PRC, the policy 
of ethnic regional autonomy aimed to integrate minority groups into the 
administrative structures of the party-state without foisting upon them Han 
culture or the socialist ideology, but the idea of integration came quite close 
to assimilation during the period between the late 1950s and late 1970s, when 
the socialist state launched a series of radical leftist movements, including 
the Cultural Revolution, under which class took precedence over nationality 
 3. Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past. It is one of the earliest post–Cold War 
surveys of the history of the “nationality problems” in the USSR. 
 4. Slezkine, 415. For two diverging perspectives on this issue, see Francine Hirsch and 
Terry Martin. Hirsch describes the Soviet approach to nationalities as “state-sponsored evolu-
tionism,” which believes that the state should take the lead in amalgamating clans and tribes 
into nationalities so as to, ultimately, “usher the entire population through the Marxist timeline 
of historical development” (7–8). Martin makes the similar argument that the Soviets consid-
ered national identity an unavoidable stage to “be passed through before a mature international 
socialist world can come into being,” although he also emphasizes the belief that the nationalism 
of the non-Soviet people are “legitimate grievances against the oppressive great-power chau-
vinism of the dominant Russian nationality” (8). However, while Martin applies the concept 
of affirmative action to the Soviet nationality policy, Hirsch disagrees, arguing that affirmative 
action implies the promotion of national minorities “at the expense of ‘national majorities’” (8). 
This is not a good place to adjudicate between these two arguments, but I do believe that it is 
impossible to draw an absolute line between the illiberal ethnic policy of the Soviet Union and 
the idea of affirmative action in Western liberal multiculturalisms. This position is consistent 
with my argument U.S. and Chinese multiculturalism should be studied comparatively, not as 
two unrelated species but as paralleled, interconnected, though quite distinct, processes.
 5. For an introduction to the minority policy in the communist Laos, see Vatthana Phol-
sena, “A Liberal Model of Minority Rights for an Illiberal Multiethnic State?” 80–109.
 6. See Baogang He’s explanation of both sides of the issue later in this chapter. 
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and ethnicity. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the ethnic policy has largely 
swung back to a more liberal mode, although it has moved in the opposite 
direction in Tibet and Xinjiang in response to waves of pro-independence 
demonstrations and riots in these provinces.7 The contradictions and limits 
of this policy, of course, do not deter the government from asserting that 
ethnic minorities are the “masters of their own house,” evoking the commu-
nal apartment metaphor that has been used in describing the Soviet policy.8 
It is not yet clear whether the government’s emphasis on central control in 
political and cultural matters and its circumscription of ethnic autonomy will 
effectively ensure stability in the long run. But even if stability is more or less 
maintained, we still need to consider the cost that the official ethnic policy 
exacts from the country’s 100 million members of minorities.
 Mainstream U.S. multiculturalism can be construed as a highly circum-
scribed version of liberal multiculturalism, which, in its normative formu-
lation, supplements classical liberalism with the tenet of ethno-cultural 
justice.9 Having originated in the racial reforms and popular mobilizations 
of the 1960s, U.S. multiculturalism is often associated with polychromatic 
metaphors—for example, the “mosaic” and “salad bowl”—that symbolize its 
conscious opposition to racial segregation and coercive assimilation. Unlike 
Canada’s official multiculturalism, U.S. multiculturalism was from its very 
beginning motivated by an awareness of racially based political and eco-
nomic inequalities.10 Since the Reagan era, however, conservative reactions 
against government policies and programs assisting racial minorities and the 
rollback of the welfare state in general have imposed important limits on U.S. 
multiculturalism.11 Meanwhile, U.S. multiculturalism departs sharply from 
 7. Colin Mackerras, China’s Minorities, 145–66; June T. Dreyer, China’s Forty Millions, 
63–276.
 8. Gardner Bovingdon, Autonomy in Xinjiang, 14.
 9. Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, 42; Can Liberal Pluralism Be Exported? 21.
 10. The Canadian federal government announced its policy of multiculturalism in 1971, 
reversing the earlier emphasis on assimilation. The Canadian Multicultural Act was passed in 
1988, providing financial and institutional support for racial and ethnic minorities and French-
speaking Canadians. It is beyond the scope of this book to discuss the debates around Canadian 
multiculturalism, but, as Irene Bloemraad recently shows, Canadian multiculturalism has laid 
much emphasis on immigrant political incorporation through an active promotion of citizen-
ship and has therefore consisted of more public policies and programs toward helping immi-
grants to overcome linguistic and cultural barriers. See Irene Bloemraad, Becoming a Citizen, 
1–16, 102–37. This emphasis on culture, as Bloemraad points out, was initially adopted to 
counter Quebec nationalism as well as to fulfill the country’s economic needs (in a way parallel 
with the economically driven encouragement of immigration in the nineteenth-century U.S.) 
(136).
 11. For an account of the contradictions between “the dream of multiculturalism” incu-
bated in the racial reforms of the 1960s and its deterioration during the Reagan era, see James 
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the model of the multination federation practiced in parts of Europe (Spain, 
Belgium, Switzerland, etc.) and Canada. Apart from a few exceptions (Native 
Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Native Hawaiians, etc.) ethno-racial minori-
ties in the U.S. are immigrant groups that do not espouse aspirations toward 
state-building and thus do not fall under the category of “national minorities” 
established in standard liberal theories of multiculturalism.12 The absence of 
a tradition in minority state-building has been noted by Kymlicka as a key 
feature of U.S. multiculturalism, which carries the potential consequence of 
being exploited by majority nationalists in other parts of the world to “justify 
suppressing minority nationalisms.”13 The term “nationalism” has been used 
in reference to the political militancy and cultural radicalism among African 
Americans, Chicanos, and Asian Americans during the 1960s and 1970s, 
though none of these groups has been given legally recognized rights for 
political autonomy.
 Before launching into a detailed historical account, we can attempt a 
few preliminary remarks about the ways in which the two multicultural-
isms are central to the project of nation-building in their respective context. 
Nationalism, of course, has very different meanings in the two countries. 
In the U.S. context, I am using the term to refer to what is often perceived 
as a kind of civic nationalism, the drive toward national identity and unity 
based on a set of commonly embraced, albeit frequently conflicting, political 
values, including democratic universalism and liberal individualism, that are 
incarnated in the nation’s legal and political institutions. This civic ideology 
of nationalism can be seen as a nonaggressive version of American excep-
tionalism, the belief that the American nation embodies a unique array of 
principles, the American creed, that enables it to play the indispensable role 
of a “civilizational empire” in the world.14 This dominant civic nationalism, 
Kyung-Jin Lee, Urban Triage, xv, xvi. Also see Howard Winant, Racial Conditions. Howard 
Winant criticizes the Clinton administration for “borrow[ing] extensively from the right” in 
race-specific initiatives (35). 
 12. Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular. He defines national minorities as ethno-cul-
tural groups that challenge majority nation-building by “fighting to maintain their own societal 
culture” or “engaging in their own nation-building” (28). One may add that Puerto Ricans can 
be seen as a national minority, but they largely count as part of the pan-ethnic group of Latinos 
in the U.S. context. 
 13. Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, 273; Multicultural Citizenship, 58–69.
 14. See Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong, 41, 49. Lieven defines American nation-
alism in relation to exceptionalism, offering a sophisticated view of the different moral and 
political implications of this exceptional nationalism. He argues that the popular version of U.S. 
exceptional nationalism, the belief that American culture is unique and worthy of pride, is in 
fact comparable in its intensity to the nationalism one finds in the “contemporary developing 
world,” including India, Mexico, and the Philippines, reminiscent of “Europe before 1914” (20). 
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as many have noted, is continuous with the more overtly imperialist aspects 
of exceptionalism, consistently undermined by ethno-religious articulations 
of American identity that engender or exacerbate economic, political, and 
cultural inequalities within and outside the nation.15 Liberal multicultural-
ism provides a crucial means through which the civic nationalist ideology is 
renewed and sustained, as it mediates between the promise of liberal democ-
racy and historical injustices experienced by racial and ethnic minorities. It 
enables a vision of the U.S., to borrow from David Hollinger, as “a democratic 
nation-state that is commodious enough to sustain diversity yet cohesive 
enough to guarantee rights and provide for welfare.”16 Although Hollinger 
is known for rejecting multiculturalism in favor of cosmopolitanism, this 
understanding is rather misleading. Hollinger is critical of multiculturalism’s 
tendency to fix racial and ethnic identities, but he is certainly not question-
ing the project’s centrality to upholding the “civic character” of American 
national identity or, in other words, the civic nationalist ideology.17 Hol-
linger’s cosmopolitanism, which champions the “principle of affiliation by 
revocable consent,” is in fact a continuation of an important strain in tradi-
tional American pluralism, one that counters the presumably divisive effects 
of particularized identities with an emphasis on the “dynamic mixing” of 
cultures and demographics and the primacy of national loyalty.18 This form 
of pluralism, as we will see, can very well be seen as the foundation of U.S. 
liberal multiculturalism, rather than a critical alternative.
 In comparison, Chinese national identity has been defined as “a relation-
ship of ‘identification’ between nation and state.”19 The authority and inter-
ests of the party-state, rather than a set of abstract political values, are at its 
core. Suisheng Zhao, in particular, argues that a kind of state-centered “prag-
matist nationalism”—the understanding of the party-state as the embodi-
ment of the nation’s will and fundamental interests and the sovereign center 
of the collective loyalty of its citizens—has remained the most potent form of 
Chinese nationalism since 1949.20 However, just as American civic national-
 15. Anatol Lieven discusses a host of imperialist symptoms of American exceptionalism, 
including white nativism, Jacksonian nationalism, and evangelical fundamentalism. For a dis-
cussion of the more pernicious aspects of American exceptionalism, also see Donald Pease, 
“Exceptionalism.”
 16. David Hollinger, Postethnic America, 143.
 17. Ibid., 14.
 18. Ibid., 13, 94.
 19. Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, “In Search of a Theory of National Identity,” 30.
 20. See Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction; James Townsend, “Chinese Nation-
alism.” Zhao argues that the CCP united various social classes and “claimed a mandate to rule 
China” by assuming leadership in the industrialization of the country (210). While this nation-
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ism has long been undercut by the darker strains of exceptionalism, China’s 
state nationalism is inseparable from ethnocentric or racialist conceptions of 
the nation, which first emerged at the turn of the twentieth century, when 
the notion of a unitary Han race was invented and mobilized as a rallying 
point for struggles against the invading European powers and the decaying 
Manchus (rulers of the Qing Dynasty).21 This Han-centered conception of 
Chinese identity, however, threatened to alienate the non-Han peoples for-
merly under Manchu control and fuel separatist movements. Both the GMD 
and the CCP, then, were compelled to espouse a conception of national unity 
predicated upon a strong, centralized state rather than identifying the Chi-
nese with the Han, though Han-centrism by no means disappeared. The 
ethnic policy established at the beginning of the PRC sought to rein in Han 
Chinese ethnic nationalism and integrate ethnic minority communities into 
the administrative structures of the communist state, thus securing the state’s 
territorial integrity and legitimizing the CCP’s leadership. This policy has 
undergone several different phases since then. As Zhao points out, to con-
tain minority dissent from the assimilationist phase of the policy during the 
1960s and 1970s, the government introduced in the 1980s “a dizzying array 
of preferential treatment in political representation, economic development, 
and social benefits” for ethnic minorities.22
 In juxtaposing U.S. and Chinese multiculturalisms, I do not intend to 
offer a systematic comparison of the two countries’ political systems or tra-
ditions. My aim, instead, is to tease out formal parallels between the two 
projects and, subsequently, the ways in which they are entangled in nar-
rative texts from both countries. Literary studies can engage and supple-
ment comparative politics by shedding light on the underlying continuity 
and connections between two disparate sets of ethno-racial policies. Both 
contemporary America and China practice a conciliatory form of multicul-
turalism that is simultaneously necessitated and delimited by the imperative 
of national unity. Conciliatory multiculturalism wields tremendous power 
alism was initially “shrouded” by Mao’s “utopian communism” (210), it became a pragmatic tool 
after the Cultural Revolution consciously employed by the government to fill the ideological 
void resultant from its shift toward market economy. Townsend argues that “[s]tate national-
ism portrays the state as the embodiment of the nation’s will, seeking for its goals the kind of 
loyalty and support granted the nation itself and trying to create a sense of nationhood among 
all its citizens” (18). 
 21. Suisheng Zhao, 21–22. Other forms of Chinese nationalism have been identified, es-
pecially popular nationalism, and cultural nationalism. State nationalism often coopts or com-
petes with these other forms. 
 22. Ibid., 31.
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in both contexts, even as it is challenged by competing proposals for ethno-
racial relations. If each room in the cozy Chinese communal apartment is 
subjected to close supervision by a controlling central power, the dazzling 
America “mosaic” often obscures the distinct patterns of dissent emerging 
from within it.
Consent, Descent (Dissent)
In the U.S. context, the concept, if not the very term, of multiculturalism 
took shape in the racial reforms of the mid-1960s, which worked to “gradu-
ally and partially [transform] the [civil rights] movement into a constituency 
for the new program its efforts had won.”23 While racial desegregation and 
civil rights legislation (the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights 
Acts of 1965) extended formal equality to all citizens, other policies and pro-
grams were explicitly intended to reverse the material effects of racism, even 
as they were couched in the language of universal rights and equal opportu-
nity. In addition to a greatly expanded social welfare system, the affirmative 
action policy was implemented through a series of executive orders and gov-
ernment plans under the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations.24 
The passage of the Bilingual Education Act in 1968 (terminated in 2001 upon 
the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act), as another example, made fed-
eral funds available to school districts for the establishment of educational 
programs for students with limited English. Although the racial minority 
movements had become fragmented by the late 1960s, they generated a veri-
table cultural revolution on college campuses, in public schools, and in the 
cultural mainstream. Curriculum changes at various levels of the educational 
system increased the representation of non-European cultures within and 
outside the U.S., in a way that addressed the needs of evolving student bod-
ies and furthered their diversification. The federal government also institu-
tionalized and expanded a few initiatives to recognize ethnic histories and 
cultures, which then trickled down to the level of public schools, colleges, 
and workplaces.25
 23. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States, 99.
 24. Since the 1970s, it has been subjected to constant scrutiny due to the conservative 
perception that some affirmative action policies contradict the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), a 
landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on affirmative action, for example, 
bars quota systems in college admissions but affirms the constitutionality of affirmative action 
programs giving equal access to minorities.
 25. For example, the Asian American Week was instituted in 1978 and later expanded into 
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 These policies and changes became a flash point of the cultural wars of 
the 1970s and 1980s.26 They were criticized by both sides, for either “disunit-
ing” America, permanently dividing it on the basis of group membership 
and identification or for projecting false hope for racial reconciliation.27 In 
his 1975 book Affirmative Discrimination, Nathan Glazer insisted that the 
U.S. was the “first great nation” to combine the principles of Republican 
citizenship with “a considerable concern for whatever is necessary to main-
tain group identity and loyalty.”28 While ethnicity in American held “great 
meaning” for individuals’ lives, it had traditionally been given “no formal 
recognition.”29 A new “American ethnic paradigm,” however, emerged in the 
mid-1960s as the nation entered into an “unexampled recording of the color, 
race, and national origin of every individual in every significant sphere of 
his life.”30 This new paradigm, for Glazer, overturned the valuable consen-
sus that was reached over race and ethnicity through the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, which wrote into law the principle that the Constitution is “color 
blind.”31 This argument followed logically from Glazer’s ambivalence, since 
the 1960s, about the state’s responsiveness to racially based rights, which, as 
Richard H. Thompson has pointed out, misread the function of the modern 
state as that of a “neutral referee” in social, economic, and cultural mat-
ters.32 Glazer’s neoconservative view of American history and society was 
openly challenged in the very beginning of the 1980s, when ethnic studies 
came of age as an intellectual enterprise dedicated to the study of racial and 
structural inequalities in the United States. In his 1982 essay “Reflections on 
Racial Patterns in America,” Ronald Takaki argued against the premise that 
America had had a long history of racial inclusion, pointing out in particu-
lar that the democratic tolerance experienced by white “ethnic” groups had 
not been extended to “racial groups.”33 Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s 
now-classic Racial Formation in the U.S. raises a similar argument that race 
should be studied as “an autonomous field of social conflict, political orga-
nization, and cultural/ideological meaning” without being conflated with 
the Asian Pacific American Heritage Month, and Hispanic Heritage Month was instituted in 
1968 and expanded in 1988.
 26. Resistance to civil rights for blacks, in fact, developed alongside the Civil Rights Move-
ment. See Omi and Winant’s discussion of the “backlash” politics in the middle-1960s (96).
 27. Arthur Schlesinger, The Disuniting of America.
 28. Nathan Glazer, “The Emergence of an American Ethnic Pattern,” 9.
 29. Ibid., 19.
 30. Ibid., 21.
 31. Ibid.
 32. Richard H. Thompson, Theories of Ethnicity, 97.
 33. Ronald Takaki, “Reflections on Racial Patterns in America,” 27.
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ethnicity, class, or nation.34 They offer a critique, in particular, of the old 
ethnicity paradigm that emerged in the 1930s, with the advent of the New 
Deal and antifascism and became coopted post 1965 by neoconservatives 
and the emerging Republican majority to reverse the civil rights gains made 
by racial minorities. This debate over the racial reforms of the 1960s, what 
Glazer called the “new American paradigm,” represents the beginning of a 
long-lasting war between two visions of American pluralism. On one side is 
constitutional color blindness, the credo that no individual can be excluded 
from basic civil rights on the basis of their “race, color, religion, or national 
origin,” which, for Glazer and many others to follow, provides a recipe for a 
genuine “national consensus” that an emphasis on racial difference threatens 
to undermine.35 The principle of color blindness, furthermore, is temporally 
stretched back to the beginning of American history, such that it figures as a 
fait accompli, albeit tainted by a history of racial exclusion and segregation, 
rather than an uncertain ideal. In opposition to that is a growing critical race 
discourse contending that the ideal of color blindness, part and parcel of the 
civic nationalist ideology, works to perpetuate the existing racial order, under 
which people of color are expected to model their experiences on those of 
European immigrants while being confronted with structural inequalities 
precluding that possibility. These competing visions, both containing many 
variations within, underlie the two major forms of multiculturalism in the 
U.S., namely, liberal multiculturalism and critical multiculturalism.
 While critical race scholars consider the premium placed on racial dif-
ference as a form of political dissent from civic nationalism, it is sometimes 
interpreted as a retrograde fixation on biological and cultural descent. The 
1980s rearticulations of the old ethnicity paradigm, developed in the works 
of Gunner Myrdal, Milton Gordon, Glazer, and Patrick Daniel Moynihan, 
among others, insisted on using the rubric of ethnicity as a unifying cat-
egory for both dominant and disadvantaged groups, with the rationale that 
it would facilitate the thriving of all different cultures in America without 
fracturing national consensus or identity. In his 1986 work Beyond Ethnic-
ity: Consent and Descent in American Culture, Werner Sollors refines, and 
largely affirms, the traditional ethnicity paradigm, as opposed to the critical 
race paradigm that surfaced in the 1960s, reframing this tradition via Josiah 
Royce’s idea of “wholesome provincialism,” which projects an image of 
“diverse provincialities in harmonious cooperation.”36 Sollors makes a point 
 34. Omi and Winant, 52.
 35. Glazer, 7.
 36. Werner Sollors, Beyond Ethnicity, 179, 187. Sollors traces the lineaments of Joycean 
vision through Horace Kallen, Randolph Bourne, and W. E. B. Dubois, arguing that all three 
47b r I d g I n g  T H e  C H A S M
of supplementing Royce’s idea by acknowledging that large power structures, 
which he vaguely calls “cultural dominance,” preclude some racialized groups 
from striving for their own political and cultural ideals in cooperation with 
others.37 Ultimately, however, he proposes considering race as “one aspect 
of ethnicity,” so as to reconcile the concept with the tradition of individual-
ism, which emphasizes what can be achieved over what is ascribed through 
lineage.38 Opposing “primordialist and even old biologist” conceptions of 
group formation, Sollors reappropriates the idea of ethnicity to signify pre-
sentist, constructionist approaches to localized identities, which allow these 
identities to enrich and enhance, rather than undermine, the “symbolic kin-
ship” that unites all Americans.39 While Sollors does not explicitly associate 
the primordialist notions of group identity with racial minority movements, 
his insistence on subsuming race under ethnicity implicitly rejects one of 
the founding rationales for these movements, the argument for a “profound 
distinction” between people of color and European ethnic immigrants in 
the “mode[s] and consequences” of their incorporation into the American 
body politic.40 Sollors’s argument for a consensus-based pluralism is echoed 
in a few other works in the 1980s and 1990s.41 This trend reached a kind of 
apotheosis in Hollinger’s Postethnicity, which takes Sollors’s understanding of 
pluralism so far that it abandons the term “pluralism” altogether in favor of 
“cosmopolitanism,” even though, as I pointed out earlier, “cosmopolitanism” 
connotes something strikingly familiar in this context—the rejection of any 
emphasis on identities considered to be based on descent (which include, 
for Hollinger, racial categories aside from African Americans) as a force that 
corrodes civic nationalism.42
 Sollors’s mediation between consent and descent does not touch on the 
question of whether the state has an active role to play in shaping and reshap-
ing ethno-racial identities, a question that concerned Glazer and other critics 
of the new “American ethnic paradigm.” Political theory started to engage this 
share a set of ideas regarding ethnicity and race. All three, though with significant differences 
among them, embraced a form of pluralism that emphasizes the importance of preserving 
organically grown ethnic cultures while calling for the harmonizing of different cultures. See 
Sollors, 179–91.
 37. Ibid., 191–95.
 38. Ibid., 36.
 39. Ibid., 21, 7.
 40. Alan Wald, “Theorizing Cultural Difference,” 23.
 41. Mary V. Dearborn, Pocahontas’s Daughters; William Q. Boelhowever, Through a Glass 
Darkly: Ethnic Semiosis in American Literature; Sacvan Bercovitch, Rites of Assent.
 42. Hollinger explains his indebtedness to Sollors in the 2005 Postscript to Postethnicity. 
See 221. 
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question in the late 1980s and late 1990s, when scholars like Amy Gutman, 
Charles Taylor, and Jürgen Habermas formulated models of multiculturalism 
that do not give the state a powerful role in determining the boundaries of 
minority groups or the rights to which they are entitled. Their views largely 
constituted a political theory corollary of Sollors’s argument for an updated 
version of “wholesome provincialism” as an individual and group attitude. 
They sought, in different ways, to extend traditional liberalism’s focus on 
individual rights into respect for group rights without jettisoning the liberal 
tenet of the state’s neutrality in cultural affairs. In his discussion of multicul-
tural policies, what he refers to as the “politics of recognition,” Charles Taylor 
questions both the practice of adhering strictly to the principle of formal 
equality, which would exclude the recognition of group-specific rights, and 
the top-down codification of these group rights.43 Instead, he argues for a 
kind of “nonprocedural liberalism” that predicates itself upon an assump-
tion of the equal value of different cultural traditions without proceeding to 
codify this assumption in a way that reifies ethnic and racial boundaries.44 
Habermas refutes Taylor’s argument that there is a contradiction between 
procedural liberalism and the politics of recognition, arguing that a liberal 
state, in its normative configuration, is inherently multicultural, in the sense 
that civil rights are conceived and actualized on the basis of ethico-political 
discussions involving conflicting perspectives shaped within specific cultural 
horizons, discussions that oftentimes escalate into “cultural battles.”45 These 
battles do not have to render a nation fragmentary, however, if its citizens 
insist on the “inclusive character of their own political culture,” thus expand-
ing the parameters within which common constitutional principles can be 
interpreted.46 For Habermas, then, the integration of a national community 
through a “consensus on the procedures for the legitimate enactment of law 
and the legitimate exercise of power” and the integration of subnational 
communities on an ethical-cultural level can and must be treated as two 
separate processes in liberal democracies.47 This is probably the most refined 
and influential argument for a strictly liberal version of multiculturalism 
that does not disturb the principle of state neutrality vis-à-vis subnational 
communities, while seeking to alleviate social inequality.48 The argument 
 43. Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition.” 
 44. Ibid., 63.
 45. Jürgen Habermas, “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State,” 
25.
 46. Ibid., 139.
 47. Ibid., 135.
 48. Andrew Mason, “Political Community, Liberal-Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimi-
lation”; Anna Stilz, Liberal Loyalty. Like Habermas, Mason also advocates for a purely liberal 
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is certainly not without problems. It not only naturalizes and universalizes 
liberal values but also substitutes the construction of a normative model of 
liberal multiculturalism for a discussion of how multicultural policies should 
respond to actual configurations of power and hierarchy in a given society.
 The consensus-based, liberal vision of multiculturalism in the U.S., to 
be sure, has a more centrist version, which supports a limited number of 
government or institutional policies and programs that promote the inter-
ests of racial minorities, but its main impulse remains clear.49 It attributes 
to American history an always and already existing equilibrium between 
a unified national identity and a fluid pluralist tradition, neither of which 
needs to be drastically changed. For this impulse, it can be aptly described 
as conciliatory multiculturalism. Discontent with conciliatory multicultural-
ism prompted some quarters of the Left to raise the idea of “critical multi-
culturalism,” which rebuffs, rather than answers, the call of nationalism. In 
an essay from the early 1990s, the Chicago Cultural Studies Group critiques 
the liberal underpinnings of U.S. multiculturalism, especially the ways in 
which it constructs ethno-racial cultures as merely particular to shore up 
the nation’s claim to transcendence from local, culturally transmitted prac-
tices and values.50 One way in which one can help counter this claim, for the 
Chicago Group, is to relativize the American nation through “international 
comparativism.”51 Doing that can transform liberal multiculturalism into 
“critical multiculturalism,” namely, an expanded version of leftist cultural 
studies capable of crossing the “enormous gulf between different styles of 
identity politics” and generating a fully contextualized understanding of the 
figure of the “subaltern” in places like India and China.52 The critical mul-
ticulturalism that the Chicago Group calls for, however, might have already 
been part of the American past. In Black Is a Country, Nikhil Pal Singh goes 
back to this past to offer an answer to the conservative backlash against 
multiculturalism that extended into the 1990s, which witnessed “a sweep-
ing rollback of civil rights–era jurisprudence” under both Republican and 
conception of national solidarity grounded in the distinction between a sense of “belonging to 
a polity” and a sense of “belonging together” (272). Stilz makes a similar argument based on 
Habermas’s notion of “constitutional patriotism,” which Stiltz interprets as collective demo-
cratic participation through “ethical-political reasoning,” in adherence to the legal and political 
traditions of particular constitutional democracies (163). 
 49. For a theoretical expression of this centrist view, see Amy Gutman, ed., Multicultural-
ism, 3–24. As Gutman puts it, at its best, liberal democracy can be identified with “both the 
protection of universal rights and public recognition of particular cultures” (12).
 50. Chicago Cultural Studies Group, “Critical Multiculturalism,” 114–39.
 51. Ibid., 135.
 52. Ibid., 124.
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Democratic administrations.53 He attributes the frailty of mainstream liberal 
multiculturalism to a kind of historical amnesia, the forgetting of the most 
important lesson that can be drawn from black social movements through-
out the long civil rights era, from the 1930s to the 1970s. Revisiting this 
era, Singh argues that the advancement of equality must “[pass] through the 
politics of race,” defining political universalism broadly in both anticapitalist 
and anticolonial terms, which often entails “imagining coalitions and think-
ing and feeling beyond the nation-state.”54
 Singh’s argument, like many others by those in U.S. ethnic studies and 
critical race studies, counters the widely propagated myth that multicultural-
ism erodes the politics of redistribution in the United States. It has long been 
argued that the struggles for civil and political rights on the part of racial 
minorities crowd out concerns for economic and social equality and distract 
from the development of class-based politics, and the racialization of wel-
fare politics has limited the support among the larger population for TANF 
(Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) and AFDC (Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children) policies.55 More recently, it has been suggested 
that multicultural policies and discourses have exacerbated the purportedly 
deleterious impact of race by further dividing “an already fractured polity” 
that would “otherwise support a strong welfare state.”56 Empirical analysis, 
however, has tended to find this claim about multiculturalism groundless.57 
More important than employing an empirical method is to point out that this 
criticism of multicultural policies is largely predetermined by the perception, 
expressed in the classic liberal critique of the “disuniting” function of mul-
ticulturalism during the cultural wars of the 1970s–90s, the belief that the 
pursuit of ethno-cultural justice can be reduced to narrow parochialism. The 
more recent critics of U.S. multiculturalism sow much confusion by blaming 
the neoliberal resistance to redistribution since the Reagan era on multi-
cultural discourses that, in their most robust version, struggle against this 
very force. Multiculturalism’s alleged role in eroding civil solidarity, as Singh 
suggests, is in fact an effort to combat the persistent expressions of excep-
tionalist, Jacksonian nationalism that are exploited, and at times fanned, by 
conservative movements in the era of neoliberalism.
 53. Nikhil Pal Singh, Black Is a Country, 11.
 54. Ibid., 218, 224.
 55. For a summary of these arguments, see Rodney E. Hero and Robert R. Preuhs, “Multi-
culturalism and Welfare Policies in the USA,” 122–29.
 56. Ibid., 121. For sources often cited in this argument, see Todd Gitlin, The Twilight of 
Common Dreams; Brian Barry, Culture and Equality; Walter Benn Michaels, Trouble with Di-
versity.
 57. See Hero and Preuhs, 129–51.
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 U.S. multiculturalism, as we have seen, is a dissonant chorus constituted 
by competing perspectives on how political, economic, and cultural equal-
ity can be best achieved for historically disadvantaged peoples, and how the 
ideal of national unity relates to that of political universalism. The liberal, 
conciliatory formulations of multiculturalism argue for allowing the state 
a limited activist role in overcoming past inequalities and broadening the 
definition of the American nation to accommodate different ethno-racial 
groups. The more critical formulations do not oppose the liberal position; 
they urge for its deepening, proposing alternative nation-formations that 
can more powerfully decenter, as well as reconfigure, the darker, imperialist 
dimensions of U.S. civic nationalism.
The Many Faces of Minzu
Chinese multiculturalism, as we will see, is also a complex, shifting process. 
The Chinese equivalent of ethnic or racial minorities in the American con-
text is shaoshu minzu, commonly, and literally, translated into English as 
“minority nationalities.” According to the fifth national census, conducted in 
2000, the Chinese state recognizes 55 minority nationalities, their numbers 
accounting for less than 10 percent of the national population.58 A majority 
of the minority population reside, often in close proximity with members 
of other minority nationalities, in autonomous areas (minority-governed 
administrative units), though a significant part of this demographic is spread 
out across the country.59 The meaning of minzu in contemporary China 
largely derives from the Soviet definition of nationality, which descended in 
a large part from Western theories of ethnos, while drawing upon the notion 
of zu (denoting lineage, race, or ethnicity, depending on the context) devel-
oped during late imperial China. Over the past ten years or so, however, the 
Chinese government has abandoned the archaic-sounding “minority nation-
alities” and adopted “ethnic minorities” instead as an official translation of 
shaoshu minzu, in an apparent effort to conform to current international 
norms and avoid the unintentional or intentional conflation of “nationalities” 
 58. Zhongguo minzu nianjian (2009) [Yearbook of Chinese ethnicities (2009)], 603.
 59. By the end of 2003, China had established 155 ethnic autonomous areas. Of these, five 
are autonomous regions, 30 autonomous prefectures, and 120 autonomous counties (banners). 
Of the 55 ethnic minorities, 44 have their own ethnic autonomous areas. The population of 
ethnic minorities practicing regional autonomy accounts for 71 percent of the total population 
of ethnic minorities, and the area where such regional autonomy is practiced accounts for 64 
percent of the entire territory of China. See Zhongguo minzu nianjian (2009), 600–603.
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with independent nations. On many levels, China’s official ethnic policy is 
quite different from the conciliatory, liberal version of U.S. multiculturalism. 
In Beyond Ethnicity, Sollors finds it amusing that a 1785 pamphlet imagined 
the future U.S. as a union of ethnic valleys, an aggregate of separate regions 
assigned to different ethnic groups.60 The system of autonomous regions 
in China would perhaps also draw some laughter from a casual American 
observer. It converges with U.S. liberal multiculturalism, however, in serving 
a particular kind of nationalist ideology. Both U.S. and Chinese multicultur-
alisms are highly constrained in how they construct minority difference and 
the terms of national integration. To proceed with this argument, however, 
we first need to clarify the meaning of shaoshu minzu in relation to a few 
Western and Soviet terms. What follows explains the multiple genealogies 
of this term, while outlining the main contour of the PRC’s official ethnic 
policy since the early 1950s.
 It is commonly argued that the immediate antecedent of the Chinese 
communists’ notion of minzu is the Lenin–Stalinist understanding of natsia, 
a historically formed and stable community of people that has emerged on 
the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological 
makeup.61 When combined with shaoshu, meaning minority, minzu does 
not denote a full-blown nation but can be equated with natsional’nost’ or 
narodnost’ in Russian, which refer to “ethnic communities that have sur-
vived through the period when tribal communities had disintegrated but 
no nations were yet formed.”62 Although, in the early 1930s, the Communist 
 60. Sollors, Beyond Ethnicity, 174–75. The particular pamphlet in question is The Golden 
Age, or, Future Glory of North-America Discovered by an Angel to Celadon in Several Entertaining 
Visions, published under the pen name “Celadon.”
 61. Stalin defined the term natsia for the Bolsheviks in his seminal 1913 article, “Marksizm 
i natsional’nyi vopros.” A natsia, for Stalin, “is not a racial or tribal [plemennyi]” group, but a 
“historically evolved community” formed “from people of diverse races and tribes.” A natsia 
is united by “a common language, territory and economic life”; its members share a “common 
mentality” (or consciousness), which is the result of shared experiences and is manifested in 
their culture.” See Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 43.
 62. Julian Bromley and Viktor Kozlov, “The Theory of Ethnos and Ethnic Processes in 
Soviet Social Sciences,” 431. For a survey of theoretical efforts to gloss and flesh out Stalin’s 
definition of a nation (natsia), see 426. In part, this history of theorization revolved around 
the question of whether a common territory and a common economy are prerequisites for the 
identification of an ethnic community. Bromley had argued in his work from the 1970s that 
the possession of common territory marks the difference between ethno-social organisms and 
what he calls “ethnicoses,” which he correlates with the terms “natsional’nost’” and “natsia” 
(or its spoken version narod), respectively. The authors point out here that “natsia” has been 
used as the term for ethnicities in capitalist and socialist countries that make strong claims for 
statehood while “operating as a single economic organism” (Bromley and Kozlov, 431). Hirsch 
explains the term “narodnost’,” documenting that “[w]hereas the ethnographers sometimes 
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Party endorsed the Soviet model of multinational federalism and Lenin’s 
policy of self-determination for minority nationalities, he soon abandoned 
them in favor of an alternative model of regional autonomy, which allowed 
for the designation of areas with a high concentration of a certain minority 
nationality as autonomous regions, prefectures, counties, or banners. The 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was established in 1947, the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region in 1955, and the Tibet Autonomous Region in 
1965. Baogang He provides a useful account of the grounds on which Mao 
rejected federalism, including the argument that Lenin’s theory of self-deter-
mination applied only to “oppressed nations casting off the rule of imperial-
ism and colonialism” but not to “minorities within a socialist state.”63 Mao’s 
rhetoric constructs the communists’ ascent to power in China as a process 
through which the Han Chinese and the various peoples in China’s bor-
derlands converted animosity and distance into revolutionary camaraderie. 
This rhetoric notwithstanding, the move away from the Soviet model was 
motivated, to a large degree, by concerns with foreign designs on Chinese 
borders (the Soviet Union’s on Xinjiang, for example) and the suspicion, as 
June T. Dreyer puts it, that minorities “would probably not choose to join 
China voluntarily.”64 While U.S. liberal multiculturalism necessitates the con-
struction of a tradition of consent-based pluralism, balanced perfectly with 
national cohesion, the official ethnic policy in China predicates itself upon 
the myth of a symbiosis between the foundation of the party-state and the 
forging of irrevocable interethnic ties (in addition to China’s prior claims to 
these areas during the long imperial era).
 In the early days of the PRC, the communist leaders outlined the vision of 
the “gradual, unforced ‘growing together’ of nationalities under socialism.”65 
In the words of Ralph Litzinger, author of a study of the Yao in contemporary 
China, throughout the 1950s, “minorities everywhere, across the expanse of 
China, were seen to move and advance through the stages of primitive com-
munism, slave ownership, feudalism, capitalism, until they finally arrived, 
in the revolutionary present, in the space of state socialism.”66 Many ethnic 
peoples were considered by the state to belong to a certain stage of history 
used narodnost’ to refer to the common folk (such as the Russian peasantry) and sometimes 
to refer to ‘a people’ in the generic sense, the Bolsheviks usually used it to connote ‘backward-
ness’”—that is, a people “at the precapitalist or early-capitalist stage on the historic timeline who 
had not yet formed a ‘bourgeois-democratic nationalist movement” (Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 
43).
 63. Baogang He, “Multiculturalism with Chinese Characteristics,” 61.
 64. Dreyer, China’s Forty Millions, 69.
 65. Ibid., 93.
 66. Litzinger, Other Chinas, 84.
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behind what the Han people had achieved. The establishment of autono-
mous governments in the early 1950s, therefore, consisted of a series of com-
promises between minority elites and communist cadres sent to minority 
regions on a mission to “instill a consciousness of being Chinese” without 
forcing socialism upon traditional cultural and social structures.67 In regard 
to the minority nationalities, therefore, the government pursued a policy of 
ronghe [amalgamation] somewhere between the policy of tonghua [assimila-
tion] favored by the GMD and the Soviet model of federalist integration.68 
The 1954 Constitution interprets ronghe as unity in diversity, promising 
that the various nationalities would be given time to think over socialist 
reforms and “make their decisions in accordance with their own desires.”69 
This gradualist, conciliatory policy was interrupted in the late 1950s, when 
the political pressure of the Great Leap Forward forced minorities to form 
communes and discard traditional cultures that may hinder their economic 
and social advancement and was not reinstated until after the Cultural 
Revolution. A draft constitution circulated at the end of 1970 noticeably 
curtailed the rights made available in the 1954 document, making no men-
tion of “retaining [minority] customs and habits.”70 The vision guiding the 
nationalities policy between the late 1950s and 1970s was the eventual disso-
lution of ethnic and national differences. As Dreyer puts it, the state asserted 
that “in socialist states, as the construction of industry increases, a common 
proletarian culture [would] gradually emerge and the similarities (tonghua 
xing) among peoples [would] become greater and greater as the differences 
[became] smaller.”71
 The early 1980s saw the government return to an emphasis on minor-
ity difference. The Constitution of 1982 returns to the stance codified in 
the 1954 Constitution, elaborating on the policy of autonomy to a degree 
unmatched by previous constitutions. Baogang He’s study of the document 
finds that minority rights in China contain elements of three major catego-
ries of minority rights recognized in Western liberal democracies, including 
(1) self-government rights, (2) special representation rights in the legislature 
or bureaucracy, and (3) accommodation rights, providing legal recognition 
to particular customs or practices.72 These rights, for He, remain highly cir-
cumscribed, firmly subordinated to a unified state leadership, more so in 
 67. Dreyer, 136.
 68. Ibid., 118.
 69. Ibid., 126.
 70. Ibid., 233.
 71. Ibid., 157.
 72. He, “Multiculturalism with Chinese Characteristics,” 67.
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volatile areas like Tibet and Xinjiang that are central to China’s national secu-
rity. He lists several ways in which the Chinese notion of ethnic autonomy 
falls short of normative definitions of the concept in liberal theories, includ-
ing the lack of a “democratic verification mechanism for minorities” (the 
absence of an independent court to check the Communist Party’s control 
over decision making in minority matters, for example) and the restriction 
of ethnic organizations with political agendas.73 He’s comparison, detailed 
as it is, remains beholden to a monolithic understanding of minority rights 
and multiculturalism. It might be more illuminating to stress the peculiari-
ties of the Chinese policy that cannot be accounted for within the liberal 
framework.
 The PRC’s policy of ethnic autonomy has had a materialist basis since 
its inception, under both the socialist ideology during the Mao era and the 
mandate of economic reform in the post-Mao era. The amalgamation of 
the different ethnicities in the Chinese nation is believed to be a function of 
the level of their economic and social development. Economic and material 
progress in minority regions, therefore, is the standard that the government 
most frequently invokes as a measurement of the efficacy of its ethnic pol-
icy. A series of infrastructure and development projects in Tibet since 1994 
and the expansion of cotton and crude oil production in Xinjiang over the 
past two decades both attest to this logic.74 In China’s Ethnic Policy and the 
Common Prosperity and Development of All Ethnic Groups, the government’s 
white paper on the ethnic policy released in 2009, much effort is devoted to 
detailing the government’s measures in promoting economic development in 
minority areas, especially since 2000, when the government launched a cam-
paign to accelerate economic progress in western regions, home to around 60 
percent of China’s ethnic minority members.75 China’s materialist approach 
 73. Ibid., 67, 8.
 74. Colin Mackerras, China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalization, 60–61. Also see Melvyn 
C. Goldstein, “Tibet and China in the Twentieth Century.” As Goldstein argues, the Chinese 
government’s efforts to develop its hinterlands in the west, especially Tibet, which often entail 
the increased “influx of non-Tibetan laborers and businessmen into Tibet,” have frequently 
come in conflict with Tibetans’ demand for autonomy (207–11).
 75. See Zhongguo de minzu zhengce yu ge minzu gongtong fanrong fazhan baipishu [China’s 
ethnic policy and the common prosperity and development of all ethnic groups]. Section V, 
“Accelerating the Economic and Social Development of Ethnic Minorities and Minority Areas,” 
outlines the “preferential measures” and key “infrastructure projects” carried out since 2000, 
including the “projects for transmitting gas and power from the west to the east,” the extension 
of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway to Lhasa, the tapping of oil and gas resources in Xinjiang, with 
particular attention paid to “their effects in stimulating local development,” as demonstrated 
in the West–East Gas Transmission project, which “alone can bring in over one billion yuan in 
revenue to Xinjiang every year.” 
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to ethnic difference forms an interesting contrast to the polarization of rec-
ognition and redistribution in the U.S. context. This approach, as many have 
argued, is very flawed, though not necessarily in the ways in which it fails 
the test of liberalism. Large-scale Han migration to both Tibet and Xinjiang 
and the persisting inequalities between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities 
in their access to political and economic power have exacerbated the deep-
seated ethnic divisions shaped in the historical struggles over the political 
status of these areas.
 Emphasizing the peculiarities of the Chinese case, of course, does not 
mean disavowing any continuity between Chinese and American multicul-
turalisms. Even though “shaoshu minzu” was for a long time translated into 
minority nationalities, the word “minzu” has complex genealogical ties with 
conceptions of race and ethnicity in the West. Prior to the adoption of the 
Lenin–Stalinist idea of narodnost’ or nationality, China had its own histories 
of descent-based and culturally based group identities, which also power-
fully shaped the idea of minority nationalities in the PRC. In her important 
work from around 1990, Pamela Crossley critiques the troubling tendency of 
undertheorization in earlier scholarship on China’s minorities, which often 
took the different nationalities in China as natural givens rather than politi-
cal and cultural constructs. In “Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern 
China,” Crossley locates the Chinese equivalent of Western notions of race 
and ethnicity in zu, the second component of the term minzu. She points 
out that the Chinese term “zu” originally indicated “a small group of people 
within a locality or a larger organization,” but over time became the preferred 
term for “established, historical peoples” during the Qing Dynasty.76
 Significantly, Crossley maps the meanings of “zu” onto both race and 
ethnicity. By the turn of the twentieth century, “zu” had been used to connote 
shared bloodlines and physical traits, as in the case of manzu, the Manchus 
(those genealogically connected to the founding population of the Qing). 
The emergence of identities based on “genealogical descent,” as Crossley 
argues, signals an indigenous concept of race.77 At the same time, Crossley 
claims that, when coupled with “min” (people), the word “zu” also dove-
tails nicely with ethnicity. Though directly translated from the Japanese term 
“minzukuo” at the end of the nineteenth century, the Chinese term “minzu,” 
insofar as it is used in the PRC, finds important cognates in the Soviet terms 
“natsia” [nation] and “narod” [ethnos, people], which, in turn, grew out 
of Western ethnology.78 As Crossley points out, the PRC’s official criteria 
 76. Crossley, “Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China,” 20. 
 77. Ibid., 20. 
 78. Hirsch attests that Russian ethnology in the late nineteenth century, which heavily 
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for classifying ethnic minority groups, or shaoshu minzu, in the early 1950s 
invoked the traditional criteria established in the Morgan–Engels tradition, 
namely “language, religion, economic life, and consciousness,” even though 
all the criteria were bent at certain points in the actual classification process.79 
Overall, then, Crossley associates the Chinese term “zu” with both a descent-
based understanding of identity (race) and a culturally based understanding 
of identity (ethnicity and nationality) in Western traditions. Combined with 
“min,” “zu” denotes a historically grounded, as opposed to an essentialized, 
collective identity. An interesting implication of her argument is that value-
laden distinctions are made between different modes of group identity for-
mation in the modern histories of both the West and China. In the Western 
context, race denotes a positivist view that humans can be categorized on the 
basis of physiognomy and lineage, while ethnicity, despite being frequently 
associated with a shared primordial origin, has largely functioned to denote 
group differences arising from the “tensions existing between ethnies and the 
polities by which they are framed.”80 In the Chinese context, the bifurcation 
of the word “zu” can be seen as a parallel to the race-ethnicity division.
 For many in the West, indeed, racial discourses came about on the basis 
of the rise of modern science, in the nineteenth century, that sought to cor-
relate biological and cultural differences. Kenan Malik points out that, in We 
Europeans (1935), Huxley and Haddon opposed the political uses of race 
under Nazi, suggesting that the term “race” should be replaced by “ethnic 
group” so as to “allow social distinctions to be studied in a neutral, value-
free fashion.”81 The terms “ethnic” and “ethnicity” gained prominence in 
postwar America, as Malik puts it, precisely because “the discourse of race 
became very properly self-conscious about the employment of its central 
terms during the 1930s and 1940s.”82 The term “ethnicity” can of course be 
synonymous with “race” when used to indicate “primordialist” identities 
influenced Lenin and other Bolshevik theorists, was shaped by British and American cultural 
evolutionists, including in particular Lewis Henry Morgan and Edward B. Tylor. Russian eth-
nologists were also influenced by such German romanticists as Herder (Empire of Nations, 44). 
But while the ethnographers “drew on the work of British and American cultural evolutionists 
to understand the connections between ‘modern’ cultures and their ‘primitive’ antecedents,” 
the Bolsheviks “were most interested in understanding the socioeconomic conditions that gave 
rise to different types of national movements” (45). Also, as Bromley and Kozlov point out, “the 
general theory of ethnos in Soviet social science was developed mainly by ethnographers and 
ethnologists” (“The Theory of Ethnos and Ethnic Processes in Soviet Social Sciences,” 425).
 79. Crossley, “Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China,” 21.
 80. Ibid., 14.
 81. Kenan Malik, The Meaning of Race, 174.
 82. Ibid.
58 C H A P T e r  1
transmitted through biological descent.83 That is why postwar proponents 
of the ethnicity paradigm made a point of recasting ethnicity as a process 
of “invention” responding to the “specificity of power relations at a given 
historical moment.”84 It is neither in the West nor in the United States, one 
must note, that distinctions are drawn between “immutable and mutable 
differences,” tied to the terms “race” and “ethnicity,” respectively.85 We can 
chart a parallel, though very different, history in China from the turn of the 
twentieth century onward.
 Largely concurring with Crossley, Frank Dikötter argues that, racial cat-
egories emerged in China on the basis of “indigenous modes of represen-
tation,” including folk notions of shared kinship and court conceptions of 
lineage groups, which the reformers at the Qing imperial court bolstered by 
borrowing aggressively from Western evolutionary theories during the last 
decade of the nineteenth century.86 Dikötter interprets the idea of huang-
zhong (yellow race), a key racialized identity that formed during this period, 
as largely an extension of the logic of zu—the word “zhong,” which literally 
means “seed” or “breed,” can be seen as a variation on “zu” that fuses the 
indigenous notion of lineage (all Han Chinese descend from the Yellow-
huang-Emperor) with Western racial taxonomies.87 Others have revised 
Dikötter’s important but partial argument by placing the construction of 
race in China after 1895 in the context of Western colonialisms, which pre-
cipitated among Chinese intellectuals and reformers a notion of the yellow 
race that encompassed not just China, but other colonized peoples in Asia 
and the Pacific, who were grouped under the same zhong, or tongzhong (the 
same zhong).88 The idea of minzu developed within the same global colonial 
context, when the ruling Manchus were seen as precursors to the Western 
powers threatening to colonize China and defined in opposition to the Han 
 83. In postwar America, this view is often associated with Andrew Greeley, Michael Novak, 
and Pierre Van den Berghe.
 84. Werner Sollors, ed., The Invention of Ethnicity, xvi.
 85. Ibid., 174.
 86. Frank Dikötter, “Racial Discourse in China,” 14. 
 87. Ibid., 15.
 88. Rebecca Karl, Staging the World. See the Introduction, chapter 6, and, in particular, 
166–68. The anti-Manchus discourse overlapped with the discourse of “Asian solidarity” at the 
turn of the twentieth century, demonstrating the proximity between zhong and zu in China at 
that moment (167). The overall point of Karl’s study is that new concepts such as zhongzu and 
minzu enabled China to conceptually organize and strategically position itself within the “un-
even global spatiality” at the turn of the twentieth century, so neither of them grew out of an 
essentialist logic in the beginning, though they could easily be naturalized for political purposes 
(16). 
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as a unified nation, or minzu.89 The terms “zhong” (which often becomes 
combined with “zu,” hence “zhongzu”) and “minzu,” therefore, were not 
clearly differentiated from each other in the early twentieth century. How-
ever, the interpretation of minzu as a culturalist and historical approach to 
identity and its separation from zhongzu became emphasized in the Ethnic 
Classification Project (1954–83) that laid down the framework of fifty-six 
ethnicities (Han + 55 minorities) in effect today. This project, according to 
a dissertation completed in 2006 by Thomas S. Mullaney, can be traced back 
to the debates over how to define “minzu” in the 1930s and 1940s, which 
involved the nationalist authorities, the communists, Chinese ethnologists, 
and Chinese physical anthropologists. Mullaney finds that, by the end of the 
1930s, “Chinese ethnologists and their system of language-based ethnic cat-
egorization had prevailed over physical anthropologists and their biometric 
approach to minzu.”90 After 1949, this culturalist interpretation of “minzu” 
“meshed well” with the communist government’s conception of the term, 
which in turn echoed the Lenin–Stalinist definition of “natsia.” “Minzu,” 
thus, has acquired a historically oriented, nonracial meaning.91
 It is certainly right to argue that the Communists’ approach to minzu, 
as reflected in the 55 + 1 taxonomy produced by the Ethnic Classification 
Project, is of a deeply instrumental nature. It propagated a descent-based 
notion of minzu by organizing the incredibly complex ethnoscape that the 
PRC inherited from imperial and republican China into “mutually exclu-
sive, ethno-linguistic units  .  .  .  serviceable to the requirements of modern 
statecraft.”92 However, we should also take note of the ways in which the 
state has, in recent years, consciously modulated this instrumental approach 
by acknowledging the instability of ethnic identities in Chinese history. We 
can find a few telling signs of this shift in the 2009 white paper on China’s 
ethnic policy. At the end of section I, the report states that “[t]he Chinese 
minzu has become an overarching name that all individual minzu recog-
nize and identify with.”93 The word “minzu” performs double duty in this 
sentence, denoting both the Chinese nation as a whole and the individual 
ethnic groups that constitute it. The larger minzu is a heterogeneous collec-
tion of the smaller minzu, rather than a homogeneous group, and the glue 
 89. Ibid., chapter 5, especially 117.
 90. Shawn Thomas Mullaney, “Coming to Terms with the Nation,” 27. Mullaney published 
a book based on the manuscript, Coming to Terms with the Nation. In the book, however, Mul-
laney excised the parts containing these quotes.
 91. Ibid., 123.
 92. Ibid., 35.
 93. See Zhongguo de minzu zhengce yu ge minzu gongtong fanrong fazhan baipishu [China’s 
ethnic policy and the common prosperity and development of all ethnic groups].
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that binds the different smaller units resides solely in history, especially the 
“anti-colonial, anti-separatist struggles” in which they had all participated.94 
The invocation of a shared revolutionary past is well-rehearsed rhetoric, the 
rationale, in fact, for abandoning the Soviet-style federalism in favor of a 
system of circumscribed ethnic autonomy in the 1940s and so is the explicit 
description of the Chinese nation as a nonunitary construct that transcends 
the Han majority. What is interesting, however, is that, in the same section, 
the individual ethnic groups within the nation are also described as having 
been “shaped by local conditions,” intermingling with each other “through 
continuous migration, living together, intermarriage, and communication.”95 
The significance of this emphasis can be seen in its conspicuous absence 
from the two previous white papers on the state’s ethnic policies, released 
in 1999 and 2005, respectively. This new rhetorical move signals the gov-
ernment’s effort to radicalize, on a rhetorical level at least, the differences 
between minzu (correlated with ethnicity or nation) and zhongzu (correlated 
with race), the latter of which has become associated with the practices and 
legacies of Western colonialism and imperialism solely. The campaign to 
cultivate minzu tuanjie [ethnic unity] in contemporary China, as we can 
see, requires a fluid, nonessentialist conception of minzu just as much as it 
requires an instrumental, descent-based one.
 In their own ways, then, both the United States and China have had to 
confront the issue of unmeltable ethnicities. Since the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, multicultural policies and discourses in both countries have consisted 
of a delicate dance between recognizing and containing ethnic and racial dif-
ferences. Discursive negotiations over the meaning of “ethnicity” or “minzu,” 
therefore, have become central to this balancing act. What I referred to as 
conciliatory multiculturalism manifests in both contexts as emphatic reart-
iculations of ethnicity, or minzu, as a fundamentally mutable and open cat-
egory, which work to delegitimize race, or zhongzu, as an essentialized and 
flawed category, thus downgrading group tensions to a level where they seem 
nonthreatening to the ideal of national consensus or unity. Rearticulations of 
ethnicity, or minzu, in other words, have taken the place of (rather than sup-
plemented) concrete policies or programs for addressing minority demands 
for equality or increased autonomy. My idea of conciliatory multiculturalism 
is not far from what many others have termed “superficial” or “weak” mul-
ticulturalism, but I believe “conciliatory” more aptly captures the political 
function and rhetorical features of what I am critiquing.
 94. Ibid.
 95. Ibid. 
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 In China’s case, the issues of how to maintain territorial sovereignty and 
national unity are as pressing today as they were in the early days of the com-
munist government. The successive waves of popular revolts and pro-inde-
pendence activities in Xinjiang and Tibet, which have become thoroughly 
intertwined with international politics, most vividly illustrate minority chal-
lenges to China’s state nationalism. Concerns with national security and sov-
ereignty, coupled with economic calculations (many minority areas are rich 
in resources), continue to inform the official ethnic policy, as can be seen in 
the tightening of security in unrest-prone areas and the continued emphasis 
on economic development and patriotic propaganda. Minority groups are 
allowed to maintain, in part, their distinct cultural identities, but are also 
portrayed in official rhetoric as inextricably intertwined with the Han Chi-
nese since times immemorial. This official, conciliatory multiculturalism, of 
course, has not completely supplanted racialist perceptions of group differ-
ence. As many have pointed out rightly, racism toward blacks often asserts 
itself in contemporary China and one can reasonably infer the existence 
of racialist attitudes and practices toward certain ethnic minority groups 
within.96
 The U.S. situation is different yet similar. The unmeltable nature of 
ethno-racial differences was brought to the fore in the Civil Rights Move-
ment and the intense theorization of race as a major sign of structural 
inequalities in the following decades. This emphasis on race, as I pointed out 
previously, is sometimes confused with the reification of cultural difference. 
This conflation is as often espoused by racial minorities eager to establish 
an inhabitable, distinct identity as by supporters of the ethnicity paradigm. 
The misunderstanding of and resistance toward the increasing focus on race 
are the driving forces behind the rhetoric of going “beyond ethnicity” and 
“postethnicity,” which in fact is not a rejection of ethnicity but an insistence 
on a particular, nonracial conception of it, that is, as a flexible, shifting form 
of identity equally available to all. It is a conception that functions to equal-
ize different social groupings and tame the group conflicts threatening to 
unbind the American nation. Indeed, the insistent repudiation of race has 
 96. See, for example, Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in China. In the epilogue, 
Dikötter contends that those in the PRC periodically display racist prejudice against blacks 
in and outside China despite the idea of Third World solidarity to which the country officially 
subscribes. For a discussion of an anti-African protest in China, see Michael Sullivan, “The 
1988–89 Anti-African Protests.” Although there have not been rigorous studies of this issue, 
Uyghurs are often racialized in China, stereotyped as criminals or even terrorists. There are no 
easy linkages one can draw between different strains of racism in contemporary China, but they 
shared an underlying biological understanding of difference and are likely to share a connection 
to the surge of China’s nationalism in the post-Mao era. 
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often been read as a way in which the majority nation “[acts] out” the trauma 
of being challenged by racial minority movements.97 Liberal multicultural-
ism, hinged upon collapsing race into (a particular conception of) ethnic-
ity, must be distinguished from critical multiculturalism, which foregrounds 
race and racialization not to exacerbate existing political and social divi-
sions but to deepen our understanding of the mutual imbrication of these 
divisions and the operation of power and capital. In the words of Antonia 
Darder and Rodolfo D. Torres, a critical approach to race sees it as “one of 
the primary ideologies by which material conditions in society are organized 
and perpetrated.”98 A further twist to the U.S. case is the re-securitization of 
the state after 9/11 and the ensuing curtailment of civil rights, which refueled 
the culture wars of the 1970s–90s. The heightened tensions between, on the 
one hand, increasingly multiplied modes of attachment among America’s 
ethnically diverse citizens and residents and, on the other, the cementing of 
American exceptionalism into a fervent patriotism have oftentimes given 
rise to efforts to further consolidate conciliatory multiculturalism. As Evelyn 
Alsultany documents, a few nonprofit advertising campaigns, for example, 
were launched after 9/11 to “deconstruct the binary opposition between 
American citizen and Arab Muslim,” with the effect, however, of reproduc-
ing “restrictive representations of diversity.”99 While the U.S. government 
launched public relations campaigns in the Middle East seeking to “conceal 
the blatant discriminatory practices it enacts” on a daily basis, nonprofit 
organizations and civil rights groups also produced public service announce-
ments that portrayed Muslims in the United States as model citizens who 
embrace American values as well as military and other public services while 
practicing a nonviolent form of Islam.100 These efforts, though motivated 
by different concerns, converge in seeking to contain the politically charged 
friction between Muslim and white, Christian values, revalorizing the image 
of a perennially inclusive U.S. national identity.
From Parallels to intersections
My preceding survey casts official Chinese multiculturalism and American 
liberal multiculturalism as two contemporaneous and parallel processes 
 97. Carl Gutierrez-Jones, “Color Blindness and Acting Out.” 
 98. Antonia Darder and Rodolfo D. Torres, After Race, 101.
 99. Evelyn Alsultany, “Selling American Diversity and Muslim American Identity through 
Nonprofit Advertising Post-9/11,” 595–96.
 100. Ibid., 618.
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through which concepts of ethnicity, race, and nation are negotiated in rela-
tion to one another. Establishing structural and formal parallels between 
these very different processes, however, is not the endpoint of my study, the 
bulk of which focuses on the various ways in which the two multicultural 
projects are increasingly connected in fictional narratives and other related 
discourses in the post–Cold War era. The following is an overview of the 
discursive bridges that link them. Not all these bridges take the same shape 
or have the same effect in diminishing the chasm of mutual misconceptions 
that lies in between.
 As pointed out, liberal, conciliatory multiculturalism underwent a period 
of theoretical legitimization in the United States throughout the 1990s and 
was further consolidated in the beginning of the twenty-first century. In 
China, the same period opened the country to Western liberal multicultur-
alism, which came to be regarded by some Chinese intellectuals as a useful 
model that can complement China’s own ethnic policy without replacing it. 
The term “multiculturalism,” often translated into “wenhua duoyuan zhuyi,” 
has made steady appearances in China’s academic journals since the 1990s, 
mostly in studies of the history of American multiculturalism.101 Will Kym-
licka’s 1995 work Politics in the Vernacular (2001) and Liberalism, Commu-
nity, and Culture (1989) were both translated into Chinese in 2005, giving 
rise to further theoretical elaborations of the history and principles of lib-
eral multiculturalism for Chinese audiences.102 Western liberalism theories 
have been invoked as a way of rethinking the pragmatic, politically driven 
approach to minority rights in China. At a 2001 conference cosponsored 
by the Chinese Confucius Society and Yunnan Nationalities University, a 
number of scholars explicitly appropriated Western discourses on individual 
and group rights to argue that the Chinese government should help pre-
serve endangered minority cultural traditions and foster cultural diversity as 
ends in themselves. He Shaoyin, for example, discusses several cultural and 
natural conservation programs in Yunnan (home to several minority groups) 
launched in the beginning of the twenty-first century in comparison with 
multiculturalisms in white-settled countries, including the United States, and 
countries in Southeast Asia. She attributes an extraeconomic significance to 
the Yunnan programs, contending that their “ultimate goal” is generating an 
 101. Wang Xi, “Duoyuan wenhua de qiyuan, shijian yu juxianxin” [Origins, practices, and 
limits of multiculturalism], 54; Qian Hao, “Meiguo minzu lilun kaoshi” [On American ethnic 
theories], 13; Gao Jianguo, “Shilun meiguo minzu duoyanxing he wenhua duoyuan zhuyi” 
[Comments on ethnic diversity and multiculturalism in the U.S.], 3–4. 
 102. See, for example, Zhu Lianbi, “Duoyuan wenhua zhuyi yu minzu-guojiao de jiangou” 
[Multiculturalism and the construction of nation-states]. 
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understanding of “the other.”103 The Yunnan examples, for her, are an integral 
part of a global effort to “create mutual understanding and communication 
among different cultures, dissolve cultural conflicts, and enable all cultures 
in the world to ‘co-exist in peace.’”104 The last phrase alludes to China’s long-
standing foreign relations doctrines—the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexis-
tence—forged first in the Non-Aligned Movement of the 1950s, but the idea 
of coexistence is reinvigorated in this phrasing by being blended seamlessly 
with the principle of liberal tolerance.105
 A competing idea is that the policy of regional autonomy in China, along 
with its Soviet predecessor, is already compatible with liberal models of mul-
ticulturalism in Western countries. The privileging of the “state will” and the 
central government’s administrative control in the Chinese model can be jus-
tified by the fact that a shared set of civic values are not yet in place in China, 
still a developing country, thus precluding a nonstatist national identity, and 
that foreign interventions continue to pose a threat to China’s multiethnic 
harmony.106 
 A more orthodox position, meanwhile, takes the liberal premise of indi-
vidual freedom to task and, unsurprisingly, finds it fundamentally at odds 
with the goal of social justice. Those holding this position rehearse a semi-
Marxist approach to ethnic difference, arguing that state socialism works 
more effectively than the free market in minimizing the material and cul-
tural inequalities between different ethnicities and thus securing interethnic 
harmony, if not the ultimate elimination of ethnicities. This position exalts 
the importance of national cohesion and, at times, borrows indiscriminately 
from criticisms of liberalism within Western political traditions. One scholar, 
for example, strings together, without irony, Huntington’s argument about 
the balkanizing effect of liberal pluralism in Who Are We: The Challenges to 
America’s National Identity and the standard Marxist critique of liberalism’s 
capitalist underpinnings.107 China’s encounter with U.S. liberal multicultur-
 103. He Shaoyin, “Quanqiuhua yu haiwai minzu wenhua duoyuan fazhan de qishi” [Global-
ization and lessons from multiculturalisms in foreign countries], 66.
 104. Ibid.
 105. The Five Principles were formed in 1954 in a series of documents between the newly 
decolonized China and India. These principles include (1) mutual respect for each other’s ter-
ritorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual nonaggression, (3) mutual noninterference in each 
other’s internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence.
 106. Guan Kai, “Duoyuan wenhua zhuyi yu minzu quyu zizhi” [Multiculturalism and ethnic 
regional autonomy], 51.
 107. Chang Shiyan, “Minzu hexie yu ronghe: shixian minzu yu zhenzhi yiti de guanjian” 
[Ethnic harmony and amalgamation: The key to the unity and political integration of the na-
tion], 69–71.
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alism, of which we only catch a glimpse here, is a complex dynamic that 
involves rhetorical appropriations (respect for the marginalized “other,” for 
instance), affirmations of the American model, as well as reassertions of the 
merit of the Chinese way. These are not separate attitudes but are often inter-
twined in each specific moment of this encounter. We see one such moment 
in chapter 3, which, in part, discusses the analogy that Chinese scholars 
and policy makers have recently drawn between the development of China’s 
western regions, dense with ethnic minorities, in the contemporary era and 
the American westward expansion of the nineteenth century. This compara-
tive move shows a mixture of the attitudes or impulses that I enumerate here.
 If U.S. liberal multiculturalism has come into contact with China’s eth-
nic policy through the work of translation, a particular site of translation is 
central to the linking of the two. Chinese American writings, as I argue, and 
figures as an important form of cultural translation by drawing connections 
between multiple national histories and cultures. These often become objects 
of translation as well, traveling on a textual level between the national spaces 
they address in their writings. The works of familiar Chinese American 
authors, including, among others, Kingston, Frank Chin, Amy Tan, and Gus 
Lee, and their Chinese translations have given rise to numerous academic 
articles and books in China, stoking among common readers and academ-
ics alike a strong interest in American social and racial history.108 Academic 
discussions of the various theoretical issues in Chinese American literature 
have lent much currency to some of the themes central to the study of ethnic 
cultures in the United States and around the globe, including racialization, 
cultural hybridity, and diaspora. Meanwhile, Chinese American authors who 
write primarily in Chinese have prompted challenges to homogeneous con-
structions of Chinese literatures and cultures. In China, Chinese-language 
writings in the United States have long been considered to be part of shijie 
huawen wenxue [world literature in Chinese], a concept that emerged in the 
early 1980s and was formerly institutionalized as a field of study in the early 
1990s.109 This field has generated many inquiries into the ways in which 
 108. The earlier translations include all three novels of Kingston, Siu Sin Far’s Mrs. Spring 
Fragrance and Other Writings, David Louie Wong’s Pangs of Love, Gish Jen’s Typical American, 
Frank Chin’s Gunga Din Highway, Gus Lee’s Honor and Duty, Fae Myenne Ng’s Bone, Jade Snow 
Wong’s Fifth Chinese Daughter, and Yung Wing’s My Life in China and America, among others. 
In addition to the Chinese translation of works by individual writers, anthologies of Chinese 
American literature has also appeared in China. See Xu Yingguo, Meiguo wenxue xuandu [An 
anthology of Chinese American literature].
 109. The term “overseas literature in Chinese” first emerged in the early 1980s. The Asso-
ciation of World Literature in Chinese was established and approved by the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs in the early 1990s, signaling the institutionalization of this field. See Rao Pengzi. “Haiwai 
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ethnic Chinese writers all over the world have transplanted, translated, rei-
magined, or repudiated Chinese literary and cultural traditions.110 Even as 
Chinese American writers help reconfigure American literature and identity 
in multicultural, multilingual, transnational terms, then, they increasingly 
destabilize what it means to be Chinese. Chapters 3 and 5 of this book high-
light the doubly critical role that Chinese American writings, in both English 
and Chinese, have played, while adding significantly to our understanding 
of this role.
 In some instances, discursive mediation between the ethno-racial poli-
tics of the two countries responds to their “actual” relations. In the post–
Cold War era, the most prominent example of such “actual” relations is the 
ambiguous, cautious alliance over the “War on Terror” that the two countries 
formed after 9/11. The U.S. projection of military power into Central Asia 
in the wake of 9/11 created a paradoxical effect. While raising new security 
concerns for China, it also lent more impetus and political legitimacy to 
the Chinese government’s campaign against the pro-independence move-
ment among the Uyghurs (Turkish-speaking Muslims) in the Xinjiang prov-
ince and abroad.111 As Mackerras documents, in the immediate aftermath of 
9/11, the Chinese tied Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang to al-Qaeda and other 
Islamic organizations in Central Asia, and the U.S. State Department helped 
lend credence to this assertion.112
 The Chinese government’s campaign against Xinjiang separatists, of 
course, started well before 9/11. Resistance to Chinese control of the prov-
ince on the part of the Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities and the 
movement for an independent Islamic republic started as early as the late 
1950s.113 Agitations for separation were stepped up in the early 1990s, when 
huawen wenxue zai zhonguo xuejie xingqi de jiqi yiyi” [The development of studies in world 
literature in Chinese and its implications].
 110. Rao points out that Chinese-language writings from outside of China contribute to an 
“integrated” conception of modern and contemporary Chinese literature and culture that em-
phasizes the unevenness of their interactions with different locales around the globe (“Haiwai 
huawen,” 7). Rao’s argument flows from a large number of studies of how Chinese-language 
writings outside the PRC speak to their specific contexts. 
 111. See Robert Bedeski, “Western China: Human Security and National Security,” 43; Mi-
chael Dillon, Xinjiang, 159.
 112. In 2002, the U.S., followed closely by the UN, formally classified ETIM (East Turkestan 
Independent Movement) as a terrorist organization after repeated lobbying from China. It, 
however, refused to recognize ETLO (East Turkestan Liberation Organization) as a terrorist 
organization in December 2003. Also, as Dru C. Gladney points out in “Islam in China,” the 
U.S. exercised pressure on Pakistan to return a Uyghur activist to China (458).
 113. Micheal Dillon provides a documentation of the major incidents of resistance in Xinji-
ang from the Khotan rising of December 1954 to the unrest in the mid-1990s. Bovingdon also 
documents several riots in the 1980s (“Autonomy in Xinjiang,” 7). Mackerras offers an account 
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the independence of the former Soviet republics (especially Kazakhastan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), along with the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan, 
precipitated the surge of militant Islam in Central Asia.114 Since then, the 
Chinese government has grown more concerned with the stability of the 
province for both political and economic reasons.115 No more than one 
month before 9/11, alleged incursions of Talibans into Xinjiang across the 
Afghanistan–China border drew many Chinese security forces.116 The con-
sensus that the two governments reached over the importance of fighting 
terror served to legitimize the criminalization and de facto racialization of 
Muslims occurring in both countries, each with a long history of wrestling 
with the religio-political tensions surrounding the presence of Islam. While 
the PRC has had to grapple with Uyghur secessionist activities since its ear-
liest days, the United States engaged in military and political interventions 
in the Middle East throughout the Cold War, which culminated in the first 
and second Iraq War, laying the seeds, at least in part, for 9/11. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991, which destabilized Central Asia and enabled a 
period of American unipolarity, served as a catalyst for the convergence of 
these two histories in the beginning of the new millennium. It is important, 
therefore, to examine the two histories in conjunction with each other. Chap-
ter 4 does this by juxtaposing two writers who help us form a comparative 
perspective on the ways in which Muslim communities challenge the secular 
configurations of multiculturalism in the two countries, while endowing the 
notions of terror and sacrifice stereotypically associated with Muslims with 
new, transformative meanings.
 This overview does not cover all the ways in which U.S. and Chinese 
multiculturalisms intersect in the contemporary period through translation 
and the work of fictional narratives. It does show, however, that they are 
of the Uyghur revolts since 1990 (China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation, 49–52). For a 
history of Xinjiang prior to the founding of the PRC in 1949, see Dillon, 8–22. Chinese control 
over what is today Xinjiang dates from the eighteenth century. During republican China, the 
GMD maintained weak control over the area through officials who virtually seceded from 
China and cooperated with Russia and then the Soviet Union. Attempts at independence dur-
ing this period resulted in the proclamation of an independent Islamic republic in two separate 
incidents and locations (Dillon 20–22). 
 114. See Meckarras, China’s Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation, 165–67. 
 115. Gladney explains that Uyghur separatism has serious consequences for the economy 
of the region, in the areas of oil production, foreign investment, and trade with China’s Central 
Asian neighbors (“Islam in China,” 458–59). Politically, Uyghur separatism continues to cause 
international pressure on China, eroding the credibility of the country’s claim to cultural plural-
ism (“Islam in China,” 460). Bovingdon reports a “political tightening” in the 1990s toward Xin-
jiang, which includes the yearly “strike hard” campaigns, periodical sweeps, and international 
offensives aimed to pressure China’s neighbors to crack down on Uyghur separatists (23–46).
 116. Gladney, “Islam in China,” 458.
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connected in complex ways that call for scholarly engagement. It also reveals 
the political stakes of comparing or translating between two different sets 
of ethno-racial politics, which can operate either as a mechanism of self-
legitimization or as an instrument of comparative critique, namely, the prac-
tice of intervening critically in more than one national context at once. The 
following chapters flesh out my account here by examining a specific set of 
narrative texts that shuttle between U.S. and Chinese multiculturalisms.
A n IMPOrTAnT glObAl  publishing event in 2008 was the release of The Wolf Totem, in North America, Europe, and 
the Asia Pacific simultaneously, Howard Goldblatt’s English trans-
lation of Chinese author Jiang Rong’s novel Lang Tuteng. As of 
now, the translation rights for the book have been agreed for more 
than 30 languages.1 A literary sensation in China when it came out 
in 2004, the novel fictionalizes the experiences of a small group 
of ethnic Han Chinese living in Inner Mongolia during the Cul-
tural Revolution. In the novel, the affiliation they cultivate with 
the local Mongols allows them to develop a critique of the Chi-
nese government’s irresponsible economic policies in Inner Mon-
golia, designated as the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in
 1. Shu jinyu, “Jiemi Lang Tuteng banquan shuchu shenhua” [Decoding the 
successful handling of publishing rights for Lang Tuteng].
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How not to Be an empire
On Conciliatory Multiculturalism
Whatever it is, paperback fiction is of our time: it is ours. . . . What-
ever we say about these books, in the whole stretch of time between 
the big bang and the final whimper these are some of the only sto-
ries that will ever have understood us.
—Thomas J. roberts, the Aesthetics of Junk Fiction
Historically, China has eschewed the route taken by classical colo-
nial powers. It has not sent its armies to distant countries, but has 
focused instead on regions it considered as part of its territory, 
including Tibet and Taiwan. In this regard, China is imitating the 
United States.
—John Perkins, the secret History of the American Empire
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1947.2 What makes the novel a global bestseller seems to have much to do 
with its political ambiguity. The New York Times reviewer Pankaj Mishra 
marvels at the “indictment of Chinese imperialism” left intact in both the 
original and the English translation.3 In China, by contrast, the wildly popu-
lar book has often been read as a cry for a muscular Chinese nationalism that 
borrows from the history of the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Mongol 
empire, which ruled China for almost a hundred years. The novel’s ambigu-
ous relationship with imperialism has no doubt helped it gain acceptance 
from readers across a broad political spectrum. What is less noticed about 
this book, but equally important, is its comparative dimension, especially its 
invocation of the kind of naturalist, racialist discourse often associated with 
the writings of Jack London, an author alluded to in the novel as a favorite 
for the Han Chinese characters. The London allusions, as we will see, implic-
itly construct American parallels to some of the problems in contemporary 
China that the novel explores.
 The Mongol empire and its modern “descendants,” Mongolia (Mongolia 
People’s Republic until 1992) and Inner Mongolia, are also the subject of 
an American novel published around the same time. Clive Cussler’s 2006 
adventure novel Treasure of Khan features Dirk Pitt, a marine engineer and 
adventurer, who defeats a present-day Mongolian mogul scheming to control 
world oil prices. Both China and the United States, along with Mongolia, 
Russia, and Middle Eastern Arab nations, figure as important players on 
global energy markets in the novel. While the United States is portrayed 
as particularly efficacious in tackling the threat of a looming energy cri-
sis, China is criticized for having sought, though in vain, to secure oil and 
other natural resources through policies that are exploitive toward its ethnic 
minorities. In the middle of the novel, the protagonist and his sidekick take a 
significant detour into the Gobi Desert, running into a local Mongol who had 
been forced to cross the border from Inner Mongolia, where overdevelop-
ment had ruined the environment and the locals’ traditional livelihoods. Just 
as Lang Tuteng invokes London (and other references) to suggest historical 
precedents for the novel’s proposal for reinvigorating Chinese nationalism, 
 2. It was the first provincial-level autonomous government to be established. Inner Mon-
golia had been incorporated into Chinese provinces under the Qing Dynasty. According to 
Mackerras, the Japanese attempt to set up puppet regimes in the eastern parts of the region 
came to an end with their defeat in World War II. Soon afterward, the CCP out-maneuvered 
the other political players in the region, declaring that Inner Mongolia would be reunited on 
the basis of “autonomy of equality,” which “could be realized only with the leadership and help 
of the CCP (Mackerras, China’s Minorities, 103). The new autonomous region was set on July 1, 
1947.
 3. Pankaj Mishra, “Call of the Wild.”
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Treasure of Khan juxtaposes China and the United States in its comments 
on how big states should conduct themselves to compete for resources with-
out incurring charges of imperialism. Treasure of Khan was translated into 
Chinese in 2008, the fifth of the Cussler novels to be introduced to Chinese 
readers.
 That the two novels appeared around the same time says something sig-
nificant. As they both compare how contemporary America and China relate 
to the historical Mongol empire, Treasure of Khan and Lang Tuteng under-
score the parallel ways in which the two countries figure in post–Cold War 
discourses of empire. The idea that the United States should be understood 
as an empire since its inception started to take hold in academic and popular 
discourses in the early 1990s, at a time when China began to be perceived as 
a key threat to U.S. power.4 The prominent roles they play in the global com-
petition for natural resources in the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
an issue that grounds both novels, has further fueled perceptions of the two 
countries as competing empires. Rodrigue Tremblay, for example, used the 
stark phrase of the “new American Empire” as a rubric under which to study 
“the explosive links between religion, partisan-politics, and oil” that formed 
in the United States after the Cold War.5 He traces the roots of the Iraq War, 
in a large part, to the 2001 Bush–Cheney energy policy, which “aimed to 
stabilize the Middle-East, militarily, and sought to insure the control of enor-
mous crude oil reserves, both known and unexplored, not only in Iraq but 
also throughout the Middle-East.”6 Michael Klare concurs, condemning the 
same policy for endorsing America’s “prodigious oil habit” and “perpetual 
dependence on Persian Gulf oil,” an endorsement that necessitated identify-
ing Saddam Hussein as the biggest threat to American national interest in 
the Persian Gulf and the 2003 Iraq War.7 The United States is certainly not 
the only country under heat for embarking on imperialist practices in search 
of energy and other natural resources. China has been increasingly criticized 
for engaging in a kind of “global activism” to ensure access to oil, which 
often entails offering loans and aid to governments of oil-rich developing 
countries without the conditions that Western countries often attach to such 
packages.8 As Klare points out, China recently entered the race for energy in 
the Persian Gulf and other areas against the United States and Russia, in a 
 4. See, for example, Bill Gertz, The China Threat. For more on the discourses of the U.S. 
and China as two competing empires in the post–Cold War era, see the Preface.
 5. Rodrigue Tremblay, The New American Empire, 12.
 6. Ibid., 90.
 7. Michael Klare, Blood and Oil, 74.
 8. Joshua Kurlantzick, “Beijing’s Safari,” 2.
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way that revives the geopolitical competition—power politics exercised for 
control over territory, natural resources, and other economic and military 
advantages—characteristic of the Cold War years.9 The Chinese government 
has also been criticized for extracting resources, not just oil, from minority 
regions in the country’s borderlands, including Inner Mongolia, a location 
featured centrally in both of the novels discussed here. Evan Osnos, a foreign 
correspondent of the Chicago Tribune, wrote an award-winning three-part 
series, titled “China’s Great Grab,” for the paper in 2006.10 Aside from pre-
dicting a “coming fight for oil” that will embroil China and the United States 
in a new “Great Game of global strategy,” Osnos detailed the environmental 
consequences of decades of irresponsible development in Inner Mongolia 
since the Mao era, which had culminated in the almost unregulated mass 
production of cashmere. Chinese environmental authorities started to stem 
overgrazing and desertification, but the belated effort may well fail to undo 
the damage.11
 With all the echoes of contemporary political discourses in them, Trea-
sure of Khan and Lang Tuteng belong to the kind of fiction that, as Thomas J. 
Roberts believes, derives its value from being “time-bounded.”12 The fiction 
that Roberts refers to, of course, is “junk fiction,” his name for genre fiction 
or popular fiction. He believes that this body of fiction unfolds like a net that 
catches bits and pieces of everyday speech and the ongoing concerns and 
obsessions of a nation, and its deliberate allusions to and invocations of the 
present convey a deep understanding of the age that produces it, thus offer-
ing a vast number of readers a comforting image of themselves. This argu-
ment, to be sure, captures an important feature of popular fiction, a label, 
as I discuss more extensively later, that is apt for both Treasure of Khan and 
Lang Tuteng. However, since almost all fiction addresses a kind of newspaper 
reality, “an image of reality we put together from all the sources reporting on 
events we do not actually see for ourselves,” to point out the time-bounded-
ness of popular fiction does not quite explain the particular cultural work 
that popular fiction performs and the distinct pleasure it generates.13 This 
chapter does not seek to address these questions in a systematic manner, but 
it does offer a few new clues to possible answers by examining the ways in 
which popular fiction speaks to the related questions of empire, nationalism, 
 9. Klare, 147.
 10. Evan Osnos, “China’s Great Grab.” The Asia Society in New York City awarded Osnos 
the Osborn Elliott Prize for Excellence in Journalism on Asia in April 2007. See “Asia Society 
Awards Osborn Elliott Journalism Prize to Evan Osnos.”
 11. Osnos, December 16, 19, 2006.
 12. Thomas J. Roberts, An Aesthetics of Junk Fiction, 11.
 13. Ibid., 13.
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and multiculturalism. The two novels studied here, I argue, demonstrate that 
popular fiction has a crucial role to play in mediating the relations among 
these concepts in a given national context.
 Cussler and Jiang acknowledge the imperialist undertones of the domes-
tic and foreign policies espoused in contemporary America and China, 
respectively. At the same time, however, they disavow the same observations 
by attributing an idealized pluralist tradition to the two nations. The two 
novels’ extensive invocations of the Mongol empire and its various premod-
ern and modern analogues serve as convenient foils for the legitimacy of the 
U.S. and Chinese nationalisms that they imagine. Cussler repudiates mod-
ern equivalents of the Mongol empire while distancing the contemporary 
United States from them; in comparison, Jiang articulates the belief that the 
Han Chinese have been historically influenced by Mongol culture and will 
continue to draw upon the latter, in a way that will forge a strong, cultur-
ally hybrid Chinese nationalism without perpetuating the imperial legacies 
of Genghis Khan. The two authors are strikingly similar in their politics. I 
argue that the narrative politics of these novels illustrates the formal logic 
of conciliatory multiculturalism (a term, as I argue in chapter 1, that can 
encompass both China’s official multiculturalism and U.S. liberal multicul-
turalism), which functions to create national unity through largely rhetorical 
or symbolic means, projecting an image of ethno-racial harmony without 
striving concretely toward this goal by tackling the political, cultural, and 
psychic causes for the inequalities among different ethno-racial groups. Both 
the Chinese and American varieties of conciliatory multiculturalism depend 
on casting ethno-racial tensions within a state and, by extension, cultural 
and ideological conflicts between states, as having always and already been 
reconciled under a form of liberal or measured nationalism, which is posited 
as naturally distinct from imperialism. Conciliatory multiculturalism, then, 
is poised somewhere between recognizing and disavowing ethno-racial ten-
sions, between engaging in cultural and political critique and justifying exist-
ing power structures. Its ambiguous logic is encapsulated in the formal and 
political oscillation that we will see in Cussler and Jiang. In the meantime, 
they also show that the sustainability of this logic depends profoundly on 
comparative narratives. The juxtaposition of American and Chinese histo-
ries in the two novels is constitutive of the ways in which they reconcile the 
political and social tensions internal to the two countries. Allusions to China 
play a key role in Cussler’s project of reimagining America as a restrained 
moral power in the world, just as interpretations of American history and 
culture are integral to Jiang’s portrayal of China in a similar light. In other 
words, U.S.–China comparisons allow the two authors to uphold the political 
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legitimacy of contemporary American and Chinese nationalisms without a 
thorough critical examination of their imperialist excess. Both novels, there-
fore, reconcile social critique with endorsing the status quo, marked by a 
pattern of political and formal vacillation that gives them a broad, centrist 
appeal. In fact, we can argue that their popularity is an index to their formal 
and political proximity to conciliatory multiculturalism.
 I start my analysis that follows by situating the two novels within U.S. 
representations of ethnic issues in China and Chinese representations of race 
relations in America, to show that Jiang and Cussler, in interweaving two 
national contexts, at once continue and update the pattern of comparisons 
found in these other texts. I then offer a reading of the two novels, with a 
focus on the relationship between the U.S.–China comparisons they engage 
in and their conceptions of multiculturalism and nationalism.
An impulse for Comparison
Treasure of Khan and Lang Tuteng are not two isolated texts. They are pre-
ceded by many popular texts, from both China and the United States, that 
concern themselves with ethnic and racial issues in the other nation. These 
texts do not engage in explicit comparisons of the two countries, as do Cussler 
and Jiang and a few other authors discussed in this book. However, many 
are covertly comparative in that they criticize one nation without reflecting 
on the other, thus implicitly holding up the latter as a standard. It is these 
implicit comparisons that, in most cases, more powerfully shape the cultural 
unconscious of the two nations. They constitute a variation on the pattern of 
accusatory comparisons that, as I point out in the Introduction, functions to 
polarize the two countries in terms of their ethnic and racial policies. We can 
very well say that Cussler and Jiang, by interweaving the United States and 
China in their narratives, bring to surface the comparative impulse inherent 
in many post–Cold War cultural representations.
 The end of the Cold War era was punctured by a few dramatic devel-
opments that thrust China into the center of media attention in America. 
Coverage of the Chinese government’s suppression of the student protests in 
1989, accompanied by images of ordinary Chinese confronting army tanks, 
portrayed an authoritarian style of government oddly impervious to politi-
cal reform. Criticism of the government’s treatment of ethnic autonomous 
regions came to a head around the same time, as a series of violent anti-Chi-
nese protests erupted in Tibet between 1987 and 1989, prompting the gov-
ernment to impose martial law in Lhasa in mid-1989. The year 1989 is also 
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when the Dalai Lama won the Nobel Peace Prize, marking a high point in his 
international campaign since the 1980s for greater autonomy for Tibet. The 
ensuing decade, not surprisingly, saw a consistent cultural offensive in the 
United States in support of the Dalai Lama. The Franco-American film Seven 
Years in Tibet (1993) is based on the eponymous memoir, first published in 
1957, by Heinrich Harrer, an Austrian mountaineer who was imprisoned by 
the British while mountaineering in India in 1939 and escaped across the 
border to Tibet in 1944.14 In a significant departure from the book, the film 
shows Harrer evolving emotionally under the influence of Tibetan culture, 
while playing up the level of violence involved in China’s invasion of Tibet 
in 1950. The film became the first of a series of controversial cinematic rep-
resentations of Tibet to receive angry reactions from the Chinese govern-
ment. Martin Scorsese’s Kundun, a biographical film of Dalai Lama spanning 
between 1937 and 1953, came out a few months afterwards, eliciting the 
same response from the Chinese government, which banned the director 
and scriptwriter from entering China.15 Paul Wagner’s Windhorse (1998) is 
set in a more recent Tibet, depicting three young Tibetans who sacrifice 
their careers and lives in protesting against the Chinese government.16 Even 
though only Seven Years in Tibet is explicitly narrated from the perspective 
of a foreigner, with all three of these films, the process of filmmaking itself 
came to figure as a form of humanitarian intervention. The official website 
for Windhorse, tellingly, carries a story about the making of the film, which 
involved one week of secret filming in Lhasa.17 The filmmakers pretended 
to be tourists to fool the Chinese secret police and the spies working for the 
Chinese government, who would suddenly swoop down on anyone look-
ing even slightly suspicious. The making of the film, thus, became a kind of 
counterspying, an act of humanitarian heroism.
 The righteousness of the Western “spy,” while frequently assumed, does 
not go unquestioned. After the most recent riots in Lhasa on March 14, 2008, 
the Western media (CNN included) found itself faced with pointed criticism 
launched from the Chinese blogsphere and YouTube, where instances of mis-
reporting and inappropriate image editing were cited as evidence that the 
Western media had stooped to political propaganda in its eagerness to sup-
port the Tibetan exile government’s claim that the riots began as a response 
to the Chinese military police’s attack on monks protesting peacefully out-
side a monastery in Lhasa and that the police fired guns at the rioters. These 
 14. Jean-Jacques Annaud, John H. Williams, and Iain Smith, Seven Years in Tibet.
 15. Barbara De Fina, Kundun.
 16. Paul Wagner, Windhorse.
 17. “About Windhorse.”
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criticisms prompted Nicholas Kristof to write a column in the New York 
Times that invited readers to air any grievances they might have over the U.S. 
media coverage of the event. He refused to fully endorse these criticisms, 
however, pointing out that the Chinese, not unlike Americans, tend to be 
oblivious to “how [their] own country is perceived abroad” and how their 
nationalism negatively impacts ethnic others.18
 Kristof ’s statement is not unfair. Chinese-language writers are not 
immune from one-sided criticism. Their comments on race relations in the 
United States are hardly ever placed in the context of race relations in China. 
Writings by new immigrants from the PRC, which started flourishing in 
the mid-1980s and quickly reached Chinese-speaking audiences on both 
sides of the Pacific, often center on the problem of racial discrimination in 
the United States, a theme also explored in many of the Chinese American 
writings that have been translated into Chinese (Kingston, Chin, etc.). While 
Chinese immigrant writings from the 1980s and early 1990s tended to focus 
on the vicissitudes of immigrant struggles to survive, since then we have 
seen a slew of more assertive writings that consciously explore and critique 
the politics of race in American culture.19 Shi Yu’s novella Daofeng xia de 
mangdian [The blind spot beneath the scalpel], published in 2006, is set in 
Dallas, where a female immigrant Chinese plastic surgeon is scapegoated 
in an inexplicable surgical accident.20 The novella shows that both her race 
and gender make her an easy target for the false accusation of medical mal-
practice, cranked up to protect the real culprits, who turn out to be powerful 
political figures. It devotes a few passages to making the point that the female 
doctor’s experience illustrates the various symptoms of the marginalization 
of the Chinese in American society, which has contributed to the develop-
ment of an ethnic Chinese consciousness. The film Guasha, which became 
one of the best-received films in China in 2001 and was adapted into an 
eponymous novel in the same year, depicts a Chinese immigrant couple in 
St. Louis who find themselves at the center of a lawsuit after an American 
doctor mistook a traditional Chinese treatment, guasha, performed on the 
couple’s child, for a form of physical abuse.21 The couple’s American dream is 
 18. Nicholas Kristof, “Calling China.”
 19. The most influential work in the early type of Chinese immigrant writings is Glen Cao’s 
novel Beijing Ren zai Niuyue [A Beijinger in New York]. It was adapted into a TV drama in 
China in 1993 and translated into English in the same year), which tells of a Chinese musician 
couple trying to striking it rich in New York. The novel offers a formulaic message that pits 
the East against the West, family stability against individualistic struggles for business success, 
social status, and sexual gratification, which reinforce familiar narratives about divides.
 20. Shi Yu, Daofeng xia de mangdian.
 21. Xiaoping Wang, Guasha [The guasha treatment]; Wang Zhongjun, Guasha [The guasha 
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put on hold as they grapple with cultural prejudices against Chinese notions 
of medicine and family. These popular narratives, among many other exam-
ples, commonly feature an enterprising or accomplished Chinese immigrant 
trying to penetrate the higher echelons of American society. If American 
representations of minority issues in China, especially those in Tibet, con-
struct the image of the American humanitarian spy, Chinese American and 
Chinese immigrant depictions of racial discrimination in the United States 
proffer a Chinese counterpart. The Chinese spy is of course a prominent 
figure in American politics,22 but in popular Chinese-language writings and 
films about the Chinese experience in the United States, the trope of the Chi-
nese “spy” takes the alternative form of a struggling immigrant who uncovers 
the hidden prejudices and racial barriers in American society in a process 
of voluntary or forced assimilation. These popular representations are not 
unrelentingly critical, as they often portray the United States as a veritable 
land of freedom and opportunities; the film Guasha, for example, ends with 
the American prosecutor’s realization of his mistake and the reversal of a 
court order separating the child from his father, signaling the possibility of 
cross-cultural understanding. Nevertheless, disaffection with anti-Asian and 
other forms of racism in these texts seldom leads to a broader critique of the 
workings of racial and ethnic difference in China or other national contexts.
 Treasure of Khan and Lang Tuteng have much in common with the popu-
lar texts just listed and, by openly juxtaposing the United States and China, 
make explicit the impulse toward a negative mode of comparison that under-
lies the other texts. This impulse registers in the two novels in a modulated 
form, for neither simply reduces the other nation into a foil for one’s own. 
They instead express certain ambivalence toward both the United States and 
China for the way they handle ethnic and international relations in pursu-
ing economic and national security interests. This modulation, however, is 
carefully circumscribed. Ultimately, the novels neutralize their own critique 
by detaching the object of their critique from imperialist excess, while pro-
jecting it onto the other nation. The U.S.–China comparisons staged in the 
novels remain shackled in unproductive negativity. Both authors deserve a 
close look in this chapter for their complex, though perhaps unsophisticated, 
maneuvers.
treatment].
 22. The most widely known case is that of Los Alamos physicist Wen Ho Li, who was ac-
cused of espionage in 1999 but eventually pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of mishandling 
computer files. In 2005, a federal judge threw out charges against Katrina Leung, another high-
profile Chinese American, for taking classified documents. Also see Gertz.
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Treasure Unwanted
Clive Cussler has authored more than thirty-six adventure novels, most of 
which appeared on the New York Times bestseller list when first published. 
Treasure of Khan was the nineteenth installment of a popular series that cen-
ters on the heroic deeds of Dirk Pitt, a marine engineer and adventurer. The 
Dirk Pitt series blends several subgenres that fall under adventure, frequently 
interweaving political intrigue, treasure hunting, wreckage excavation, 
exploration of exotic locales, and male romance. In a way, it bears out the 
worldly tradition of American genre fiction. As Bruce Robbins has argued, 
it is in such popular genres as the adventure novel, science fiction, and the 
political thriller that “the planet as a totality has become widely perceptible” 
to American readers.23 Pitt, the protagonist, often finds himself triumphing, 
through daring and technological acumen, over villains bent on diaboli-
cal, world-harming schemes. The series, however, is notable among Ameri-
can adventure novels for its unapologetic political overtones that betray the 
surprising endurance of the East–West opposition as a dominant cultural 
trope. Several parts of the series have Pitt defend American national security 
against the threat posed by rogue regimes and terrorist or criminal organi-
zations originating in East Asia. They parade a set of orientalist figures and 
narrative conventions that can be traced back to the pulp fiction and comic 
strips of the 1930s, including, in particular, Buck Rogers’s struggle to rid the 
future world of Han/Mongol hordes and Flash Gordon’s battles with warlord 
Ming the Merciless on the planet Mongo. In Dragon (1990), for example, 
Dirk Pitt defeats a group of terrorists seeking to restore Japan’s imperial glory 
and destroy the U.S. economy by planting nuclear bombs on American soil. 
Flood Tide (1997) has Pitt rescue illegal immigrants from a Chinese tycoon 
based in Hong Kong and race against the Chinese government to locate the 
fictional sunken ship containing the lost bones of the Peking Man (an exam-
ple of the Homo Erectus excavated in Zhoukoudian, China, during the first 
half of the twentieth century), which can purportedly be used to bolster the 
chauvinist view that the human race originated in China rather than Africa. 
Black Wind (2007), the installment immediately preceding Treasure of Khan, 
revolves around Pitt’s battle with a North Korean secret agent who, with the 
help of a Japanese communist terrorist group, plots to wage a biological war 
on the United States as a way of pressing for the reunification of the Korean 
peninsula.
 Treasure of Khan exemplifies this political strain in Cussler, but also 
 23. Bruce Robbins, “The Worlding of the American Novel,” 15.
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places an interesting twist on it. Pitt has defended American interests not 
only against foreign threats but also against what the novel implies as the com-
promising of the nation’s claim to a liberal tradition in both domestic and 
international realms. Published at a critical juncture, when American power 
and moral status in the world were both undermined, I argue, the novel reg-
isters an eagerness to restore the nation, as well as the adventure genre, to a 
former state of moral certitude. The seasoned American hero who frequently 
intervenes in the politics of other countries while defending his own is sub-
jected in the novel to some scrutiny, the legitimacy of his actions implicitly 
challenged but ultimately affirmed as they are distinguished from the impe-
rialist quests that his antagonists, including a fictional China, engage in.
 In Treasure of Khan, as in Cussler’s earlier novels, Dirk Pitt works for a 
government agency named the National Underwater and Marine Agency 
(NUMA), which has an eponymous real-life counterpart that depends mostly 
on royalties from Cussler’s books. Having recently been promoted to head 
the agency, Pitt now appears in Siberia, on a Russian research vessel, involved 
in a joint Russian–American scientific survey of Lake Baikal’s uncharted cur-
rent flows. Pitt and his American and Russian colleagues detect an underwa-
ter landslide that sends huge killer waves across the lake toward the fishing 
village on the shore. Pitt and his friend Al Giordino rescue from the waves 
the occupants of an oil survey vessel, employed by a Mongolian oil company 
called Avarga Oil Consortium. During the night following the rescue, how-
ever, the members of the oil survey team are abducted by mysterious agents 
working for the owner of Avarga Oil, Tolgoi Borjin. After some detective 
work, Pitt and Giordino find their way to Borjin’s headquarters and dis-
cover that Borjin has been using a German device that creates sound waves 
to produce seismic waves deep underwater, which can then be “recorded 
and processed by computer modeling to develop a subsurface image.”24 It is 
revealed that Borjin uses this technology to do two things: first, search for 
oil-trapping geographical formations under the sea; second, induce artificial 
earthquakes to destroy major terminals of crude oil, such as Ras Tamura 
in Saudi Arabia, so as to raise the value of his own oil export. Eventually, 
Pitt and Giordino infiltrate Bjorjin’s palace for the second time, destroy the 
earthquake device along with the palace, and succeed in rescuing surviving 
members of the oil survey team. In a final one-on-one showdown, Pitt kills 
Borjin after luckily dodging death at the hands of his enemy, therefore avert-
ing a “global depression” that can result from the oil panic that Bjorjin sought 
to create.25
 24. Clive Cussler, with Dirk Cussler, Treasure of Khan, 403.
 25. Ibid., 539.
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 Walter Nash points out that every action-packed thriller involves a 
problem “big enough” for the hero to solve.26 I would argue, however, that 
it inevitably presents itself with an even bigger problem, namely, how to pre-
vent the hero from turning into a villain in the process of solving a specific 
problem.27 In Treasure of Khan, where the specific problem confronting the 
hero—how to stem the perpetuation of the evils of empire in the contempo-
rary period—is a deeply political one, and the accompanying meta-problem 
has particularly higher stakes. How does Dirk Pitt avoid, in the process of 
fighting the oil tycoon Borjin, turning into a de facto agent for the American 
quest for foreign sources of energy? The novel accomplishes this task in two 
related ways. First, it presents the hero as only partially representative of the 
U.S. government. Second, it defends the U.S. government itself against the 
charge that it engages in imperialist practices motivated by energy needs by 
imagining an alternative, foreign-oil-independent America and distinguish-
ing it firmly from the various forms of empire imagined in the novel. The 
construction of an alternative America is simultaneously a critique of the real 
America and a reassertion of America’s claim to liberal political ideals.
 In its real-life version, NUMA is not affiliated with the U.S. govern-
ment. As advertised on its website, NUMA is a “501C3 non-profit, volunteer 
foundation” specializing in “preserving [the American] maritime heritage 
through the discovery, archaeological survey and conservation of shipwreck 
artifacts.”28 The foundation’s projects include identifying shipwrecks and 
other historically significant artifacts (including cruise liners, passenger lin-
ers, freighters, gunboats, ironclads, and downed aircraft lost in wars, includ-
ing the Civil War and World War II, among others), usually off the east coast 
of America and along transatlantic routes. The fictional version of NUMA, 
as we see in Treasure of Khan, extends its arms not only across the Pacific 
but into central and northern Asia as well. As a government agency, the fic-
tional NUMA embarks on maritime projects that are shown to be central to 
the American national interest. Its members, however, act as often on their 
own counsel as on government orders, symbolically maintaining a certain 
critical distance from the various evils and inefficiencies associated with the 
government. Pitt and Giordino, for instance, decide to enter Borjin’s palace 
 26. Walter Nash, Language in Popular Fiction, 68.
 27. The best existing studies of popular fiction present their subject as formally innovative 
narratives that address in complex “serious” literature and surrounding cultural discourses 
through intense intertexuality. See Roberts, Nash, and Harriett Hawkins, Classics and Trash. For 
studies of the psychological and sociological dimensions of the experience of reading popular 
fiction, see Janice Radway, A Feeling for Books.
 28. “About NUMA.”
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for the second time without contacting the local American embassy because 
they believe that “[d]iplomacy ain’t going to work in this case.”29
 If the novel’s heroes are NUMA and the U.S. government, its “bad guys” 
are outmoded or disintegrating empires and weak states hijacked by oligar-
chic power. The novel opens with a long prologue that juxtaposes two his-
torical vignettes. The first is a description of the Mongols’ attack on Hakata 
Bay, Japan, in 1281, when the Mongol empire reached its zenith. The Mon-
gols were defeated by the Japanese counterattack, miraculously aided by a 
sudden storm, to which the Japanese would later refer as “kami” (the divine 
wind). The crushing defeat that led to the decline of the Mongol empire in 
the opening vignette is followed by a tale that symbolizes the resurrection of 
this imperial legacy. It is set in the 1930s, during the early stages of the Sino–
Japanese war. A fictional British archaeologist, Leigh Hunt, is heading an 
excavation project in the city of Shang-du (in northern China), the location 
of the relics of Genghis Khan’s Palace of Great Harmony. Hunt literally stum-
bles upon the long-lost map for the treasure buried at the tomb of Genghis 
Khan. Although Hunt seeks to take possession of the map, it is stolen by 
his local Mongol assistant Tsendyn, which Hunt does not realize until right 
before his death in a plane crash on his way from Shang-du to Ulanbataar 
(Ulan Bator). Tsendyn, as it turns out in the novel, passed the secret map 
on to his son, none other than the evil Borjin. The unearthing of the secret 
map sets in motion the main plot of the novel, serving clearly as the novel’s 
metaphor for the persistence of empire into contemporary times.30 The death 
of Hunt sounds an ironic elegy to British colonialism in Asia, while Tsendyn 
and his offspring, the genealogically “legitimate” heirs of Khan, appropri-
ate and extend the heritage of the Mongol empire in what the novel por-
trays as a perverse manner. We learn later in the novel that the excavation of 
Khan’s treasure enables the rise of Borjin’s oligarchic power in present-day 
 29. Cussler, Treasure of Khan, 405.
 30. How to define empire has become an unavoidably contentious matter in the contempo-
rary academy. For a useful overview of premodern empires, see Susan Alcock et al., eds., Em-
pires. The edited volume allows for diverging definitions of empire, which may or may not take 
the Roman polity of the first century c.e. as the archetype of all empires (Alcock, 125). Some 
of the contributing authors, however, prefer a more detailed, narrower definition. See Barfield 
and Schreider, for example, who define empires in terms of specific attributes, including being 
“organized to handle [cultural] diversity” and “[maintaining] sovereignty over all people and 
territories in their realms” (Alcock, 71). Empire, of course, has continued on from premoder-
nity. Modern, or capitalism, imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century gave 
way, after the age of decolonization, to the American empire and what Hardt and Negri, in their 
work Empire, describe as the deterritorialized, post–Fordist Empire that cannot be equated with 
the power of one sovereignty state. China, in the meantime, is often seen as an anomalous relic 
of premodern, territorial empires that has lurched into the post–Cold War era.
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Mongolia, allowing him to go as far as controlling Mongolia’s foreign poli-
cies. Borjin had discovered the precise location of Khan’s tomb and had built 
the headquarters of Avarga Oil, or his “palace,” at the site. He has been selling 
parts of the treasure to foreign buyers to finance his oil exploration. Coveting 
oil reserves in Inner Mongolia, an ethnic autonomous region in present-day 
China that was divided from Mongolia, or the Mongolian People’s Republic, 
when the latter achieved independence from Republican China (with the aid 
of the Soviets) in 1921, Borjin utilizes the German device to destroy major 
oil terminals in the world to create a severe pinch on China’s oil import. 
Having achieved that, Borjin claims to have access to rich oil reserves that he 
is willing to sell to the Chinese if they allow Inner Mongolia to secede from 
China and reunite with Mongolia. In an unlikely turn of the plot, Borjin acts 
as a “broker” between the Chinese and Mongolian governments, arranging 
for the “Mongolian Autonomous Republic”—Cussler’s name for the “Inner 
Mongolian Autonomous Region”—to rejoin “its rightful place as part of the 
greater Mongolia.”31 The Chinese, then, are virtually giving up a vast terri-
tory for oil that will come from this very place. The novel attributes a kind of 
ironic justice to Borjin’s shenanigan. After their first encounter with Borjin, 
Pitt and Giordino narrowly escape his palace and wander unknowingly into 
the Gobi desert surrounding it. They become acquainted with migrants from 
Inner Mongolia, pushed out by the “Chinese bureaucrats” who had com-
mandeered all the Mongolian land “without regard to its natural balance.”32 
Through Pitt and Giordino’s observations, the novel critiques the PRC’s pol-
icy toward Inner Mongolia, for the insufficient autonomy it offers and its 
disrespect for the nomadic culture of the Mongols. It is only fair that they 
lose Inner Mongolia. Within the same sequence, Pitt and Giordino also take 
a jibe at the Soviets, mentioning that Russia dominated Mongolia’s cultural 
and ideological identity for most part of the twentieth century.33 China and 
the Soviet Union are both presented in the novel as outmoded empires that 
have disintegrated or are doomed to fall apart.
 Significantly, Treasure of Khan does not present Borjin as someone right-
ing modern colonial wrongs committed by both the West and Mongolia’s 
neighboring empires. Borjin, the villain, clearly uses the rhetoric of Mongo-
lian nationalism as a cloak for his own pursuit of power. Punishing both Bor-
jin and his opponents, the novel attacks what it perceives as contemporary 
forms of empire (modern China, the Soviet Union, and Borjin’s nonstate oil 
empire) for their pursuit of economic and cultural dominance, both symbol-
 31. Cussler, Treasure of Khan, 275.
 32. Ibid., 321.
 33. Ibid., 334.
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ized in the novel by the images of drilling and archeological excavation. The 
power struggle between what the novel considers to be lingering territorial 
empires and organized criminal networks that take root in weak states, rep-
resented by Mongolia in this case, may very well be read as a projection of 
the post-9/11 American obsession with global terrorism unto China.
 Juxtaposed with the evil empires of the novel’s post–Cold War world is the 
perfect liberal nation represented by the fictional America. At the end of the 
novel, the president of Mongolia extends his gratitude to Pitt and the rest of 
the NUMA team for “rescuing Genghis for all posterity.”34 The president also 
takes Pitt’s advice that, once the government starts to collect revenues from 
the new oil fields developed in Inner Mongolia, which China has irreversibly 
acceded to Mongolia, the profit should “go to the people who need it most.”35 
As the president puts it, “Indeed, we’ve taken a lesson from your own state of 
Alaska. A portion of the revenues will be distributed to every man, woman, 
and child in the country. The remainder will support the state’s expansion of 
health, education, and infrastructure. Borjin has taught us that not a dime 
of profits will end up in the hands of an individual, I can assure you.”36 The 
president’s speech here projects an idealized image of American nationalism 
as a template for Mongolia to follow. The fictional America here reconciles a 
New Deal era commitment to social welfare with the more socially conserva-
tive belief in small government. It is a perfect blend, in other words, of pre- 
and post-Reagan America.37 It is an ideal embodiment of liberal nationalism, 
underlined by a state of equilibrium between justice and equality on the one 
hand and freedom and individual rights on the other. It has figured out, 
miraculously, how to employ state power to the benefit of the redistribution 
of wealth while containing the power within certain limits. The oil drilling 
in Alaska, unlike Borjin’s plans to drill in Inner Mongolia, is romanticized in 
the novel, presented as a condition for this liberal nationalism. It is an alter-
native kind of drilling that enhances, through the mediation of the govern-
ment, the well-being of the entire nation rather than special interests. We can 
see that, even as the practices of excavation and drilling figure in the novel as 
 34. Ibid., 536.
 35. Ibid., 537.
 36. Ibid., 537–538.
 37. It is commonly agreed upon that the modern U.S. welfare state was established with the 
passage of the Social Security Act in the 1930s. See Joel Blau, Dynamics of Social Welfare His-
tory in the United States. New Deal liberalism gave way to a more muted form of liberalism in 
the Cold War era, reinvigorated through the Great Society programs in the 1960s. Since 1969, 
however, reactions against the Great Society programs have largely prevailed, and, as a result, 
“the potential for an activist social welfare policy and an expansive social work practice has 
shrunk” (Blau, 274).
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metaphors for the continuation of the legacies of a premodern empire in the 
contemporary period, they become something else when associated with the 
operations of NUMA, the various levels of government in the U.S, and U.S. 
allies. The same operations come to signify scientific research, the exposure 
of historical “truth,” and, as we have seen, the redistribution of resources, 
thus indicating substantial differences between contemporary configurations 
of empire and what NUMA and the United States stand for in the novel.
 The question of drilling for oil in Alaska is directly addressed in ear-
lier parts of the novel. After the destruction of several key oil terminals in 
the world at the hands of Borjin’s minions, the novel moves to a Goldman 
Sachs conference room, where a few analysts discuss the impact of a pos-
sible “oil shock” on the American economy.38 Oil markets specialist Jan 
Clayton lauds the previous administration’s approval of drilling in the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), which had been allowed to “[run] at full 
capacity.”39 He expresses the belief that, along with an expanded Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve, oil drilling in ANWR helps defend the country from 
fluctuations on the world oil market, which the novel presents as vulner-
able to disruption by criminal and terrorist networks. Through the Goldman 
Sachs passage, the novel takes a questionable stand on the thorny issue of 
access to oil reserves in ANWR. Drilling for oil in Alaska’s wilderness pre-
serve has remained a political controversy since the 1979 oil shock, and, as 
of today, no plans for drilling have actually been approved. The novel, as we 
can see, justifies its implicit advocacy for opening ANWR for oil drilling by 
exaggerating its importance for national security. The president in the novel 
is a “no-nonsense populist from Montana,” aided by a wise vice president 
who had formerly headed NUMA.40 Upon hearing the news of the destruc-
tion of several oil terminals in the Middle East (all as a result of Borjin’s sabo-
tage), the president immediately decides to call for voluntary gas rationing 
and announce the possibility of instituting mandatory fuel rationing, besides 
raising the terrorist threat advisory for all U.S. ports. The vice president, in 
the meantime, points out confidently that the fully operating “Alaska pipe-
line” will relieve the impact of oil shortage on the domestic market even 
though it cannot affect the global price of oil significantly.41
 The novel’s proposal for strengthening the ability of the United States to 
defend itself against global oil crises closely follows the Bush energy policy, 
announced in May 2001, which included a proposal to increase domestic 
 38. Cussler, Treasure of Khan, 175.
 39. Ibid., 176.
 40. Ibid., 366.
 41. Ibid., 367.
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oil production by initiating oil drilling in ANWR.42 It also echoes a state-
ment that President Bush issued later in 2001 that directed the Department 
of Energy to fill the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to its 700 million barrel 
capacity.43 As Michael Klare points out, however, these measures had an 
almost negligible role in increasing America’s independence from foreign 
oil and its ability to weather massive disruptions of the supply flow. The 
ideology of energy “independence,” as expounded by the Bush administra-
tion, was no more than a “mask for our continuing dependence on imported 
energy,” a state that in turn made dangerous foreign commitments inevita-
ble.44 Cussler’s novel makes minimal concessions to this criticism by having 
its own populist president exhort voluntary and mandatory gas rationing but 
otherwise shows little concern for the disastrous inadequacies of the Bush 
policy that it promotes. The American energy policy presented in the novel, 
then, involves a set of inversions. The measures that served as a mask for 
America’s deepening dependence on foreign oil figure as an essential con-
tribution to national self-sufficiency. The United States becomes a victim of 
terrorist attacks on oil terminals despite its drive to achieve energy indepen-
dence rather than an aggressor waging preemptive wars to secure means of 
satisfying its addiction to imported oil. These inversions suppress the entire 
history since 9/11, driving the novel toward a groundless political fantasy. 
Its restoration of American innocence can be read as an act of profound 
disavowal, indicating a deep anxiety over the ways in which the excess of the 
Bush administration’s foreign policy after 9/11 affected the nation’s political 
and moral status in the world.
 The novel’s anxiety is not simply of a political nature. It is also generic. If 
what characterizes the Dirk Pitt series is the hero’s tireless defense of national 
interests and global peace against evil governments, organizations, and indi-
viduals, it is difficult to continue the Manichean politics of the series in an 
era of increased multipolarity, in both political and moral terms. Written at 
a time when American hegemony hurtled to a close in the smoke and fog of 
the Iraq War, therefore, Treasure of Khan took it upon itself to retell the story 
of oil and U.S. foreign entanglements. In this particular installment, Dirk 
Pitt and his NUMA colleagues are protecting America from not only foreign 
threats but the collapse of its self-perception as a civilizing, democratizing 
force as well. In restoring an idealized image of the United States, they are 
also defending the moral foundation of politicized adventure novels such as 
the ones that they themselves populate.
 42. Klare, Oil and Blood, 15.
 43. “President Orders Strategic Petroleum Reserve Filled.”
 44. Klare, Blood and Oil, 185–86.
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 As they proceed to fulfill their political and generic roles, the novel’s 
heroes come to embody a limited version of liberal internationalism that 
harkens to the Wilsonian tradition. By helping Mongolia strengthen its 
democratic system, members of NUMA are practicing, in the most direct 
and literal way possible, the central Wilsonian principle of promoting liberal 
nationalism around the world. As terrorist disruptions of global oil supply 
are intertwined in the novel with conflicts between various territorial and 
nonterritorial empires, American interventions, as figured here, function 
to defend liberal nationalism against imperial forces. The novel taps into 
the Wilsonian tradition, arguably, to emphasize the idealist (as opposed to 
realpolitik) underpinnings of the history of American intervention in foreign 
countries and thus help to cast this history and, by extension, the premise 
of adventure novels like itself, as morally legitimate. Meanwhile, though the 
novel remains passionately attached to the comforting notion of American 
moral leadership in the world, it implies a pragmatic acknowledgment of 
the need to limit the level and scale of intervention. NUMA’s involvement 
with restoring order and democracy in Mongolia is nothing but a fortu-
nate accident, which started innocently with a survey project on Lake Bai-
kal conducted in collaboration with Russian scientists. With the lives of the 
members of the abducted research team hanging in the balance, Dirk Pitt 
proceeds swiftly with his rescue plan without consulting any government 
officials other than NUMA’s own technicians and scientists. He dismisses the 
idea of an expanded role for the government as inefficient at best (“would 
take days, if not weeks” to get off ground) and possibly risky (would cause 
an unnecessary “international incident”).45 Against the backdrop of the Iraq 
War and American military intervention throughout the post–Cold War 
years, Pitt’s remarks read like an argument for small-scale, low-level global 
activism for democracy, conceivably an alternative mode of intervention, 
and for the continuing relevance of the adventure novel as a genre for imag-
ining possible circumstances and means of such activism.
 In staging a moderate form of liberal internationalism aimed at safe-
guarding liberal nationalism worldwide, Treasure of Khan converges, in part, 
with Francis Fukuyama’s notion of “realistic Wilsonianism” in America at 
the Crossroads.46 Distancing himself from the Bush administration’s neo-
conservative foreign policy (which he sees as a perversion of neoconserva-
tism), Fukuyama argues for maintaining American power in the post–Cold 
War “unipolar world” by crossing Wilsonian liberal idealism with political 
 45. Cussler, Khan’s Treasure, 406, 433.
 46. Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads, 9.
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realism.47 To this end, Fukuyama argues against U.S. involvement in forced 
regime change through preemptive war on both moral and practical grounds. 
Though the United States should actively engage in supporting democracy 
around the world, it should do so in more prudent and internationally legiti-
mated ways. If Fukuyama’s well publicized defection from the hawkish uni-
lateralism of the first Bush term is an attempt to “reconcile competing schools 
of U.S. foreign policy: neoconservatist, realist, liberal internationalist, and 
nationalist or Jacksonian,” its eclectic quality resembles the ambiguous, oscil-
lating politics of best-selling adventure novels like Treasure of Khan.48 The 
novel presents NUMA as a participant in a semi-governmental version of 
Fukuyama’s ideal of a measured, realist Wilsonian internationalism. As a 
highly autonomous government organization engaged in multilateral scien-
tific collaboration, NUMA practices a kind of informal internationalism. At 
the same time, it works closely with the American government to coax other 
states (Mongolia in this case) into embracing or advancing a Western-style 
democratic system and allying themselves with the American interest.
 If the novel’s version of U.S. internationalism emphasizes the principles 
of liberal nationalism, its imagining of U.S. nationalism takes into consider-
ation the ways in which the nation is embedded in world history. The novel 
not only emphasizes energy independence as a way of avoiding foreign policy 
with imperialist undertones but also goes out of its way to foreground trans-
national strands in American history, thereby presenting the United States as 
a multicultural nation that acknowledges and accepts its own heterogeneity. 
The novel’s imagining of American pluralism can be seen in part in how it 
presents Hawaii. Hawaii first appears in the novel’s opening vignette, which 
links the history of the landlocked Mongol empire to a web of sea adventures 
across the Pacific. During the Hakata Bay attack in 1281, the flagship of the 
Mongol fleet, captained by a fictional Mongol general Temur, was blown out 
to the sea and eventually drifted to Hawaii. The Mongol general then asked 
Mahu, an experienced Hawaii sailor, to help repair the canoe and bring him 
back to the Mongol empire, which had by then occupied Northern China. 
Mahu accompanied Temur to China and then sought to return to Hawaii 
on board a big Chinese junk, which, as the novel reveals later, sank in the 
Pacific. The defeat of the Mongol fleet by the storm certainly prefigures the 
ways in which contemporary empires find themselves at the mercy of natural 
forces, like earthquakes, especially when they are enhanced by technology. 
More important, Temur’s adventures frame Hawaii as more than simply an 
 47. Ibid., 189. For an explanation of what “neoconservatism” means to Fukuyama, see 
Robert Jervis’s review of America at the Crossroads.
 48. Michael Allen’s review of America at the Crossroads, 46.
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American territory; instead, the islands figure in the novel as a station on 
the various travel and trade routes across the Pacific, a crucial component of 
what has now come to be known as the Asia Pacific.
 At the same time, however, Hawaii also figures as a spatial symbol of the 
nation, to be protected forcefully by a strong federal government determined 
to uphold national security. Later in the novel, NUMA members Dirk and 
Summer (Dirk Pitt’s son and daughter) discover traces of the ancient, sunken 
Chinese junk, along with some of the treasure it carried. This finding brings 
them into a confrontation with Borjin’s minions, who are also hunting for 
the sunken ship. Summer, however, is unaware of the implications of this 
discovery; she is amazed that it “had caused a sensation” and had drawn 
media representatives to her “like vultures.”49 For NUMA, then, excavating 
sunken ships is a scientific, nonprofit endeavor far removed from Borjin’s 
evil schemes. This contrast suggests that, while the transnational history of 
Hawaii needs to be excavated and studied, a goal that NUMA follows, this 
restorative effort is not intended to throw into question the U.S. annexation 
and exploitation of the islands. The novel’s representation of Hawaii, in other 
words, serves to bolster the American claim to being a diverse, multicultural 
nation rather than, as it very well should, remind the reader of U.S. impe-
rialism since the turn of the twentieth century. Hawaii’s centrality to U.S. 
national security and its inseparability from the union are simply assumed in 
the novel. Realizing that Borjin’s assistants have induced an artificial earth-
quake to blow apart the lava that seals the treasure from the sunken Chi-
nese junk, a NUMA agent notifies the White House of the situation as a 
grave threat to national security. The vice president immediately orders a 
couple of F-15s stationed at a naval base in Oahu to the earthquake’s epicen-
ter. The novel’s cavalier reference to Hawaii’s naval bases invokes the history 
of American imperialist incursions into the Asia Pacific, which, as Chalm-
ers Johnson puts it, constitute a 1989 parallel of the “expansionist agendas” 
openly espoused after 9/11.50 Yet the vice president’s military order is framed 
as a purely defensive act that symbolically fends off the tentacles of an evil 
power secretly aspiring to “[restore] the riches and glory of the Golden Clan” 
of Genghis Khan.51 The novel’s America is yet again idealized and insulated 
from the contradictions and tensions plaguing the America outside the text. 
It becomes an embodiment of a realist but robust form of liberalism that 
simultaneously stresses cultural pluralism in the domestic sphere and the 
 49. Cussler, Treasure of Khan, 368.
 50. Chalmers Johnson, Sorrows of Empire, 2.
 51. Cussler, Khan’s Treasure, 278.
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extension of this pluralism into foreign policy to promote nongovernmental 
scientific collaborations and morally legitimate interventions.
 Clearly, this idealized United States is the novel’s response to the post-
9/11 disaffection with the imperialist nature of U.S. power, which had far 
exceeded the confines of the leftist academy. The novel expresses and dis-
guises its anxiety over the decline of America’s political and moral status in 
the world through a forceful reassertion of “quintessential” American vir-
tues, including the tradition of Wilsonian internationalism and the ideal of 
national self-sufficiency (a rational, morally justifiable isolationism), which 
acquire an enhanced luster by being set against the apparently unjust prac-
tices espoused by the other political players in the novel. Ultimately, the 
novel’s projection of a fantasized America does not so much reconcile the 
tensions between liberal (inter)nationalism and its imperialist underbelly as 
displace them onto other states, including the convenient target of China. 
The facile, or false, reconciliation staged in the novel provides the sense of 
moral closure that the reader expects from the adventure genre. The reader 
sees America and the world revolving around it threatened then redeemed. 
Although this chapter does not involve a study of Cussler’s readership, the 
novel’s popularity, to a certain extent, confirms the efficacy of its conciliatory 
impulse in generating textual pleasure.
Wolves on the Frontier
Clive Cussler is not a stranger to the Chinese audience either. Five of his Dirk 
Pitt novels have been translated into Chinese, including Treasure of Khan, 
the translation of which was published in 2008.52 The Chinese translation, 
predictably, deletes the entire side plot of the Chinese government’s seces-
sion of Inner Mongolia in exchange for oil.53 Some of the more high-profile 
translations, such as that of Khaled Hosseini’s Kite Runner, underwent even 
more stringent scrutiny. The novel’s description of the Soviet-influenced 
communist regime in Kabul during the Cold War, for example, was removed 
for fear that it might trigger unwelcome reflections on some of the CCP’s 
policies in China during the same period. At around the same time, however, 
a Chinese novel that invokes the historical Mongol empire and critiques the 
PRC’s policy toward Inner Mongolia obtained surprising popularity across 
 52. The others are Raise the Titanic (1976), Dragon (1990), Polar Shift (2005), and Inca Gold 
(1991).
 53. Yao hong et al., trans., Kehan de baozang [Khan’s treasure].
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the country, which was then translated into a kind of international value 
rarely bestowed upon modern and contemporary Chinese literature.54 Jiang 
Rong’s novel Lang Tuteng, published in 2004, draws on the experiences the 
author had during the eleven years, from 1967 to 1978, that he spent in Inner 
Mongolia. He had traveled there at the height of the Cultural Revolution, 
when a great number of urban youths were sent to rural and remote areas in 
China under Chairman Mao’s instruction for them to be reeducated from the 
peasants.55 The autobiographically based narrator details the Han students’ 
fascination with traditional Mongol nomadic culture and critiques the Chi-
nese government for causing irreversible ecological destruction in the area 
and forcing upon the ethnic Mongols an agrarian mode of production. Lang 
Tuteng became an instant cultural sensation upon its publication, giving rise 
in China to many impassioned readings. While praises of the novel do not 
necessarily focus on the same aspect, many of its criticisms make the same 
argument that the novel fuels Chinese nationalism.56 The startling success of 
the novel in China convinced Penguin to purchase the rights of its English 
translation, later titled The Wolf Totem. Some readers in the West remark 
admiringly, as the Times reviewer Mishra does, on the novel’s daring critique 
of the Chinese government’s ethnic and environmental policies, without not-
ing how it also echoes the discourses of ethnic amalgmation and nationalism 
in contemporary China.57 On the opposite side of the spectrum of critical 
 54. Penguin paid an advance of $100,000 for the worldwide rights of the English version of 
the novel, setting a record for the highest amount ever paid for the translation rights of a novel. 
See Jürgen Kremb, “A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Beijing’s Unwanted Best Seller.” The Chinese 
publishing industry, in fact, sought to make a positive example out of the marketing of the 
novel.
 55. Zuoya Cao points out, in Out of the Crucible, that “More than two million students 
were transferred to rural areas” during 1969, after Chairman Mao issued the instruction for the 
“educated youth” to go to the countryside (4). The rustification campaign, which eventually saw 
more than “sixteen million” urban youth sent to the countryside, started in the 1950s, reached 
its climax at the end of the 1960s, and ended in 1977, when the Cultural Revolution ended.
 56. For a brief summary of these criticisms, see Xu Xinjian, “Dangdai zhongguo de minzu 
shenfen biaoshu” [Articulations of national identity in contemporary China], 109. For a spe-
cific critique of the novel for appealing to the mass market with parochial nationalism, see Li 
Jianjun, “Zhenzu haishi wandou” [Pearls or peas].
 57. See Timothy Weston, “A Defense of Jiang Rong’s Wolf Totem”; Jonathan Mirsky, “A 
Decade in the Grasslands.” One might wonder why such a critique of the Chinese government 
was allowed to stay in print in China. It would seem more of an anomaly if one realizes that 
the author of the novel, whose real name is Lü Jiaming, became involved in the 1989 student 
movements and was imprisoned for the involvement. He published the novel under the pseud-
onym Jiang Rong, in part, to avoid government censorship. Jiang’s avoidance of public exposure, 
however, only partially explains why the novel did not receive any censorship from the Chinese 
government. More important, as I point out, the novel is often construed in China to be for 
Chinese nationalism rather than against the Chinese government.
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reactions outside of China, the German sinologist Wolfgang Kubin criticized 
the book as “fascist.”58 This extreme criticism of the novel’s nationalist slant, 
however, stretches the meaning of fascism beyond recognition and obscures 
why the novel could have resonated with so many readers in different cul-
tural and national contexts. Existing readings of the novel, from both within 
and outside China, are well justified, but they tend to focus on one of its 
particular aspects, failing to recognize that what defines the novel is precisely 
its formal and political oscillation—its simultaneous staging and reconcili-
ation of the conflict between national unity and minority interests. Just like 
Treasure of Khan, Lang Tuteng illuminates the complex workings of concilia-
tory multiculturalism through a double narrative movement: It endorses a 
masculinized, or muscular, nationalism while at the same time separating 
it from imperialist expansion, which the novel explicitly critiques. In both 
novels, the double narrative movement rests upon a comparative framework 
that juxtaposes the United States and China. While they might seem to be 
two unrelated texts, the two novels are now available, through the work of 
translation, in the same language in both the United States and China. Their 
convergence on the book markets of the two countries can be seen as a some-
what fortuitous literalization of their more substantive connections.
 Lang Tuteng’s protagonist and narrator Chen Zhen, like the author Jiang 
Rong, is a Han Chinese student sent to Inner Mongolia during the Cultural 
Revolution. Chen works closely with local herdsmen to protect herds of sheep 
from the packs of wolves hovering around the grasslands. He quickly devel-
ops a strong fascination with wolves. The novel provides several extended 
scenes showing the complex interactions among sheep, dogs, humans, and 
wolves on the grasslands, which coexist in symbiotic yet antagonist relation-
ships. Chen illustrates that the local Mongols treat wolves as instructors and 
protectors rather than enemies. They respect the ecological function that 
the wolves serve in curbing the population of rodents and sheep that might 
damage the grasslands, acquire battle skills by learning from wolves, and 
hunt them methodically but with restraint. As Bilge, a local sage, puts it, “the 
grasslands will be gone without the wolves.”59 Chen reflects extensively on 
the Mongols’ reverence for the wolf and attributes it to an ancient form of 
totemism that constitutes an important part of their metaphysical outlook. 
 58. See Wolfgang Kubin’s interview with broadcaster Deutsche Welle. It was translated into 
Chinese and published on the Chinese edition of the Deutsche Welle online as “89 nian qianhou, 
zhongguo zuojia ziji beipan le wenxue” [Chinese authors betrayed literature since 1989].
 59. Jiang Rong, Lang Tuteng [The wolf totem], 77. I use my own translation of quotes from 
Lang Tuteng throughout, but I have also been influenced by Goldblatt’s translation in preparing 
my own.
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The worship of the “wolf totem,” Chen believes, continues to shape the Mon-
gols’ attitudes toward wolves in important ways. The delicate ecosystem of 
the grasslands, however, is severely threatened when unreasonable quotas 
for wool, wolf skins, and army horses are imposed on the Mongol herdsmen. 
While Inner Mongolia remains nominally an autonomous region, many Han 
Chinese and nonlocal Mongols have moved in to take charge of economic 
matters in Inner Mongolia. The Inner Mongolia Production and Construc-
tion Corps, a paramilitary organization with economic as well as defense 
functions, is established in the second half of the narrative. The leaders of the 
corps, none of whom has much sympathy for the Mongol belief in human–
nature harmony and reverence for the wolf, ordered that all wolves be killed 
and all grasslands be exploited to their maximum capacity. At the end of the 
novel, plans are in the works to promote settlements on the grasslands, thus 
completely replacing the traditional nomadic culture with one that combines 
agriculture and ranching. The novel is concluded by an epilogue that brings 
us to the end of the 1990s, when the narrator and his friends return to Inner 
Mongolia after a twenty-year absence. The transition to settlements indi-
cated at the end of the main narrative has materialized, making the narrator 
lament that the logic of “one system fits all areas” continues to (mis)guide 
China’s economic policy toward Inner Mongolia.60 The process of decol-
letivization, moreover, continues to fuel overdevelopment, as many Mongol 
households now rent out their pastures to nonlocal herders who abuse them 
with chilling indifference. Chen fears, as he tours the grasslands for the first 
time since he left for a big city, that a final ecological collapse is looming, 
despite the “false prosperity” created by overdevelopment.61
 The novel can be read as a recent variation on what has come to be 
known as “xungen wenxue” (roots-seeking literature). In the history of con-
temporary Chinese literature, roots-seeking literature designates a group of 
narratives and poems that appeared in the middle and late 1980s, many of 
them by writers and intellectuals who had been recently exposed to folk or 
ethnic cultures in remote areas in China during the Cultural Revolution. 
These works foreground the living customs, cultural forms, and ethical val-
ues of isolated communities in the hinterlands or far-flung provinces that 
had barely been affected by forces of modernization. Even though, as a lit-
erary movement, roots-seeking literature tapered off toward the end of the 
1980s, its political and aesthetic concerns continue to inform more recent 
narratives. The word “roots” is misleading here. The literary investments in 
 60. Ibid., 357.
 61. Ibid., 359.
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folk and ethnic cultures did not signal an outpouring of nostalgia toward 
pristine, premodern cultures in China; they were instead an intellectual and 
aesthetic response to the influx of modern Western thought and art forms 
in the period immediately after the Cultural Revolution. Roots-seeking lit-
erature focuses on the countryside as a way of tapping into what the authors 
believe to be the substrata of Chinese culture and thereby exploring alterna-
tive ways of imagining modernity and China’s relationship to it.62 It is also 
important to point out that the rise of roots-seeking literature coincided with 
a revived interest in ethnic cultures at the beginning of China’s economic 
reform.63 Some of the writers associated with roots-seeking literature are 
themselves members of ethnic minorities devoted to excavating marginal-
ized cultural traditions.64 Moreover, roots-seeking literature can be seen as 
a distant precursor to Chinese-language writings in the United States since 
the 1980s, which also involve unfamiliar locales in which Chinese culture 
acquires new meanings. Indeed, many recent Chinese immigrants who came 
to the United States after the Cultural Revolution describe their experience 
as “yang cha dui,” which means, literally, a transnational analogue of Chinese 
students’ experience of being sent to toil in remote areas during the Cul-
tural Revolution.65 All these permutations of roots-seeking literature address, 
explicitly or implicitly, China’s integration into economic and cultural glo-
balization, providing different models for thinking through the interactions 
between what is “traditionally” Chinese and what might compel it to change. 
Lang Tuteng offers a perfect site for examining the intersections of the vari-
ous aspects of roots-seeking literature. Unlike many recent overseas Chinese-
language writings that foreground the Western/U.S. bias against the Chinese, 
the novel turns its attention to the conflicts between Han Chinese (agrarian) 
culture and Mongol (pastoral-nomadic) culture. The West, however, is not 
absent from the narrative. On the contrary, it is a constant presence that 
dictates the way through which the Han–Mongol conflicts are revolved.
 62. Chen Sihe, Zhongguo dangdai wenxue shi [History of modern and contemporary Chi-
nese literature], 277–81; Mark Leenhouts, “Culture against Politics.” Leenhouts describes roots-
seeking literature as a movement against cultural “iconoclasm” in modern Chinese history and 
the politicization of art under Mao (543).
 63. See Ralph Litzinger, Other Chinas. Litzinger argues that, after the end of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1976, intellectuals throughout China were asked to “seek truth from facts” as a 
way of advancing the country’s effort to modernize itself (2). The study of “local cultures and 
histories” was seen as part of this intellectual project (Litzinger, 2).
 64. Chen, Zhongguo dangdai wenxueshi [History of modern and contemporary Chinese 
literature], chapter 16.
 65. For an instance in which this term is applied to Chinese students and workers who have 
come to the U.S. since the early 1980s, see Jiang Zengpei, ed., Zhongguo liuxuesheng wenxue 
daxi [An anthology of literature by Chinese students overseas], 4.
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 The Han–Mongol conflicts are emblematized in the novel by recurrent 
battles between the wolf and the sheep, representing nomadic culture and 
agrarian culture, respectively. In the novel, the military success of the Mon-
gol empire is attributed to the Mongols’ entanglements with wolves, which 
are portrayed in the novel as intelligent, disciplined, and organized hunters 
that offer important lessons to their human rivals. Having witnessed a pack 
of wolves coordinate an ambush on a herd of gazelles, Chen Zhen hazards 
that wolves acted as “supreme military instructors” to Genghis Khan and the 
tribal leaders of other northern nomadic peoples.66 The passive and witless 
sheep, on the other hand, is used in the novel as a metaphor for the Han 
Chinese, who, according to the author, can be “selfish, numbed, and cow-
ardly” even when their own people are being slaughtered.67 The culture of 
the sheep, Han agrarian culture, however, has imposed its will upon Mongol 
nomadic culture in contemporary China. In a move that echoes Cussler’s 
criticism of China’s policies in Inner Mongolia, the novel holds the Chinese 
government responsible for overherding and destroying the grasslands. At 
several places, Jiang explicitly points out that the Inner Mongolia Production 
and Construction Corps’s management of the grasslands aimed, in a wrong-
headed way, to put an end to the “primitive nomadic culture” and introduce 
agriculture to maximize land utility.68 Wolves, along with insects and mice, 
are seen as a “plague” to eliminate.69 Han agrarian culture has overpowered 
the traditional order of life on the grasslands not because of its superiority in 
spirit or courage but because of its unscrupulous use of modern technology. 
Toward the end of the novel, the officers of the Production and Construction 
Corps decide to use guns and jeeps to wipe out the entire wolf population, 
reducing the human–wolf combat romanticized continuously throughout 
the novel to nothing but “light entertainment” for the hunters.70 The figure 
of the gun is a common trope emblematizing the encroachment of Western 
modernity upon China since the mid-nineteenth century. The nineteenth-
century British attempt to open China to international trade, after all, has 
been seen as a quintessential example of “gunboat diplomacy.” Here, how-
ever, this trope is employed to dramatize Han incursions upon the autonomy 
of ethnic minorities within China.
 The author’s critique of Han Chinese’s destruction of Mongol culture 
and the natural environment from which it sprang, however, takes on a tone 
 66. Jiang, Lang Tuteng, 19.
 67. Ibid., 205.
 68. Ibid., 163.
 69. Ibid., 298.
 70. Ibid., 318.
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completely different from that of Cussler’s criticism of the Chinese govern-
ment’s exploitation of Inner Mongolia and consequently leads to a very dif-
ferent conclusion. For Jiang, the biggest problem with the denigration of 
Mongol culture is the impoverishment of Han-dominated Chinese culture 
in general, which the author links to the decline of China’s position in the 
world after reaching its apex during the Tang Dynasty. As Jiang puts it, China 
frequently fell to non-Han rulers (including the Mongols) after this period 
precisely because of an “enfeebled” disposition rooted in its agrarian cul-
ture.71 By contrast, as we have seen, Mongol nomadic culture, the culture of 
the wolf, is exalted as a foundation for Genghis Khan’s empire. Reflections 
on the different elements of the Chinese “national character” and its implica-
tions for China’s relationship to the world are characteristic of roots-seeking 
literature. Lang Tuteng, however, invents a new, wildly popular formula for 
such reflections. It not only offers a rarely told story featuring humans and 
wolves involved in both heated battles and passionate love affairs; it also cre-
ates a meticulous balance between critiquing what the novel perceives as the 
flaws of Han Chinese culture and highlighting its mutability, its potential for 
change and transformation through encounters with other cultures in China.
 Far from arguing for Mongol independence (as Cussler does), Jiang 
advocates for resolving Han–Mongol conflicts by welding the “warrior spirit” 
of the Mongols with the “peaceful, toiling inclinations” of the Han.72 The 
novel, in fact, argues emphatically that this form of cultural welding is inte-
gral to the history of the Han, though this point has often been neglected, 
to the detriment of Chinese culture as a whole. Each chapter of Lang Tuteng 
is preceded by excerpts from historical writings that document the various 
ways in which the Mongols, among other peoples of inner Asia, identified 
with or had mystical encounters with the wolf. A number of these epigraphs 
imply or state explicitly that this human–wolf affinity implicates the Han 
Chinese as well because they are intimately connected to the other peoples 
around them through a history of miscegenation and cultural intermingling. 
These epigraphs were omitted from the translation, perhaps to streamline 
the English text. This omission can obscure the history of Han–Mongol 
interactions the author seeks to construct. Toward the end of the novel, Jiang 
cites renowned Chinese historian Fan Wenlan’s Zhongguo Tongshi [Complete 
history of China] (1978): “The tribal name of Emperor Yan is Jiang . . . The 
Jiangs descend from a branch of the Qiang, who traveled to the middle land 
from the west.”73 Emperor Yan is known as one of the two ancestors of the 
 71. Ibid., 186.
 72. Ibid., 196.
 73. Ibid., 343.
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Han (the other is Emperor Huang). This excerpt, therefore, is used to high-
light the mixed origin of the Han Chinese—their genealogical connection 
to the Qiang suggests that the agrarian Han and nomadic non-Han peoples 
were inseparable at their inception. Throughout the book, the narrator Chen 
alludes to historical periods, including the long reign of the Mongols and 
Manchus, during which Han culture was infused with heavy doses of non-
Han traditions. This quote traces this history of cultural interpenetration to 
a point of originary heterogeneity.
 Jiang’s representation of the Han–Mongol cultural confluence functions 
to challenge the received notion of the cultural supremacy of the Han Chi-
nese. Although the novel recycles the Han-centric cliché that the Mongols 
lack a literary tradition, which makes them culturally “backward,” it chal-
lenges Han-centrism by arguing that the Han Chinese have been continu-
ously transformed, on both cultural and genealogical levels, by other peoples 
around them.74 (This epigraph also hints at the origin of the nom de plume 
the author adopts for the novel, which combines Emperor Yan’s tribal name 
with “Rong,” a term that the Han used historically to refer to the Qiang.) 
One can find parallels of Jiang’s view in recent studies of the historical inter-
actions between the Han and nomadic peoples that traditionally inhabited 
the Eurasian steppe. According to Thomas J. Barfield, the historical empires 
established by nomads in Mongolia can be seen as “shadow empires” that 
prospered by “extorting vast amounts of wealth from China through pil-
lage, tribute payments, border trade, and international reexport of luxury 
goods—not by taxing steppe nomads.”75 The term “shadow empires,” how-
ever, does not simply connate a parasitic relationship. What Barfield finds is 
a pattern of symbiosis and interdependence between the nomad empires and 
the native dynasties in China. The unification and prosperity of the native 
Chinese dynasties benefited the corresponding nomadic empires through 
trade and various peace arrangements, and leaders of imperial confederacies 
would lend military assistance to declining Chinese dynasties “to protect 
them from domestic rebellions.”76 The Han Chinese officially deemed the 
nomadic empires “tributaries” at various points, not because they were actu-
ally subordinate but only to “disguise embarrassing facts about its relation-
ship with the steppe.”77
 Lang Tuteng’s rewriting of the history of Han–Mongol relations is not 
simply to make a historical point. As the narrative goes back and forth 
 74. Ibid., 61.
 75. Thomas J. Barfield, “The Shadow Empires,” 10.
 76. Ibid., 22.
 77. Ibid., 23.
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between observations of present-day Inner Mongolia (from the Cultural 
Revolution to the late 1990s) and meditations on the historical Mongol 
empire, the historical Han–Mongol intermixing that the author emphasizes 
is also projected onto the future. It is a model that the author promotes for 
rebuilding ethnic relations in contemporary China, a point made abundantly 
clear through a number of didactic monologues attributed to the protago-
nist Chen Zhen. While the author’s critique of the government’s policies 
in Inner Mongolia may be sharp, the remedy he proposes—the notion of 
ethnic intermixing—meshes quite well, ironically, with government rhetoric 
on ethnic minorities. As we have seen in the Introduction and chapter 1, 
the PRC’s policy toward ethnic minorities emphasizes the idea of ronghe, or 
amalgamation, a term that has garnered different meanings since the found-
ing of the country. Its connotations range from the notion that Han and 
different nationalities will eventually dissolve the distinctions in their levels 
of economic and social development under socialism to a form of cultural 
pluralism informed by Western liberalism. The idea of ethnic amalgamation 
has served to enable and consolidate the unity of the Chinese nation under 
the CCP leadership. Uradyn E. Bulag makes the same argument in his essay 
“Yearning for ‘Friendship,” where he surveys changes in the depictions of the 
role that Mongol communists played in the anti-Japanese war in Chinese 
historiography. The more contemporary, post–Cultural Revolution accounts 
all emphasize the “indestructible revolutionary friendship” between the 
Mongols and the Han Chinese in their purportedly shared struggles against 
the Japanese, conveniently erasing the historical Mongol antagonism toward 
what Bulag explicitly calls “settler colonization” on the part of the Han.78 This 
focus on cross-ethnic “friendships” in the official policy has also given rise 
to much research in China on the mutual penetration of Han and non-Han 
cultures throughout Chinese history, intended to counter the more conven-
tional thesis of sinicization or assimilation.79 Jiang’s vision for ethnic rela-
tions in historical and contemporary China, though critical of the ways in 
which the government distorted the principle of amalgamation into a kind of 
forced uniformity, sits very well with the overall thrust of the official ethnic 
policy, which, as I have argued, can be seen as a Chinese version of concilia-
tory multiculturalism that is indispensable to the project of state nationalism.
 78. Uradyn Bulag, “The Yearning for ‘Friendship,’” 20.
 79. For a review of historical research that complicates the thesis of sinicization since the 
1990s, see Qi Meiqin, “Guanyu shinianlai ‘hanhua’ yiji xiangguan wenti yanjiu de kaochao” [A 
review of research on “sinicization” and related issues], 103–13. As Qi points out, this research 
harks back to the revisionary theories that the pre-eminent Chinese historian Chen Yinque 
raised as early as the 1940s (108–9).
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 At times, the novel’s endorsement of Chinese nationalism is quite explicit, 
taking on a didactic and strident tone. It appears, at such moments, that the 
call for Han–Mongol amalgamation aims to strengthen China against West-
ern powers that, for the author, possess the same fierceness as the Mongols. 
At several places, the author ventures the theory, through the protagonist 
Chen, that the Germanic peoples who played an important role in the trans-
formation of Rome in the medieval period were nomadic, just like the Mon-
gols.80 To compete with Western powers that descend from the Germanic 
people, therefore, China should learn from the wolves within. In one of the 
more didactic passages in the novel, Chen makes this point in unmistakable 
terms during a discussion with his friends. As he puts it,
The worship of the wolf totem goes back further than Confucianism, and 
has remained naturally resilient through the generations. . . . If the Chinese 
can exorcize what is rotten in Confucianism and transplant a seed of the 
wolf totem into what is left, then the ethos of the wolf totem can merge 
with such Confucian precepts as pacifism and education. This way, the 
Chinese character can be reshaped and China made strong again.81
Based on this and similar sections of the novel, some critics have read into the 
novel an imperialist impulse that historically and conceptually overlaps with 
nationalism. One of the harshest critics describes the novel as “a mediocre, 
vulgarized interpretation of the Nietzschean notion of the Will to Power.”82 
To the critic, the novel endorses “power” and “hegemony,” thus generating a 
misleading impression about China’s expansionist ambitions.83
 The novel, however, does not present this trumpeted nationalism as a 
Chinese imitation of a coveted Western model. Its emphasis on the mascu-
linization of “national character” is quite deliberately balanced against its 
call for cultural amalgamation and coexistence. What the novel projects is 
thus a vision of a harmonious world order that mirrors, on a larger scale, 
cultural pluralism within a nation. At a few points, Bilge explains to Chen 
local herdsmen’s reluctance to upset natural balance by killing too many 
wolves. He calls the grasslands the “big life,” a self-sufficient ecosystem that 
encompasses many “small lives” often engaged in life and death battles.84 
 80. Jiang, Lang Tuteng, 109, 195.
 81. Ibid., 253.
 82. He Tongbin, “Wenming yu yexing de jitai hejie” [A perverse reconciliation of civiliza-
tion and wilderness], 91.
 83. Ibid., 91.
 84. Jiang, Lang Tuteng, 149
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Natural ecological balance is invoked in the novel as a metaphor for the 
paradoxical relations among different ethnicities, races, and nations, which 
coexist in a shared environment, alternating between interdependence and 
mutual antagonism. In one of his monologues, Chen realizes that the ears 
of a wolf are stiff and unbendable, prompting him to reflect on the Chinese 
expression of “grabbing the ox by its ears,” which carries the imperialist con-
notation of subjugating the weaker races and peoples.85 Chen is quick to note 
that “modern nations” should not engage in “subjugating and oppressing” 
other peoples, though, if a country is not equipped with the ability to grab 
others by their “ears,” it will only make itself vulnerable to being grabbed by 
others.86 Clearly, the novel seeks to reconcile its vision of a muscular Chinese 
nationalism with both a pluralist ethnic policy and a democratic, nonaggres-
sive model of foreign policy. Jiang is arguing that the open-ended and yet 
strong Chinese nationalism that the novel promotes is necessary not only for 
defending the Chinese national interest but also for shaping a more equitable 
world order that subverts Western hegemony.
 The delicate balance that the novel maintains between its admiration 
for and critique of Western powers is emblematized in its invocations of 
the figure of Jack London, often mentioned merely in passing in various 
reviews of the novel. Chen had carried to Inner Mongolia two big cases of 
books, some of which were prohibited by the Chinese government during 
the Cultural Revolution. Jack London is the only fiction writer specifically 
named as someone that Chen and his friends love to read. Chen mentions 
the novel The Sea-Wolf in passing and the short story “Love of Life” at some 
length, identifying the latter as one of Lenin’s favorite stories.87 The allusion 
to London’s naturalist celebration of a primordial drive for life in the story 
figures here as an analogue of what Chen sees in nomadic Mongols and, by 
extension, in the sturdy, warlike peoples all over the world. Chen employs 
evolutionary language in explaining the superiority of the wolves, “a species 
that had survived millions of years of selection in an unimaginably inhospi-
table environment” that naturally “weeds out the unfit.”88 This evolutionary 
language, which bleeds into Chen’s exaltation of Western powers, is reminis-
cent of the racialist ideas articulated in many of London’s writings. London’s 
progressive, socialist leanings, as critics have pointed out, are inseparable 
from his racialist notions regarding the physical and moral superiority of 
the white race over the Asiatics, a group often reduced in his writings to a 
 85. Ibid., 296.
 86. Ibid., 297.
 87. Ibid., 171.
 88. Ibid., 296, 331.
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symbol of the dehumanizing power of monopoly capitalism.89 It is arguable 
that Jiang is implying a kind of symmetry between London’s understanding 
of class and racial struggles in the United States at the turn of the twentieth 
century and his own understanding of ethnic relations in China and the 
country’s position vis-à-vis Western powers a century later.
 The author, however, is not oblivious to the ways in which he might 
implicate his own work in London’s racism. Instead, he deftly separates his 
own position on nation, race, and ethnicity from London’s. Though Jiang 
does not elaborate specifically on the significance of The Sea-Wolf, he does 
share this particular London novel’s ambivalence toward Nietzschean eth-
ics, qualifying his endorsement of social Darwinism with an emphasis on 
interdependent coexistence. Most notably, Jiang consciously alludes to the 
notion of the “Yellow Peril,” the title of an infamous essay London wrote in 
1904 when he traveled to Manchuria as a war correspondent, to emphasize 
the disastrous effects of the ways in which the Han Chinese “subsumed” the 
Mongols under their agrarian lifestyle.90 Arguably, Jiang reinterprets the the-
sis of the “Yellow Peril” as the imperialist domination that the Han Chinese 
have achieved over ethnic minorities on the country’s frontiers, thus implic-
itly critiquing both London’s view of the Chinese and other East Asians as 
a menace to the Western world and the Han Chinese’s treatment of ethnic 
others. The novel’s apparent endorsement of social Darwinism and racism 
has disturbed some readers, as we can see in Kubin’s “fascism” accusation, 
but such reactions miss a much larger point. The novel, in fact, uses the “Yel-
low Peril” trope as a launching pad for a critique of processes of racialization 
in both American and Chinese histories and a plea for China to embrace a 
robust but restrained nationalism that will place it on equal footings, in both 
moral and material terms, with Western countries, while at the same time 
contributing to the construction of a new, harmonious world order. The 
extraordinary murkiness and elasticity of the novel’s politics has certainly 
played a crucial role in securing its popularity in both China and the West. 
More important, we can argue that the novel’s reflections on international 
relations—China’s relationship with London’s America and other Western 
powers—not only extend the symbiotic model that it prescribes for Han–
Mongol relations but also, in fact, play a constitutive role in shaping this 
model. For Jiang, the construction of a new world order requires that China 
 89. For an extensive discussion of racism in London’s writings, see Colleen Lye, America’s 
Asia, chapters 1 and 2. London’s short stories “An Unparalleled Invasion” and “Goliah,” for 
example, feature the Chinese as dehumanized slaves who, through mass migration, infest and 
threaten to overtake the U.S. and even the entire Western world.
 90. Jiang, Lang Tuteng, 226. The essay in question is Jack London’s “The Yellow Peril.”
101H O W  n O T  T O  b e  A n  e M P I r e
embrace the ideal of ethnic intermingling, so as to strengthen its “national 
character” while averting the racialist and imperialist practices of Western 
nations.
 The ideal world order projected in Lang Tuteng, just like the fantasized 
America in Treasure of Khan, speaks to our times. It serves implicitly to 
project an image of China as a promoter of world harmony rather than a 
newly anointed global power concerned only with advancing its own inter-
ests, grabbing for energy and resources in unscrupulous ways. The political 
affiliation of the novel’s perspective on the ideal international order and Chi-
na’s position in it is more plainly on view if we compare it with the Chinese 
government’s formulations of its own foreign policy. Since the early 1990s, 
the government has frequently affirmed and updated the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence, established in the 1950s as a foundation for China’s 
foreign policy, to assure the world of the Chinese government’s intention to 
act as a nonaggressive, peacemaking member of the international commu-
nity. We catch a glimpse of this official rhetoric in Hu Jintao’s speech at Yale 
on April 22, 2006, the last day of the Chinese president’s three-day visit to the 
United States. In the speech, President Hu explains how the current Chinese 
government approaches development and modernization (what has come to 
be known as the party’s “Scientific Development Concept”), and how it views 
the issues that concern all cultures, including human dignity, social harmony, 
and world peace. Sprinkled throughout the speech are various references to 
China’s commitment to helping to foster diversity and harmony in the world:
The Chinese civilization has always given prominence to good neighborli-
ness. The Chinese nation cherishes peace. In foreign relations, the Chinese 
have always believed that “the strong should not oppress the weak and the 
rich should not bully the poor” and advocated that “all nations live side by 
side in perfect harmony.”
 The Chinese held that “one should be as inclusive as the ocean, which 
is vast because it admits hundreds of rivers” and called for drawing upon 
the strength of others. Today, China holds high the banner of peace, devel-
opment, and cooperation. It pursues an independent foreign policy of 
peace and commits itself firmly to peaceful development.
. . .
 Cultural diversity is a basic feature of both human society and today’s 
world and an important driving force for human progress. As history has 
shown, in the course of interactions between civilizations, not only do we 
need to remove natural barriers and overcome physical isolation; we also 
need to remove obstacles and obstructions of the mind and overcome vari-
102 C H A P T e r  2
ous prejudices and misunderstandings. Differences in ideology, social sys-
tem, and development model should not stand in the way of exchanges 
among civilizations, still less should they become excuses for mutual con-
frontation. We should uphold the diversity of the world, enhance dialogue 
and interaction between civilizations, and draw on each other’s strength 
instead of practicing mutual exclusion. When this is done, mankind will 
enjoy greater harmony and happiness and the world will become a more 
colorful place to live in.91
The first excerpt articulates, in almost euphemistic terms, two basic prin-
ciples of China’s foreign policy—state sovereignty (“the strong should not 
oppress the weak”) and multilateral cooperation (all nations “in perfect 
harmony”). The language in which the speech elaborates on this policy is 
notably eclectic—one hears echoes of Confucian precepts as well as tenets of 
Western liberalism. Invoking and expanding on the notion of “wenmin duoy-
angxing” [cultural diversity], the ideal world order projected in Hu’s speech 
figures as a globalized version of conciliatory multiculturalism, suggesting 
that material, ideological, and political differences between nations should 
simply be bracketed and contained. What starts with the liberal lingo of “cul-
tural diversity,” however, ends on the note of “harmony,” a familiar gesture 
toward traditional Chinese values. Indeed, the president emphasizes a bit 
earlier in his speech that Chinese culture has traditionally “given prominence 
to social harmony, unity, and mutual assistance.” The notion of “harmony” 
here, of course, is not of a homogeneous kind, as it is merged with that of 
diversity. The combination of the two deliberately invokes the Confucian 
ideal of “harmony without sameness.” As William A. Callahan observes, the 
phrase, taken from a famous passage in Analects, where Confucius points out 
that “[t]he exemplary person harmonizes with others, but does not neces-
sarily agree with them,” has figured prominently in the Chinese leadership’s 
explications of its idea of a peaceful world order since the beginning of the 
twenty-first century.92
 Hu’s emphasis on world “harmony” recasts on a broader level the gov-
ernment’s goal to construct a “harmonious society” domestically, which 
was announced at the Sixth Plenum of the Sixteenth CCP Congress, held in 
the October of the same year. It also implicitly harks back to the concept of 
“peaceful rise,” which emerged as a key principle of China’s foreign policy in 
 91. The transcription of the original speech, given in Chinese, was translated into English 
and made available, along with the Chinese text, through various news outlets on the day of 
Hu’s visit. My excerpt is taken from the official translation.
 92. William A. Callahan, “Remembering the Future,” 586, 588.
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the beginning of the new millennium. The concept was initially conceived 
for the purpose of assuring the world that China would strive to rise to the 
status of a great power without waging war or causing a drastic change in the 
world order.93 Although the rhetoric of peaceful rise gave way to “peace and 
development” in some key documents from 2004 onward, the ideas underly-
ing the peaceful rise theory stayed in circulation, as we can see in the refer-
ence to “peaceful development” in Hu’s Yale speech.94
 Hu’s reelection to a second term as president in 2007 did not fundamen-
tally alter the tenor of China’s foreign policy expressed in this 2006 speech. 
As Suisheng Zhao puts it, Hu’s foreign policy agenda during his second term 
is to “find a balance between pursuing international influence and down-
playing its aspirations to being a global power,” which includes, more spe-
cifically, building strategic partnerships to facilitate the “likely emergence 
of a multipolar world of sovereign states.”95 This agenda, which has been 
described as a state-centric version of “multilateralism,” borrows selectively, 
and superficially, from different intellectual and political traditions and 
implicitly contrasts itself with the widely criticized unilateralism in U.S. for-
eign policy during the George W. Bush years.96 Returning to Lang Tuteng, we 
can see that the novel, in many ways, functions as a graphic explication of 
the government’s vision of a pluralist world order, just as it echoes the offi-
cial policy toward ethnic minorities. It calls for ethnic amalgamation while 
presenting this process as always and already inherent in Chinese history. It 
points to the history of Western/Mongol imperial conquests as a source of 
useful models for the empowerment of China in the contemporary moment, 
 93. The concept was first formulated by Communist Party official Zhen Bijian in 2003, at 
the Bo’ao Forum for Asia held in Beijing. See Robert L. Suettinger, “The Rise and Descent of 
‘Peaceful Rise,’” 3. According to Suettinger, Zhen had initially conceived the idea of “peaceful 
rise” as a response to two dominant U.S. views of China’s future at the turn of this century, 
“either that it would emerge rapidly to threaten U.S. security, or that it might collapse as a failed 
state” (3).
 94. Suettinger observes that it was decided in April 2004 that the leadership would not use 
the term “peaceful rise” in public (1). The reasons are unclear, but Suettinger speculates that it 
has much to do with the pressing possibility of Taiwan’s declaration of independence (which 
might require a military response), the idea’s lack of intellectual rigor, and a leadership contest 
within the government (6–8).
 95. Zhao, Suisheng. “Chinese Foreign Policy in Hu’s Second Term: Coping with Political 
Transition Abroad.”
 96. C. R. Hughes, “Nationalism and Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: Implica-
tions for Southeast Asia,” 129. Hughes points out that, since 9/11, China has increased its efforts 
to increase cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, by participating in and forming re-
gional economic organizations (such as the China-ASEAN FTA) and calling for the deployment 
of a “New Security Concept” that embraces a realist, state-centric concept of multilateralism. 
For Hughes, China uses its relationship with ASEAN to “develop a counterweight to US power,” 
without making it appear to be an open challenge (130).
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only to suggest that China transcends the existing models. In its own way, the 
novel registers the same conservative impulse that we can discern in Cussler’s 
Treasure of Khan, an impulse that is unsettled at times but restored eventu-
ally. The social significance, and textual pleasure, of the two novels reside in 
their time-boundedness: The critical pressure they exert on the logic of the 
dominant model of multiculturalism in their respective nation is carefully 
contained.
 It does not mean, of course, that such popular novels as Treasure of Khan 
and Lang Tuteng are uncomplicated. A set of generic conventions, as well as 
the possibilities of combining and reinventing these conventions, allow these 
novels to simultaneously create and resolve narrative tensions. Some of them, 
therefore, function as narrative corollaries of conciliatory multiculturalism, 
which binds a nation together through the containment and superficial 
reconciliation of ethno-racial conflicts. Treasure of Khan idealizes the U.S. 
nation in a way that simultaneously expresses and disavows anxiety over the 
imperialist excess of the U.S. government; Lang Tuteng launches a critique 
of the Chinese government, only to then call for a more muscular Chinese 
nationalism. Ultimately, the two novels credit contemporary America and 
China, respectively, with a morally legitimate form of nationalism, distin-
guishing them from what the novels consider to be premodern and modern 
empires. Integral to their politics is the comparative framework that they 
construct. The other country, be it China or the United States, is invoked to 
provide an implicit rationale for why “we” still need a strong nation and why 
it can be differentiated from the idea of empire. The formal logic of concilia-
tory multiculturalism, as it becomes manifest in the two authors discussed 
here, has serious limitations, but its complexity cannot be underestimated.
In CHInEsE OPErA,  Alex Kuo’s first foray into fiction writing, a mixed-race American couple, Sonny Lin and Sissy George, visit the 
PRC in the days leading up to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. 
In a surprising twist of the plot toward the end of the novel, Sissy 
George, part Native American and part black, succeeds in helping a 
Chinese dissident intellectual, Professor Luo, flee the country using 
apparently little other than magic. According to a press dispatch 
about the miraculous escape, some Chinese witnesses recall that the 
alleged foreigner helping Luo escape was disguised as or perhaps 
really was a “tall Muslim from the north” of China, and the pair sim-
ply disappeared like “a mirage.”1 On one level, Sissy George being 
imagined as a Uyghur from Xinjiang can be construed to suggest
 1. Alex Kuo, Chinese Opera, 116.
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Toward a Comparative Critique
Metaphor and dissenting nationalism in Alex kuo
There are only a few big states among all states in the world. All big 
states go through a period of growth, which includes the incorpo-
ration of territories, the integration of ethnicities, and the develop-
ment of borderlands. . . . This process is most typically illustrated 
in the U.S. westward movement.
—He Shunguo,  
“The Westward Movement and Modernization in U.S. History”
each day he grew more impatient as he tried to move the empha-
sis between metaphor and ambiguity, occasionally stumbling in 
his language of radical that added to, but took away more than 
it clarified.
—Alex kuo, Panda Diaries
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possible conceptual parallels between the experiences of racial minorities in 
the United States and those of certain ethnic groups in China. Such U.S.–
China comparisons abound in Chinese Opera. Upon deciding to help Profes-
sor Luo, Sissy explicitly compares the Chinese government’s suppression of 
the 1989 protests to Sand Creek and Wounded Knee.2 She assures Luo that 
she can help him disappear because her people “have been doing this for 
many generations,” thus invoking the memory of the Underground Railroad 
in antebellum America.3 We quickly notice, however, that these comparisons 
are of a self-reflexive nature, often warning the reader not to take them at 
face value. The first example, after all, can also be read as a scene of mis-
recognition that indicates the tendency of the “Chinese witnesses” to conflate 
Uyghurs with foreigners or foreignness with whiteness (Sissy does not look 
white, so cannot be a real foreigner). While it certainly suggests that a loose 
analogy can be drawn between certain ethnic and racial groups from the two 
nations, this scene also points to the disturbing possibility that such analo-
gies ground themselves in unexamined assumptions and stereotypes. Kuo’s 
comparisons, in addition, are complexly structured, often operating in sev-
eral dimensions at once. Though Sissy is paralleled with Uyghurs, she is also 
implicitly aligned with the dissident intellectual Luo, who might be seen as 
part of a non-ethno-racial minority in China. The same pattern is repeated 
in the other comparisons we have seen, where the histories of Native Ameri-
cans and African Americans (Sand Creek, Wounded Knee, and the Under-
ground Railroad) are linked metaphorically to the struggle for democracy 
and intellectual freedom in contemporary China. The self-reflexive, layered 
comparisons proliferating in Kuo’s fiction and other related writings are the 
focus of this chapter, which analyzes the ways in which these comparisons 
enable a double critique of the United States and China, with a focus on 
ethno-racial injustices resulting from the process of national expansion. Kuo, 
I argue, challenges the logic of conciliatory multiculturalism on two counts. 
By foregrounding the various incompatibilities between nation-building 
projects and minority rights without prescribing an easy solution to them, 
he counters the notion that ethno-racial conflicts can be resolved without 
radical reconfigurations of how the nation is conceived. More important, 
Kuo proposes a new model for U.S.–China comparisons, which I describe 
as a form of “comparative critique,” through intensive reflections on the 
entangled political implications of metaphor and its cognates. Chapter 1 dis-
cusses two authors who cover over and exonerate the imperialist excess of 
 2. Ibid., 108.
 3. Ibid., 109.
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one nation at the expense of the other. Kuo provides a sophisticated alterna-
tive to this unproductive but commonly adopted practice.
 Born in Boston in 1939, Alex Kuo spent his childhood and adolescence 
in Chongqing, Shanghai, and British Hong Kong. He moved to the United 
States with his family in 1955 and has spent most of his adult life in the 
Pacific Northwest. He held numerous teaching and administrative positions 
between 1963 and 2007, including a chairmanship in the Department of 
English and Comparative American Cultures at Washington State Univer-
sity. Between 1989 and 1998, he taught in Beijing, Changchun, and Hong 
Kong, as lecturer, Senior Fulbright Fellow, and Lingnan Fellow, respectively. 
He embarked on a literary career in 1974 as a poet and has since published 
four collections of poetry.4 His experiences in China and Hong Kong gave 
rise to a raft of stories and novels concerned with contemporary Chinese 
culture and individuals traveling or migrating between China and the United 
States. A large part of these writings remain unpublished. Not until 1998 did 
Asia 2000 Ltd., a Hong Kong-based small press (now defunct), publish Kuo’s 
novel Chinese Opera, which was finished in 1989. The same press published 
his collection Lipstick and Other Stories (2001) after it had been rejected by 
46 other publishers.5 His Panda Diaries (2006) and The White Jade and Other 
Stories (2008) were both published by small presses, based on manuscripts 
composed in 1991–92 and 2003–4, respectively.6 Although Lipstick won an 
American Book Award in 2002, Kuo’s works have generated little discussion 
in Asian American literary studies.
 The reasons for this neglect are many. When Alex Kuo was studying for 
his M.F.A at the Iowa Writers’ Workshop, he crossed paths with Frank Chin 
and Lawson Inada, who, along with Shawn Wong and Jeffery Paul Chan, 
edited the first anthology of Asian American literature, Aiiieeeee, published 
in 1974. Although Kuo had published his first collection of poetry, The Win-
dow Tree, by 1971, his name did not appear in Aiiieeeee or its updated version, 
The Big Aiiieeeee, which came out in 1991. The circumstances for this omis-
sion were complicated, but the most important one involved the differences 
between the modernist poetics in The Window Tree and the anti-assimila-
tionist aesthetics advocated by the editors of the two Aiiieeeee collections.7 
 4. Alex Kuo, This Fierce Geography: Poems; Changing the River; New Letters from Hiro-
shima and Other Poems; The Window Tree.
 5. Interview with Alex Kuo, April 28, 2005. 
 6. Alex Kuo, Panda Diaries; White Jade and Other Stories. 
 7. Alex Kuo, in discussion with the author, April 28, 2005. Kuo also related that misun-
derstanding played a part in his exclusion as well. During the late 1960s, Kuo was writing for an 
anti-Vietnam War newspaper, so he took the pseudonym Spike Mulligan to protect his identity. 
Without knowing the context, Frank Chin saw Kuo’s use of a white name as a form of racial 
betrayal. 
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The exclusion of Kuo from Asian American literature is unfortunate, espe-
cially because the issues of race, immigration, and U.S. imperialism figure 
prominently in both his poetry and fiction. Like his poetry, his fiction has 
drawn a very limited audience. Although he has quite recently appeared in 
a few anthologies of Asian American literature, his offbeat, experimental 
style does not fit in with the lyrical realistic narratives about immigration 
and return that tend to dominate the market for ethnic narratives.8 Crafting 
his narratives as poetry, Kuo does not provide vivid, detailed accounts of 
national histories or ethnic experiences, as readers have come to expect from 
Chinese American and other Asian American writers, preferring instead 
spare, pared-down narratives sprinkled with ambiguous vignettes and inter-
ludes as well as with political and cultural references that are usually left 
unexplained. The lack of scholarly interest has further narrowed the already 
limited market for Kuo’s works.
 What is most notable about Kuo’s fiction, most of which straddles the 
United States and China (among other places), is its deviation from the more 
familiar narratives about Chinese Americans’ exploration of China, which 
emphasize the ambiguity of “homecoming,” the futility of trying to recuper-
ate the China permanently associated with the Chinese-born parents. One 
can compare Kuo’s writings, for example, with two videos, Felicia Lowe’s 
China: Land of My Father (1979) and Richard Fung’s The Way to My Father’s 
Village (1987), both of which feature a North American-born Chinese nar-
rator seeking to reconstruct the parents’ history in China. As Peter Feng 
argues, these visual texts accentuate the epistemological distance separat-
ing Chinese Americans from contemporary China, thereby “decentering the 
Middle Kingdom.”9 Kuo’s fiction, by contrast, foregrounds China, in its vari-
ous historical incarnations, as an object of intellectual inquiry and an integral 
part of American and Chinese American histories, without suggesting that 
Chinese Americans are racially or culturally Chinese. He is of course not 
alone in engaging in this transnational project. He shares a set of narrative 
and political concerns with fiction writers such as Kingston, Betty Bao Lord, 
and Lan Samantha Chang and journalists such as the late Iris Chang and 
Leslie Chang, whose recent book Factory Girls investigates the life of migrant 
workers in contemporary China.10 Like these writers, Kuo gives pause to 
 8. See Guiyou Huang, ed., Greenwood Encyclopedia of Asian American Literature; Zhang 
Tong, ed., An Anthology of Chinese American Literature.
 9. Peter Feng, “Decentering the Middle Kingdom,” 104.
 10. One can see parallels with the Chinese American narratives of return in Japanese and 
Korean American literature. See Patricia P. Chu, “Asian American Narratives of Return.” Chu 
studies, among other themes, the ways in which nisei and sansei negotiate the tensions between 
different cultural identities while coming to terms with the various political issues in Japan, 
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any critical efforts to map out Chinese American writings around a fixed 
spatial or political center. Drawing attention to the mutual entanglements of 
American and Chinese histories, he calls for new critical practices that treat 
Chinese American writings as a switchboard through which different local 
histories intersect and gain new meanings.
 Returning briefly to Chinese Opera, we can see that, although the novel 
tells a largely familiar story of a second-generation Chinese American 
returning to China for a temporary teaching position, it switches midway 
into a study of contemporary Chinese culture. The protagonist, Sonny Lin, 
arrives in China shortly before the Tiananmen Square protests, with a strong 
sense of his identity as a Chinese American, without the hyphen. He con-
fesses to have only begun to learn Chinese, contesting that those who think 
he is a native-born Chinese “haven’t looked close enough.”11 Sonny’s insis-
tence on distinguishing himself from native-born Chinese comes as a gentle 
reminder of the ever-existing danger of Asian Americans being excluded 
from civic life in the United States on grounds of their perceived “foreign-
ness.” His half-Native American, half-black partner Sissy George also chafes 
at the question from Professor Luo, whom she first meets on the flight to 
China, of whether she is an American, until she realizes that, coming from a 
Chinese professor, it is not a blatantly racist question. The typical “Chinese 
American” plot is disrupted, however, when Cao Feng, a Chinese journalist 
working for the Xinhua News Agency, meets Sonny at a postperformance 
reception at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. The narrative, which has been fil-
tered through Sonny up to this point, rechannels itself through the reporter 
Cao, who launches into a series of meditations on the issue of freedom in 
news reporting in China, which he compares to fiction making. Juxtaposing 
Sonny’s and Cao Feng’s perspectives, U.S.- and China-centered, respectively, 
Chinese Opera moves toward a binocular vision, which crystallizes in the 
various explicit comparisons mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. It 
offers a glimpse into Kuo’s engagement with comparative cultural critique, 
which is more clearly demonstrated in some of his other writings.
 What follows is devoted to tracing and unpacking this engagement. I 
examine the ways in which Kuo addresses ethno-racial politics and other 
issues in both the United States and China. Integral to Kuo’s political invest-
ments is a formal one, namely, his re-employment of metaphor, which pro-
vides a conceptual basis for the comparative model that he constructs in his 
writings. I first discuss Kuo’s 2006 novel Panda Diaries, which juxtaposes the 
including its imperial and military history in the first half of the twentieth century. 
 11. Alex Kuo, Chinese Opera, 37.
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Indian policies of the nineteenth-century United States and China’s policy 
on modernizing ethnic areas during the Cultural Revolution. The novel, I 
argue, comments critically on the homogenization of national space and 
culture that occurred in the histories of both countries, thereby revealing the 
omissions and erasures at the heart of conciliatory multiculturalism. I under-
score the singularity of Kuo’s critical vision by showing how it differs from 
an emerging discourse in China that compares China’s modernization of its 
western regions with the U.S. westward expansion. I then move backward to 
the author’s 2001 short story collection Lipstick to offer a sense of the ways in 
which Kuo’s literary project exceeds the U.S.–China binational framework.
The Two Wests
In one of his poems from the 1980s, “Andrew Jackson and the Red Guards,” 
Kuo compares the fanaticism of the Red Guards in China, whose “cucumber 
legs” are “churning up power / As far as Tibet,” with Jacksonian democracy 
implicated ironically in the removal of Indians.12 This poem is emblematic 
of Kuo’s literary projects in general, which often suggest a kind of imprecise 
congruence between the processes of national expansion and integration in 
the United States and China, both of which have involved a form of coloniza-
tion. His Panda Diaries, in particular, weaves together the historical experi-
ences of Native Americans and ethnic minorities in China. Kuo is not the 
only one drawing this parallel, but he approaches it differently from most 
others. The significance of Kuo’s comparative vision can be illustrated more 
clearly when we place him alongside other cultural voices that engage in 
similar U.S.–China comparisons. Written largely in the early 1990s (though 
not published until more than a decade later), Panda Diaries foreshadowed 
the surge, since the turn of the twenty-first century, of academic writings 
in China that compare China’s development of its western regions, home to 
many ethnic minorities, with the westward expansion of the United States.13 
In the early 2000s, the Chinese government launched the West China Devel-
opment Program so as to close the developmental gap between the inland 
 12. Alex Kuo, Changing the River, 31.
 13. Between 2000 and 2009, at least seven or eight book-length studies came out that study 
specific aspects of the history of the U.S. westward expansion with an eye on providing useful 
lessons for China’s development of its own west. Hundreds of journal articles and academic 
theses, as well as a number of international conferences, were devoted to comparative studies of 
the two processes.
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western provinces and the rest of China.14 For many contemporary Chi-
nese intellectuals, the history of American expansion (1803–98) from the 
purchase of Louisiana to the annexation of Hawaii provides a mixed model 
for China’s development of its own west. Despite the temporal gap between 
the opening of the American West and the ongoing project of West China 
Development, these academics find it useful to discuss what may or may not 
be transferable from the American experience. The comparisons between 
the “two Wests” tend to cast the United States as a flawed but useful prec-
edent that legitimizes China’s own enterprise. Most of the scholars taking on 
this comparative project demonstrate an awareness of the implications of 
national expansion for the environment and the cultural integrity of ethnic 
minorities. However, they largely focus on what government policies and 
initiatives it might take to achieve the goal of environmental and cultural 
conservation in the process of developing China’s west, making little effort 
to discover or advocate for minority perspectives on this issue. In contrast to 
Kuo’s writings, the emerging intellectual discourse on the “two Wests” largely 
refrains from questioning the imperialist logic of national expansion.
 He Chansheng, a professor in the Department of Geography at the Uni-
versity of Michigan, collaborated with Niu Shuwen and Cheng Shengkui, 
scholars based in China, on an article, pointing out in particular the practice 
of abusing natural resources during America’s westward movement, includ-
ing the destruction of forests in the Five Lakes region, the erosion of topsoil 
as a result of excessive mining, and the extinction of animal species (pas-
senger pigeons, bison, and seals, among others).15 They refer to the “Dust 
Bowl” phenomenon, which stemmed from this environmental deterioration 
and exacerbated the Great Depression, as a warning against irresponsible 
development in China.16 Another article, penned by Shao Fen, professor of 
law at Yunnan University, echoes this view by pointing out that the U.S. gov-
ernment neglected environmental issues associated with the development of 
the West until the 1930s, when a series of environmental laws started to be 
instituted.17
 Shao Fen also points out that, partially as a result of an awareness of 
historical precedents, like the U.S. example, the Chinese government started 
paying attention to environmental issues at the very beginning of the West 
 14. Ding Lu and William V. W. Neilson, ed., China’s West Region Development, 1–24.
 15. He Chansheng, Niu Shuwen, and Cheng Shenkui, “Meiguo xibu fazhan dui zhongguo 
xibu dakaifa de qishi” [“Lessons from development of the U.S. West to China’s West Develop-
ment Program”], 188–93.
 16. Ibid., 191.
 17. Shao Fen, “Meiguo xibu kaifa lifa jiyi jingyan jiaoxun” [Development of the West in the 
U.S. and its lessons].
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China Development Project. The government integrated environmental 
protection into its basic policies in 1983 and ratified a number of interna-
tional treaties on environmental protection, including the Declaration of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. A series of laws 
and regulations regarding natural resources and the environment were cre-
ated during the 1980s as well. However, many years of irresponsible develop-
ment in the west prior to the West China Development Project had already 
severely destroyed the region’s ecosystem, leading to desertification and the 
loss of soil; and the new environmental policies were, for a long time, poorly 
implemented. It remains a serious question whether, despite the increased 
environmental awareness among the Chinese leadership, China can avoid 
the “destruction first, conservation afterwards” pitfall.18 By being equally 
critical of the environmental record of both the United States and China, 
Shao is suggesting a point that has become a common understanding among 
many environmentalists, namely, that the two countries have a joint respon-
sibility to conserve resources and improve the global environment. China 
should not use the historical model of the U.S. westward expansion as an 
excuse for pursuing a high rate of development at the expense of the environ-
ment, nor should the United States begrudge a commitment to joining global 
environmental efforts because developing countries like China and India 
are purportedly obdurate about their wasteful ways. Until recently, the two 
countries, the top two polluters in the world, had engaged in a kind of blame 
game over the environment. In a New York Times special column in August 
2007, renowned China-hand Orville Schell described the situation as one in 
which “while the U.S. [hid] behind China, China [hid] behind the U.S.,” both 
“sitting the game out.”19
 Closely related to the problem of the environment is the issue of protect-
ing the lifeworlds of indigenous groups and ethnic minorities. He Chang-
sheng and his collaborators mention in their article the killing of Indians 
and the destruction of their culture as the cost of the American westward 
expansion.20 Shao Fen uses the example of Native Americans to argue against 
dismissing and destroying the cultural heritage of ethnic minorities living in 
 18. Ibid., 124.
 19. Orville Schell, “Expert Roundtable.” Many nonprofit organizations also devote them-
selves to building dialogue and concerted efforts on the environment between the two coun-
tries. Two examples: (1) U.S.–China Association for Environmental Education, which works 
closely with its sister organization in China, Global Village of Beijing; and (2) The China–U.S. 
Energy Efficiency Alliance, a nonprofit organization combating global climate change by pro-
moting energy efficiency and clean energy in China. It pools financial and technical resources 
to help China design and implement large-scale energy-efficiency incentive programs. 
 20. He Chansheng, Niu Shuwen, and Cheng Shenkui, 191.
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China’s west. The minority population in western regions accounts for 87 
percent of the country’s entire minority population. Most of the minority 
members in these regions, as Shao points out, are “shiju,” which translates 
roughly as “indigenous” (in the sense that they had established their habitats 
there long before the Han presence).21
 Implicit in this argument is the centrality of the issue of ethnic minorities 
to China’s development of its western regions. Indeed, the Chinese govern-
ment’s policy toward its western frontiers has long been shaped by its con-
cerns with national security and the unity of the Han Chinese and various 
ethnic groups on the frontiers. Changes in the Chinese government’s policy 
toward Tibet during the Mao era, for example, reflected its consideration of 
how best to minimize the resistance of Tibet’s religious and aristocratic elites 
to the central Communist government.22 As Robert Bedeski points out, the 
urgency of developing western regions in the new millennium follows largely 
from the sense that regional equality will be crucial not only for keeping up a 
high level of economic growth in China but also for maintaining the central 
government’s authority over the many ethnic groups in the western regions 
in a post–Cold War world where the United States has become the “domi-
nant power” in Central Asia.23
 While minority interests occupy a prominent position in the ongoing 
intellectual discussion around the western region development, however, 
this concern remains largely subordinated to national interests, which are 
often equated with those of the ethnic majority, the Han Chinese. In urging 
 21. There are no rigorous definitions of “indigeneity.” Current definitions emphasize that 
indigenous populations have “ancestral roots” deeply embedded in the lands they inhabit, thus 
differentiated from the “more powerful sectors of society living on the same lands or in close 
proximity.” See S. James Anaya, Indigenous People in International Law, 3. It has been added 
that indigenous communities are also defined by their historical isolation from modernization 
and the modern process of state-formation. This is the rule-of-thumb distinction that Kymlicka 
draws between indigenous populations and stateless nations, both of which, for Kymlicka, fall 
under the category of national minorities. See Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, 122. If one 
follows Anaya’s definition, most ethnic groups in western China can be called “indigenous.” If 
one applies Kymlicka’s definition, which is narrower, then many of these groups are not strictly 
indigenous. As Colin Mackerras points out, while they have an ancestral claim to where they 
live, they had developed their own governments before being incorporated into imperial China 
and later republican and communist China (Mackerras, China’s Minorities, 21–22). There are a 
number of exceptions, however. The Oroqens, the group specifically named in Panda Diaries, 
match the current definitions of “indigeneity.” One of the smallest minority nationalities in 
China, they were hunters in the Xingan Mountains historically and did not develop a semi-
agricultural lifestyle until after the founding of the PRC. Other examples include the Ewenki 
and the Hezhe in northeast China.
 22. Goldstein, “Tibet and China in the Twentieth Century,” 192–99. 
 23. Bedeski, “Western China,” 43.
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the Chinese state to assume a central role in conserving natural and cultural 
landscapes in western areas, some choose to emphasize the meaning that 
this project of conservation holds for the Han Chinese. In a sleight of hand 
dictated by the logic of Chinese nationalism, Shao believes that protecting 
important cultural sites in the west is about “preserving the roots of the Han 
Chinese,” who first originated amidst ceaseless interactions among the vari-
ous peoples of the region.24 In offering a list of these sites, Shao mentions the 
burial site of Emperor Qin (the first Han Chinese emperor) and the Potala 
Palace of Tibet in one breath.
 The privileging of the national (Han) interest entails the more severe 
blind spot of disregarding the potential incongruities between state conser-
vation policies and the material and cultural needs of minority peoples. This 
point is manifest, for example, in an essay by Gu Jun and Yuan Li, profes-
sor of history and researcher in ethnology, respectively, on the history of 
environmental and cultural conservation in the American West as a model 
for comparable policies in China. The authors discuss in particular the idea 
of establishing U.S. national parks, traditionally credited to George Catlin’s 
appeal for government-enforced measures to protect indigenous cultures and 
wildlife on the plains. They applaud the creation of the Yellowstone National 
Park in 1872, the establishment of National Park Service in 1916, and the 
appearance of many similar national parks between 1933 and World War 
II.25 They neglect to point out, however, that Catlin’s original proposal was 
actually not adopted by the planners of Yellowstone. The troubling legacy of 
Yellowstone has been addressed in scholarly writings. Stan Stevens points 
out that Catlin advocated the establishment of a park across a vast area of 
the Rocky Mountains “in effect to make most of the Great Plains a sanctu-
ary where the scores of different Native American peoples could continue 
to live their traditional ways of life and the vast herds of buffalo, elk, and 
antelope could continue with their seasonal migration.”26 However, Native 
American tribes had been completely excluded from Yellowstone by the 
mid-1880s, due to the “government policies concerning the confinement of 
Native Americans on reservations” as well as “national park policies.”27 Ste-
vens identifies the “Yellowstone model” as one in which strict nature protec-
tion is the main goal, to the exclusion of indigenous settlement and land use, 
 24. Shao, “Meiguo xibu kaifa lifa jiyi jingyan jiaoxun” [Development of the West in the U.S. 
and its lessons], 124.
 25. Gu Jun and Yuan Li, “Meiguo wenhua ji ziran yichan baohu de lishi yu jingyan” [His-
tory of the protection of cultural and natural heritage], 168. 
 26. Stan Stevens, Conservation through Cultural Survival, 29–30.
 27. Ibid., 29.
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a model that was not questioned or revised until the second half of the twen-
tieth century.28 Much international effort has been made to promote conser-
vation policies that establish governments and indigenous communities as 
co-owners and co-managers of protected areas.29 The nature reserves poli-
cies in China, especially the western regions, have been subjected to critical 
scrutiny for their impact on local minority communities. It has been noted 
that the Chinese government has since the 1990s introduced a set of initia-
tives in nature conservation that consciously emphasize the economic needs 
of minority communities with a historical presence in the conserved areas, 
thus departing from the Yellowstone model from the very beginning.30 The 
Chinese model, however, remains quite limited. The ecological values and 
knowledge of the indigenous and ethnic communities in western China have 
hardly been incorporated into the government’s approaches to conservation 
and development.31 While the government recognizes the economic needs 
and historical rights of indigenous communities, making allowances for 
limited use of agricultural and forest lands within protected areas, the local 
villagers are almost never involved in the management of these areas.32 Intel-
lectual discussions on the relationship between conservation and minority 
 28. Ibid., 28–32.
 29. For a good literature review of international conventions and guidelines addressing 
indigenous rights in international conservation since the early 1980s, see Sanjay K Nepal, “In-
volving Indigenous Peoples in Protected Area Management,” 749–51. Also see the various case 
studies from both developed and developing countries around the world in Stevens.
 30. Clem Tisdell and Zhu Xiang, “Reconciling Economic Development, Nature Conserva-
tion and Local Communities”; Trevor Sofield and F.  M.  S. Li, “Processes in Formulating an 
Ecotourism Policy for Nature Reserves in Yunnan Province, China.” Tisdell and Zhu point out 
that, as is the case with other developing countries, China’s strategies for easing pressures on 
biodiversity conservation, which can be traced back to the of Agenda 21 in 1994, has placed a 
special focus on improving economic opportunities in the neighborhood of protected areas in 
a way that benefits local communities. Sofield and Li offer a study of the process of formulating 
an ecotourism strategy for five newly designated reserves in the Yunnan Province in China and 
find that it involves much negotiation of the “Western paradigms of environmental conser-
vation, wilderness and sustainability, upon which ecotourism is based” (142). China’s policy 
toward minority nationalities is cited as an important factor in the government’s insistence that 
the ecotourism policy must benefit first and foremost the minority communities that inhabited 
the areas within the reserves in the past. 
 31. Xu Jianchu et al., “Integrating Sacred Knowledge for Conservation: Cultures and Land-
scapes in Southwest China.” Using the southwestern province of Yunnan as an example, the 
authors call for a drive toward “pluralism” in conservation (Xu et al. 2005, under “Indigenous 
Knowledge and Pluralism in Conservation”). They acknowledge the efforts on the part of the 
various levels of government to heed customary wisdom, as in the case of moving away from 
the push to sedentary livestock management, but note that there needs to be more extensive 
interaction between indigenous specialists and environmental scientists, as well as between 
indigenous communities and local governments. 
 32. Sanjay K. Nepal, “Involving Indigenous Peoples in Protected Area Management,” 759.
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interests that are currently taking place in China, as we can see, do not 
push the limits of government policies on conservation. They in fact tend 
to mirror these limits, by neglecting the importance of employing minor-
ity perspectives and experiences in conservation policy making. Endorsing 
the Yellowstone legacy reflects a certain intellectual complacency that can 
preclude efforts to thoroughly critique and transform deeply flawed models 
of conservation and state–minority relations. This complacency, no doubt, 
results in a large part from the current intellectual climate in China, that is, 
the highly limited intellectual freedom available to Chinese intellectuals, but 
it also illustrates the unstable and ambiguous politics of cultural translation 
and cross-national comparisons.
 The U.S.–China comparative discourse introduced here offers a hint at the 
ways in which China’s intellectuals and policy makers scour American politi-
cal and cultural history for what can provide a rationale as well as momen-
tum for China’s modernization, even as the United States perceives China as 
increasingly relevant to its own economic and security priorities. Though 
Chinese scholars and intellectuals have also shown interest in borrowing 
from development programs in other nations, they seem to find the U.S. 
case particularly pertinent.33 As we see, the U.S. westward expansion figures 
in this comparative discourse as an instrument of legitimization, offering a 
largely effective model that the Chinese government can comfortably follow 
and improve on in pursuing its own development goals, without fundamen-
tally reconsidering its approach to minority and environmental issues. Kuo’s 
Panda Diaries engages in a similar comparison as the policy discussions just 
studied, but Kuo is far more critical of the histories of national expansion and 
integration in both countries. He is by no means sanguine that the state can 
preempt or correct the problems that this process entails for minority and 
indigenous populations. Instead of relying on the government to assume the 
responsibility to preserve local cultures and natural ecosystems, he presents 
the process of state-sponsored economic development and national expan-
sion as an inevitable threat to both. Panda Diaries, I argue, can be read as a 
comparative critique of development projects that entail the elimination of 
certain species, habitats, and races from a modernized national space.
 More important, Kuo complements the social scientific approaches often 
adopted in discussions of the nation as a colonizing force. Panda Diaries 
performs a critique of both the United States and China while offering sus-
 33. See Gao Guoli, “Guowai qianfada diqu duiyu woguo xibu dakaifa de jidian qishi” [Les-
sons from under-developed areas in other countries], 32–36. Gao’s article cites the development 
of Hokkaido in Japan and Southern Italy, along with that of the American West, as historical 
precedents from which China can learn.
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tained reflections on the underlying metaphorical logic of comparative dis-
courses. Metaphor, as Kuo suggests in extremely complex ways, provides a 
conceptual model for turning observations about the impasses of national 
modernization—its human and environmental costs—into a productive and 
transformative critique. The novel, in other words, presents metaphor as 
a productive hazard, a slippery but necessary conceptual tool for a com-
parative and transnational understanding of the making of homogenized 
national space.
A Panda Bear is not a Bear
In 1987, Native American (Anishinaabe) author Gerald Vizenor published 
Griever: An American Monkey King in China, a fictionalized memoir of his 
stint in Tianjing, China, as a foreign teacher.34 In the opening chapter the 
author’s persona dreams about encountering a bear shaman on the southern 
Silk Road, who shows him cave paintings in the desert featuring images of 
bear shamans. The bear shaman then asks the author to pick a birch scroll 
to take with him, holding him responsible for the secrets inscribed on the 
scroll. The subsequent narrative in the memoir is presented as the unfolding 
of what is prophesized in the scroll that the author receives in his dream. The 
author, in other words, merges with the bear shaman he sees in his dream 
and becomes a shaman with prophetic and healing powers. Throughout the 
novel, the narrator also dresses himself as or assumes some qualities of the 
Monkey King, a rebellious, powerful monkey in the classic Chinese fantasy 
Journey to the West, which figures as a Chinese analogue of the bear shaman 
in Native American myths. The bear and the monkey are among the many 
sacred and mundane animals that populate Griever, serving, along with the 
human beings connected to them, as mediums between everyday life and 
what lies beyond.
 This essay is not about Vizenor but about the animal figures, especially 
the bear shaman, in Griever and the comparative vision it gestures toward are 
crucial for understanding the author that it does discuss. Alex Kuo’s Panda 
Diaries also germinated from the author’s experience in China as a foreign 
teacher in 1991 and 1992, not long after the publication of Vizenor’s book. 
While it claims to be a novel, Panda Diaries can hardly be properly desig-
nated as such. It offers a few snippets from protagonist Ge’s life in China, 
including growing up separated from his parents during the Cultural Revo-
 34. Gerald Vizenor, Griever, 18.
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lution and being demoted to the city of Changchun in northeast China after 
having presumably committed a political mistake as an intelligence officer 
in Beijing. The nonchronological narrative is further fragmented by various 
forms of authorial intrusion, including poetry, interpolated news stories, 
and critical reflections and commentaries on apparently unrelated historical 
events.
 In the novel, Kuo weaves together the histories of small, endangered 
indigenous communities in both China and the United States, associat-
ing their precarious fate with the irresponsible killing of animals that have 
traditionally been endowed with mythical qualities in indigenous cultures, 
including wolves, horses, and deer. Kuo explicitly refers to the symbiotic 
relationship between Native Americans and bison as a parallel to the inter-
dependence between the Oroqens in China and the animals that they wor-
ship and hunt. We can tease out at least two axes of comparison from Kuo’s 
narrative. Vertically, animals and indigenous populations become metaphors 
for each other, occupying two interconnected worlds that are equally threat-
ened by the process of modernization that nation-states propel. Horizontally, 
a metaphorical relationship is constructed between China’s policy toward 
the Oroqens during the Cultural Revolution and the Indian policies of the 
nineteenth-century United States. In intertwining the vertical and horizontal 
metaphors, the novel reflects on the functions of metaphor as a rhetorical 
figure and conceptual model that grounds comparative narratives. While 
metaphor predicates itself on the structuring of a “source domain” and a 
“target domain,” two discreet units bound up in a static, often hierarchized, 
relationship, it also implies the interdependence and interpenetration of the 
two domains that disrupt any given hierarchy imagined between them. Kuo 
demonstrates that, as the different functions of metaphor cannot be disen-
tangled from each other, metaphor is best understood in terms of irresolv-
able ambiguity. Mediating between the disciplining and liberating power of 
metaphor, Panda Diaries suggests a nuanced form of cultural critique that 
brings together the experiences of indigenous peoples, as well as species, 
from disparate time–space configurations.
 The novel also features an animal character, the Panda mailman, pre-
sented as Ge’s best friend in the beginning of the narrative. The Panda mail-
man talks and behaves just like a human being, except for some dietary 
peculiarities. He looks different from human beings, and yet the characters 
in the novel are not often alarmed by his presence outside the confines of a 
zoo. In many senses, the Panda mailman, representing an endangered ani-
mal species in China, figures as an animal double for Ge, a contemporary 
Chinese intellectual who feels beleaguered, or endangered, in a China soon 
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to be engulfed by the 1989 student protests. The Ge–Panda duo is related 
to the metaphorical pairing of indigenous people and their sacred animals. 
Kuo invokes the latter kind of pairing to comment on the simultaneous rise 
of species-based and race-based hierarchies, speciesism and racism, in the 
process of the modern nation’s colonization of indigenous and minority 
space, and he uses the Panda–Ge duo to critique state-centric, paternalistic 
approaches toward ethno-cultural and environmental justice that purports 
to remedy the ills of national expansion. As the panda does not figure in 
any traditional myth, one might say that Kuo’s novel creates a new urban 
myth modeled upon, in an inverted manner, the oral traditions of indigenous 
communities on both sides of the Pacific. In other words, the panda bear in 
Kuo’s narrative can be read as an inverted, modern, Chinese parallel to the 
powerful bear in Native American myth. The panda’s utter vulnerability and 
dependence on humans’ loving care forms a sharp contrast with the bear’s 
command of fear and respect from human beings. One cannot understand 
the figure of the panda bear in Kuo’s novel, then, without comparing it to the 
animal figures in Native American myth and cultures, as seen in such works 
as Vizenor’s Griever. It is only fitting that we use a comparative mode of read-
ing to understand a text that organizes itself around a series of comparisons.
 Kuo’s narrative presents the panda as a singular exception to other ani-
mals that have crossed paths with human beings since the advent of moder-
nity. In an earlier part of the novel, set in the Chinese city of Changchun, the 
Panda mailman and Ge drive to a California Noodle Company restaurant 
in the city, where Panda takes offense at the waitress who addressed him as 
“Animal Ambassador,” demanding that the waitress respect his “difference” 
rather than use the label attached to all pandas. The scene at the noodle 
company is then followed by the author’s reflections on the history of vari-
ous genocides in the New World that involved humans and animal species 
simultaneously. Kuo relates the destruction of the plains Indians’ bison com-
missary prior to the Battle of Little Big Horn “that was to change the colonial-
native narrative forever” by depriving the Indians of their food source.35 He 
then turns to a more general critique of the history of “wanton killing” in the 
“new, new world” that stemmed from European colonists’ espousal of “the 
right to expansion and the right to kill everything in its way.”36 The Panda 
mailman, then, represents an animal species that mysteriously escapes the 
modern human impulse to kill animals and other humans at whim. Being 
constantly labeled as “Animal Ambassador,” as Kuo suggests, constitutes a 
 35. Kuo, Panda Diaries, 30.
 36. Ibid., 31, 32.
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kind of character assassination—or, simply put, stereotyping—that, just as 
much as being physically annihilated, signifies a powerless position.
 Kuo makes clear the metaphorical linkage between violence toward 
humans and violence toward animals in one of his explicitly intrusive pas-
sages: “Whose nightmare was it? Who had the ammunition, and who was 
the rifle pointed at? In the twinning of this metaphor, every half included 
another surrogate from the animal kingdom, always.”37
 On a specific level, Kuo is pointing out that the slaughtering of the Amer-
ican bison destroyed the livelihood of Native Americans, turning them into a 
historical analogue of the animals that they depended on. On a more general 
level, Kuo is arguing that the killing of animals naturalizes and logically facili-
tates the killing of people. In other words, the human practice of killing other 
human beings often arises from, or is motivated by, their experience of kill-
ing animals, whose characteristics are then mapped onto the human groups 
to be slaughtered. Zoltán Kövecses, a theorist of conceptual metaphor, argues 
that abstract ideas do not arise literally from experiences but always through 
the mechanism of metaphorical mapping whereby abstract experiences in 
general are constituted on the analogy of more physical ones.38 Kuo echoes 
Kövecses’s view of metaphor by showing that it can serve as a conceptual 
basis for the transformation of one form of killing into another. Right before 
the passage just quoted, Kuo attributes to the Texas legislature that created a 
fellowship program to reward hunters of the plains Indians’ bison commis-
sary a kind of “uncontrollable ambiguity” that “physically killed the body 
on both sides of the metaphor.”39 Kuo’s remark on the “metaphorical twin-
ning” of animals and humans suggests the historical entwining of speciesism 
(systematic discrimination based on species) and racism, the inseparability 
of environmental and ethnocultural injustices committed during the era of 
expansion in U.S. history.
 As Cary Wolfe points out (via a quote from Derrida), speciesism makes 
 37. Ibid., 32.
 38. Metaphor has been studied intensely in cognitive linguistic theory as a conceptual 
model constitutive of how humans think and speak. See Zoltán Kövecses, Metaphor in Culture. 
Elaborating on and refining the theory of conceptual metaphor that originated from Mark 
Johnson and George Lakoff, Zoltán explains that metaphor consists in a kind of cognitive map-
ping that parallels abstract ideas with embodied experiences. In many languages, for example, 
the various parts of a pressurized container are mapped onto various elements of anger, thus 
providing a structure for the latter abstract idea. As Kövecses puts it, “[t]hrough detailed map-
pings, the metaphor provides a coherent structure for the concepts [that anger compromises]” 
(Kövecses, 199). More important, Kövecses poses the question of whether metaphors motivate 
or simply express the abstract ideas that constitute the fabric of a specific cultural system. See 
chapter 9, in particular 216. 
 39. Kuo, Panda Diaries, 32.
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possible a symbolic economy in which we engage in a “noncriminal putting 
to death” of not only animals but other humans as well “by marking them as 
animal.”40 Both speciesism and racism derived from the notion of the Great 
Chain of Being during the Enlightenment era, espoused by philosophers and 
writers as well as biologists and zoologists (Linnaeus and Buffon, for exam-
ple). The implication of natural science in the rise of modern racism has been 
noted.41 Kuo makes a similar point regarding natural scientists, quipping that 
their “specimen-gathering scientific rationality” is often “short-circuited by 
their anthropocentric will to kill.”42 But he goes further by placing the rise of 
both speciesism and racism against the background of European colonialism 
in the New World. John James Audubon, for example, believed in “hunting 
and poisoning passenger pigeons,” which led to the eventual extinction of 
passenger pigeons on the U.S. continent.43 The feat of putting an entire bird 
species to death echoes the slaughtering of bison herds and Indian popula-
tions, signaling that the expansion and homogenization of national space in 
the nineteenth-century United States were colonial processes with both a 
human and nonhuman cost.
 As I mention earlier, the figure of the panda represents an intriguing 
complication to the extension of the twin phenomena of racism and specie-
sism into the contemporary era. Toward the end of the book, Ge starts to 
wonder whether the Panda mailman, the representative of the panda species 
in the novel, is a “message” he needs to heed and whether he should behave 
like some of the animal species that “have learned to make the adjustment 
between politics and environment.”44 Apparently, then, the panda comes to 
embody a kind of proximity to transcendent powers that resemble the status 
accorded to the mythical bear in the traditional cultures of Native Americans 
and other indigenous peoples. As David Rockwell argues, the bear is seen in 
these traditional cultures as a “furry person, a relative.”45 Tribal people model 
their lives upon the lives of bears, initiating their young into adulthood, for 
examples, in an elaborate ritual during which the initiated dress up and act 
 40. Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites, 43.
 41. Kenan Malik, Meaning of Race, 87. Malik explains that, while the naturalists of the 
eighteenth century believed largely that a great gulf existed between humans and animals, nine-
teenth-century science was “drawn to the notion of human society constrained by natural laws” 
and saw “the origins of all human faculties in animal life” (87). Despite this difference, both 
outlooks enabled the construction of a naturalized hierarchy of life that entails both speciesism 
and racism.
 42. Kuo, Panda Diaries, 31.
 43. Ibid., 31.
 44. Ibid., 96.
 45. David Rockwell, Give Voice to Bear, 7.
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like bears.46 According to Lydia T. Black, bears are seen in many indigenous 
cultures in the circumpolar North, among many other places, as inhabit-
ing an “in-between” world that mediates between the human world and the 
“domain of deities and spirits.”47 The boundaries between the animal domain 
and the human domain remain porous, the crossing of which are often con-
ceptualized as “death, birth, and sexual congress.”48 This observation echoes 
Joseph Epes Brown’s point that bears are considered in Native American 
cultures to have been created before human beings, closer to the Great Spirit 
in their anteriority.49
 However, the panda in Panda Diaries can be read only as an inverted par-
allel to the bear shaman, representing a perverse extension of the premodern 
tradition of revering animals into our own times. Although the benevolence 
bestowed on the panda may seem to be a reversal of the human desire for 
territorial expansion that necessarily requires killing, it acts, at best, as a 
deceptive distraction from various forms of political and social violence. In 
fact, this benevolence is the flip side of speciesism, a manifestation of anthro-
pocentrism, designating humans as benefactors of animals whose habitats 
are threatened by human practices in the first place.50 Panda Diaries contains 
authorial comments and news inserts that satirize the ways in which pan-
das are cherished as national treasures in China and embraced all around 
the world. It opens with a Preface that tells the story of Ruth Hackness, the 
American fashion designer who, in 1936, brought back home wrapped in 
her arms the first live giant panda to be seen in the New World. The episode, 
for Kuo, inaugurated the ambassadorial role that the panda was to play ever 
since. As Kuo puts it,
whenever a Nicolae Ceausescu is not losing his testicles in his own palace, 
or an Imelda Marcos is not counting her missing Parisian alligator shoes; 
or a Prince Charles is not traversing the remnants of the British common-
wealth whining about the abuse of the English language; or the Palestinian 
and Israeli youths are not trying to kill each other with rubber bullets, 
stones, or more specific targeted killings; or another still-living Enola Gay 
airman or USS Arizona swabby is not saluting the flag; the world media 
 46. Ibid., 19–23.
 47. Lydia T. Black, “Bear in Human Imagination and in Ritual,” 344.
 48. Ibid.
 49. Joseph Epes Brown, The Spiritual Legacy of the American Indian, 38.
 50. Anthropocentrism and speciesism do not mean the same thing, but are rather two sides 
of the same coin. Anthropocetrism assumes the animals are valuable only if they serve human 
interests, thus indirectly denigrating animals, while speciesism denotes negative attitudes to-
ward animals based on their membership in a biological species other than homo sapiens.
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focuses on the copulation effectiveness of these twenty-three zoo-bound 
pandas.51
Apparently capable of accomplishing the feat of uniting all countries on earth, 
the panda functions as a symbolic stand-in for what exceeds the symbolic, or 
human representational schemas, something that transcends the history of 
human strife. It provides human beings with a symbol of the sacredness of 
all creatures, an icon of the transcendent that, occasionally at least, elevates 
and cleanses the profane, anthropocentric world. In other words, the novel 
figures the panda as the center of a contemporary version of animal worship.
 This worship, however, is clearly compromised by condescending benev-
olence, the belief that “only man can save the giant panda.”52 This point 
becomes clear in the coda of Panda Diaries, where a poem titled “Animal 
Grammar” offers a list of common English idioms that use animals as meta-
phors for qualities considered to be subhuman. The panda is the only animal 
in “Animal Grammar” that is not part of everyday English idioms involving 
animals. It, instead, appears as part of “Panda-monium,” a silly instance of 
wordplay. The absence of the word “panda” in common English expressions 
can be seen as a linguistic corollary of the exoticized, exalted place that the 
panda occupies in Western culture, but the idle wordplay reveals the ironic 
tension between the panda’s semi-sacred status in the contemporary Western 
and world imagination and its easy slide into an object of ridicule. Kuo is sug-
gesting that the logic of contemporary forms of animal worship, as one sees in 
the rush to save and love giant pandas, is haunted by the irreversible loss of a 
premodern world where humans and animals worked in close proximity with 
each other as interdependent parties, if not equal partners. The social posi-
tion the panda occupies in our times is a far cry from the position accorded 
to the mythical bear in traditional tribal cultures. As Richard Tapper explains, 
the modern urban–industrial society is characterized by the marginaliza-
tion of animals, which impinge on human lives only as pets or zoo animals 
or symbolically as animal toys and characters in children’s literature.53 This 
marginalization reflects the decreased reliance on animals in the relations of 
production prevalent in urban–industrial societies, which has led conceptu-
ally to the anthropocentric belief that humans should reign over animals and 
their environments.
 More important, in Panda Diaries, the anthropocentric approach to ani-
mal rights and nature conservation is closely associated with the policies and 
 51. Kuo, Panda Diaries, 2.
 52. Ibid., 35.
 53. Richard Tapper, “Animality, Humanity, Morality, Society,” in What Is an Animal? 56–57.
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political attitudes affecting ethno-racial minorities in the United States and 
China. As the Panda mailman is paired up with the disaffected Chinese intel-
lectual Ge, one might read Panda as an animal counterpart of the figure of the 
Chinese dissident, be it Wei Jingsheng, Harry Wu, or the Dalai Lama, that is 
often embraced and championed in the West. We can thus project the dou-
bleness—exalted and yet vulnerable—ascribed to pandas onto the Chinese 
dissidents. In the beginning of Panda Diaries, the Panda mailman visits Ge at 
his apartment and reminisces about his visit to the National Zoo in Washing-
ton, DC. While many visitors were busy taking photos of the pandas inside 
the cage, they ignored Panda because he was “not where he was supposed to 
be.”54 The pandas, in other words, are turned into a media spectacle rather 
than integrated into the fabric of everyday American life. This situation can 
be read as an implicit critique of the kind of role that Chinese dissidents play 
in American culture. Like the pandas in the cage, they are often staged in the 
U.S. media as adorable novelties, objects of paternalistic love and pity, or an 
endangered species in need of Western protection. The protective impulse 
they elicit, however, does not quite extend to the raced and ethnicized bodies 
outside the limits of the staged spectacles. Arguably, Kuo is making a point 
about the contradiction between America’s claim to a liberal empire, a benign 
world power advocating for the rights of racial, ethnic, and other minorities 
at home and around the world, and the persistence of political and economic 
inequalities in the country. Kuo’s critique, of course, is not confined to the 
United States. It also concerns itself with the state-centered approach toward 
the rights of minority and indigenous populations practiced in contemporary 
China.
 Early on in Panda Diaries, we see a scene from the Cultural Revolution, 
when a twelve-year-old Ge is forced to live with the Oroqens after his par-
ents were sent to a separate place for political re-education. The scene shows 
that, during the Cultural Revolution, the Oroqens’ habitat was irrevocably 
reduced by the government policy of assimilating them into an agricultural 
mode of production, coupled with the dwindling of reindeer herds as a result 
of environmental degradation.55 At one point, the author intrudes upon the 
 54. Kuo, Panda Diaries, 25.
 55. English-language sources on the history of the Oroqens are far and few in between, 
most of which focus on the grammar of the disappearing Oroqen language. However, see Lind-
say Whaley, “The Growing Shadow of the Oroqen Language and Culture.” Wayley provides a 
brief history of the Oroqens’ transformation from a community of hunter–gatherers in the 1950s 
to the predominantly farming, fast shrinking ethnic group in the twenty-first century. Wayley at-
tributes this transformation largely to the modernization policies implemented in Mao’s China, 
which pushed them into “communal living with other minorities and the Han majority,” but he 
also points out the role played by the earlier history of the Oroqens, who unfortunately set up 
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narrative and offers two conflicting accounts of the current population of 
the Oroqens. One version sets the number at 500, and the other, apparently 
culled from a government document, offers the figure 10,000 and credits the 
government for the great social progress achieved among the Oroqens.56 It 
is likely that Kuo invokes this official figure to suggest, aside from baseless 
exaggeration on the part of the government, the fact that a large number of 
Han Chinese have married the Oroqens since the end of Mao’s era to gain the 
preferential treatment benefits that come with minority status. The larger fig-
ure clearly serves to bolster the claim that the official ethnic policy preserves 
ethnic cultures, when in fact increased intermarriage has further dissipated 
the already endangered Oroqen culture.57
 Kuo’s comments on the fate of the Oroqens complement his critique of 
the pattern of the “metaphorical twinning” of humans and animals in the 
nineteenth-century United States by showing how it is mirrored in post-1949 
China. They also offer a useful rebuttal to the view, expressed by the Chi-
nese scholars discussed earlier, that state initiatives can eliminate any pos-
sible negative implications of China’s current effort to develop its minority 
areas, especially those in the west. One can argue, to extrapolate from Kuo’s 
argument against the government’s policy toward the Oroqens both during 
the Cultural Revolution and in more recent years, that this misguided view is 
not too far from U.S. exceptionalism, which celebrates the westward expan-
sion as a Puritan errand into the wilderness that, as Amy Kaplan puts it, 
proved “antithetical to the historical experience of imperialism,” rather than 
an encroachment on the world of indigenous peoples.58
 In his article “Globalization, Indigenism, and the Politics of Place,” Arif 
Dirlik reminds us that at the center of contemporary struggles against the 
simultaneously homogenizing and fragmentary forces of globalization is the 
effort to reclaim singular, and yet not isolated, places from these forces, often 
organized under the term “indigenism.” It is important, Dirlik argues, to 
differentiate between the “indigenism” that simply reacts against the global 
and the “indigenism” that derives its meaning from “substantial autonomous 
claims” to “an almost absolute attachment to place understood concretely,” 
their hunting grounds at a place that has become “a corridor for a succession of military pow-
ers” (13). 
 56. Kuo, Panda Diaries, 69–70.
 57. Wayley discusses the issue of Han–Oroqen intermarriage in his article, explaining that, 
in the post-Mao era, the government offered the Oroqens “special dispensations,” including 
exempting them from the “one child policy,” thus providing a strong incentive for Han–Oroqen 
intermarriage (14). 
 58. Amy Kaplan, “‘Left Alone with America’: The Absence of Empire in the Study of Ameri-
can Culture,” 4.
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in all its biosocial complexity.59 The former sense of “indigenism” often takes 
the form of a nation-state, which in itself is “a colonial force that erases the 
local and the place-based in the name of its own universalistic claims.”60 The 
second sense of “indigenism,” by contrast, “appears in its full critical signifi-
cance against the colonialism not only of the global but also of the national.”61 
More important, Dirlik interprets the place-consciousness that underlies the 
second sense of “indigenism” not as “localized parochialism” but as an abil-
ity to recognize the “interactions between the global and the local that cut 
across the boundaries of the nation, projecting the local into transnational 
spaces.”62 Not unlike Dirlik, Kuo works toward a comparative, transnational 
approach to the tensions between colonial and indigenous, anticolonial atti-
tudes toward place. The history of Native Americans has hardly been under-
stood in relation to that of ethnic minorities in China. Kuo’s novel is part of 
an emerging cultural discourse that both constitutes and reflects upon these 
connections. Its juxtaposition and comparison of the two histories subject 
both the U.S. and China—their governments and political cultures at large—
to critical scrutiny. Against cultural relativism and (Western-centric) moral 
universalism at once, Kuo argues that the West needs a stronger dose of self-
criticism in decrying minority rights violations in the non-West and that 
developing countries cannot be exonerated from charges of such violations 
simply because they have been victimized by Western colonialism and impe-
rialism. Reading Kuo does not show us what it is like to establish “actual” 
contact between Native Americans and indigenous or minority groups in 
China, and yet he helps lay an important conceptual basis for such contact. 
Kuo not only bridges disparate histories imaginatively by figuring them as 
metaphors for each other but also reflects consciously on the conflicting 
political implications of metaphorical logic. We have caught a few glimpses 
of Kuo’s comments on and reemployment of metaphor, but this dynamic 
deserves a closer look.
Metaphorical Diffusion
In the second of Coetzee’s Tanner lectures at Princeton, later published as 
The Lives of Animals, novelist Elizabeth Costello suggests in her impassioned 
speech on animal abuse that Swift’s satire “A Modest Proposal” has perhaps 
 59. Arif Dirlik, “Globalization, Indigenism, and the Politics of Place,” 16.
 60. Ibid., 20.
 61. Ibid., 20.
 62. Ibid., 19.
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been misread all along.63 The mock proposal that Irish families save them-
selves from poverty by raising babies for the dinner table of their English 
masters may be more than an oblique comment on the ways in which the 
English rule in Ireland was causing starvation and, in a sense, already kill-
ing Irish babies. How is it, Costello asks, that we never read Swift’s essay 
as a critique of the practice of killing and eating piglets? Costello certainly 
does not represent a reliable perspective in Coetzee’s lectures, delivered in 
fictional form, but this particular question is insightful and relevant to my 
discussion of Kuo’s Panda Diaries. It is indeed unimaginable for readers of 
Swift, wherever they are, to read Irish babies as a metaphor for piglets. One 
implication of Costello’s question is that the two parts that constitute a meta-
phorical expression are often not equal. Since such an expression customarily 
illustrates the meaning of an abstract concept by mapping it onto a concrete 
object or embodied experience, it is a conceptual mechanism contingent 
upon and constitutive of the construction of a set of hierarchical orders in 
which objects and experiences are ranked according to their perceived level 
of sophistication. While humans can be compared to animals, that is to say, 
they cannot be a vehicle for animals. This truism both reflects and reinforces 
the hierarchical relationship constructed between animals and humans under 
the reign of speciesism and anthropocentrism. This is also part of the point 
that Kuo makes in his critique of the various instances of “metaphorical twin-
ning” under colonialism, which compare members of the human species, 
ethnicized and racialized groups in many cases, to particular animals (plains 
Indians–bison, the Oroqens–reindeer), thus reducing these groups to subhu-
mans fit for mass slaughter. This logic is highlighted in “Animal Grammar,” 
which consists of a litany of familiar metaphorical expressions, such as “dumb 
as an ox,” “crazy like a loon,” and “to leech,” among others. These expressions 
compare a person to an animal to the effect of denigrating both. Echoing 
Kuo’s critique of “metaphorical twinning” within the body of his narrative, 
“Animal Grammar” demonstrates, on a broader level, the ways in which met-
aphorical language registers and facilitates colonial violence that affects both 
animals and humans. Metaphor has long been theorized as a figure of iden-
tity, organicity, or consummate union, and as such, it has become a bête noire 
in poststructural criticisms, as seen, for example, in De Man’s privileging of 
allegories and Homi Bhabha’s elevation of metonymy over metaphor.64 The 
 63. J. M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 55–56.
 64. De Man critiques the Romantic privileging of metaphor in his early and mid-career 
writings. “Reading (Proust),” 57–58; “Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric,” whereas De 
Man deconstructs the Romantic conception of metaphor as an expression of essential connec-
tions. Homi Bhabha differentiates between metaphor and metonomy as two conceptual models 
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other side of the coin, metaphor’s power to create and preserve hierarchical 
orders, has strangely eluded critical attention. Kuo, shows us a different face 
of metaphor, suggesting that, as a figure of comparison or cognitive map-
ping, it both flattens and hardens differences. These two sides of metaphor 
can be seen as a figurative corollary of the interplay of incorporation and 
exclusion that defines nation-building projects. As Panda Diaries suggests, 
both the United States and China have stretched themselves across a diverse 
range of terrains and cultures, imposing, with more or less coercive force, a 
homogenizing vision of development upon certain species and communities, 
which are at the same time separated from the majority nation on grounds of 
their purported inferiority or backwardness. The process of national expan-
sion in both countries, in other words, is captured formally in the structure 
of metaphor.
 By bringing together U.S. and Chinese histories as imprecise parallels 
of each other, moreover, Kuo shows that there is yet another side to meta-
phor. While metaphorical logic undergirds nation-building projects, it can 
also enable the emergence of comparative perspectives on these projects by 
allowing us to draw connections between and among them. Panda Diaries 
explores many such connections. Even as the plight of the Oroqens and that 
of Native Americans are brought into a metaphorical relationship with each 
other, they are also linked, metaphorically, to other ecological, political, and 
cultural injustices on both sides of the Pacific, including the silencing of dis-
sident intellectuals in contemporary China. The continuous proliferation and 
layering of metaphors, a pattern that one might describe as metaphorical 
diffusion, suggests that Native Americans do not exactly constitute a North 
American equivalent of the Oroqens or exist in a dyad with the latter, just 
as animals and humans do not constitute a closed circuit, even though they 
can be productively compared. By allowing his metaphors to be destabilized 
by other metaphors, Kuo does not engage so much in cognitive mapping as 
in cognitive demapping. The juxtaposition of the United States and China in 
Panda Diaries gestures toward a new comparative framework without by any 
means seeking to map out a stable structure for it. Tapping into the deter-
ritorializing power of metaphor, Kuo recalls Jahan Ramazani’s theorization 
of the figure. For Ramazani, metaphor can operate as a “rhetorical site of 
resemblance and ‘double vision’” and a “linguistic and conceptual ‘contact 
underlying two conflicting kinds of collectivities, the former grounding bounded unities like 
nation-states and the latter helping to shape interstitial, hybrid, postnational cultural formations 
that instantiates what Bhabha terms the “Third Space.” See Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 
155, 227.
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zone’ and ‘third space.’”65 It has been employed in the work of Indian dia-
sporic poet A.  K. Ramanujan, for instance, to “[mediate] postcoloniality,” 
that is, illustrate rhetorically the spatial movement and the process of cultural 
hybridization that constitute the postcolonial condition.66 It is not a stretch to 
say that writing under the postcolonial condition, or in the diapora, as Kuo 
shows, generates a special connection with metaphor.
 Kuo’s complex approach to metaphor is clearly captured in a key passage 
in Panda Diaries. In the midst of the narrative about Ge’s experience with the 
Oroqens, we find a stand-alone lyrical interlude functioning as a miniatur-
ized version of the novel as a whole. This passage illustrates, while comment-
ing explicitly on, the pattern of metaphorical diffusion that suffuses the novel 
as a whole. It starts, appropriately, with a metaphor: “This is a tent in a dream 
forward where he lives, and it does not have a door. In its place, choose an 
empty space, whether square, rectangle or circle, or any shape of his imagin-
ing, and he will have lived in it. His eulogy is a history of doors and passages, 
of light to dark, or dark to light, or those journeys in between. But there is 
no door to this tent.”67 The tent can be seen as a spatial metaphor for Chinese 
history, which can be accessed only through the workings of imagination. 
The nebulous “he” in this paragraph can refer to both an imagined historical 
subject and the one doing the imagining, thus formally mimicking the for-
mation of a coherent national identity based on individual acts of identifica-
tion. Indeed, “his eulogy,” an apparently clichéd narrative of the vicissitudes 
of Chinese history and the inexhaustible resilience of the Chinese people 
(“doors and passages,” “light to dark, or dark to light”), is simultaneously a 
eulogy about “him” and created by “him.” The image of the tent, then, signi-
fies a self-contained historical narrative that aims to circumscribe national 
consciousness with a fixed set of tropes. It presents the nation as an enclosed 
space standing apart from the world outside. There is “no door” to this tent; 
one finds a way in by mentally inhabiting it. National membership, in this 
case, is contingent upon accepting a particular narrative of Chinese history 
and weaving oneself into it.
 The singular “he” in the first paragraph of the interlude gives way, how-
ever, to a collective “we” in the third paragraph. For a moment, “we” also walk 
through the space inside the tent, watching various events unfolding within 
it, including what seems to be the Tiananmen Square protests, during which 
“a young history student” hurls a rock at an army tank. But “we” soon realize 
that being completely captivated by a given narrative of the nation entails a 
 65. Jahan Ramazani, The Hybrid Muse, 77, 101.
 66. Ibid., 77.
 67. Kuo, Panda Diaries, 14, 15.
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kind of epistemological blindness. In the beginning of the fourth paragraph, 
then, “we” reflect on this blindness and then abruptly leave the tent for a dif-
ferent site: “But we are too far off ourselves, as reliable as the metaphors seem 
to be. So let’s step aside and check our omissions and exaggerations. There, 
the sun is rising unstoppable, nothing turning it back there. There are walls 
here, too, some covered with revolutionary words, the bird still lives in 
several colors. The only sound rising from the thronging crowd is an inept 
gasp anticipating irreversible dreams. We must move cautiously here, renew 
our identities, cross our hearts, if we are to avoid the stray lunatic endanger-
ing every species.”68
 “We” have realized that figuring Chinese history as an enclosed, doorless 
tent is a case of abusive use of metaphor. It isolates the nation, through “omis-
sions and exaggerations,” from its messy entanglements with other spaces, 
thus delimiting conceptions of national identity. With this realization, “we” 
venture into an altogether different world as a way of uncovering these entan-
glements. “Stepping aside” from the imaginary tent of China, “we” now speak 
from a different but no more innocent place simply referred to as “here,” as 
opposed to “there,” where “the sun is rising unstoppable.” The place denoted 
as “here” can certainly be read as the United States, the destination of many 
Chinese immigrants since the nineteenth century as well as Chinese political 
dissidents who escaped their home country after the suppression of the 1989 
protests, while “there” can be seen as a reference to the ascending China, 
which has taken over the mantel of the “rising sun” from Japan. Forced to 
“move cautiously,” “renew our identities,” and “cross our hearts,” “we” are now 
subjected, in this new land, to genocidal impulses “endangering” every spe-
cies that does not fit in, a predicament that foreshadows the novel’s later refer-
ences to the “metaphorical twinning” of animals and humans that facilitates 
the killing of certain members of both categories. “We” now redefine our col-
lective identity by engaging in struggles against exclusionary conceptions of 
legal and cultural citizenship in the United States. The aim of these struggles, 
the author suggests, is not assimilation, but instead the expansion of conven-
tional coordinates of American culture. The grammar-conscious, strangely 
unidiomatic phrase “The Bird Still Lives” in this paragraph might be read as 
a Chinese American variation on the more idiomatic version “Bird Lives.” 
Invoking the famous graffiti commemorating the death of jazz musician 
Charlie Parker, Kuo is arguably drawing an imprecise analogy between Chi-
nese immigrants in the United States and African Americans or, in another 
metaphorical twist, between Chinese immigrants and social and artistic out-
 68. Ibid., 15.
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casts in general. “The Bird Still Lives” suggests, on a grammatical level, the 
ways in which Chinese Americans pluralize American culture while being 
transformed in the very same process.
 We can see now that even though this interlude begins with a disavowal of 
metaphor, it goes on to suggest a metaphorical, parallel relationship between 
Chinese and U.S. histories and the traces of genocidal lunacy embedded in 
both. Rather than construct spatial metaphors to territorialize history, Kuo 
uses the logic of metaphor to illuminate historical passages between presum-
ably self-contained national spaces. Traversing “here” and “there,” “we” reveal 
the inextricable connections between the two spaces and challenge the myth 
of coherent national identity. I should qualify my previous reading—namely, 
mapping “here” and “there” onto the United States and China in this par-
ticular order—by pointing out that such an exact correspondence does not 
exist. The point of this interlude is to blur the distinctions between “here” and 
“there,” not to consolidate their internal unity. In the same vein, the pronoun 
“we” does not just refer to a clearly defined identity—Chinese Americans, for 
example—but gestures more broadly to new collective identities formed on 
the basis of physical or conceptual movement between and among different 
national spaces and cultures.
 Metaphors proliferate swiftly in the rest of the interlude. “We” briefly 
mention other locations, such as Bogota, where “history is declaring its own 
martial law,” before returning to the tent that started it all.69 Kuo, clearly, not 
only is drawing connections between ethno-racial and other injustices in the 
United States and China but also is gesturing toward a global perspective on 
political violence in general. He demonstrates that metaphorical diffusion is 
an indispensable discursive tactic for presenting the history of a nation in 
terms of how it spills out of state borders, in the form of both the border-
crossing movement of its citizens and its entanglements with other national 
histories. It is also, at the same time, crucial for highlighting the linkages 
between and among different political symptoms of modernity, including 
anthropocentrism, racism, and colonialism. In other words, Kuo shows us a 
way of mitigating the conceptual violence of metaphor and reappropriating it 
for a multiply comparative mode of cultural critique.
 Even though the pattern of metaphorical diffusion in Panda Diaries sug-
gests a conceptual basis for productively comparative critique, it of course 
does not solve all the paradoxes entailed in comparative modes of thinking. 
We can in fact argue that the proliferation of metaphors in the text gener-
ates the kind of problem that Paul Breslin identifies in Derek Walcott’s epic 
 69. Ibid., 15.
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poem Omeros. As Breslin points out, in Omeros, especially the last chapters 
of book IV and book V, the poet’s persona “extends his wanderings to North 
America and Europe, seeking to make every event rhyme with a Caribbean 
counterpart.”70 Although the poem’s rage for parallelisms is reversed toward 
the end of the poem, where the Walcott persona “begins to criticize his own 
obsession with Homeric parallels,” it nevertheless tangles these particular 
chapters in “serpentine coils of dubious analogy.”71 Unlike Walcott, Kuo does 
not reflect consciously on the excessive diffusion of metaphors into form-
less associations, preferring to leave the dilemma to critics, but neither does 
he indulge in it. Indeed, in Panda Diaries, Kuo quickly wraps up the lyrical 
interlude just analyzed and moves on to a snapshot of Ge’s life among the 
Oroqens.
Counting and Seriality
The organizing principle of metaphorical diffusion can also be seen in the 
collection of short stories Lipstick and Kuo’s earlier poetry. Lipstick can be 
read as a more associative version of Panda Diaries; both were indeed com-
posed around the same time and both came to print more than ten years after 
they were written. If the central concern of Panda Diaries is metaphor, Lip-
stick focuses on the idea of “counting” as a political act predicted upon con-
ceptual metaphor. To count, first and foremost, means to construct a series 
based on certain perceived commonalities or historical connections among 
purported members of this series.
 Going back to Panda Diaries for the moment, the trope of counting also 
emerges there but in a muted way. Late in the narrative, we learn that Ge 
used to be a top national security official in Beijing and was asked to “com-
pile an accurate and reliable body count of the fatalities” resultant from the 
Tiananmen “riot.”72 His reluctance to offer an official estimate led to his exile 
to the remote city of Changchun, which made him realize that “there is no 
room for the story-teller to escape.”73 Counting is storytelling and he could 
not bring himself to sacrifice its principles for careerism. This scene shows 
the logical linkage between giving a count and giving an account, or telling a 
story. Trying to estimate how many were killed during the suppression of the 
Tiananmen Square protests involves not only the task of counting bodies but 
also that of determining which bodies deserve being included in the count. 
 70. Paul Breslin, Nobody’s Nation, 262.
 71. Ibid., 262, 72.
 72. Kuo, Panda Diaries, 72. 
 73. Ibid., 73.
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It is a political act instrumental for establishing the contour and structure of 
a given historical narrative. The question of counting raised in this particu-
lar section reverberates throughout Panda Diaries, which recounts U.S. and 
Chinese histories in relation to each other, as part of an expansive series of 
stories about the violence entailed in the modernization and homogenization 
of national space. On a smaller scale, the stories in Lipstick also juxtapose or 
translate between different national histories, suggesting ways in which they 
can be examined as a loosely connected series.
 In a story titled “Definitions,” Kuo places the Chinese government’s sup-
pression of the 1989 protests in the context of many other forms of state-
sponsored violence characteristic of the twentieth century. The protagonist 
Shen, a news anchor in China who has been warned to follow the “definitive 
dogma on disappearance” in reporting on those killed and arrested during 
the Tiananmen Square protests,74 picks up a few archived newspapers that 
had spilled from file cabinets and finds stories of a number of seemingly-
disjointed events:
Dateline Buenos Aires, August 7, 1977. Disappeared today, Pepe, Marianna 
and Angela Mendoza, father, wife and daughter, 27, 24 and infant, witnesses 
said, whisked away in a green Ford Falcon while they were walking along 
Avenida Florida in broad daylight. No known political activism or mem-
bership. . . . Shanghai 1937, then Selma 1966, Warsaw 1945, and on and on, 
the room full of it, until he got to Hiroshima and Nagasaki 1945.75
In this story, the protagonist is literally counting: the Junta that came to power 
in Argentina in 1973 and waged a “Dirty War” afterward; the Japanese occu-
pation of Shanghai in 1937; the slaughtering of civil rights marchers in Selma, 
Alabama, in 1965; the Nazi’s leveling of Warsaw at the end of World War II; 
and, finally, the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to wrap up the 
same war. Dazed from all this data, Shen walks into the lobby and finds the 
entire building and the streets outside deserted. He realizes that, to everyone 
else, he has become one of the “disappeared,” and can now tell their stories “in 
the first person.”76 The “disappeared” is a term that first emerged in studies 
of Cold War Latin American history, referring to victims of state-organized 
abductions, torture, and murder.77 The abstraction of the “disappeared” into 
a transnational and transhistorical identity category in Kuo’s story is remi-
niscent of Benedict Anderson’s theorization of the emergence of collective 
 74. Kuo, Lipstick, 57.
 75. Ibid., 59; italics in original.
 76. Ibid., 59.
 77. Diana Taylor, Disappearing Acts, x, 98.
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identities in the modern world. In his article “Nationalism, Identity, and the 
World-in-Motion,” Anderson continues his argument in Imagined Commu-
nities, making a distinction between collective, including national, identities 
engendered by cultural forms like newspapers and such tools of governance 
as the census. By erasing the boundaries between local and nonlocal through 
the use of a standardized vocabulary, newspapers allowed what can be called 
“quotidian universals,” such concepts as “nationalists,” “agitators,” and “lead-
ers,” to “[seep] through and across all print languages,” thus giving rise to 
collective identities without uniformity or clearly demarcated boundaries.78 
Newspapers enabled the rise of what Anderson calls “serial thinking,” that 
is, the construction of identities with internal coherence that are neverthe-
less radically open and performative.79 The unbound serial identities can be 
differentiated, though not in an absolute sense, from the essentialized, bound 
identities that census categories prescribe. The nature of a collective identity, 
to extrapolate from Anderson, is contingent not upon who is included but 
upon the style of inclusion. “Definitions” dramatizes an instance of Ander-
son’s idea of “serial thinking,” which gives rise to the mental construction, if 
not the actual emergence, of a new kind of collective identity. The category 
of the “disappeared” that Shen invents in the story, not unlike that of the 
“stateless” or “illegal aliens,” is a paradox, as it is founded upon a shared state 
of being deprived of recognizable social identities. It constitutes an unbound 
identity that counters the state’s power to tie individuals to or tear them away 
from fixed identities.
 “Serial thinking” figures prominently throughout Lipstick, giving the sto-
ries a subtle continuity. Another story, titled “Keepers,” offers an extended 
dream scene that stages an imagined meeting of the “disappeared,” as defined 
in the story “Definitions.” Xiao Baba, the protagonist, dreams about dip-
ping into a picture of a high mountain lake and swimming across it to the 
“topological legends of the opposite shore,” which takes the shape of a “citrus 
country.”80 The orchard is under the care of an unnamed couple, “runaways 
from the Guatemalan highlands” (implicitly referring to a history of indig-
enous movements and civil insurrections in that region), who share food and 
drinks with Xiao and a “recent defector,” a Tiananmen Square mainlander.81 
Tapping into Xiao’s consciousness, the third-person narrator describes both 
the caretaker couple and the mainlander as “dissenting nationalist[s]” from 
 78. Benedict Anderson, “Nationalism, Identity, and the World-in-Motion,” 121.
 79. Ibid., 121.
 80. Kuo, Lipstick, 84.
 81. Ibid. For more details about the history of civil strife and indigenous movements in 
Guatemala, see Jennifer Shirmer, “Appropriating the Indigenous, Creating Complicity.” 
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an “origin of hyphens,” who are now “weav[ing] their stories unhurriedly.”82 
As the various dissidents gather, the “opposite shore” becomes, to Xiao, an 
“expanding universe of colors.”83 When Xiao stands up to leave, he feels that 
he has become completely interchangeable with the dissidents whom he 
met: “he [knows] he [is] them, there by the side of the shelter, and they [are] 
him, in this orchard, here now swimming strong, back across the lake.”84 
The merging of different individual identities in this scene is a familiar 
move for Kuo, which, like the use of “we” in the Panda Diaries passage that 
starts with the image of a doorless tent, sutures artificial boundaries through 
“serial thinking.” The dissidents in this imaginary orchard are “dissenting 
nationalist[s]” not just because of the particular causes they had devoted 
themselves to, which certainly involve rebellion against state policies, but also 
because they embody a nonconventional way of imagining collective, includ-
ing national, identities, encapsulated in Xiao Baba’s vision of “an expansive 
universe of colors” that does not break apart or collapse into a unitary, care-
fully bound series. Through the perspective of Xiao Baba, Kuo is suggesting 
a form of pluralist nationalism that resists the homogenizing and hierarchiz-
ing impulses of many historical and ongoing nation-building projects. The 
legendary “opposite shore” in the story spatializes the political power that 
coalitions of “dissenting nationalists” can generate while implying the degree 
to which these coalitions engage literally in struggles over space and habitats. 
We can see that Kuo’s comparative critique of state violence and reimagin-
ing of the nation are intimately connected with each other, both underlined 
by his reflections on seriality. At the end of the story, as Xiao swims back 
across the lake, he knows that the image of the legendary shore will become 
“memory that would keep and not shift and change” and “hope looking for a 
random child to give itself to,” like “that one waiting at the West Bank, rock 
already in hand.”85 Dreams matter to our empirical reality, in other words, just 
as metaphor is something we live by.
Trading Places
As this chapter started with a scene of misrecognition that accidentally 
bridges a set of ethnic and national divisions, it is apt to close it with a story 
that dramatizes a conscious effort to build connections across these divisions. 
 82. Kuo, Lipstick, 84.
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The open-ended model of pluralist nationalism that Kuo suggests is by no 
means easy to realize, but the author would not allow us to give up on it. In 
the story “Smoke,” also collected in Lipstick, Kuo transplants, while rewrit-
ing, Native American (Creek) poet Joy Harjo’s poem “The Woman Hanging 
from the Thirteenth Floor Window.” Harjo’s poem depicts the thoughts going 
through the mind of a Creek woman hanging from a building in eastside 
Chicago while she considers whether to commit suicide. Kuo’s story, on the 
other hand, centers on a woman hanging from the thirteenth-floor window 
of the Bank of China building in Beijing, a new hub of an ever-expanding 
circuit of global finance. The thirteenth floor, which literally does not exist in 
some buildings, signals the ways in which both the Creek woman in Harjo’s 
poem and the unnamed woman in Kuo’s story are excluded from inhabit-
able social space and therefore have to claim one for themselves from the 
wilderness of invisibility. More interesting, the story presents the image of 
the hanging woman from the perspective of a Chinese official Shen, head of 
the Ministry of Therapy, a recently established branch of government. Having 
received psychiatric training in the United States, Shen is now charged with 
the task of maintaining the mental health of the citizens of a modernizing 
nation. Shen urges the woman to speak about what drove her to suicidal 
despair and to turn her despair into active social protest, and the woman 
responds by asking, “If I do, will you trade places with me?”86 This simple 
question launches an ethical challenge that sends the U.S.-trained Minister of 
Therapy into silence. While Shen reflects upon the difficulties of entering the 
consciousness of another, the narrative itself offers an affirmative answer to 
the challenge. By translating Harjo’s poem into a story about contemporary 
urban China, Kuo is exploring the possibility of stepping into the form, or 
imaginary space, created by Harjo. Much of Kuo’s lifelong work, indeed, is 
devoted to the idea of trading places as a process of creating new connections 
and generating new metaphors; it is what turns the nonplace of the thirteenth 
floor into an interface of many possible worlds.
 86. Ibid., 63.
In HIS 1993 essay “Helpless Thought,” Hui Muslim writer Zhang Chengzhi revisits his anger at the assertion of America military 
power during the first Gulf War, which he sees as a step toward 
consolidating the unipolar world order that prevailed in the decade 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. What angered Zhang 
most, however, was the ways in which Chinese news broadcasters 
ventriloquized the “Anglo-Saxon” tone on the war.1 In another essay, 
written ten years later but included in the same collection, Zhang 
reiterates his distaste for the Chinese media’s embrace of “Anglo-
Saxon orthodoxy,” this time in condemning Islamic “terrorists.”2 
Although the Hui Muslims, one of the nine Muslim groups in China, 
are linguistically and culturally different from the Uyghur Muslims, 
 1. Zhang Chengzhi, “Wuyuan de sixiang” [Helpless thought], 39.
 2. Zhang Chengzhi, “Gou de diaoxiang” [A statue of a dog], 23.
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deep pluralism . . . reinstates the link between practice and belief 
that had been artificially severed by secularism; and it also over-
turns the impossible counsel to bracket your faith when you par-
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the group that the Chinese government has linked to Islamist terrorist orga-
nizations in Central Asia, they have also been frequently accused of harbor-
ing an Islam-inspired propensity toward antistate violence.3 As one of the 
most important Hui Muslim writers active today, Zhang has since the early 
1990s written extensively about the question of Muslim militancy in rela-
tion to specific historical and geopolitical contexts as a way of rebuffing the 
equation, in both the West and China, of Muslim struggles with terrorism.4 
Since the early 2000s, the Chinese government’s campaigns against Uyghur 
unrest in Xinjiang and Uyghur independence organizations overseas have 
been thoroughly infused with antiterror rhetoric. Like Tibet, Xinjiang has 
come to embody a perpetual state of emergency that requires special govern-
ment control techniques, which in this case range from the successive tides 
of “strike hard” campaigns in the 1990s to the newly launched “Tianshan 
Project” aiming to clamp down on the distribution of pro-independence 
material in Xinjiang and four other Northwest provinces.5 Such measures, 
if we extend Zhang’s point about China’s adoption of antiterror rhetoric as 
an infelicitous instance of translation, mirror the U.S. government’s curtail-
ment of civil liberties after 9/11 that dislocated the American people from 
the “normal political order,” “the nation as a shared way of life.”6 This is 
certainly not an exact parallel, but what we can say, at the very least, is that 
the two governments’ responses to Islamic militancy in the post–Cold War 
era, before and after 9/11 in particular, reveal the structural limits of the two 
nations’ multiculturalisms.
 This chapter brings together two narratives that, as Kuo does in Panda 
Diaries, address these limits obliquely by turning to the (distant and recent) 
past. One of them is Zhang Chengzhi’s fictionalized history Xinling Shi 
[A history of the soul], a 1991 work that has not yet been translated into 
English. The other is Arab American author Rabih Alameddine’s first novel 
Koolaids: The Art of War, published in the United States in 1998. Xinling Shi 
reconstructs the history of the Jahriya, a suborder of Sufism, in eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century China, with a focus on the popular insurrections in 
northwest and southwest regions that the Jahriya spearheaded during the 
period in reaction to, among other things, the imperial government’s sup-
 3. Jonathan Lipman points out, in Familiar Strangers, that all the Chinese judgments of 
the Hui Muslims that he recounts in his book “have included a proclivity for antisocial behav-
ior” (Lipman, 118).
 4. He has written, for example, in support of the Palestinian resistance movement and in 
commemoration of the life of Malcome X. See “Toushi de sushuo” [A story of stone throwing]; 
“Zhenzheng de ren shi X” [X embodies true humanity].
 5. Pan Ying, “Xibei wushenqu qian xieyi lianshou daji ‘sangu shili’” [Five northwest prov-
inces signed agreement to clamp down on “Three Forces”]. 
 6. Donald Pease, “The Global Homeland State,” 6–7.
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pression of their spiritual belief. Koolaids is a collage of voices that consti-
tute a fragmentary narrative of the complex causes and consequences of the 
prolonged Lebanese Civil War as well as the struggles of the religious, racial, 
and sexual others in 1980s and 1990s America. By reconstructing histories of 
ethno-religious or racio-religious wars, Zhang and Alameddine draw atten-
tion to what conciliatory multiculturalism writes out of national conscious-
ness. Ethno-religious harmony, they seem to say, is not to be achieved in the 
present or the future if these histories of violence are allowed to be forgotten 
and repeated.
 In unearthing histories of ethno-religious conflicts, these narratives take 
on momentous questions central to contemporary discussions of multicul-
turalism. How would an awareness of these histories challenge or reshape 
China’s ethnic policy or U.S. liberal multiculturalism? What positions do 
ethno-religious minorities and religious values occupy in multicultural proj-
ects? Stanley Fish has famously argued that even the strongest version of 
liberal multiculturalism, what he calls the “politics of difference,” cannot help 
delimiting itself because “sooner or later the culture whose core you are toler-
ating will reveal itself to be intolerant at the same core.”7 The example he uses 
to illustrate what he means by “intolerant” is, predictably, the fatwa against 
Rushdie. Is it true that religious faith, especially the Islamic faith, engenders 
a form of intolerance incompatible with multicultural values? Can there be 
alternative perspectives on how religion relates to various multiculturalisms? 
The two narratives studied here offer extremely nuanced commentaries on 
all of the questions just posed. Before I say more about them, however, I 
would like to go on a theoretical detour, since the relationship between reli-
gion and politics has become an intensely discussed topic since 9/11, espe-
cially as it pertains to the position of Muslims and Islam in modern secular 
nations. It is a discussion in which both Zhang and Alameddine intervene.
 One of the key works on this topic is Gil Anidjar’s The Jew, the Arab, 
which builds on the Schmittian concept of political theology to offer an intel-
lectual genealogy, since the medieval period, that casts the Arab and the 
Jew as two separated and yet conjoined figures of the enemy vis-à-vis the 
Christian West. Arabs are largely considered to be the military, political, and 
external enemy and Jews the theological, internal enemy, though this dis-
tinction often proves unstable. Underlying, and mirroring, this complicated 
history is the simultaneous bifurcation and conflation of the political and 
the theological in Western history. An early sign of the separation of the two 
spheres can be seen in Augustine, for example, whose “[j]ust-war theory 
was developed in almost complete isolation from the [Christian] command-
 7. Stanley Fish, “Boutique Multiculturalism,” 382–83.
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ment to love one’s enemy.”8 The modern conception of the state, as Ani-
djar points out, à la Schmitt, also depended on the “separation of theology 
from politics.”9 Simultaneous with this separation, however, was “a structural 
translation of theology into politics,” or, in other words, the shaping of a 
homology between concepts of modern state theory such as sovereignty and 
metaphysical concepts.10 The mutual penetration of the political and the 
theological, however, is masked by their institutional separation, with the 
consequence that Arabs and Jews have come to be imagined in the Christian 
West as distinct from or antagonist toward each other despite their historical 
connections, as captured in the term “Semite.” Talal Asad offers a converging 
and complementary argument regarding politics and religion in Formations 
of the Secular. Asad also insists on the inseparability of religion and secu-
lar politics, but points out that the entwining the two involves more than 
“structural analogies between premodern theological concepts and those 
deployed in secular constitutional discourse,” which came about as a result 
of the process of translation that Schmitt identified.11 More important, for 
Asad, the rise of the modern concept of secular politics presupposed and 
required a specific notion of religion. Modern secular states (including, but 
not excluded to, those rooted in Western Christendom) did not, as conven-
tional arguments for secularism as a normative ideal would have it, pro-
tect civil freedoms “from the tyranny of religious discourse,” for the very 
concepts of civil freedoms and religious tyranny are modern inventions.12 
The secular state created itself by constructing a “specific political realm—
representative democracy, citizenship, law and order, civil liberties” that 
purportedly “transcend[ed] particular and differentiating practices of the 
self  .  .  . articulated through class, gender, and religion.”13 Religious author-
ity, in the meantime, was recast as sectarian, irrational, and tyrannical, pre-
cluded from competing for the loyalty of citizens or engaging in public talk 
on nonreligious issues. The ascendance of secular nationalism was, in other 
words, predicated on the belief that religious organizations and institutions, 
and Islamic ones in particular, are incongruous with the properly politi-
cal, even when they engage in procedural politics.14 This point is echoed in 
William Connolly’s Why I am Not a Secularist, where the author theorizes 
 8. Gil Anidjar, The Jew, The Arab, 24. 
 9. Ibid. 106.
 10. Ibid.
 11. Ibid. 191, 255.
 12. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular, 255.
 13. Ibid., 5, emphasis in the original.
 14. The examples Asad uses here include “the call by Muslim movements to reform the 
social body through the authority of popular majorities in the national parliament  .  .  .  as in 
Algeria in 1992 and in Turkey in 1997” (Formations of the Secular, 199). 
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secular nationalism and political liberalism as two concurrent and symbi-
otic processes (at least in the West) that need to be reconfigured simulta-
neously.15 Going back to Anidjar, we can say that Arab Muslims have not 
just become the primary political enemy of the Christian West; they have 
become antithetical to modern definitions of politics. The process in which 
Arab Muslims became the enemy, moreover, should also be seen as a process 
of racialization. In the case of Muslims, religion and race should be seen, to 
quote Anidjar again, as “contemporary, indeed, coextensive and, moreover, 
co-concealing categories.”16
 The particular point I wish to make through this theoretical excursion is 
that studying the experiences of racio-religious and ethno-religious minori-
ties such as Arab Muslims in modern, secular nation-states is crucial for 
critiquing various versions of conciliatory multiculturalism at the core of the 
self-representations of these nation-states. Extrapolating from scholars like 
Anidja and Asad, one can argue that, as an integral aspect of modern, secu-
lar nationalism, multicultural policies establish their own legitimacy on the 
basis of their supposed distinctions from “intolerant” religious and cultural 
values, even as these distinctions mask the deep continuity between politi-
cal and religious spheres. Conciliatory multiculturalism’s claim to tolerance 
obscures the mechanisms of exclusion inherent in it. Stanley Fish is right that 
liberal multiculturalism as it is practiced in the contemporary United States 
is naturally incongruous with certain cultural or religious values, but it is 
not because these values are intolerant in themselves. They must be defined 
as intolerant under liberal multiculturalism. Rather than recycle secularist 
biases by dichotomizing liberal tolerance and religious bigotry, therefore, we 
should instead challenge the limits of U.S. multiculturalism by reconsidering 
the relations of religion to secular politics. The Chinese ethnic policy needs 
to be questioned in a similar way. It carries important parallels with U.S. 
liberal multiculturalism as a secularized instrument of nation-building that 
is nevertheless inflected by ideas “translated” from traditional value systems 
with metaphysical dimensions (Confucianism, most obviously), if not reli-
gion. Not unlike U.S. liberal multiculturalism, it has shown an inability to 
accommodate the radical ethno-religious difference embodied in militant 
elements of Muslim communities. As Zhang Chengzhi reminds us, the trope 
of Islamic terrorism has traveled across state and ideological borders with 
alarming ease. It is therefore important to examine the experiences and cul-
 15. Connolly objects in particular to the belief that nation-states provide “the best hope 
for democracy,” arguing instead that the idea of national unity is what in many cases restricts, 
rather than facilitates, pluralistic democracy (89).
 16. Gil Anidjar, Semites: Race, Religion, and Literature, 28.
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tural production of Muslim communities in the two countries comparatively. 
My study of the two narratives in this chapter does so by focusing on what 
they suggest about the structural limits of Chinese and U.S. multicultural-
isms and possible tactics for reconfiguring their formal logic.
 Both Xinling Shi and Koolaids came out and received critical claim in the 
decade immediately before 9/11, a decade when Muslim communities were 
subjected to increasing surveillance and pressure in both countries. They 
foreshadowed academic discussions around the resurgence of religion in the 
post-9/11 era, proposing their own visions of genuinely inclusive forms of 
multiculturalism that fully accommodate radical ethno-religious differences. 
Both authors rework religious concepts—the Jahriya’s exaltation of spiritual 
freedom and the Christian doctrine of universal love—as promising supple-
ments to secular conceptions of multiculturalism. In what follows, I first 
situate the two narratives in historical contexts, that is, the development of 
Hui Muslim and Arab American identities and literary articulations. Then, 
through a reading of the two texts, I argue that they help us imagine ways 
of extending the limits of Chinese and U.S. multiculturalisms, respectively, 
by breaking down the conceptual opposition between religion and secular 
politics. To further illustrate the significance of the authors’ interventions, 
I situate their ideas in the context of intellectual discussions on the politics 
of religion in their respective context. The juxtaposition of the two writers 
in this chapter does not mean to suggest an exact symmetry. If the previous 
chapter on Alex Kuo teaches us anything, it is that a cross-national compari-
son can never be blind to its own excesses and reductions. My comparison 
here, therefore, does not seek to offer general remarks on overlaps between 
Hui Muslim and Arab American experiences. It does argue, however, that 
both groups have produced important reflections on ethno-religious and 
racio-religious differences that cannot be metabolized by conciliatory mul-
ticulturalism. Zhang and Alammedine offer particularly illuminating speci-
mens of these reflections, consciously rebelling, in their own ways, against 
the violence engendered from the workings of the “coextensive, co-conceal-
ing” categories of race/ethnicity and religion by, paradoxically, revealing the 
extent of this violence. By retracing paths of war, they help answer the ques-
tion of how contemporary nations might minimize its scourge.
Muslims in China and the U.S.
Unknown to many, Islam has been propagated in China for over 1,300 years. 
In his groundbreaking work Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the 
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People’s Republic, Gru Gladney delineates four tides of Islam in Chinese his-
tory.17 The first tide, spanning between the seventh and the fourteenth cen-
turies, was the constitution of Muslim communities along China’s southeast 
coast and in the northwest, where descendants of the Arab, Persian, Cen-
tral Asian, and Mongolian Muslim merchants, militia, and officials settled. 
The second wave began in the late seventeenth century, as Sufism spread to 
China and Sufi communities formed around descendants of saintly leaders. 
The third tide rose at the end of the Qing Dynasty, when increased con-
tact between Muslims in China and the Middle East spurred several reform 
movements that projected conflicting visions on how Islamic ideas should 
mesh with Chinese culture.18 The fourth tide, which continues today, started 
as China opened itself to the West in the early 1980s, upon the end of the 
Cultural Revolution. Partially encouraged by the Chinese state, Muslims in 
China began to travel abroad for pilgrimages and religious studies more fre-
quently and became increasingly vocal in voicing their cultural concerns.19
 As Jonathan Lipman, author of Familiar Strangers, points out, Muslims 
in China were all referred to as Hui during the Ming and Qing Dynasty, 
and this designation continued to be used during republican China.20 After 
the founding of the PRC, however, the government identified ten Muslim 
minority nationalities, using the category of Hui to designate Muslims “who 
do not have a language of their own but speak the dialects of the peoples 
among whom they live,” as opposed to the nine Turkish-Altaic and Indo-
European Muslim language groups.”21 The Hui are thus different from the 
other Muslim groups, not only because they were affected by all four tides of 
Islam in China but also because they are not distinguished from the majority 
Han by language or locality. However, although the Hui were granted the sta-
tus of a minority nationality largely on the basis of their religious belief, they 
 17. Dru C. Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 36–64.
 18. The Ikwan Muslim Brotherhood, for example, advocated a “purified, ‘non-Chinese’ Is-
lam,” while Xi Dao Tang, a small, completely “native” Islamic movement promoted the study of 
the “Chinese Confucian-Islamic classics” (Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 55, 57). There are contra-
dictions internal to these movements as well: the Ikwan, or Yihewani in its sinicized version, for 
example, supported Muslim unity as well as Chinese national consciousness (Gladney, Muslim 
Chinese, 55). 
 19. A Muslim protest in Beijing in May 1989, for example, was organized to condemn the 
publication of a book entitled Sexual Customs, which the Muslims believed denigrated Islam. 
See Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 2. 
 20. Historically, Hui was a shortened version of Huihui, which came originally from Huihe 
(Lipman, Familiar Strangers, xxiii). Since the 1950s, Hui refers to “a Muslim or descendent of 
Muslims who lives in China but does not belong to one of the nine linguistically or territorially 
defined Muslim minzu (nationalities)” (Lipman, xxiii).
 21. Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 19. The other nine are Uighur, Kazak, Dongxiang, Kirghiz, 
Salar, Tadjik, Uzbek, Baoan, and Tatar. 
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are not a purely religious category. A Hui person can maintain her minor-
ity status without believing in Islam, since the Hui identity passes down, as 
Gladney points out, “through migration, intermarriage, and adoption.”22 In 
Xinling Shi, which excavates and rewrites the history of the Jahriya in impe-
rial China, Zhang Chengzhi accepts the PRC definition of the Hui, referring 
consistently to the Jahriya as part of Huimin (the Hui people). I follow the 
author in using the term “Hui” to refer to Chinese-speaking Muslims in both 
historical and contemporary China.
 Compared with the other Muslim minorities in China, the Hui Muslims 
have a particularly ambiguous relationship with Chinese culture. Gladney 
limns the two extreme views on this relationship, the view that the Hui are 
virtually indistinguishable from the Han majority, essentially assimilated 
except for “certain religious beliefs and archaic customs,” and the opposite 
view that they constitute an “isolated religious enclave” that historically 
fomented reform movements and armed rebellions against secular Chinese 
authorities.23 The events of 9/11 brought the question of Islam to the fore in 
China, though, as many have pointed out, due to a surge in Uyghur separat-
ist activities in Xinjiang, attention to religiously fueled “terrorism” mounted 
in China throughout the 1990s.24 These developments have affected the 
Uyghurs more than the other Muslim minorities in China, but the tensions 
between Islam and secular Chinese culture have become an urgent issue for 
all Muslims in the country. Zhang Chengzhi’s Xinling Shi is one of the few 
literary works in China that tackle this issue directly. The timeline of the 
narrative overlaps largely with what Gladney identifies as the second tide of 
Islamic influence in China, when the spread of Sufism crystallized the con-
flicts between Islam and the secular authorities of imperial China. On the 
 22. Ibid., 59. Gladney explains that Hui Muslims encompass a “spectrum of ethnoreligious 
expression” (Muslim Chinese, 113). For some Hui communities in northwest China, Islam is 
the most salient aspect of Hui identity. For others (in the southeast, for example), Hui identity 
is based almost entirely on genealogical descent from foreign Arab ancestors. In between are 
Hui Muslims for whom identity is a “mixture of ethnic ancestry and religious commitment” 
(Gladney, Muslim Chinese, 113).
 23. Ibid., 22–24.
 24. See Gladney, “Islam in China,” 455–61. Gladney explains several factors that make 
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region central to China’s national interests. First of all, 
the government is concerned with the separatist movement in Xinjiang and the advocacy for 
it overseas and on the Internet. The large Akto insurrection in April 1990 (the first major 
uprising in Xinjiang) was suppressed and Amnesty International claims that there have been 
frequent roundups of “terrorists” since then. Alleged incursions of Talibans into China through 
Xinjiang prior to 9/11 swamped the area with Chinese security forces, a development only to 
be intensified afterwards. Gladney also analyzes the economic factor (China’s increased trade 
with Central Asian and Arab countries for oil) and the political factor (the credibility of China’s 
cultural pluralism and its international image) that make Xinjiang an important issue. 
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one hand, Zhang presents the Jahriya during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century as fearless protagonists of spectacular dramas of antistate rebellions, 
no less than the earliest group of jihadists in Chinese history. On the other, 
however, he advocates for their incorporation into mainstream Chinese his-
tory by staging their struggles as a precursor to the peasant and national-
ist revolutions in later eras that were to put an end to imperial China and 
launch China onto a path toward modernization. For Zhang, then, the Jah-
riya should be accorded a crucial position in Chinese history although they 
have never fully assimilated into secular Chinese culture. By making this 
apparently paradoxical argument, as I elaborate later, Zhang is renegotiating 
the structure and boundaries of Chinese national identity, the meanings, 
that is, of its “center” and “margins.” The Jahriya’s antistate struggles figure in 
Zhang’s narrative as a crucible in which contradictory views of the relation-
ship between Islam and secular Chinese culture clash and weld with each 
other, gesturing in the end toward a new, fluid understanding of Chinese 
history and identity that does away with a fixed center. Xinling Shi, therefore, 
is both a fictionalized, personalized history and a parable of a new model of 
pluralism for contemporary China.
 Xinling Shi should also be situated in the history of contemporary Hui 
Muslim literature. In her article “Hui Writers: A Hundred-Year Précis,” Hui 
Muslim scholar Ma Lirong argues that a conscious exploration of the Hui 
experience in literary forms began around the mid-1950s, when the PRC 
government started the Ethnic Classification Project.25 Yang Jiguo makes a 
similar point in an earlier essay “Characteristics of Contemporary Hui Lit-
erature,” emphasizing the enabling role that government initiatives played in 
the rapid growth of Hui literature since the end of the Cultural Revolution.26 
He praises the government for spurring Hui and other minority writers into 
expressing ethnic self-consciousness through efforts to collect and compile 
Hui writings, organize symposiums and discussions on this topic, and launch 
journals devoted to Hui literature.27 Overall, Ma’s and Yang’s historical surveys 
rehash the official narratives of the PRC’s ethnic policy and its historical ori-
gin. For Ma, especially, the rise of Hui Muslim literature bears out a uniquely 
Chinese history of cultural pluralism, which began with a homegrown ideal 
of cultural “amalgamation” articulated during the anti-Japanese war in the 
1930s as a means of uniting different ethnic groups in China against a com-
 25. Ma Lirong, “Jin bainian huizu zuojia gailun” [Hui writers: A hundred year précis], 96.
 26. Yang, Jiguo, “Dangdai huizu wenxue de chuangzuo tezheng” [Characteristics of con-
temporary Hui literature].
 27. Ibid., 73.
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mon enemy.28 This ideal has, since the 1980s, found reinforcement in the 
government’s renewed emphasis on cultural pluralism on both the national 
and international levels, allowing Hui Muslims to foreground their ethno-
religious heritage in the context of the Chinese nation-state as well as global 
Islam, thus offering a further impetus to Hui Muslim literature.29 Since the 
1980s, this literature has continued to grow in many regions of the country, 
reaching as wide a distribution as the Hui people themselves, some of whom 
live in ethnic enclaves (including but not limited to the Ningxia Hui Autono-
mous Region) while others are dispersed among the Han majority. What is 
more interesting in Ma’s account is her description of Hui–Han relations as 
they are registered in Hui literature. Not unlike Zhang, Ma casts the relations 
in ambiguous and paradoxical terms—the Hui are simultaneously inside and 
outside secular Chinese culture. As she sees it, the aesthetic and political val-
ues of Hui Muslim literature reside in its focus on both the spiritual and the 
secular, both religious devotion and integration into surrounding Han and 
non-Han cultures through trade and other secular activities.30 It is not clear, 
however, what sociopolitical conditions underlie this dual relationship and 
what tensions, conflicts, and cultural changes can arise from it. Ma lays great 
emphasis on Hui writers’ devotion to the ideal of qingjie, which translates 
literally as “pure and clean,” connoting, as Gladney explains, “Islamic moral 
purity and the authenticity of ethnic ancestry, lifestyle, and heritage.”31 Much, 
however, remains to be said about the ways in which literary representations 
of this ideal can disrupt or help reorganize the secular sphere within which 
they circulate. Xinling Shi is one of the most important texts in contemporary 
China that explore the political implications of the ideal of qingjie. Its con-
struction of Jahriya history accentuates the conflicts between the spiritual 
and the secular, while at the same time demonstrating that these two spheres 
are inseparable and mutually susceptible.
 Like the Hui Muslims, Arab Americans can be seen as an ethno-religious, 
or more precisely racio-religious, category. It is only in the 1990s that “Arab 
Americans” emerged as “an organized ethnic designation” at the intersec-
 28. Ma, “Jin bainian huizu zuojia gailun” [Hui writers: A hundred year précis], 100. The one 
who put forth this idea is Hui leftist translator and writer Ma Zongrong. An advocate of Chinese 
national unity during the Anti-Japanese War (1937–45), Ma Zongrong cofounded the Chinese 
Hui Culture Institute under the auspices of the Chinese Hui Patriotic Association in 1939. The 
mission of the institute included “amalgamating ethnic cultures in China into one” (Ma, 95). 
 29. Ibid., 96.
 30. Ibid., 97. The ideal of qingjie extends into the portrayal of secular life in Hui literature, 
as one sees in the depictions of love for one’s parents and romantic love in a number of novels 
by Hui authors. 
 31. Gladney, “Islam in China,” 13. In China Islam is sometimes referred to as qingzhen 
jiao—the Doctrine of Purity and Truth.
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tion of Arab immigration in the United States, U.S. relations with the Mid-
dle East, and wars and political conflicts in the region.32 Michael Suleiman 
documents that there have been two major waves of Arab immigration to 
North America. The first lasted from the 1870s to World War II, consisting 
largely of Christian immigrants from the greater Syria region, and the second 
went from World War II to the present, including immigrants (of various 
religious affiliations) from Israel and all twenty-two Arab nations.33 Emi-
gration from Syria began to assume large proportions in the 1890s, but the 
number declined sharply in the post–World War I years, largely as a result 
of changes in U.S. immigration laws.34 These early immigrants experienced 
discrimination based on their association with their Turkish/Muslim over-
lords and were occasionally classified in a legal sense as Asiatics and denied 
U.S. citizenship. Consequently, these Syrian immigrants actively identified 
themselves as Arabs to stake a claim to a Semitic identity and, by extension, 
whiteness.35 Evelyn Shakir’s survey of the history of Arab American fiction 
provides an illuminating detail about the racial status of early Arab immi-
grants from Syria. As Robert Woods observes in The City Wilderness (1898), 
“[N]ext to the Chinese, who can never be in any real sense Americans, the 
Syrians [i.e., Lebanese and Syrians] are the most foreign of all our foreign-
ers, and out of the nationalities would be distinguished for nothing whatever 
excepting as curiosities.”36 While “Arab” compared slightly more favorably 
with “Asiatic” at the turn of the twentieth century and became officially white 
in the following decades, the term took on new meanings in the post–World 
War II era. The influx of Muslim Arab immigrants after the 1948 Palestinian 
exodus changed the religious and political composition of Arab America. As 
Nouri Gana points out, Arab immigrants met increasing challenges because 
of their “faith and political agendas,” and consequently, their claim to white-
ness became attenuated.37 Steven Salaita also argues that Arab American 
 32. Steven Salaita, Arab American Literary Fictions, Cultures, and Politics, 26.
 33. Michael W. Suleiman, “Early Arab-Americans,” 1.
 34. Samir Khalaf, “The Background and Causes of Lebanese/Syrian Immigration to the 
United States before World War I,” 18.
 35. Suleiman documents that Syrians “had come in large numbers and were admitted into 
the U.S. and granted U.S. citizenship since the 1880s” (44). But in 1914 a certain George Dow 
was denied his petition to become a U.S. citizen by Judge Henry A. M. Smith, district judge 
in Charleston, SC, on the grounds that Dow was a “Syrian of Asiatic birth” (Suleiman, 44). In 
reaction to the judge’s decision, Kalil A. Bishara wrote in the English section of his Origin of the 
Modern Syrian that Syrians were Arabs and thus were the “purest type of the Semitic race” and 
had a “better claim upon the White Race than that of any modern nation of Europe” (Suleiman, 
44). The case of George Dow was eventually reversed.
 36. Evelyn Shakir, “Arab American Literature,” 5.
 37. Nouri Gana, “Introduction,” 1574.
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racialization became a “de facto reality” in the post–World War II United 
States, especially during and after the 1990s.38
 With increased racialization comes an enhanced racial consciousness 
among Arab Americans. Suleiman finds that, by the 1967 Arab–Israeli War, 
third-generation Arab immigrants “had started to awaken to their own iden-
tity and see their identity as ‘Arab,’ not just Syrian.”39 Simultaneous with and 
constitutive of the rise of an Arab American political consciousness was a 
correlated cultural consciousness on the verge of a “critical breakthrough,” as 
Salaita puts it, as evident in the publication of a number of Arab American 
literary anthologies and the rise to fame of a group of Arab American writ-
ers.40 An impressive number of Arab American authors have dealt with the 
Israeli–Palestine conflict in their works, for example.41 Besides the Israeli–
Palestine conflict, the Lebanese Civil War, the Palestinian diaspora in the 
Middle East and in the United States, and anti-Arabic racism since the early 
1990s (Joseph Geha’s Through and Through, for example) are also frequent 
topics in recent Arab American literature. Alameddine’s Koolaids is a notable 
example of these writings, focusing simultaneously on the local, regional, 
and international politics shaping the prolonged Lebanese Civil War and 
cultural politics in the 1980s United States. The novel illustrates the ways in 
which religious doctrines inflect the political culture of both Lebanon and 
the United States, ironically erasing their purported distinctions. In a way 
reminiscent of Zhang, Alameddine is careful not to cast theologico-political 
divisions as a force destined to break nations apart. Instead, he proposes 
reworking religious doctrines as a way of reactivating the ideal of a genuinely 
pluralistic universalism that can help broaden our conceptions of the mod-
ern nation.
A Metaphysical Challenge
Zhang Chengzhi’s Xinling Shi is a fictionalized history of the Jahriya sect, a 
suborder of the Naqshabandi Sufis, in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
China (during the Qing Dynasty). It has been described as a kind of “apoc-
ryphal history” that acquired a “biblical status” among Jahriya followers in 
China.42 In the Preface, the author provides an account of his immersion in 
the world of the Jahriya in Western China since 1984. Eight extended trips to 
 38. Steven Salaita, Anti-Arab Racism in the USA, 23.
 39. Suleiman, 10.
 40. Ibid., 76. 
 41. Salaita, Arab American Literary Fictions, 52.
 42. Jian Xu, “Radical Ethnicity and Apocryphal History,” 527.
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western parts of China inspired in him the resolve to write a book that Jahriya 
followers “would protect with their lives.”43 He was subsequently embraced 
by many members of the Jahriya, who showed him a number of secretly cir-
culated religious histories, written in Persian or Arabic and translated into 
Chinese for him, along with “nearly a hundred and sixty family genealogies 
and other manuscripts.”44 The narrative of Xinling Shi starts with the intro-
duction of Sufi revivalism into China in the eighteenth century through the 
work of Naqshabandi Ma Mingxin, among others. It offers a narrative of the 
long-lasting conflicts, since the 1760s, within the Sufi communities in north-
west China, especially between the rival Sufi suborders of the Jahriya and 
the Khafiya. The increasing internecine fighting culminated in 1781, when 
legal disputes and street violence between the competing orders brought the 
imperial army to Xunhua (a region in northwest China) for an intervention. 
The Khafiya sect allied with the Qing court and received the positive appel-
lation the “Old Teaching,” while the Jahriya, which sought to represent the 
spirit of Islamic renewal and remained more militant toward state authorities, 
was given the pejorative epithet of the “New Teaching.”45 The imperial army 
engaged Jahriya followers in merciless battles in 1781 and 1784, succeeding 
nearly in obliterating the entire sect. The Jahriya, however, managed to sur-
vive. Zhang’s narrative then jumps to a century later, when violent confron-
tations between the Hui and the Qing army erupted in northwest regions. 
The Jahriya played a crucial role in the major battles during the ten-year 
war (1862–73), especially in the last stage of the conflicts. In the meantime, 
a Hui-led multiethnic rebellion, the Panthay Rebellion (1855–73), occurred 
in Yunnan in southwest China, offering another stage for the inspired valor 
of the Jahriya.46 Scholarly studies of the Hui Muslim role in the waves of 
violence in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century China have tended to argue 
against reducing them to “Muslim rebellions” and emphasize instead numer-
ous other contributing factors.47 This critical move is certainly effective in 
 43. Zhang Chengzhi, Xinling Shi [History of the soul], 7.
 44. Ibid., 8.
 45. Ibid., 91. What sects the “New Teaching” and the “Old Teaching” actually referred to 
historically are not fully settled. For a fuller discussion, see Raphael Israeli, Islam in China, 
chapter 8. What is certain, as Israeli points out, is that the “New Teaching” was identified with 
the Naqshbandi Jahriya during Ma Mingxin’s lifetime (142).
 46. “Panthay Rebellion” is the most common term given to the rebellion in the English 
language. The word “panthay” might come from “pa-ti,” the Burmese term for Muslim. The 
rebellion is virtually unknown in China.
 47. For example, Lipman argues that the eighteenth-century wars between the Jahris and 
the Qing army should not be described as “ethnic conflicts” or “Muslim rebellions;” rather, the 
Jahri insurrections in northwest China that lasted a century and a half were due to a combi-
nation of “the complex of national policy decisions regarding the New Teaching, provincial 
maladministration, local religious and political rivalries, military officials overzealous in their 
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refuting racialist and secularist stereotypes of Islam as violent and irrational, 
but it is not the only alternative to rehashing common assumptions. Zhang 
Chengzhi takes an opposite route. He moves the question of religion to the 
center of his narrative, maximizing the role of the Jahriya faith in his account 
of the violent conflicts in Hui areas during the Qing era. I argue that his 
approach supplements the ongoing discussion of the formation of ethnic and 
racial identities in the Qing era by highlighting the factor of religion. More 
important, he intervenes productively in the official discourse on multicul-
turalism in contemporary China, which relies on muting references to ethnic 
and religious conflicts in the past and present of the nation. An authoritative 
account of the Hui-led rebellion in Yunnan, for example, casts them as “a 
form of class struggle” and as “part of the struggle of all China against the 
Qing.”48 Zhang’s history of the Jahriya, in other words, exerts pressure on 
dominant narratives of the relationship between ethno-racial and religious 
differences in both imperial and contemporary China.
 Historical scholarship on the late Qing, when Zhang’s history of the Jah-
riya is set, offers convincing rationales for employing the concepts of race 
and ethnicity to describe group identities during that period. It has been 
argued that indigenous Chinese equivalents of modern Western notions of 
racial and ethnic identity were at work during this period. Frank Dikötter 
believes that the ideology of descent is deeply rooted in Qing history. He 
describes the Qing era as “marked by a consolidation of the cult of patrilineal 
descent,” as manifest in the various lineage feuds throughout the empire and 
in the turn towards “a rigid taxonomy of distinct descent lines” during the 
period of the Qianlong emperor.49 Similarly, Pamela Crossley argues that, 
while the Western notion of race was not imported into China until the late-
nineteenth century, the Qing court had produced its own version of racial 
ideology during the eighteenth century.50 To stave off the dissipation of Man-
chu culture, the Qing court moved increasingly toward a “racial conception-
alization” of the Manchus, based on bloodlines and genealogy.51 Elaborating 
on Crossley’s point, Mark Elliott contends that, from the very beginning of 
their rule in China, the Manchus created a political universalism by blending 
obedience to unenforceable orders, and currents from the Muslim west” (Lipman, Familiar 
Strangers, 114). Also see David G. Atwill, The Chinese Sultanate. Atwill also points out that the 
conventional understanding of the Penthay rebellion in the southwest is “deceptive” because it 
“overemphasizes ethnic and religious divisions” (9), underestimating the involvement of other 
non-Han people in the region.
 48. Israeli, Islam in China, 191. 
 49. Dikötter, “Racial Discourse in China,” 14–15.
 50. Crossley, “Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China,” 11.
 51. Crossley, “The Qianlong Retrospect on the Chinese-Martial (hanjun) Banners,” 85.
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generally accepted norms of virtue and culture of the Han elite, namely, neo-
Confucianism, with political institutions, most important, the Eight Banners 
system (a banner is a military–civilian organization led by a banner nobil-
ity) that separated the Manchus from Han society, a separation that Elliott 
refers to as “Ethnic Sovereignty.”52 This mixture allowed the Qing Dynasty 
to become a heterogeneous empire “composed of multiple hierarchies of 
lordships based on different types of authority.”53 The institutionalization 
of “Ethnic Sovereignty” was instrumental in preventing the “fusion” of the 
Manchus with the Han elite class, thus allowing the Manchus to maintain a 
separate identity from and power over the Han majority up until the end of 
the Qing in 1911.54
 While these histories all demonstrate the formation of the notions of race 
and ethnicity during the Qing era, they focus largely on the Han–Manchu 
dynamic. The Hui, however, were on neither side of this opposition, pos-
sessed of neither cultural influence nor political power. The Qing court and 
its officials, in many cases, protected the interests of Han immigrants and 
residents, especially in Yunnan, at the expense of the native Hui people.55 
The history of Hui Muslims, then, complicates existing academic discourses 
around race and ethnicity in late Qing, showing that the era witnessed mul-
tiple ethno-racial rivalries that cannot all be subsumed under the divide 
between the Manchus, the ruling minority, and the Han, the ethnic majority. 
A point more crucial to reading Zhang’s Xinling Shi, however, is that existing 
historical studies of ethnicity and race during this era hardly touch on the 
issue of religion. The antistate struggles of Hui Muslims, as Zhang points 
out, also had a great deal to do with the state’s decision to interfere with the 
conflicts between two rivaling sects of Sufism, the Jahriya and the Khafiya, 
dubbed by the Qing court as the “New Teaching” and the “Old Teaching,” 
respectively. These struggles, in other words, entail an element inexplicable 
within a simple paradigm of race and ethnicity.
 By folding religion back into discussions of ethnic and racial formation 
during the Qing era, Xinling Shi frames the violent history that it describes 
as a confrontation between the Confucian conception of universal imperial 
power and the Jahriya notion of an alternative moral universe presided over 
by a spiritual power. It figures Confucianism as a form of political theology—
though distinct from religion, it carries important religious undertones. In 
so doing, the narrative holds under critical lens a central foundation of the 
 52. Mark Elliott, The Manchu Way, 4.
 53. Ibid.
 54. Ibid., 7.
 55. See Atwill, 80–83, 94–97.
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Qing’s political system and, by extension, the political system of contempo-
rary China.
 Northwest China, in Zhang’s description, is an unruly region where “sec-
ular political economy” and orthodox Confucian teachings never took root.56 
Having had to survive the condition of extreme poverty and isolation, vari-
ous peoples living in the northwest were uniquely primed for conversion to 
Sufism. They were quickly swept up by the intoxicating belief in a higher spir-
itual power that would help them make sense of the endlessly grinding pain 
of earthly life. With Ma Mingxin’s missionary work, the Jahriya flourished in 
parts of northwest China, providing an “invisible, iron-clad refuge” for the 
souls of those toiling at the bottom of the Qing society.57 Zhang’s account of 
the origin of the Jahriya in Confucian China goes beyond a class analysis, 
as he locates its base in those who were completely excluded from “secular 
political economy.” There is something radically different about the Jahriya. 
In Zhang’s account of the war in 1781, the Jahriya became the “most potent 
enemy” of the state because they displayed a level of resistance that the Qing 
rulers had never seen before.58 Aside from the corruption of local officials, 
which, for Zhang, manifested the “false prosperity” of the eighteenth-century 
Qing, what also drove Qing rulers into a ruthless attempt to obliterate the 
Jahriya was the believers’ astounding strength, resilience, and willingness to 
sacrifice for their cause, which struck the emperor as dangerously irreconcil-
able with a secular understanding of his imperial subjects.59 The emperor 
was deeply disturbed when several unexpected storms gave an advantage 
to the Jahriya warriors during their first major battle with the Qing troops, 
sensing the presence of a divine power that did not bow to his sovereignty. As 
Zhang puts it, the emperor had in fact been “defeated psychologically” before 
the battle ended in his favor, and he developed the ominous vision that the 
dirt-poor people of the northwest had become a “strange rival” that must be 
annihilated.60 Ironically, in attributing changes on the battlefield to a divine 
power, the emperor comes to mirror his enemy. He reveals a perspective on 
political power that is not fundamentally different from that of the Jahriya. 
Like the Jahriya, the emperor believes that the legitimacy of secular rule is 
founded on the will of transcendent forces, and the strange resilience of the 
Jahriya warriors testifies to the existence of such a force operating against 
him. The threat that the Jahriya posed to the Qing court, as Zhang suggests 
 56. Zhang, Xinling Shi, 21.
 57. Ibid., 37.
 58. Ibid., 145.
 59. Ibid., 51.
 60. Ibid., 64.
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through the emperor’s reaction, was not only military and political but also 
metaphysical. It goes right to the heart of the issue of legitimacy.
 Zhang’s depiction of the metaphysical panic caused by Jahriya resistance 
gestures toward an argument about the imbrication of the theological and the 
political in Chinese history. Neo-Confucianism (the fourth stage of the Con-
fucian tradition formed during the twelfth century), adopted by Qing rulers 
as their own political and moral orthodox, is known for its concern with 
maintaining a stable, hierarchical social order, with a moral ruler at its pin-
nacle, but it also, in the words of John Berthrong, “probed the transcendent 
dimensions of what it means to understand the Will of Heaven.”61 The moral 
ruler is considered to be the “Son of Heaven” who knows and carries out the 
Will or Mandate of Heaven, understood as the “primordial creativity of the 
cosmos that provides a model” for human virtues.62 The Will or Mandate of 
Heaven is one of a set of concepts that constitute the metaphysical founda-
tion of neo-Confucianism, making it comparable, to a certain degree, with 
such monotheistic religions as Christianity.63 Another connection between 
Confucianism and Christianity, indicated more implicitly in Zhang, is their 
shared universalism. As many have pointed out, Confucianists were largely 
uninterested in converting those from other cultures, believing that Confu-
cian principles are of “universal value” and its cultural superiority could be 
recognized without instruction or pressure.64 Confucianism’s nonaggressive 
attitude toward other cultures is arguably analogous to the Christian com-
mandment to love one’s enemy, which, as Anidjar points out in The Jew, The 
Arab, in fact disables thinking or loving “the enemy as the enemy,” for, in its 
perfected form, the universal Christian love “abolishes . . . the divisions” that 
 61. John H. Berthrong, All under Heaven, 73.
 62. Ibid. 
 63. Ibid. Though many would argue that Confucianism is not a religion, it also concerns 
itself with metaphysical dimensions of reality, a characteristic most pronounced in neo-Con-
fucianism, the fourth stage of the Confucian tradition formed during the twelfth century and 
appropriated by the Qing court as the orthodoxy. Drawing from Buddhist and Daoist thought, 
neo-Confucianism builds on a metasystem hinged upon the ideas of li (principle), ming (Man-
date of Heaven), and taiji (the Supreme Ultimate). See Berthrong, 88–101.
 64. James Townsend, 2. As Townsend points out, this view of Confucianism has often 
been referred to as the thesis of culturalism. The thesis contains two parts: (1) Confucianism 
has unrivaled superiority over other cultural systems and (2) legitimate rule rests on adherence 
to Confucian norms. In “Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China,” Pamela Crossley 
summarized this thesis as the belief that (1) “Chinese culture was somehow autochthonous” and 
(2) “through nothing much more subtle than the sheer charisma of Chinese culture, peoples 
were attracted to China and its society from elsewhere and, no great obstacle withstanding, 
were consumed in the flames of hanhua” (2). For Crossley, this view distorts the much more 
contentious and fluid dynamic between Han and the many peoples bordering them throughout 
history.
154 C H A P T e r  4
created the enemy in the first place.65 Confucian universalism, too, lacks a 
mechanism of actively engaging the other on the other’s terms. Even as it 
disavows violence, Confucian universalism justifies the subjugation of theo-
logico-political enemies, including the Jahriya, in a way that is reminiscent 
of the historical failure of Christianity’s doctrine of universal love to enable 
an ethos of generosity or forbearance toward such enemies.
 Furthermore, Zhang suggests that the Qing state’s fears of Jahriya mysti-
cism and its consequent suppression of the faith through military force facili-
tated the cultivation of close bonds among Jahriya followers that became 
analogous to the bonds constituting ethnic and racial identities. In making 
this point, Zhang recovers, or at least hypothesizes, a history of the ethni-
cization of Jahriya followers that is distinct from the more explored pro-
cess through which the ruling Manchus shaped their own ethnic identity. 
Throughout Zhang’s narrative, the Jahriya followers’ eagerness to sacrifice 
for their faith and the emergence of a genealogically based Jahriya identity 
are linked through blood imagery, which signals both religious sacrifices and 
the passing down of religious tradition through successive biological gen-
erations. This semantic conflation suggests that religious affiliation became 
entwined with ethnic affiliation in the case of the Jahriya. Zhang explains 
that the Jahriya ideal of sacrificing one’s life for the sanctity of Islam—reli-
gious martyrdom in other words—enveloped and comforted the believers 
like “hot and thick” blood.66 In the middle of his narrative, Zhang provides 
a genealogical tree of the third-generation sheikh of the Jahriya in China, 
with annotations of when each of his ancestors and descendants suffered—
exiled or killed—at the hands of Qing officials. The collective sacrifices that 
these individuals made for the Jahriya are overlaid upon their genealogical 
linkages. Indeed, Zhang points out explicitly that his construction of these 
“bloodlines” brings together biological and spiritual lineages.67 As men-
tioned earlier, Hui identity is at least partially based on descent and lineage, 
in both imperial China and the PRC.68 Zhang, however, departs from “nar-
row understandings of bloodlines” or biological lineage, suggesting that the 
collective Jahriya identity was forged in shared faith and sacrifices, which 
created ties akin to, and even stronger than, bonds of kinship.69 The Jahriya, 
as rendered in Xinling Shi, emerged as an oppositional, antihegemonic iden-
 65. Anidjar, The Jew, The Arab, 27.
 66. Zhang, Xinling Shi, 76.
 67. Ibid., 212.
 68. Lipman also argues that Hui identity in China, at least since the Ming Dynasty, has 
been based more on lineage than on religious observance, thus on “a definition of ‘Huiness’ 
appropriate to the minzu (ethnicity/nationality) paradigm” (Familiar Strangers, 40). 
 69. Zhang, Xinling Shi, 94.
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tity, never easily classifiable, from mutually constitutive religious and political 
conflicts. Their pursuit of “spiritual fulfillment, absolute justice, and freedom 
of the soul” constituted an ardent “indictment” of “a dark era” in Chinese 
history.70
 As I pointed out previously, some have called Xinling Shi an “apocry-
phal” or fictionalized history, and I largely adopt this generic designation. 
It is indeed a history that has obtained a “biblical status” by rejecting domi-
nant definitions of historical truth. The style as well as substance of Xinling 
Shi speaks of a politics of resistance and opposition. Over the course of his 
narrative, the author gradually collapses the distance between himself and 
his subjects. He confesses to having felt disappointed by the pedantic, ten-
dentious style that characterizes historical studies from both the Qing era 
and the post-1949 period, thus spurring himself into a quest for an alterna-
tive approach to historiography. He found an example in the style of Jahriya 
chroniclers, who often do not bother with “moralization” or “meticulous 
descriptions of facts.”71 Their documentation of the Jahriya’s wars with the 
Qing army in Gansu, for example, is summary, bare-boned, stripped of any 
explicit expressions of aversion to death and sacrifice. The narrator’s immer-
sion in this style guides him toward rejecting his “formal historical training” 
and writing a new kind of history that, instead of seeking to provide accurate 
detail, would approach the inner experience of the believer by surrendering 
itself to a form of mysticism.72 Xinling Shi, then, is not only a story about the 
historical emergence of the Jahriya identity but also a narrative of a personal 
transformation, the author’s journey toward a religious, epistemological, and 
ethical conversion.
 However, if these aspects of the narrative bear out a separatist impulse, 
setting the Jahriya apart from secular Chinese culture, this impulse is checked 
with a countercurrent of integration. As the author puts it in apostrophe in 
the Preface, “I have not forgotten about you, my Han, Mongol readers and all 
the others, whom I do not see!”73 The book, then, is also intended to be read 
as an allegory of the possibilities of political opposition under hegemonic 
power, which turns the anomalous case of the Jahriya into an analogue of 
peasant rebellions and nationalist revolutions in Chinese history since the 
late Qing. Lest the readers interpret the book as an articulation of a nar-
rowly ethno-religious affiliation, Zhang makes a point of explicitly propos-
ing the practice of subordinating ethnic and national origins to “the ideal of 
 70. Ibid., 42.
 71. Ibid., 169.
 72. Ibid.
 73. Ibid., 9.
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humanism,” which, as I discuss a bit later, he places at the core of the Jahriya’s 
struggles for spiritual freedom.74 He reincorporates the Jahriya into secular 
Chinese culture by proclaiming that its members share with other Chinese a 
passionate love of the homeland, except that they display a more fierce resolve 
to defend theirs.75 The Hui rebellions in northwest and southwest China dur-
ing the Qing era, thus, are portrayed in Xinling Shi as a history that brought 
to relief the revolutionary spirit latent in all Chinese, which expressed itself 
in “people’s insurrections” throughout eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
China, culminating in the Taiping Uprising, led by Hong Xiuquan, a Chris-
tian convert.76 In Zhang’s narrative, “the Jahriya moved farther and farther 
away from [Islamic] fundamentalism” and increasingly transformed into 
“something entirely new, a Chinese belief system.”77 In his own way, Zhang 
constructs a history of the Jahriya’s simultaneous assimilation into and exclu-
sion from secular Chinese culture, a history filled with violent confrontations 
as well as nonviolent forms of adaptation.
Humanist Jihadism
Zhang uses the word “shenzhan” (a literal Chinese translation of jihad, the 
Holy War) throughout Xinling Shi to describe religion-inspired collective 
insurrections aimed at hegemonic political power, as exemplified by Hui 
rebellions during the Qing era. He insists that jihad is legitimate only when 
it aims to protect the “faith of the soul” from “intolerable” religious oppres-
sion.78 This view recalls, but also differs from, Talal Asad’s point that Muslim 
scholars do not support militant Islamism because the legal preconditions of 
jihad must include “both the presence of a genuine threat to Islam and the 
likelihood of success in opposing it.”79 As there has never been a “centralized 
theological authority” in the Islamic world, Zhang’s interpretation of jihad 
does not function as either an affirmation or a revision of an orthodox view.80 
In any case, Islam in China, as Israeli Raphael puts it, is a “Chinese-Muslim 
innovation” with numerous sects that nobody can tabulate.81 Zhang’s idea of 
jihad, insofar as it becomes a metaphor for antihegemonic, collective strug-
 74. Ibid., 77.
 75. Ibid., 23.
 76. Ibid., 160.
 77. Ibid., 206.
 78. Ibid., 58.
 79. Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing, 11.
 80. Ibid.
 81. Israeli, 142.
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gles, necessarily implies a comment on the socialist revolution that brought 
the Communists to power in 1949 and the successive leftist movements that 
followed. Framing jihad as a form of opposition to extreme oppression can 
be read as Zhang’s way of projecting an ideal form of the socialist revolution 
that does not lead to the suppression of individual freedom. It is not surpris-
ing, then, that Zhang makes a point of parsing his understanding of jihad as a 
form of humanism. Writing about the death of one of the Jahriya leaders, the 
author exalts him as a monument to the survival of “humanism,” the triumph 
of “human faith” over what seeks to annihilate it.82 The Jahriya’s jihad must be 
understood, the author suggests, not just as a religiously motivated political 
act but as a political act in a broader sense (especially since part of his point is 
that the political is inevitably theological). The ideal of spiritual freedom that 
they fought for constitutes a condition and metonym for the more general-
ized ideal of human freedom, the genuine autonomy of thought and action. 
Defending this ideal requires the formation of oppositional collectivities that 
take on dominant power in both peaceful and military means, the latter only 
if there are extreme circumstances. In writing about the Jahriya, therefore, 
the author is envisioning the possibilities of continuing the tradition of the 
Chinese socialist revolution while replacing the homogeneous collectivism 
embodied in the idea of a proletarian dictatorship, which in a way echoes 
that of an obedient people under a benign Confucian ruler, with a pluralist 
model of multiple, competing collectivisms. What he means by a kind of 
humanist jihad at once challenges the foundation of China’s secular moder-
nity and allows for the reintegration of Chinese identity on a renewed, neces-
sarily hybridized basis. Zhang is doing no less than propose a new vision of 
Chinese national identity grounded in the confrontations and mutual adap-
tation between competing notions of equality and freedom drawn from dif-
ferent theologico-political traditions. At one point in Xinling Shi, the author 
expresses the ambiguity of his vision of Chinese national identity by casting it 
as a paradoxical formal ideal: He wants to write in a “Chinese language” that 
is not completely tied to Chinese “characters.”83
 Many critics, however, have not fully appreciated the complexity of 
Zhang’s oppositional politics. His perceived investment in the notion of pop-
ular uprisings made Xinling Shi a political liability before it was published.84 
 82. Zhang, Xinling Shi, 286.
 83. Ibid., 276.
 84. It has been documented that Zhang was not able to find a literary journal to publish 
his manuscript before it finally came out as in book form in 1991. See Liu Fusheng, “Linglei de 
zongjiao xiezuo: Zhang Chengzhi zongjiao xiezuo de yiyi” [Religion in literature: Meaning of 
Zhang Chengzhi’s writings], 64. 
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Some critics, however, have endorsed the book based on the assumption that 
the Jahriya’s struggles described in it are simply intended as an allegory of 
socialist and leftist movements. One critic, indeed, argues that Xinling Shi 
locates the possibility of social transformation in the collective energy of 
the oppressed, thus continuing the tradition of leftist writings in twentieth-
century China. For the critic, the book constitutes a Chinese example of 
Herbert Marcuse’s notion of “transforming mimesis,” giving visibility to the 
revolutionary potential inherent in Jahriya subjectivity.85 This is of course not 
an incorrect interpretation. Zhang has certainly not been reticent about his 
adulations for Mao for uniting the Chinese against Western incursions or his 
objections to the continuing dominance of Western, especially U.S., power. In 
his epilogue to Xinling Shi, an extended free verse poem, the author’s persona 
addresses Mao directly, “I love you more than any party member does.”86 
The author has also stated in unmistakable terms his opposition to ethnic 
separatism, an issue intensified in areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.87 Nevertheless, even though Xinling Shi can be 
read allegorically, it should also be appreciated for its ethno-religious spec-
ificity. Purely allegorical readings inevitably leave out the linkage that the 
author draws between religious faith and humanism, failing to point out how 
Zhang’s vision of national identity differs from the official rhetoric of minzu 
tuanjie [ethnic unity] in contemporary China.
 The juxtaposition of religious faith and humanism in Xinling Shi is not 
an isolated incident. Zhang reiterates their connection in his more recent 
essays.88 This move, moreover, resonates with a series of discussions of “the 
humanistic spirit” that took place among Chinese intellectuals and writers 
in the middle of the 1990s. In these discussions, as in Zhang’s work, religion 
is often identified as a crucial condition for fostering humanism in China. 
Participants in the discussions largely associate the ideal of humanism with 
the flourishing of independent, political engaged intellectual work, whereas 
Zhang predicates humanism upon the forging of antihegemonic collective 
identities. However, their conceptions of humanism overlap with Zhang’s 
 85. Zhang Hong, “Zhuti renting, geming yishi yu renmin meixue—lun zhang chengzhi zai 
xin shiqi de wenxue shijian” [Identification, revolutionary consciousness, and people’s aesthet-
ics: Zheng Chengzhi’s literary writings since the reform era], 81.
 86. Zhang, Xinling Shi, 307.
 87. Zhang Chengzhi, “Sanfen meiyou yinzai shushing de yanyan” [Three prefaces that did 
not come to print], In Qingjie de Jiingshen [The clean spirit], 161.
 88. The author states that he hopes young people in the future will stand up to power and 
systems but always remember the importance of “the human soul, humanism, respect for hu-
mans” and show special concern for the “lowest social stratum, the poor, and justice” (Zhang 
Chengzhi, “Sanfen meiyou yinzai shushang de xuanyan,” 156).
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around an emphasis on the sovereignty of the individual mind and on seek-
ing sustenance for this ideal in religious belief.
 Between March and July of 1994, the prestigious Chinese intellectual 
journal Dushu [Reading] published the transcripts of five roundtable discus-
sions focusing on the question of how to develop humanism in contemporary 
Chinese society, all with the title “Renwen jingshen xunsilu” [Reflections on 
the humanistic spirit].89 As the transcripts show, the Shanghai-based intel-
lectuals trace the absence of a strong humanist tradition in China to a history 
of political pragmatism among Chinese intellectuals since the turn of the 
twentieth century, which places the political task of preserving national inde-
pendence over and above the quest for moral and spiritual values that may 
transform the individual mind.90 This pragmatism, which also stemmed from 
Confucianism’s conception of intellectuals as architects of state governance,91 
has taken on new, more troubling guises since the 1980s, with the increasing 
commercialization of Chinese society.92 To provide an antidote to the prag-
matic, narrowly political orientation of the Chinese intelligentsia, participants 
of the roundtable discussions invoke a countertradition. It is pointed out that, 
while Western Humanism constructed itself over and against institutional-
ized religion, Chinese reformers at the end of the nineteenth century believed 
that religion (new forms of Confucianism and Buddhism in particular) had a 
major role to play in cultivating a general respect in society for the notion of 
human dignity.93 This countertradition resurfaced in the work of individual 
Chinese intellectuals throughout the twentieth century, but it remains feeble 
and obscured by official intellectual histories. Ultimately, two bifurcating 
positions derive from this argument. Some discussants argue for detaching 
intellectual labor from state ideology (including the emphasis on state sov-
ereignty) and reorienting it toward the “perfection and liberation” of man.94 
Others call on intellectuals to devote themselves to disseminating particular 
moral and spiritual values as a way of helping to generate critical conscious-
ness in China’s incomplete civil society.95 Anticipating and underscoring the 
 89. This discussion on the topic of the humanistic spirit has been studied by scholars but 
not in relation to Zhang Chengzhi. See Gloria Davies, Worrying about China, 87–105.
 90. Gao Ruiquan et al., “Renwen jingshen: Part II,” 78.
 91. Zhang Rulun et al., “Renwen jingshen: Part I,” 5.
 92. Gao Ruiquan et al., “Renwen jingshen: Part II,” 80.
 93. Xu Jilin et al., “Renwen jingshen: Part II,” 76.
 94. Gao Ruiquan et al., “Renwen jingshen: Part II,” 79; also see Xu Jilin, “Renwen Jingshen, 
Part III,” 54. For a critique of this aspect of the movement, see Liu Kang, “Is There an Alterna-
tive to (Capitalist) Globalization?” Liu compares the discussion of humanism to the projects of 
“cultural conservatives” in the U.S., including E. D. Hirsch and Allan Bloom, criticizing it for 
“denying from the outset the validity of any political engaged criticism” (214). 
 95. Wu Xuan et al.,“Renwen jingshen: Part IV,” 72–74.
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latter of these two positions, Zhang critiqued conceptions of national iden-
tity in contemporary China through an exploration of the history and val-
ues of the Jahriya. Indeed, Zhang is explicitly applauded during one of the 
roundtable discussions as an ideal model of a freethinking, politically active 
intellectual.96
 What we can conclude from this reading of Zhang Chengzhi and the 
related intellectual discourse on humanism is that religion figures importantly 
in the project of rethinking the meaning of political opposition in contempo-
rary China. Xinling Shi has played an important role in this ongoing project, 
mediating between ethno-religious separatism and state-centered national-
ism that emphasizes government control over cultural and religious matters. 
Ethno-religious wars, for Zhang, are not to be celebrated or suppressed from 
history; read a certain way, they suggest the importance of forging a robust 
pluralism that not only tolerates radical ethno-religious communities but 
also incorporates them into the process of negotiating the terms of national 
identity. The next section discusses Rabih Alameddine’s Koolaids: The Art of 
War, a text equally fascinated with violent conflicts. By juxtaposing a word 
associated with an insider status in religious, political, or cultural groups with 
the title of a sixth-century treatise on war by Sun Tzu, Alameddine suggests 
an intimate connection between the inside–outside distinction and state-
sponsored violence. Alameddine, like Zhang, concerns himself with the ways 
in which the atrocities of war force us to reflect on the possibilities of bridging 
the underlying religious and political divisions.
A Politics of Love
Koolaids: The Art of War is Lebanese American writer Rabih Alameddine’s 
first novel. It is a collage of first- and third-person narrations revolving around 
the impact of sectarian violence during the Lebanese Civil War, which lasted 
from 1975 to the early 1990s, and the lived experience of Lebanese in the 
United States, some of whom are gay men living in New York City coping 
with the height of the AIDS epidemic. The novel offers glimpses into a num-
ber of interlinked patterns of life that together constitute a panoramic study 
of the religious conflicts and power politics that turned Lebanon into an 
“unstated” state and the racialization of Arab Americans in the two decades 
leading up to 9/11.97 Some of the myriad voices in the novel are attributed to 
 96. Ibid., 73.
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specific characters, including Lebanese painter Mohammad (the character 
closest to the author, who is also a painter, in a biographical sense), fellow 
Lebanese Samir, Samir’s mother who lives through part of the civil war, and 
gay partners and friends of Mohammad and Samir in New York. One of the 
voices, which sometimes narrates dream sequences and feverish fantasies, is 
harder to identify, though it is attributed to Mohammad toward the end of the 
novel. This free-floating, largely unidentified voice often engages in satirizing 
the theological wrangling between Christianity and Islam, critiquing the uni-
versalistic claims of both and the politics they inform. Through this voice and 
the juxtaposition of many others with it, the novel presents both the war-torn 
Lebanon and the contemporary United States as sites of sectarian violence, 
their distinctions ironically erased by the shared ways in which they embrace 
the logic of war, the imperative of the friend–enemy distinction. Violence and 
war, in other words, have a way of leveling the differences between self and 
other, creating what might be described as a space of negative universalism, 
where all parties involved are reduced to mutually mirroring factions of a 
broken whole. The novel not only dissects this undesirable universalism but 
also seeks, toward the end, to remake it as well.
 The novel traces the Lebanese Civil War, in part, to rivaling essential-
ist conceptions of Lebanese national identity. Early on in the narrative, an 
unnamed narrator points out the “European complex” that the Lebanese 
have long harbored, which has also shaped their relationship with the United 
States.98 The narrator cites a mass-circulated e-mail message that calls on all 
“fellow Maronites” to “throw away the Arab shackles” and restore Lebanon 
as the “homeland of Christians.”99 The gist of this militant message resonates 
with a quote that David Gilmour attributes to Maronite Émile Eddé, president 
of Lebanon under the French Mandate from 1936 to 1941, who called Leba-
non a “Christian refuge, an outpost of European civilization in the backward 
East.”100 On the other side of this obsession with everything European, as 
Alameddine puts it, is the resurgence of “Arabism,” or “Islamic Fundamental-
ism,” that resorts to guerilla warfare and suicide tactics.101 Besides critiquing 
the politicization of religious differences in Lebanon, Alameddine also sheds 
light on the complex local and international power dynamics surrounding 
the prolonged civil war. The various narrators in the novel offer snapshots, 
mostly out of chronological order, of the course of the war, including the 
process of dissolution” (1622). 
 98. Rabih Alameddine, Koolaids, 28.
 99. Ibid., 59.
 100. David Gilmour, Lebanon, 27.
 101. Alameddine, Koolaids, 28.
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massacre of Palestine refugees in Ain El Rummanneh, which set off the war, 
military interventions on the part of Syria and Israel, both with their own 
political proxies and supporters in Lebanon, and the impotent peace efforts 
of the United States. The Israelis and Syrians continued to jockey for power 
in Lebanon after the official end of the civil war in 1991, creating scenarios 
that, as Alameddine puts it, only Kafka would have been able to imagine.102
 The Kafkaesque undertones of the civil war have much to do with its 
ironic effect of creating a zone of indifferentiation. As various religious 
groups engage in sectarian and internecine violence, they quickly lose any 
coherent identity that can separate them from their enemies. Citing the old 
Lebanese proverb “My brother and I against my cousin, my cousin and I 
against the stranger. Just let me hate somebody,” Alameddine emphasizes 
that theologico-political rivals often come to imitate and resemble each other, 
becoming virtually undifferentiated in their moral stances and military tac-
tics.103 The author provides a mocking account of a few highlights during the 
civil war to show the affinity among various warring factions. While Hizbal-
lah evolved from the Shiite militia that originally fought the PLO, they later 
on used the war tactics “learned  .  .  .  from the PLO” against the Israelis.104 
Israel, Hizballah, and Syria in turn mirrored one another in employing the 
“Ya Robbi Tegi Fi Aino” tactic, which had originally been used by Egypt in the 
1967 Israeli–Arab War. “Ya Robbi Tegi Fi Aino” is the Egyptian for “Oh God, 
I hope this gets him in the eye,” referring in the book to haphazard, aimless 
attacks that, deliberately or not, target civilians as well as military camps.105 
The various forms of mirroring are referred to in Koolaids as the “Middle 
East version of The Art of War,” an ironic allusion to Sun Tze’s ubiquitous 
classic on war strategy that has aestheticized the concept of war for many of 
its Western readers.106 The literalized war, as Alameddine suggests, is far less 
elegant; it erases all patterns of distinction that make tactical or moral victo-
ries possible.
 A kind of mutual mirroring, Alameddine suggests, also aptly describes 
the relationship between Lebanon and the West, purportedly divided along 
the Christian–Muslim line. One stand-alone passage in the first half of the 
book, filtered through the unidentified, sardonic voice recurrent through-
out the novel, blends the central ideas of the New Testament and those of 
the Qur’an, offering no comments on their clear incongruence. The passage 
opens by grafting the name Mohammad onto the beginning of the Gospel of 
 102. Ibid., 237.
 103. Ibid., 138.
 104. Ibid., 97.
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John, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the 
Word was Mohammad.”107 This statement mixes together the Christian belief 
that God’s will expresses itself in the fundamental order of the world (the 
Word, logos) and the Muslim belief in Mohammad as the last of the prophets 
or messengers of God, gleefully blasphemous toward both. The passage goes 
on to juxtapose two contrasting doctrines from the two religions:
For God so loved the world that He gave His one and only Son, that who-
ever believes in Him shall not perish, but have eternal life  .  .  .  Whoever 
believes in Him is not condemned, but whosoever does not believe stands 
condemned already because he has not believed in the name of God’s one 
and only Son. For Mohammad, peace be upon Him, said God was neither 
a son nor a father . . . Say not “Trinity”: desist: it will be better for you: for 
Allah is one Allah.108
Here, a statement of the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity is rudely jux-
taposed with one that indicates the Muslim objection to it. Even though both 
sentences start with “For,” neither flows logically from the preceding one. 
This juxtaposition, therefore, does not simply point out a central theological 
difference; its perplexing, illogical style can be read as a mocking imitation of 
the assertive, prophetic tone in which both Christian and Muslim doctrines 
are conveyed. The sentence in the middle ostensibly recasts the Christian 
commandment of faith, which works to exclude nonbelievers from God’s 
love, and yet it can simultaneously be construed as a reference to the equally 
rigid distinction between believers and nonbelievers in Islam. The passage, 
among others in Koolaids, simultaneously mocks Christianity and Islam while 
showing how their doctrines mirror each other in style and substance. The 
author’s theological critique is coupled with political commentaries about 
the ways in which both the West and Lebanon’s Arab neighbors carelessly 
squandered the lives of Lebanese during the civil war and in its aftermath: 
Assad “kidnaps and tortures thousands of Lebanese,” just like the U.S. ally 
Israel, while American State Secretary Warren Christopher condones the for-
mer and “kisses [Israel’s] ass.”109 All the intervening parties here share the 
guilt of normalizing wanton killing and making it no longer “newsworthy.”110 
Alamaddine’s critique of the U.S. role in the war extends the well-rehearsed 
argument that U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East follows from and per-
 107. Ibid., 76.
 108. Ibid.
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petuates the politicization of Christian–Muslim conflicts that can be traced 
back to Medieval Europe.111
 Koolaids furthers its critique of American politics and culture by invoking 
a long history of prejudices against Arabs within the United States. Samir’s 
mother, whose diary entries are dispersed throughout the book, laments that 
Americans “make fun of ” Arabs all the time, as if they were “all crazy, maybe 
even degenerate.”112 A federal building in Oklahoma is blown up, and Arab-
looking images of possible suspects are spread “all over the news.”113 These 
details prefigure the intensification of the profiling and racialization of Arab 
Americans after 9/11. As Salaita points out, anti-Islam orientalism and right-
wing Christian values have played a significant role in the rise of “imperative 
patriotism” in the post-9/11 period, an ideology that equates the national 
interest with the defeat of what had come to be known as Islamism.114 Reli-
gion and politics are so thoroughly enmeshed in the contemporary Ameri-
can public sphere that “anti-Arab racism” and “Islamaphobia” have become 
inseparable, referring in general to the “same thing,” even though they are 
by no means identical terms.115 Implied in Sailata’s critique is the point that 
proliferating public expressions of Christian religiosity in American domestic 
and foreign policy and the racialization of Arabs and Muslims threaten to 
turn the United States into a “theocracy,” a mirror image of what it identifies 
as the enemy.116 Not unlike Salaita, Alameddine draws attention to the paral-
lel ways in which religion figures in the political culture of both the United 
States and Lebanon, generating a relationship of near symmetry.
 The same symmetry, Alameddine suggests, can be seen in the religiously 
sanctioned discrimination against homosexuals in both cultures, an issue 
 111. In Contending Visions of the Middle East, Zachary Lockman underscores the slippery 
line between Muslim (a religious category) and Arab (a political category) in Western percep-
tions. “Yet it can be argued that Islam occupied a unique (though never simple) place in the 
imaginations of western Europeans from at least the eleventh or twelfth century onward—that 
it was Europe’s ‘other’ in a unique sense. The Jews were close at hand; and though they were 
sometimes regarded as an ideological problem as a result of their steadfast refusal to accept that 
Jesus was the messiah and the son of God, they never constituted a political or military threat to 
the hegemony of Christianity in Europe” (Lockman, 36). During the Cold War, the U.S. assumed 
the mantle of European colonial powers to become the guarantor of stability in the Middle East. 
As Lockman explains, “Despite talk of pressing friendly regimes to accommodate political and 
social change, however, US policymakers gave priority to maintaining the paramount position 
of the US in the region, keeping the Soviet Union out and protecting local clients” (Lockman, 
118). The 1950s saw the cooling of U.S.–Egyptian relations, the U.S. military interventions in 
Lebanon in 1957, as well as the CIA-sponsored military coup in Iran in 1953 that overthrew the 
government and installed the shah (Iran’s king) as absolute ruler. 
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that intersects with both the daily indignities of racism and the sudden 
trauma of war. At one point, the free-floating, unidentified narrative voice 
ridicules the story of Lot in the Genesis, calling attention to its implication 
that a father offering his daughters to “horny buggers” is more acceptable 
than “men fucking men.”117 Koolaids also alludes to the Muslim version of 
the same story, incorporating excerpts from the Qur’an (Surahs 26, 27) about 
how Allah destroys Sodom and Gomorrah after Angels instruct Lut and his 
family to leave.118 If the civil war dissolves the differences among the vari-
ous theologico-political factions in Lebanon, the war against sodomy has the 
same leveling effect on Christianity and Islam. Muhammad is alienated from 
his family in Lebanon because of his gay identity even as he struggles with the 
predicament of being an Arab gay man in the United States. He finds himself 
in a war zone wherever he turns. He and his gay lovers and friends battle the 
havoc of AIDS and cultural isolation with the kind of grit and forbearance 
that characterize victims of all wars. One of the passages in the novel, fil-
tered again through the unidentified voice, draws an explicit analogy between 
the Lebanese Civil War and the war on “sodomy” and AIDS. It points out 
that, after the American troops’ unsuccessful intervention in 1984, President 
Reagan “avoided discussing Lebanon” the same way he avoided mentioning 
AIDS.119 In the meantime, the “doctors, pharmacists, and various medical 
personnel” that gained from the AIDS epidemic are compared to a contingent 
of “war profiteers.”120
 We can see that just as Zhang Chengzhi critiques the Confucian tradition 
in China by unearthing the history of its suppression of the Jahriya, Alamed-
dine focuses on the mass casualties resultant from the Lebanese Civil War 
and the AIDS epidemic in the contemporary United States as a way of critiqu-
ing Christian extremism along with its Islamic counterpart. This critique is 
also crystallized in the dream scene that opens the novel and recurs through-
out the text in slightly different forms. The scene restages the biblical pas-
sage about the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, commonly interpreted to 
represent conquest, war, plague, and death.121 The rider of the White Horse, 
who has generated different interpretations among Christians, figures in this 
dream scene as Christ, who has come to save true believers from the Great 
Tribulation. The horseman refuses to take the initially unidentified dreamer 
(who is revealed at the end of the novel to be Mohammad), for he is a “non-
 117. Alameddine, Koolaids, 64.
 118. Ibid., 177.
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Christian homosexual,” “a fucking fag, a heathen.”122 “I didn’t die for this 
dingbat’s sins,” the horseman growls.123 This passage mimics the Dispensa-
tional view that the Book of Revelation represents events that will happen in 
the future and that Christ will return invisibly before the seven-year Tribu-
lation to take Christians bodily up to Heaven.124 By dramatizing this inter-
pretation of the Apocalypse from the perspective of one of those doomed to 
be “left behind,” this recurring scene suggests that, to those excluded from 
the Rapture, the savior and the force presiding over the Tribulation are one 
and the same.125 Christ and Antichrist, in other words, are partners in sow-
ing violence and suffering on earth. This scene is emblematic of the novel’s 
critique of right-wing interpretations of Christian scriptures (the story of 
Sodom and Gomorrah, for example), which, as the author suggests, have a 
powerful influence on public policy in the contemporary United States, turn-
ing Christian moral laws into political weapons against various social groups, 
Muslims and homosexuals in particular.
 However, Alameddine is not simply calling for cleansing political cul-
ture and public policy of vestiges of religious dogmas. By underscoring the 
permeation of religiosity in American politics even prior to 9/11, he effec-
tively dismantles the standard secularist assertion that modern conceptions 
of political space represent a triumph over religious sectarianism. Instead, 
he suggests the possibility of transforming religious teachings into ethi-
cal principles with a genuinely universalistic agenda that may help reduce, 
rather than engender, sectarian conflicts. Toward the end of the narrative, 
the author implies that there is an important distinction between adhering 
to the letter of religious teachings and adhering to their spirit. Furthermore, 
he suggests that this distinction can in fact be seen as an integral part of 
Christianity, namely, what Saint Paul refers to as the distinction between 
the law of works and the law of faith. It is not a coincidence that toward the 
end of the novel the unidentified narrative voice recounts a funeral service 
that starts with an opening prayer and a reading from Paul’s Letter to the 
Romans. The Romans excerpt offers assurance, to Jews and Gentiles alike, 
of salvation through Christ’s sacrifice: “[t]hrough baptism into His death we 
were buried with Him, so that, just as Christ was raised from the dead by 
 122. Ibid., 1.
 123. Ibid.
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the glory of the Father, we too might live a new life” (Rom 6.4).126 Both Jews 
and Gentiles are folded into Paul’s view of salvation, which is founded on 
faith in Christ’s blood rather than mere adherence to God’s commandments. 
Conceivably, Alameddine is arguing, through Paul, that faith in the universal 
address of God’s love, agape, manifest through the sacrifice of his only Son, 
can be reappropriated as a basis for a new kind of human subject defined by 
a relation of love to oneself and to others (“love your neighbor as yourself ”). 
The Romans excerpt, then, leads logically to a fragment from the Gospel of 
Matthews, where Jesus makes it clear that “as often as” we neglect the needs 
of “those least ones,” we neglect to do it to Jesus.127 The labor of human love, 
like God’s love, is defined by its universal address, such that neglecting any 
one individual is neglecting God. Here, Alameddine is driving at a point 
reminiscent of Alain Badiou’s provocative argument about Paul. Badiou reads 
Paul as a “new militant figure” who teaches us that the act of declaring faith 
in God constitutes a revolutionary “event,” “a rupture, an overturning” of the 
subjection of humans to legal commandments, the law of works.128 The faith-
event is neither material nor subjective, because it represents a union of the 
two, a “thought-practice,” in other words, that inaugurates the labor of “tire-
lessly addressing itself to all the others” and thereby effectuating collective 
liberation.129 For Badiou, then, practicing the Christian teaching of universal 
love contains the promise of a new kind of revolution, a post-Marxist form of 
militancy. As he puts it, the “materiality” of the labor of universal love is “the 
militant dimension” of faith.130 The value of Badiou’s interpretation of Paul is 
the reinvigoration of religious and political universalism: Human subjectivity 
is defined here not in terms of what it excludes or submits to but in terms of 
its power to actualize universal love and break from exclusionary regimes of 
power. To a certain extent, Alameddine seems to agree with Badiou’s reading 
of Paul and the Christian faith. He writes that the universalistic impulses of 
Christianity jibe with the ambitions of the best of art, which also projects the 
possibility for individuals to transcend their limitations by participating in a 
generalized idea of humanity. Just a few pages after the excerpt from Paul’s 
letter, the unidentified narrator cites Borges’s “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” 
which features an imaginary region Tlon, where “all men who repeat one line 
of Shakespeare are William Shakespeare.”131
 At the same time, Alameddine wonders aloud whether the doctrine of 
 126. Alameddine, Koolaids, 204.
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universal love does not hide something much less savory. Even though Paul, 
in Badiou’s reading, announces a new law of faith, a “nonliteral” law, that 
ruptures the law of works, it is clear that the two kinds of law remain thor-
oughly intertwined in Paul and Christianity in general.132 The segment of 
the Romans excerpted in Koolaids runs on a bit longer. Immediately after 
proclaiming the possibility of salvation for everyone, Paul turns his atten-
tion to the body as a locus of sin that has no place in God’s universal love. 
As humans partake in Christ’s resurrection, their “sinful [bodies]” will have 
been left behind, crucified with Christ.133 The “sinful [bodies]” do not just 
point to the absolute limits of the Christian universalism signified by the 
doctrines of faith and love. They constitute its very condition, as salvation 
has no meaning other than the transcendence of the bondage of the body. 
For some, indeed, the Romans can be read as a “theory  .  .  . of the enemy,” 
structured around tropes of warfare (“let us lay aside the works of darkness, 
but let us put on the weapons of light”).134 War, of course, is also Alamed-
dine’s main theme. The mass casualties of the Lebanese Civil War and the 
AIDS epidemic in the contemporary United States bear witness to the deadly 
consequences of the entwining of theological and political exclusions. Just as 
harrowing as literal death, perhaps, is the death of a spiritual and emotional 
kind. In the novel, Mohammad is pressured to leave Lebanon and join his 
uncle in Los Angeles in 1975. His relationship with his father, as well as 
the fatherland, is consistently strained. His decision to attend an art school 
angers his father but not nearly as much as his confession to being gay, a 
confession that leads to his complete exile from his family. Mohammad’s gay 
friends in New York experience similar pain. One of them receives a letter 
from his stepfather urging him to “confess [his] sins” so that God will open 
His arms to him.135 In scenes like this, religious faith, whether Christian and 
Islamic, signifies an absolute form of subjectivation—one’s voluntary sub-
mission to the law—rather than the beginning of a new life underlined by 
universal love. Death, indeed, is a far more universal experience than salva-
tion. As the novel puts it at one point, “[i]n the commemoration of death, I 
unearthed myself.”136
 The novel’s allusions to parts of the New Testament, then, can be read as 
an emblem of the narrative’s oscillation between a sardonic dissection of the 
lethal consequences of theologico-religious wars and an earnest search for 
ways of putting an end to the endless cycles of death, which, as the author 
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puts it, always “begin all over again” as if nothing happened before.137 The 
ideal of universal love, based on the most appealing part of Christianity, does 
not completely wither away under the crushing weight of senseless death. 
Ultimately, it figures as a possible enabler of an elusively radical set of social 
relations. Mohammad’s quest for physical and spiritual healing encapsulates 
this trajectory. On the one hand, a cynical version of him questions how 
death can ever be redeemed. In one of his monologues, he expresses doubt 
that “there is conclusive proof an afterlife exists” or that consciousness is 
made of more than matter.138 In conjunction with these expressions of spiri-
tual skepticism, the novel also quotes, and implicitly critiques, several literary 
voices that romanticize death by turning it into a spiritual experience. Her-
mann Hesse’s view of death as one of the great transformers of life and Louis 
Ferdinand-Celine’s complaint that antibiotics took half of the tragedy out of 
medicine, for example, come across, in the midst of all the human misery 
described in the novel, as cruelly insensitive.139 Mohammad also pokes fun at 
the New Age spirituality for offering facile antidotes to death. At two differ-
ent points in the novel, he writes mockingly of his turn to a Hindu guru for a 
spiritual cure for AIDS, which leaves him with nothing but a renewed “sense 
of humor” inspired by the apparent absurdity of the pursuit.140 The novel 
cheers this bitter sarcasm on by sprinkling the narrative with comical, imagi-
nary exchanges that lampoon spiritual quests. In one of these passages, a 
dialogue takes place among Arjuna, his charioteer Krsna, Eleanor Roosevelt, 
Krishnamurti, Julio Cortázar, and Tom Cruise, where contempt is hurled at 
such religious gurus as Krishnamurti for telling vague parables about the 
meaning of life.141 Eventually, however, the novel does offer an alternative 
to the cynical, nonredemptive conception of death, as Mohammad’s life and 
quest come to an end. In the final iteration of the dream scene involving the 
Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, which is also the last section of the entire 
novel, the rider of the white horse at last extends acceptance to Mohammad, 
comforting him with the words “I love you, Mohammad” before he takes his 
last breath.142 In this scene, the redemptive power of the Christian notion of 
universal love makes room for what the law forcefully excludes, the “sinful 
body” of a Lebanese, non-Christian, gay man in this case, rather than relegate 
it to the hopeless realm of eternal death. Through the ending of the novel, 
Alameddine detaches the notion of universal love from its Christian roots, 
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thus expanding its claim to true universality. It becomes, arguably, an ethi-
cal principle that may help engender an unbounded form of pluralism. This 
final moment of closure does not privilege Christianity over Islam or other 
religious traditions, but instead signals the possibility of transforming these 
traditions from within based on an unflinching study of the ways in which 
they collude in casting the seeds of death. This deliberately utopian ending 
is foreshadowed in the novel’s projection, at one point, of an idyllic Lebanon 
before the civil war, a nation at the center of the Arab world where various 
cultural and religious crosscurrents in the East and West intermingled freely. 
It is a place where people felt comfortable considering themselves to be “both 
nationals and foreigners.”143 Just like the novel’s ending, this passage imag-
ines a genuinely nonexclusive form of pluralism that might serve to suture 
together the fragments of modern nation-states (Lebanon, the United States) 
and dilute the symbolic power of their internal and external borders. Taken 
as a whole, Koolaid’s critiques various kinds of sectarianism, the “koolaid 
syndrome” one might say, while gesturing toward the possibility of a new 
form of political theology that is genuinely universalistic and pluralist. Its 
relations to Zhang Chengzhi’s Xinling Shi are clear at this point. Paralleling 
what Alameddine does with Christian theology, Zhang recasts the tenets of 
the Jahriya to articulate a new model of pluralist universalism that challenges 
the limits of both Confucianism and official multiculturalism in contempo-
rary China.
 It is conceivable that Alameddine’s effort to hold the Christian faith up 
to its own ideal is a way of forcing his audience, most of them Americans, 
to reflect on the belief system most familiar to them. The author is certainly 
not alone in exploring the ways in which religion is indispensable for discus-
sions of multiculturalism, and progressive politics in general, in the contem-
porary United States, where religion remains a robust component of public 
discourses, a phenomenon that has come to be seen as a challenge (one of 
many in fact) to standard narratives of the rise of secular modernity.144 On 
the one hand, a civil religion, a nondenominational Christianity continues 
to be regarded as a treasured ingredient of good Americanism and civic 
national identity; on the other, since the colonial period, struggles for reli-
gious diversity have effected legal and cultural changes that favor equal pro-
tection and recognition of religious rights, ensuring the flourishing of “an 
 143. Ibid., 149.
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open, free, competitive, and pluralistic religious market” as well as “high 
levels of individual religiosity.”145 It has recently been argued that the post–
World War II rise of liberal multiculturalism owes a debt to the legal efforts 
of non-Protestant religious groups, especially Jewish and Catholic groups, 
to fight “sectarian attempt(s) to insert Protestantism into public education,” 
a process that helped solidify the belief that the state should actively help 
level the playing ground for different religious organizations as they strive 
to maintain and grow their influence.146 In a similar vein, Chris Beneke has 
argued that the earliest origins of American pluralism lay in the explosion 
of religious differences during the mid-eighteenth century, which drasti-
cally broadened the “range of acceptable opinions” in print while fostering 
the integration of colonial politics and the opening of American colleges—
a cultural constellation that Beneke compares to the accommodation of 
ethno-racial differences in post–World War II multiculturalism.147 Beyond 
this specific connection between religion and multiculturalism, as R. Marie 
Griffith and Melani McAlister point out, there is a long “history of both 
religious activism and political religiosity in the United States,” including 
phenomena “ranging from the religious beliefs of the ‘founding fathers’ to 
the international origins of religious pacifism to the socioreligious meanings 
of the ‘home birth’ movement.”148 A movement for “religious politics” started 
occurring in the 1980s, when a new generation of religious intellectuals 
“worked to raise awareness, legitimize religious concerns in policy-making, 
and increase funding for faith-based organizations in general.”149 Since the 
2000 presidential election, the rise of the Christian Right and what Steven 
Salaita has called a “theocracy” in the United States underscore the many 
ways in which religion entails, incites, and fuels political struggles, but it 
should not obfuscate the more productive roles it can play in politics, which 
often require crossing “political and denomination lines.”150 These roles take 
many forms: the writings of the evangelical left “on poverty, racial injustice, 
and global inequality, as well as spiritual renewal,” the founding of Tikkun 
magazine that supports a “loving criticism” of Israeli policies toward the 
Palestinians, and various faith-based organizations advocating religious and 
other social liberties.151 Although Alameddine’s novel does not sketch out 
institutional means of integrating religion productively into debates around 
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public policy and political culture, his rewriting of the Christian doctrine of 
universal love supplements the academic discussions cited previously. Like 
Zhang, he suggests that a thoroughly pluralist universalism needs to address 
and draw upon religious teachings.
 The historical narratives offered by Zhang and Alameddine address the 
challenge that Muslim difference poses to the multicultural order in the 
United States and China in the post–Cold War era. Revisiting ethno-religious 
wars without papering over their massive toll or lingering legacies leads the 
authors to intriguingly similar arguments. If there are ethno-religious differ-
ences that conciliatory multiculturalism cannot accommodate, the answer 
is not that religion should be confined firmly to the private sphere. After 
all, the “secular” political sphere, as it is manifest in contemporary America 
and China, is inseparable from the religious—the continual dominance of 
Christian and Confucian values in their respective political sphere is but 
one example. As secularism is founded on the artificial dichotomization of 
the religious and the political, insisting on the complete secularization of 
political culture can only cover over, or even entrench, existing ethno-reli-
gious divisions. In other words, it can only further undermine the project 
of multiculturalism. Instead of pursuing a strictly secularist version of mul-
ticulturalism, the two authors studied here provide us with a provocative 
alternative, by emphasizing the importance of recognizing and employing 
the power of religion. They propose genuinely universalistic understandings 
of religious doctrines (Christian as well as Islamic) as an alternative ethical 
foundation for social relations and in so doing point to an expanded model 
of multiculturalism that draws from political theories and religious thought 
while creatively reworking both to mediate their mutual antagonism. Under 
this model of multiculturalism, ethno-religious minorities are not simply 
beneficiaries of the majority nation-state but full participants in political 
discussions of how to restructure the ways in which a nation as a whole 
approaches social differences. Put another way, ethno-religious conflicts 
should not be seen as polarizing forces to be contained by multiculturalism. 
Rather, they should be conceived as integral to the continuous negotiations 
over the key terms of multiculturalism in a given national context. Read-
ing Zhang and Alameddine in conjunction with each other, then, turns an 
infelicitous instance of translation—the global dissemination of the idea of 
“Islamic terrorism”—into an opportunity for a productive dialogue on ways 
of pushing the frontiers of contemporary multiculturalisms.
M Y dISCUSSIOnS of Kuo, Zhang, and Alameddine in pre-vious chapters argue that these authors reconstruct histories 
of violent conflicts between the majority state and ethno-racial and 
religious minorities in a way that punctures the myth of an already 
achieved state of national harmony that prevails in both contempo-
rary America and China. These authors engage, through their nar-
ratives, in the strenuous labor of reconceiving pluralist universalism 
in opposition to facile versions of it embodied in conciliatory mul-
ticulturalism. On the one hand, they suggest that building national 
solidarity, whether in civic or state-centric terms, frequently con-
flicts, sometimes violently, with assertions of historically shaped 
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impersonal intimacy
Yan geling’s Fusang and Its english Translation
love is an ethical and social responsibility to open personal and 
public spaces in which otherness and difference can be articu-
lated. love requires a commitment to the advent and nurturing of  
difference.
—kelly Oliver, Witnessing
“Asian American” connotes the violence, exclusion, dislocation, 
and disenfranchisement that has attended the codification of 
certain bodies as, variously, Oriental, yellow, sometimes brown, 
inscrutable, devious, always alien. It speaks to the active denial 
of personhood to the individuals inhabiting those bodies. At the 
same time, it insists on acknowledging the enormous capacity for 
life that has triumphed repeatedly over racism’s attempts to dehu-
manize, over the United States’ juridical attempts to regulate life 
and culture.
—kandice Chuh, Imagine Otherwise
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group differences within a nation. On the other, they argue that the result-
ing tensions are not to be confined or suppressed; they should instead be 
confronted by both dominant and marginal social groups through a pro-
cess whereby they work together on revising the terms and conditions 
of national identity in an ethos of openness and generosity. Kuo’s idea of 
dissenting nationalism, Zhang’s model of competing collectivisms, and 
Alameddine’s rethinking of Christian universalism share an investment in 
exploring conceptions of national identities that emphasize both coherence 
and inconclusiveness.
 What these authors do not pay sufficient attention to, however, is the 
ways in which individual subjectivity mediates, and is mediated by, the ide-
als of national identity they envision. They are more concerned with recon-
structing neglected histories from scattered fragments of collective memory 
than with imagining how these histories relate to the individual psyche. 
This chapter takes up the topic of how the individual, embodied subject 
can become a battleground for different nationalist discourses and a site of 
psychic labor through which these discourses can be reshaped. It does so 
through a discussion of Fusang, an unusual novel by Chinese immigrant 
author Yan Geling. Published first in Chinese in 1996 and translated into 
English in 2001 as The Lost Daughter of Happiness, the novel offers a pro-
vocative portrayal of the titular character Fusang, a Chinese prostitute in 
nineteenth-century San Francisco. To the uneasy surprise of many, Fusang 
is depicted not as a victim of racial and sexual violence but as an enigmatic 
figure who actively accommodates the violent penetrations of her body. Her 
accommodation of sexual violence entails a rejection of the self-possessed, 
autonomous liberal subject and thus figures as a tactic of survival and resis-
tance that turns the character into an unlikely pioneer of a new regime of 
subjectivity and relationality.
 Although the name of Yan Geling may mean very little to U.S.-based 
academics, most Asian Americanists included, she is often commended by 
scholars in China and Taiwan as one of the most important Chinese-language 
authors in the United States. Before she came to the United States as a student 
in 1989, Yan had published three novels in China, where she was born in the 
late 1950s. During and after her study at Columbia College in Chicago for an 
MFA in fiction writing, she published award-winning short stories, novel-
las, and novels in Chinese-language literary journals in the United States, 
Taiwan, and China.1 In 1995, she won a United Daily News Novel Prize with 
 1. Yan is also known as the script writer for the 1992 film Shaonu Xiaoyu, based on her 
novella of the same title, and as a co-script writer (along with Joan Chen) for the 1998 Tianyu, 
directed by Chen. 
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Fusang, the story of a village girl in Canton who was abducted, brought to 
the United States on a cargo ship, and sold into a brothel in nineteenth-cen-
tury San Francisco Chinatown.2 Since then, Yan has continued to publish at 
a breathtaking pace, winning admiration from literary prize committees in 
both China and Taiwan and from established Chinese film directors, who 
have commissioned scripts from her or purchased the rights to her works.3 
Yan has also experimented with writing in English. Her first English- 
language novel, The Banquet Bug, came out in 2007 to positive reviews.
 The most interesting aspect of the novel Fusang, which makes it quite 
rare among Chinese-language writings in the United States, is that it is a fully 
transnational narrative with a history of reception in both the United States 
and China. My reading of the novel therefore pays close attention to its trans-
lation and reception, both of which consist of a series of appraisive, interpre-
tive acts. The English translation, The Lost Daughter of Happiness, excises or 
shortens many passages in the original, seeking to make the translation read, 
in the words of Cathy Silber, the translator, more like an “English-language 
novel.”4 I draw particular attention to the textual alterations that accompany 
the novel’s entry into a different political and cultural context. In chapter 
1, I point out a discrepancy between the English and Chinese versions of 
Jiang Rong’s Lang Tuteng. In the case of Yan’s Fusang, however, comparing 
the original and the translation is a much more crucial task. Passages that 
are excised from or abbreviated in the English translation, most of which 
contain descriptions (from the narrator’s or other characters’ perspectives) of 
Fusang’s unruly sexuality, become a kind of constitutive absence that signals 
a certain cultural anxiety. These editorial changes, no doubt, have centrally 
shaped Anglo-American responses to the novel, but they are also critical 
moves in their own right that implicitly pass judgment on what the novel 
does right and what it does not. Not coincidentally, the deleted and short-
ened passages also play a crucial role, either by being highlighted or ignored, 
in Chinese critics’ readings of the novel. I offer, in various sections of this 
chapter, an analysis of the interpretive, regulatory work that the translation 
 2. United Daily News literary prizes are among the most prestigious awards for Taiwan 
writers and Chinese-language writers around the world. Authors in China have also started to 
compete for the award.
 3. Yan is the scriptwriter for Chen Kaige’s film Mei Lanfang, an autobiographical film 
named after its subject, the most important icon of Chinese opera. Zhang Yimou acquired 
rights to one of her recent novels Jinling shisan chai [Thirteen women in Nanjing].
 4. Cathy Silber, Telephone Interview, Nov. 27, 2004. Silber informed me during our tele-
phone interview that she was sometimes at odds with the Hyperion editor as to what changes 
were necessary, although she agreed with him on some alterations that would make the trans-
lation read more like an “English-language” novel. The author was consulted on most of the 
revisions, though Silber added that she did not seek to exercise control over the process. 
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process performs and what it may say about the ways in which the novel 
challenges the conciliatory logic of U.S. liberal multiculturalism. My own 
understanding of the novel, which I get to shortly, also anchors itself on the 
missing and shortened passages.
 Along with comparing the two different versions of the novel, I explore 
the divergences and confluences between the interpretations of the central 
character Fusang generated in the United States and China. Anglo-American 
critics, with access only to the sanitized, incomplete version of the novel via 
the translation, have largely construed Fusang as a frustratingly inscrutable 
character, even as they argue that she subverts the orientalist imagination 
of Asian women. In China, Fusang’s accommodation of sexual and social 
violence and her ability to draw pleasure from it has caused misgivings in 
critics who read the character allegorically as a symbol of the Chinese nation 
that has been forced to contend with Western colonialism and political and 
cultural hegemony since the mid-nineteenth century. The characterization of 
Fusang is either criticized for its complicity with the orientalist feminization 
of Chinese culture or praised for accentuating the virtuous resilience that 
has enabled China to overcome its historical humiliations. The novel’s recep-
tion in China, then, illuminates a postcolonial understanding of the Chi-
nese nation that approaches racialized experiences of Chinese immigrants 
in the West as an extension of China–West relations. This understanding, 
though not unjustified, provides important ammunitions for the party-state’s 
emphasis on national sovereignty and unity in all policy matters, including 
the policy of regional autonomy for ethnic minorities (as opposed to feder-
alism), which was rationalized on the purported grounds that the different 
ethnicities in China forged unbreakable friendships during shared struggles 
against Euro-American (and Japanese) colonialisms during the first half 
of the twentieth century. The various competing interpretations of Fusang 
show us yet another way in which ideas of race and nation in contemporary 
America and China are interconnected. Even as Chinese immigration and 
Chinese immigrant writings reveal the limits of liberal acceptance of racial 
others in the United States, they broach the topic of U.S. racial dynamics in 
China, which often becomes entangled with discussions of U.S.–China rela-
tions and of such translated concepts as postcoloniality and orientalism.
 Ultimately, I provide a new reading of Fusang that challenges nation-
alist discourses and nation-centered critical practices. These practices, I 
believe, suppress Fusang’s inexplicable queerness, normalizing her into an 
autonomous ethnic subject or a coherent embodiment of national identity. 
In response, I analyze the character through the very lens of queerness. I 
argue that her accommodation of sexual violence encodes a set of queer 
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practices that in effect challenge conventional (liberal as well as nationalist) 
configurations of individual subjectivity. The radical challenge embodied in 
Fusang suggests a psychic and corporeal basis for new forms of individual 
and collective identity and therefore the new models of national integra-
tion discussed in chapters 3 and 4. In dialogue with literary and theoretical 
traditions in both the United States and China, Yan’s novel turns what could 
have been a narrative of sacrifice and pain into a productive inquiry into the 
possibility of transforming versions of multiculturalism that prioritize the 
coherence of the nation, a goal often contingent on the disciplining of the 
(raced) female body.
Opaque or Transparent?
A third of the novel Fusang consists of second-person narration of the titular 
character’s experience. The rest is mostly third-person narration describing 
Fusang’s interactions with johns and with the missionaries trying to rescue 
her. The novel is also sprinkled with first-person narration in which the 
embodied, explicitly female narrator compares her own life with Fusang’s. 
There is certainly no linear narrative to be found in the novel, but the plot 
can be summarized as follows: Fusang is brought to California toward the 
end of the 1860s from a Canton village and sold into a brothel. She quickly 
attracts the attention of Chris, a white teenager; Da Yong, a Chinatown gang-
ster; and Chinese laborers forced to live a bachelor’s life because of the immi-
gration restrictions on Chinese women. She becomes Da Yong’s possession 
when she willingly allows him to take her away from the missionaries who 
are trying to save her. Meanwhile, Fusang develops a crush on Chris and ini-
tiates sexual relations with him several times. Their consummation does not 
happen, though, until a riot breaks out against the Chinese and Chris joins 
a group of rioters in gang-raping Fusang. Finally, she turns down Chris’s 
marriage offer and weds herself to Da Young just before he is executed for 
killing a white merchant. She then returns to Chinatown and lives there until 
an old age.
 Fusang is an imagined character based on and yet different from the 
descriptions of Chinatown prostitutes available in various historical docu-
ments.5 Although the narrator claims that Fusang is an actual historical figure 
 5. Benson Tong, Unsubmissive Women. In this book-length study of Chinese prostitutes, 
Tong maps out the history of Chinese prostitutes in San Francisco and on the frontier in gen-
eral. Before the passage of the Page Law in 1875, which prohibited the entry of women for 
the purpose of prostitution, the majority of the adult Chinese women in California declared 
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documented in some of the “one hundred and sixty histories of the Chinese 
in San Francisco that no one else has bothered to read,”6 she implicitly under-
mines this claim by questioning the reliability of historical records, pointing 
out that they offer reductive or conflicting accounts of Chinatown prostitutes 
and the people surrounding them.7 The novel further hints at the ambiguous 
status of its central character with the very name of Fusang, which coincides 
with the title of Stan Steiner’s 1979 history of Chinese in America. Steiner 
explains that Fusang appeared in ancient Chinese chronicles as the name of a 
paradisiacal kingdom east of China discovered by a Buddhist priest Hui Shen 
in a.d. 499; modern scholars have quibbled over whether the discovery actu-
ally happened or whether the kingdom, if actually discovered, was an island 
off Japan or the Americas.8 The debates around the meaning of the land of 
Fusang underscore the slippages between history and myth. “Fusang” has 
another, similarly mythical meaning in Chinese, namely, a giant tree in the 
East where the sun rises. By naming her main character Fusang, therefore, 
Yan draws attention to the ways in which her representation of a nineteenth-
century Chinese prostitute blurs the boundary between history and fiction 
and questions the presumed stability of historical knowledge.
 Most American and British reviewers of The Lost Daughter of Happi-
ness highlight the narrator’s disavowal of complete knowledge of Fusang’s 
character. Some see this renunciation of narrative authority as an implicit 
challenge to the Western complacency about being able to know the non-
West. British reviewer Julia Lovell, for example, contends that, by having its 
subject remain “at all times opaque,” the novel subverts the “basic tenet of 
Orientalism—that the Orient can be read.”9 An American reviewer, Jeffrey 
C. Kinkley, also affirms the opacity of Fusang’s characterization for allowing 
the novel’s plot to break out of the predictable mold of “white men saving 
yellow women from yellow men.”10 Other reviewers interpret the lack of a 
themselves as prostitutes in census forms (Tong, 30). Most of the prostitutes were imported and 
controlled by Tongs, secret societies in Chinatown (Tong, 10). Some of the women who came 
before 1853 operated as free entrepreneurs, the most notable example of which was Ah Toy, 
who arrived in San Francisco in late 1848 or early 1849 (Tong, 6). Also see Doris Muscatine, 
Old San Francisco. Muscatine also documents a “lone Chinese courtesan” who arrived in 1849. 
She was a “stunning twenty-two-year-old” with a dozen names, the most common of which 
were Ah Toy and Ah Choy (Muscatine, 205). Judy Yung’s Unbound Voices focuses mainly on 
the first part of the twentieth century, but it provides a California Illustrated Magazine article 
that condemns prostitution in Chinatown and cites a few real examples. 
 6. Yan Geling, The Lost Daughter of Happiness, translated by Cathy Silber, 3.
 7. Ibid., 274.
 8. Stan Steiner, Fusang, 3–9.
 9. Julia Lovell, “Chinatown Lady,” 20; italics in the original.
 10. Jeffrey C. Kinkley, review of The Lost Daughter of Happiness, 136 (2). 
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well-defined central character as a deliberate attempt to unsettle the reader’s 
own sense of belonging. Rebecca Barnhouse, for example, speculates that the 
author consciously frustrates the readerly expectation for a sharply delin-
eated protagonist in order to make the reader feel, along with Fusang, the 
pain of being “displaced in the physical and psychological landscapes” that 
one struggles to inhabit.11 In general, the reviewers of The Lost Daughter of 
Happiness argue that the novel subverts its Orientalist trappings by refusing 
to make Fusang a transparent object. Their unanimous focus on Fusang’s 
opacity, however, is not without problems.
 While the Anglo-American readings just recapitulated do not reduce 
Fusang into a transparent racial stereotype, they are nevertheless reductive. 
In these interpretations, Fusang figures as little more than an empty signifier 
that warrants all manners of projections or subjective readings. This problem 
becomes more serious when we consider the less appealing implications of 
seeing Fusang as “opaque.” Indeed, one critic complains that “Fusang never 
becomes a fully realized character” and suggests that only readers with a 
“strong interest in the subject” should pick up the novel.12 We might say that 
Fusang’s, and hence the novel’s, purported opacity is yet another symptom 
of Western-centric approaches toward the non-West, which manifest, on 
the one hand, in subsuming the other as a known object and, on the other, 
in dismissing the other on grounds of inscrutable difference. By describing 
Fusang as “opaque,” the reviewers are seeking, arguably, to rationalize their 
inability to decipher the character. If this is the case, Fusang is not the only 
Chinese American female literary figure to be denied the status of a mean-
ingful character that merits close attention. Chinese American writer Gish 
Jen once wondered aloud, during a luncheon-discussion with her readers at 
the Public Square in Chicago, why some reviewers of her latest novel The 
Love Wife had characterized one of its central characters, Lan Lan, a nanny 
from China, as an opaque figure that the author does not allow the reader to 
sympathize with or understand.13 Jen quipped that the reviewers had prob-
ably read “right past” the pages and pages of internal monologue attributed 
to Lan Lan.
 For critics in China, in contrast, Fusang becomes an almost transparent 
signifier. Fusang’s experiences as a Chinatown prostitute serve to allegorize 
 11. Rebecca Barnhouse, review of The Lost Daughter of Happiness, 97.
 12. Cathleen A. Towey, review of The Lost Daughter of Happiness, 203. 
 13. As part of the Illinois Humanities Council, a nonprofit organization, the Public Square 
hosts readings, lectures, and public discussions of political issues. The occasion for Jen’s reading 
and luncheon-discussion, held on October 27, 2004, was the publication of her The Love Wife 
in that year. 
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China’s encounter with Western imperialism and the racialization of Chinese 
immigrants in the United States from the mid-nineteenth century onward. A 
critic goes as far as to proclaim that the value of the novel lies in its reflections 
on the various power dynamics outlined in “postcolonial theory” and reads 
the desire between Fusang and Chris as a parable of the mutual fascination 
between the “mature West” and the “ancient East.”14 Many endorse the char-
acter’s indiscriminating hospitality, describing her as a Mother Earth figure, 
derived from archetypes in Chinese myth who absorb death and regenerate 
life.15 For these critics, Fusan can be construed as a symbol of the survival 
instincts of Chinese immigrants or “traditional Chinese virtues” that allow 
China and Chinese around the world to overcome a long history of being 
overpowered by Westerners.16 An almost equal number of critics, however, 
take Yan Geling to task for “internalizing” orientalist imaginings of China in 
her portrayal of Fusang.17 Fusang, under this critical perspective, symbolizes 
a fantasy of cultural reconciliation that masks the tenacity of the racialist 
“prejudices” stemming from the persistently unequal relations between East 
and West.18 Both the supporters and the detractors of the novel, however, 
converge on their use of an allegorical approach to it. They demonstrate 
that a certain postcolonial discourse—the notion that China has withstood 
successive waves of incursion by Western nations, which continue to exer-
cise significant power over how China is perceived and positioned in the 
world—deeply influences how Chinese immigrant writings like Fusang are 
interpreted in China. Whether they warn of the continuing evil of Western 
neocolonialism or express confidence in China’s ability to survive and rise 
above Western dominance, Chinese critics of Fusang seldom stop to ques-
tion the Jamesonian critical framework they use (Jameson’s theory of Third 
World writings is duly cited in some of the Chinese criticisms of Fusang) that 
interprets the character Fusang as a metaphor for the historical destiny of an 
undivided Chinese nation.
 14. Li Xiaohua, “Fusang de renwu biaozheng he dongfangzhuyi wenhua duiying” [How 
characters in Fusang register orientalism], 211.
 15. Cai Qing, Xu Xu, Zhang Hongwei, “Fusang zhong de shenhua yuanxing jiexi: zhuixun 
xin de minzu wenhua zhigen” [Mythical archetypes in Fusang: In search of new roots of na-
tional culture], 77. 
 16. Yang Hongyin, “Minzu yuyan yu fudian xushu” [National allegory and heteroglossic 
narration]; Lin Cuiwei. “Fusang zhong de Nu Xing Guan” [Femininity in Fusang].
 17. Teng Wei, “Huaixiang zongguo de fangshi” [The remembering of China in Yan Geling’s 
immigrant literature], 1. 
 18. Hu Shaoqing and Zhang Yueyuan, “Zhongguo-xifang de huayu laoyu, dui ershi shiji 
yilai jige “kuaguo jiaowang” wenben de kaochao” [The China–West dichotomy: Reading trans-
national narratives since the 1990s], 79. 
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 Fusang’s reception history, therefore, constitutes an important site for 
studying the ways in which such concepts as Orientalism, anti-Asian racism, 
and postcolonialism have circulated between contemporary America and 
China. The introduction of theories of orientalism and postcoloniality into 
China in the early 1990s, combined with the “Chinese economic success,” 
has helped to consolidate Chinese nationalism, which justifies the heavy 
premium it places on the notion of unity, in a large measure, through invo-
cations of China’s continuing vulnerability in the international sphere.19 The 
period since the 1990s has also seen a surge in state-centered expressions of 
Chinese nationalism, including renewed interest in traditional Chinese cul-
ture (in which state promotion plays a key role),20 mass civil protests against 
foreign impingement upon Chinese sovereignty,21 and, more recently, a 
heated online discussion of whether there is a constellation of cultural values 
that define Chineseness and how they might help or hinder China’s rise in 
world economy and politics.22 Heightened nationalist sentiments, naturally, 
inflect Chinese interpretations of Chinese immigrant writings in the United 
States, especially those written in Chinese, which often come to be read as 
allegories of China’s responses to Western powers, the United States in par-
ticular, in the post–Cold War period. To extol Fusang’s “traditional Chinese 
 19. Arif Dirlik and Xudong Zhang, “Introduction”; Dai Jinhua, “Behind Global Spectacle 
and National Image Making”; Wang Hui, “Contemporary Chinese Thought and Modernity.” 
Dirlik and Zhang point out that the appropriation of postcolonial critique in China “both in-
dicates the heightened awareness of power relations in cultural production and manifests the 
kind of confidence derived from the Chinese economic success in the global market” (13, 14). 
Also see Dai, who notes that the surge of Chinese nationalism in the mid-1990s, often framed 
in anti-American terms, is closely related to “larger social critiques targeted at globalization, 
transnational capital, and the economic, cultural, and political imperialism of the West” (177). 
While Wang Hui takes notes of Chinese intellectuals’ criticism of nationalist sentiments in the 
1990s, he also acknowledges that “[in] Chinese postmodernism, postcolonial theory is often 
synonymous with a discourse on nationalism, which reinforces the China/West paradigm” 
(170).
 20. In 1994, the Chinese government sponsored an international conference on Confu-
cianism and designated Confucianism as an essential component of the nation’s patriotic educa-
tion curriculum. See Kang Liu, “Is There an Alternative to (Capitalist) Globalization?” 172.
 21. Nationalistic protests in China in the late 1990s and early 2000s include, most notably, 
the demonstrations following NATO’s bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 
and the public outrage over the collision between a U.S. Navy spy plane and a Chinese fighter 
in 2001.
 22. This discussion was first organized by Sina.com, the third largest website in China, to 
commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the PRC. It caught enormous public 
attention in May 2009, when an essay written by a college professor for the website received 
surprisingly enthusiastic responses from common readers and was republished in print media. 
As of now, the discussion has engaged a large number of well-known public intellectuals and 
bloggers, as well as common Chinese, many of whom have ventured ideas about the most “uni-
versal” characteristics among the (Han) Chinese. 
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virtues” reflects the nationalist desire to construct an indigenous culture as 
a counterweight to Western cultural hegemony. To repudiate the character 
as a symptom of internalized orientalism indicates anxiety over whether this 
hegemony can be dislodged.
 Yan’s novel, however, is not simply appropriated by different political and 
critical discourses; its translation into English, which in many ways condi-
tioned its reception by English-speaking audiences, constituted a more force-
ful act of appropriation. The changes made in the translation, the removal 
and shortening of a large number of passages in the original, entail acts of 
interpretation that echo, even as it partially generated, Anglo-American 
reactions to the novel. These changes aim to make the novel safe for a liberal 
view of race, only to demonstrate the limits of liberal tolerance. To intervene 
in the existing readings of the translation, then, we need to recover what was 
taken away from the original Chinese version. This work of reconstruction 
allows us to see how the translation process, compounded by the politics 
of reading surrounding Chinese immigrant literature in the United States, 
severely obscures the novel’s formal and political sophistication.
Suppressed irony
Two important passages narrated from Chris’s perspective are removed 
from the English translation, The Lost Daughter of Happiness. In the first 
passage, a sixty-year-old Chris remembers how he was surprised when, as 
a teenager, he first saw Fusang comply uncomplainingly with her johns. 
He believes that he is now finally able to understand Fusang’s inexplicable 
ability to draw pleasure from forced sexual acts. He concludes that Fusang 
embodies a “primitive maternity,” defined by “eternal suffering, boundless 
tolerance, and willing sacrifice:”23 “Maternity is the highest level of feminin-
ity—she opens herself to be plundered and invaded. She does not reject. Her 
indiscrimination is the most elegant form of wantonness.”24 In the second 
passage, the narrator reveals the older Chris’s reflections on Fusang’s attempt 
to seduce him when she temporarily lived at the missionary house (from 
which she was soon to be taken by Da Yong). He concludes that Fusang is the 
“most authentic, most natural” woman because she lets everyone “plough” 
and “sow” her as “a plot of earth.”25
 These two passages undoubtedly prompt Chinese critics to interpret 
 23. Yan Geling, Fusang, 85.
 24. Ibid., 85.
 25. Ibid., 114.
183I M P e r S O n A l  I n T I M A C Y
Fusang as a Mother Earth figure, either criticizing her as a thoroughly ori-
entalized fantasy or commending her as a symbol of Chinese resilience. The 
removal of these passages from the translation shows not that they would 
be unimportant from the perspective of English-speaking readers. Just the 
contrary. In fact, the translator explained their removal from the translation 
by saying that these passages are “too sentimental” and “overstated”—they 
are “telling, instead of showing” the reader what to make of the character 
Fusang.26 In other words, these passages would give the moral of the novel 
away; their removal, on the other hand, would ideally leave the English-
speaking critics guessing about Fusang’s meaning. The critics of the English 
translation, consequently, became convinced of Fusang’s opacity, despite all 
the other suggestive passages designed to “show” rather than “tell” about 
the character. The Anglo-American interpreters of the novel (including the 
translator) and the Chinese critics, therefore, are actually much more similar 
than different—they both base their readings on explicit rather than descrip-
tive passages. They either claim a complete understanding of Fusang when 
another character offers a reading of her or give up on deciphering the char-
acter when the more explicit passages are absent. Both groups of critics, from 
different ideological vantage points, elide the formal complexity of the novel. 
Chris, in fact, can be read as an unreliable observer rather than a guide to 
Fusang’s interiority. The novel’s conscious exploration of the various contra-
dictions in Chris’s oedipal/orientalist longing for Fusang suggests that we do 
well to read irony into his paean to Fusang’s “primitive maternity.”
 The narrator attributes Chris’s infatuation with Fusang to a convergence 
of racial and sexual fantasies. When Chris first visits Fusang in her brothel as 
a twelve-year-old boy, he carries with him all the “fairy tales and adventure 
stories” he has consumed and the resultant view that the “Orient” is a realm 
of fascinating mysteries.27 For Chris, Fusang brings to life a fairy tale, her 
“cavelike room” figuring as a “distant kingdom.”28 The narrator suggests that 
Chris approaches Fusang with a set of Orientalist assumptions, which fuel 
his infatuation with her. Chris perceives Fusang’s accented, limited English 
phrases as primitive sounds that “predate human language,” and in so doing, 
projects her as an infant, or an innocent savage, untouched by civilization.29 
Fusang’s bound feet impress Chris as “fishtails” that signify both “stunted 
 26. I obtained this information through my telephone interview with Silber.
 27. Yan, Lost Daughter, 15.
 28. Ibid., 15.
 29. Yan, Fusang, 10. The sentence that contains this phrase is missing from Silber’s transla-
tion. See Yan, The Lost Daughter of Happiness, 13. 
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evolution” and cruel mutilation.30 Thus, the younger Chris imagines Fusang 
as part of a primitive culture that insulates itself from modern civilization 
and metes out cruel treatment to its women. Chris’s imagination is reminis-
cent of a range of orientalist discourses and images circulating in the nine-
teenth-century United States, such as the noble savage discourse (registered, 
for example, in Melville’s Typee) and the sensual images of women in the 
harem (reappropriated for example in Poe’s “Ligeia”). Yan’s novel, therefore, 
reverberates with contemporary historical and literary scholarship by figur-
ing nineteenth-century U.S. orientalism as a contradictory, unstable struc-
ture of knowledge that consists of a hodgepodge of images about different 
parts of what is known as the “Orient” or Asia.31 Chris’s various assumptions 
about Fusang constellate into a sexualized fantasy of rescue. In the days fol-
lowing his first visit to Fusang, Chris wanders around in daydreams. As the 
narrator puts it, addressing Fusang: “His infatuation with you has left him 
time for nothing else. In his dreams, he is much taller, brandishing a long 
sword. A knight of courage and passion. An Oriental princess imprisoned in 
a dark cell waits for him to rescue her.”32 The “mutilated points of [Fusang’s] 
feet,” again, figure prominently in the boy’s fantasy.
 The novel figures Chris’s unconscious as a repository not only of Orien-
talist fantasies about white men saving women of color from men of color 
but also of oedipal stereotypes of alluring mature women. Chris taps quickly 
into these stereotypes as he comes into contact with a sensual “oriental” 
woman. In the eyes of the twelve-year-old Chris, Fusang’s body is a “fruit 
heavy with juice,” “ripe to the bursting point.”33 “Her pursed lips and low-
ered lashes lent her face all the gentleness of a mother.”34 Chris’s desire for 
thrills turns into the kind of “adoration boys all over the world feel for ripe 
beautiful women.”35 While Chris regresses into childhood, Fusang is elevated 
to the status of a primal goddess, her thick long hair falling “like water, as 
black and impenetrable as sky began before time.”36 By juxtaposing Chris’s 
 30. Yan, Fusang, 11. Here I depart from Silber’s translation, which translates Yan’s original 
as “a stage of evolution no one has imagined” (Yan, Fusang, 14). Yan’s original literally translates 
as “a stage between evolution and regression” (Yan, Lost Daughter, 11), which I prefer to trans-
late as “stunted evolution.” 
 31. Malini Johar Schueller, U.S. Orientalisms. Schueller provides an analysis of the different 
constructions of the Orient in U.S. culture before 1890, including the orientalism induced by 
the U.S.–North African conflict of the late eighteenth century, Near Eastern orientalism, and 
Indic orientalism (ix). 
 32. Yan, Lost Daughter, 19.
 33. Ibid., 16.
 34. Ibid., 12.
 35. Ibid., 16.
 36. Ibid., 14.
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oedipal infatuation with his heroic fantasy of coming to Fusang’s rescue, 
the novel shows that, for Chris, Fusang is at once a hypersexualized mother 
who incites penetration and a chaste whore who awaits salvation. Chris’s 
desire for Fusang, indeed, is a case that illustrates what Homi Bhabha terms 
“ambivalence” at the heart of colonial and racial desire.37
 Chris’s characterization not only gestures toward the intersections of 
heterosexuality and racialized desire in nineteenth-century America. It also 
shows that infatuation with the racial and sexual other is bound up with a 
more insidious emotional undercurrent. Chris’s desire for Fusang is sym-
biotic with his fear of the otherness she embodies, a fear that is mostly dis-
placed onto the Chinese men around her. As he goes through what seems to 
him Chinatown’s shady establishments and becomes exposed to anti-Chinese 
protests starting to flare up in San Francisco, Chris is increasingly gripped 
by the conviction that the Chinese, especially the male laborers who account 
for most of the Chinatown population, are an “inferior race” that should be 
“wiped out.”38 At some points, Chris’s desire to rescue Fusang seems to be 
motivated by or at least correlated with a different desire—the desire to dis-
tinguish himself from, as well as destroy, “those hideous Oriental buildings, 
all these grotesque feet and queues” and all these things that he “couldn’t 
understand.”39 Fusang also becomes a victim of this racial hate in the rape 
scene, which I discuss in the following section.
 The novel’s orientalization of Fusang through Chris, therefore, might 
arguably be read as what Judith Butler calls, in her Bodies That Matter, a 
“critical mime,”40 which refers to an act of citing or appropriating dominant 
discourse that aims to expose its foundational violence. Indeed, one can say 
that the novel mimics Chris’s view of Fusang as a way of opening up a con-
ceptual space beyond it. It suggests a critical vantage point from which one 
can see Chris’s complicity with the inherently violent racial stereotypes of 
exotic, passive, submissive, and sexually available Asian women.41 When the 
younger Chris believes that Fusang’s passivity gives her freedom, because she 
 37. Bhabha, 69. He uses the concept of “ambivalence” to indicate the contradictions in the 
“polymorphous and perverse collusion between racism and sexism” and in the subjectivities of 
both the colonizer and the colonized (69). Extrapolating from Said’s organization of “manifest” 
and “latent” orientalism into one congruent and intentional system of representation, Bhabha 
critiques the “closure and coherence attributed to the unconscious pole of colonial discourse” 
(72). 
 38. Ibid., 44.
 39. Ibid., 198.
 40. Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter, 47.
 41. For a useful review of the Asian American feminist critique of these stereotypes, see 
Laura Hyun Yi Kang, Compositional Subjects, especially the chapter titled “Cinematic Projec-
tions.” 
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is a “body not ruled over by the soul,” he can be seen as positing an oriental 
and feminine other essentially opposed to his own repressed self, brought 
up on Calvinist teachings against physical desire and prohibited socially and 
legally to pursue his desire.42 When the older Chris, cited in the beginning 
of this section, fantasizes about Fusang as a Mother Earth figure who rises 
above unspeakable violence through her uncomplaining passivity and her 
“elegant wantonness,” he can be understood as enacting what Kristeva terms 
the ritual of “purifying the abject,” which in the case of the novel figures as 
Fusang’s othered, prohibited body.43
 The Anglo-American and the Chinese interpretations of Fusang out-
lined in the previous section, which emphasize her opacity and transparent 
symbolic value (as a metaphor for the Chinese nation), respectively, elide 
the ways in which the novel undercuts Chris’s perspective. The decision to 
remove these passages from the novel’s English translation might have been 
motivated by the fear that the passages, described by the translator as too 
“sentimental” and “overstated,” would repel the novel’s potential critics and 
readers in the West, who are presumed to be largely white, middle-class, and 
liberal. They might very well attribute these two passages to the author and 
subsequently criticize her for perpetuating an essentialist, exoticist view of 
Asian femininity and femininity in general. Chinese and other Asian immi-
grant literature is expected to adhere to the tenets of liberal multiculturalism 
and stage a critique of historical configurations (as opposed to the continual 
presence) of orientalism. Parts of Yan’s Fusang, however, might upset this 
liberal expectation and instead lead the average, supposedly careless Ameri-
can reader to believe that the novel is coopted by orientalism. The deletion 
of these two passages, then, provides a glimpse of how trade book publishing 
in the United States shapes Asian immigrant literature by exercising an overt 
form of censorship. The critics of The Lost Daughter of Happiness, one might 
say, exercise a more covert form of censorship by refusing to acknowledge 
parts of the novel that cannot be subsumed under a simple antiorientalist 
reading, literally dismissing them in describing Fusang as “opaque.” While 
the English translation has been made safe and palatable for mass consump-
tion in the United States, it loses much of the original’s formal and thematic 
 42. Yan, Fusang, 86.
 43. Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 17. Kristeva defines the abject as what is fundamentally 
suppressed from the human psyche. The abject is “the jettisoned object, is radically excluded 
and draws me toward the place where meaning collapses” (2). The abject appears either as “a 
rite of defilement and pollution” or as “exclusion or taboo” in various religions; religions and art 
both comprise various means of “purifying the abject” (17). In Bodies That Matter, Judith Butler 
defines the abject more generally as a social and psychic zone of uninhatability that “constitutes 
the defining limit of the subject’s domain” (3).
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sophistication. The Chinese critics unquestioningly equate Chris’s perspec-
tive on Fusang with the novel’s largely to support their allegorical readings 
of the character as an emblem of the Chinese at home and abroad. As they 
use the novel to construct coherent narratives of the historical trajectory of 
China’s relation to the West, especially the United States, the Chinese crit-
ics fail to consider the possibility that the novel could at once imitate and 
subvert orientalist stereotypes in creating the figure of Fusang. The critics on 
both sides of the Pacific, therefore, converge in reducing Fusang to an unam-
biguous character and subordinating her to nation-centered interpretative 
frameworks. Fusang is turned either into a proper ethnic subject attesting to 
racial progress in contemporary American culture or into the quintessential 
modern Chinese subject struggling under Western domination.
Signifying excision
I argued that the existing criticisms of Yan’s Fusang and its English trans-
lation show how different audiences, from different cultural and political 
standpoints, appropriate Chinese immigrant literature in the United States. 
Equally important, these critical appropriations are anticipated and mirrored 
within the novel itself, which dramatizes how various characters compete to 
possess Fusang in both epistemological and sexual terms. While the Chinese 
laborers and gangsters in the novel try to confine Fusang to the social and 
domestic structures of Chinatown, Chris, in both his younger and older ver-
sions, projects onto her, as I demonstrate in my previous section, an incoher-
ent panoply of cultural stereotypes. One can see strong echoes between the 
male characters’ competing interpretations of Fusang and those of the novel’s 
critics. The allegorical readings generated in the Chinese context natural-
ize Fusang’s Chineseness, as does the heterosexual economy of Chinatown 
presented in the novel. Just as Chris turns Fusang into a desirable oriental by 
distinguishing her from the “hideous” surroundings of San Francisco Chi-
natown, the Anglo-American critics of the novel, along with its translator 
and publisher, are engaged in restaging Fusang as a proper racial subject 
who does not yield willingly to the sexual depravations of Chinatown’s male 
denizens and visitors.
 Despite the competing efforts to comprehend and possess her, Fusang 
consistently fascinates, baffles, and disorients the novel’s male characters 
with her boundlessly open sexuality. Her at-home-ness with forced sexual 
transactions sets her apart from common tropes of fallen women, such as 
veteran prostitutes hardened against the world and prostitutes with a heart of 
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gold, who embody moral virtues under a worldly guise. She does not, appar-
ently, see her role in terms of sexual slavery. Surprised at Chris’s age at their 
first encounter, Fusang nevertheless decides not to “cut a single corner with 
him,” instead smiling at him “as if he were a man every bit [her] match.”44 She 
also willingly accommodates Da Yong when she comes under his control. 
When Chris tries to kill Da Yong while the latter is asleep, Fusang quietly 
deters him by continuing to wash Da Yong’s hair as she was ordered.
 Many of Fusang’s Chinese clients construe her effortless accommodation 
of their sexual needs as an expression of submissive affection and conse-
quently propose to buy her out of prostitution and marry her.45 Da Yong 
quickly overwhelms his rivals and takes possession of Fusang, petting her the 
same way he treasures his “dog,” “parrot,” and “jewelry case.”46 In a scene that 
literalizes Eve Sedgwick’s argument about male homosociality being triangu-
lated through the female body, a brawl breaks out between Da Yong’s gang 
and a group of white passengers on a ship over the latter’s insulting remarks 
about Fusang and her music.47 Throughout the novel, the male Chinese 
characters vie with each other and with the dominant race for control over 
Fusang, all the while under the illusion of her willing submission. Though 
the novel fully acknowledges the historical, legal, and psychic structures that 
resulted in the gendered racialization of early Chinese migrants in San Fran-
cisco, it does not romanticize this racialized group. Just as it implicitly sub-
verts Chris’s orientalist desire for Fusang through critical mimicry, the novel 
suggests the cost of Da Yong’s desperate defense of his own and the other 
Chinese men’s endangered masculinity by showing how it is predicated on 
the possession of Fusang’s body.
 Each of the “readers” within the text seeks to stabilize Fusang’s implica-
tions for particular ethnic or national identities by domesticating her capa-
cious, indiscriminate sexuality. Likewise, as we can see in the competing 
critical discourses around the novel, turning an enigmatic female figure 
in Chinese immigrant fiction into a modern ethnic or national subject is 
contingent upon shearing her sexuality of its inexplicable excess. The inter-
pretive battles both within and around Yan’s novel demonstrate the ways in 
which Asian American women’s sexuality and subjectivity become, to quote 
 44. Yan, Lost Daughter, 15.
 45. The slippage between prostitutes and domestic women, as presented in the novel, is 
peculiar to early Chinese immigrant history. Chinatowns in the U.S. had a predominantly male 
population until after World War II, when the 1945 War Brides Act started to increase the 
number of Chinese women immigrating to the United States. See Tong, 159.
 46. Yan, Lost Daughter, 156.
 47. Ibid., 164.
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Leslie Bow, a “register of international and domestic struggle,” defined in 
conflicting terms by competing nationalist discourses.48
 At one point, the novel seems to acquiesce with reductive readings of 
Fusang by toying with the possibility of her domestication through racially 
inflected heterosexual desire. Upon meeting Chris after a long absence, 
although Fusang draws a blank when trying to remember who Chris is, as 
would be the case with any of her other johns, she is eventually moved by 
Chris’s persistence at being accepted sexually. The narrator goes on to proj-
ect a parallel between Fusang’s feelings for Chris and her own affection for 
her husband. Just as the narrator feels both infatuated with and distanced 
from her husband because of their perceived “differences,” Fusang develops 
a heightened sensitivity to Chris by becoming aware of how she is different 
from him: “You are aware of your strange feet, your cold faux jade bracelet. 
You’re aware of the heartbeat of every embroidered blossom on your peach 
silk blouse.”49 For a brief moment, Fusang seems to have been interpellated 
into the racialized economy of heteronormative desire that Chris inhabits 
and to have become a recognizable object of that desire. The younger Chris’s 
erotic gaze puts her through a process of subjectification, turning her into a 
desiring subject as well as a desired object.
 However, the novel soon thwarts its own movement toward a standard 
interracial romance. The various legal and social restrictions prohibiting 
Fusang’s desire for Chris do not lead her to take her own life in the fashion 
of a betrayed Madame Butterfly. The novel gradually suggests that Fusang’s 
all-accepting sexuality, characterized as a form of pristine femininity by the 
older Chris, can be construed as a process of dismantling the normative 
desire that threatens to claim her. It is not a stretch to say that the novel not 
only critically mimics and therefore self-consciously critiques the various 
acts of appropriation to which Fusang is subjected but also illustrates how 
these forces can potentially be resisted and neutralized.
 When Chris, as a young man in his twenties, proposes to marry her and 
then move with her to Montana toward the end of the novel, Fusang qui-
etly leaves to prepare and stage a wedding with Da Yong, who is soon to be 
executed. Fusang’s apparent submission to the institution of marriage signi-
fies just the opposite. Her marriage with the dead Da Yong, as the last part 
of the novel suggests, becomes an implicit statement of her refusal to marry 
in real life. It is indeed a final, definitive rejection of marriage. This ending 
decidedly distinguishes the novel Fusang from Ruthanne Lum McCunn’s 
 48. Leslie Bow, Betrayal and Other Acts of Subversion, 10.
 49. Yan, Lost Daughter, 43.
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Thousand Pieces of Gold, a novel based on the life of Lalu Nathoy, a nine-
teenth-century Chinese prostitute working in a mining town in Idaho.50 
While McCunn’s novel largely revolves around Lalu’s love for and marriage 
with Charlie Bemis, a saloon owner, Fusang does not offer the satisfaction 
of a conventional interracial romance between a white man and an Asian 
woman.
 Although Fusang’s rejection of marriage triggers profound confusion in 
the young Chris and, as he gets older, eventually compels him to think of 
the Chinatown prostitute as a form of primitive materiality that cannot be 
socially integrated, it is actually prefigured in a number of long passages that 
appeared earlier in the novel. In one scene, Chris follows Fusang back from a 
teahouse to her brothel. Dying to find out whether Fusang is in danger, Chris 
climbs up a small tree beneath Fusang’s window. When he flings himself 
forward and lands on Fusang’s window ledge, however, Chris is greeted by a 
shocking scene:
Her body was taking in a man. It was sleek with a faint film of sweat. She 
wasn’t resisting as he had expected, but accommodating herself completely 
to the man. The way the beach accommodates the tide.
. . .
He thought there should be struggle, some sign of suffering. But what he 
saw instead was harmony. No matter that the man wore a queue, or that his 
sallow back was covered with grotesque tattoos—the harmony was beau-
tiful.51
Fusang’s embrace of this experience, for one thing, undercuts Chris’s fan-
tasy of rescue and the underlying gendered pattern of racialization (Asian 
women are seen as hypersexual while Asian men are seen as either asexual 
or sexually perverted). The sight of Fusang drawing pleasure from her inter-
course with a random Chinese man, unsurprisingly, baffles Chris, who has 
been conditioned to associate the masculinity of Chinatown laborers with 
grotesqueness.
 But Yan’s staging of intraracial “harmony” in this scene is not a cultural 
nationalist proclamation of a natural erotic bond between Asian men and 
Asian women.52 Instead, it amounts to a description of a nonnormative sex-
 50. Ruthanne Lum McCunn, Thousand Pieces of Gold.
 51. Yan, Lost Daughter, 62.
 52. A recent example of this version of cultural nationalism is Darrel Hamamoto’s film, 
Yellowcaust: A Patriot Act (2003), in which the University of California Davis professor includes 
clips from a self-made pornographic film that stars Asian actors. His expressive purpose was to 
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ual practice that can potentially challenge the reification of sexual, racial, and 
national differences. Fusang conveys her desire both for the Chinese man 
and for Chris (whom she sees) through bodily movements that are seductive, 
almost phallic:
Her body was [the harmony]’s basis; she controlled the advance and retreat.
. . .
And [the pleasure] did not reside solely in her, the movement of her body 
spread it to the man, and her gaze sent it toward Chris.
 Chris realized that now he was crying for a different reason. With the 
onslaught of the mysterious pleasure, his body unfolded and quickened in 
ways he’d never known. The movements of their bodies drew him into their 
rhythm.53
Fusang’s desire in this passage is not only active but expansive, contagious, 
and implicitly nonmonogamous as well. At this moment, probably against his 
own will, Chris’s murderous jealousy toward the Chinese john, his wish to 
“rescue the beautiful slave girl on her dying breath,” morphs into the pleasure 
of an imaginary sexual union.54 Although the sexual pleasure Fusang experi-
ences and helps generate in Chris remains ambiguous, indefinable, and “mys-
terious,” it is clearly differentiated from what Chris sees as passive submission 
characteristic of primordial femininity.
 How do we, then, understand Fusang’s apparently unintelligible sexual-
ity? I submit that we consider Leo Bersani’s theory of impersonal intimacy, 
which builds on a series of writings since his 1988 article “Is the Rectum a 
Grave,” as a possible interpretive framework.55 In his 2002 article “Sociability 
and Cruising,” Bersani questions the disparaging definition in Freudian psy-
choanalysis of a male homosexual as one who “cruises the world . . . in search 
of objects that will give him back to himself as a loved and cared for subject,” 
“re-eroticize Asian America” and to bring Asian men and women together sexually. See Masters 
of the Pillow (2003), James Hou’s documentary film about the making of the pornographic film. 
 53. Ibid., 62, 63.
 54. Ibid., 61.
 55. Leo Bersani, “Is the Rectum a Grave?”; Homos; “Sociability and Cruising.” In “Is the 
Rectum a Grave?” Bersani points out that while sex is often practiced to create “a hyperbolic 
sense of self, it also potentially implies “a loss of all consciousness of self ” (218); he posits the 
enhancement of the latter aspect of sex as the aim of radical sexual politics. He builds on this 
argument in Homos, where he considers the possible manners in which male homosexuality 
provides a “privileged vehicle” for self-shattering sex (10). “Sociability and Cruising” continues 
the line of thinking presented in Homos, explaining in more detail the psychic resources and 
labor required for constructing new forms of intimacy dissociated from the fortification of the 
self. 
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recasting this longing as a radial form of sexuality. By loving others as the self, 
Bersani argues, the gay cruiser recognizes that “difference can be loved as the 
non-threatening supplement of sameness,” thus providing an alternative to 
the normative, heterosexual approach to sexual difference.56 Cruising, there-
fore, constitutes a form of training in “impersonal intimacy,” namely, sexual 
relations that do not result in psychic individuation through the simultane-
ous eroticization and repudiation of the gendered other.57 Embracing imper-
sonal intimacy, for Bersani, helps build a psychic foundation for relating to 
the other in general, on both sexual and nonsexual levels, as supplementary 
to the self. That is to say, both heterosexuals and homosexuals can practice 
impersonal intimacy, to different extents and at different costs, and, in so 
doing, disrupt normative heterosexual desire organized around reified sexual 
difference.
 Sexual difference, it needs to be emphasized, claims a unique position 
in Bersani’s theory of impersonal intimacy. Although he allows in his essay 
that sexual difference should not be “prejudicially sanctified in our psycho-
analytically oriented culture as the ground of all difference,” he adds that it 
perhaps “does have a unique epistemological function in human growth as an 
early and crucial model for structuring difference.”58 In contrast to Bersani’s 
proposition, the representation of Fusang’s sexuality in this important pas-
sage unsettles the normative operation of both sexual and racial differences 
without attributing to one mode of differentiation more psychic and social 
importance than it does the other. In Racial Castration, David Eng argues that 
psychoanalytical theories and queer discourses can be useful for Asian Amer-
ican and critical ethnic studies if we open them “upon a social terrain marked 
not by singular difference but by multiple differences.59 Indeed, the passage 
where Fusang derives pleasure from forced intercourse shows both the use-
fulness and the limitations of psychoanalytically informed queer theories for 
analyzing how Chinese immigrant literature interrogates the construction of 
social differences.
 Although Fusang’s desire is not exactly homosexual and she of course 
does not cruise the world, she, like the gay man posited in Bersani’s article, 
shows the same ability to approach the threatening other as the “non-threat-
ening supplement” of herself. One can, therefore, simultaneously claim a kind 
 56. Ibid.
 57. Leo Bersani, “Sociability and Cruising,” 17.
 58. Ibid., 17. This view of sexual difference is a slight change from the one expressed in a 
slightly earlier article “Against Monogamy.” In that essay, Bersani explicitly parallels sexual dif-
ference with “national, racial, religious, ethnic” differences (4).
 59. Eng, Racial Castration, 2.
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of queerness for Fusang and reinscribe queerness as disruptions of not only 
sexual but also racial and ethnic differences and as a process of becoming 
rather than a stable component of one’s identity. As demonstrated in her 
interactions with Chris, Fusang manages racial and sexual trauma, registered 
on her body in the form of violent penetration, by being hospitable to and 
drawing pleasure from it. She goes through a ritual of coquetry with any ran-
dom client, as she does with Chris: she would pour some tea, turn to smile 
at the customer, adjust her shirt, and then wait a moment.60 In one of the 
passages deleted from the English translation, the narrator describes, from 
Fusang’s perspective, one of her sexual experiences, in which she reaches the 
acute pleasure lying at the far end of “a vast plain of pain” by treading over 
“resistance and unwillingness, shame and anger.”61 By showing how Fusang 
turns the pain of sexual servitude into a source of pleasure, this passage 
might very well disturb middle-class American readers. This concern might 
have motivated the removal of this passage from the English translation. The 
omission obscures the ways in which the novel appropriates conventional 
forms of female sexual service, like prostitution, in order to stage new modes 
of relating to the racial and sexual other. Inserted back into the translation, 
the passage suggests that the peculiar form of sexual hospitality that Fusang 
exhibits not only reconciles her with the violent world around her but actively 
intervenes in it as well. Fusang’s vastly expansive desire temporarily dissolves 
Chris’s hatred of the Chinese johns. The visual pleasure he feels signifies 
either a cross-racial identification (with the Chinese john) or a cross-gender 
and cross-racial identification (with Fusang), both of which are precluded 
from the racial and sexual economy of the nineteenth-century San Francisco 
presented in the novel and, to a different extent, from today’s America.
 As Bersani argues, impersonal intimacy entails both self-extension and 
self-subtraction. By practicing sexual acts like cruising, one can learn to 
refrain from the wish to be individuated from all otherness and embrace one’s 
numerous inaccurate replications in the world, thus extending oneself into 
the world in a nonaggressive way. Just as Bersani’s notion of impersonal inti-
macy, an expansive connectedness, is predicated upon the work of self-sub-
traction, Fusang’s all-accepting sexuality is based on the stripping away of her 
sense of an enclosed, autonomous self. Right after the scene just discussed, 
Fusang gets up and “splash[es] herself with water to wash off [menstrua-
tion] blood.”62 Watching her from outside the window, Chris is “shocked” at 
 60. Yan, Lost Daughter, 11–13.
 61. Yan, Fusang, 88.
 62. Yan, Lost Daughter, 64.
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Fusang’s “nonchalance” toward blood.63 Fusang seems indifferent to, or intent 
upon dismantling, the difference between inside and outside, private and 
public. As blood trickles down her leg, Fusang fails to cohere into a sub-
ject with easily recognizable boundaries. She has become a kind of uncount-
able body inextricable from the world. As the narrator puts it, Fusang’s body 
“doesn’t count now.”64 This image emblematizes Fusang’s resistance toward 
being counted, or categorized as a normative female subject that upholds a 
specific set of nationalist discourses. The novel’s representation of Fusang’s 
open-ended sexuality suggests that acts of survival can be continuous with 
the process of forging new kinds of subjectivity that do not strive toward 
autonomy or coherence.
 The novel stages the most extreme implications of Fusang’s sexuality in 
the gang-rape scene. The race riot that occasions the rape of Fusang bears 
some resemblance to historical accounts of race riots against the Chinese that 
happened in the 1870s in Los Angeles, Chico, and other parts of the Amer-
ican West.65 As the English translation shortens the extensive description 
of the rape in the original (which underscores, again, that the translator of 
Fusang and the publisher of the translation construed parts of the novel to be 
unacceptable to mainstream American readers), I have to quote mainly from 
the Chinese original in my following analysis. Speaking in second person, the 
narrator equates Fusang’s experience of being raped and her daily interac-
tions with her johns, “You can’t tell the difference between selling your body 
and gang-rape.”66 If an important difference between rape and prostitution 
is the supposition of female consent, this difference is all but nonexistent in 
the case of Fusang as presented in the novel. The novel’s equation of rape and 
prostitution mirrors inversely the analogy Andrea Dworkin draws between 
prostitution and gang rape in her essay “Prostitution and Male Supremacy.”67 
Both the novel and Dworkin’s essay point out that women do not consent to 
prostitution, just as they do not consent to rape, because they are not legally 
or socially defined as sovereign subjects in full possession of their bodies. 
However, while Dworkin calls for changes in social structures that will enable 
women to attain to subjecthood, Yan gestures toward a critique of the very 
 63. Ibid.
 64. Ibid.
 65. Sucheng Chan, Asian Americans, 48–49.
 66. Yan, Fusang, 183.
 67. Andrea Dworkin, “Prostitution and Male Supremacy.” Dworkin criticizes the tendency 
among academic feminists to discuss prostitution in abstract, theoretical terms. She explains 
how prostitution facilitates unmitigated violence against women by making the following state-
ment, “The only analogy I can think of concerning prostitution is that it is more like gang rape 
than it is like anything else” (3).
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notion of subjectivity, characterized by autonomy and individuation, as a 
source of social violence. We cannot expect to universalize access to subjec-
tivity, that is to say, without changing its premises.
 From the translator and publisher’s perspective, perhaps, Fusang, with all 
her provocative complexity, would not be able to strike a chord in the novel’s 
mainstream reader who is likely to have been socialized into liberal notions of 
the sovereign subject. It is perhaps why the rest of the paragraph that begins 
with the sentence just quoted is completely deleted. I therefore translate it as 
follows:
One can even say that you never felt you were selling your body at all, 
because you accept the men. There is equality in your interactions with 
the men: You find pleasure even as you are physically violated, and you 
take away from the men what you give them. Instinctively, you have trans-
formed the traffic in your body into exchanges between and among bod-
ies. Your body is so hospitable that you never realized that you had had to 
exchange it for money. Encounters between and among bodies allow differ-
ent lives to converse with and learn from each other.
 This makes me suspect again that you, Fusang, are from a very old 
time.68
The last sentence of this passage seems to suggest that the narrator is aligned 
with the older Chris, who sees Fusang as a symbol of primitive, pristine femi-
ninity. But if this passage indeed posits an originary femininity, it does not 
signify, as the older Chris believes, a boundless ability to countenance suf-
fering and regenerate life. It does not justify rape by implying that it satisfies 
women’s masochistic sexual fantasies or, in other words, their proclivities 
for suffering, nor does it stop at critiquing rape as traffic in the female body. 
Instead, it proposes a possible antidote to rape impulses by teasing out the 
radical implications of the survival tactic Fusang uses in this scene. As Fusang 
imagines the process of the rape as “exchanges between and among bodies,” 
she becomes a conduit of a subversive, self-subtracting sexual practice. This 
passage suggests, therefore, that, by embracing differently configured bodies 
without feeling threatened, in other words, by practicing a form of imper-
sonal, indiscriminate intimacy, we could start, as Fusang does in this pas-
sage, to dissolve conventional notions of subjectivity grounded in entrenched 
social difference. The dissolution, in turn, would make impossible the resent-
ment of the other that feeds such misogynist (and racist, in this particular 
case) practices as rape.
 68. Yan, Fusang, 183.
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 The novel’s representation of Fusang, as I pointed out earlier, is in conver-
sation with various historical studies of the experience of Chinese prostitutes 
in nineteenth-century America. It rewrites conventional historical narratives 
that cast these women as either victims or agents seeking control of their own 
lives and, in so doing, resonates with and contributes to contemporary critical 
inquiries into subjectivity and relationality. Bersani’s ideas of impersonal inti-
macy and self-divestitude are by no means the only critical resource useful for 
our understanding of the radical implications of Yan’s novel. Contemporary 
feminist theories have also questioned the idea of autonomous, individuated 
identity by reimagining the female body.69 Some feminists, borrowing from 
different intellectual and scientific traditions, focus particularly on theorizing 
the interconnectivity between different bodies as a sexual corollary of inter-
subjective conceptions of identity. Christine Battersby, for example, builds 
her conception of the female body over and against the equation of embodi-
ment with an experience of containment posited in Lakoff and Johnson’s the-
ories of metaphor (which believes that the experience of containment gives 
rise to mental patterns—or schemata—that constrain metaphorically how we 
conceptualize other relations). Battersby argues for a fluid understanding of 
the body by citing embodied experiences peculiar to women (menstruation, 
pregnancy, and childbirth), modern topological theory (which sees form or 
structure as a temporary stability in patterns of flow) and new scientific para-
digms of form, and historical formulations of the body (as seen in Nietzsche 
and Bergson, among others) that broke from a rigidly masculine view of 
the body as coherent and well-contained. As Battersby points out, she is not 
alone in making this argument; many others, including Irigaray, Harraway, 
Emily Martin, and Kelly Oliver, to name only the most obvious suspects, 
have reenvisioned the (female) self/body in terms of “patterns of potentiality 
and flow.”70 The queer and feminist theories cited in this chapter are directly 
 69. Autonomy has always been a key idea in feminist philosophy, not always connected to 
the issue of the body. See Marilyn Friedman, “Feminism in Ethics: Conceptions of Autonomy.” 
Friedman points out that “[t]he standard current feminist account of autonomy may be called a 
social or relational account,” variants of which have been offered by many feminist philosophers, 
including “Evelyn Fox Keller, Jennifer Nedelsky, Seyla Benhahib, Lorraine Code, Morwenna 
Griffiths, Alison [sic] Weir and Susan Brison” (217). 
 70. Christine Battersby, “Her Body/Her Boundaries,” 355. For two more examples of this 
theoretical negotiation, see Allison Weir, Sacrificial Logics; Jane Caputi, “‘Take Back What 
Doesn’t Belong to Me’: Sexual Violence, Resistance, and the ‘Transmission of Affect.’” Weir 
uses Kristeva to distinguish between dominating and nondominating identity, arguing that the 
“separateness or identity of the self ” does not have to presume the suppression of nonidentity; 
in fact, “[i]deally, the identity of the self is based on the acceptance of the nonidentity of others, 
and of the nonidentity within oneself ” (13). Caputi discusses sexual violence toward women as 
a transmission of affect, the “dumping” of negative emotions from the masculine subject to the 
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relevant to efforts in U.S. ethnic studies, including Asian American studies, to 
reconfigure identities organized around race, ethnicity, and nation. Kandice 
Chuh’s argument against referential understandings of the term “Asian Amer-
ican,” for example, grounds itself in the larger argument against taking the 
universal “citizen-subject” and the proper, rights-bearing “subject of the law” 
on face value.71 Such a poststructural project requires not only intervention in 
conventional narratives but also investment in reimagining and reorganizing 
embodied practices. As Yan suggests through Fusang, a necessary ingredient 
of the ongoing theoretical efforts to break the false dichotomy between reified 
national identities and reified minority identities is to intervene in the corpo-
real and psychic dimensions of the process of identity formation.
 The idea of an embodied subject seeking disembodiment by circulating 
itself among other bodies might seem unattainable. But the novel suggests 
that it could be concretized in the future and that a condition of possibility for 
attaining this new kind of subjectivity resides in reflections on the violence 
inherent in normative sexual desire. The narrator relates that Fusang feels her 
strength drained away and experiences a taste of “humiliation” when Chris 
joins the rapists and yet tries to set himself apart from them by being tender 
toward her.72 The “little bit of tenderness” that Chris tries to give her gener-
ates in Fusang a traumatized reaction—she feels humiliated and tries to break 
away from Chris.73 Fusang’s humiliation suggests a perception of the pro-
found contradictions within the racialized economy of heterosexual desire. 
Chris’s sexual longing for Fusang, expressed through violent penetration in 
the rape scene, becomes literally intertwined with an outburst of racial hate. 
His attempt to instill some “tenderness” into this sexual act does not offset 
its violence; instead it overlays the violence of subjectification upon that of 
physical domination. Fusang tries to manage the traumatic effects of this 
redoubled violence by treating Chris like everyone else, biting off one of his 
buttons as a reminder of her “peculiar contact” with him.74 It can be argued 
that Fusang’s resistance toward heteronormative, monogamous desire, mani-
fest later in her refusal to marry Chris and in her decision to wed herself to 
feminine other. Healing from such abuse, for Caputi, entails self-cleansing through reconnect-
ing with the positive, elemental forces in the world. This process repudiates sexual violence as a 
form of, but “as force of connection, linking us energetically to each other, to the elements, and 
to a divinity that is experienced not as a transcendent White father god . . . but on earth, . . . and 
in other sexual bodies” (12). One’s embodied connections to the environment thus facilitate the 
reconstitution of a female self in the wake of masculine violence.
 71. Kandice Chuh, Imagine Otherwise, 22–23.
 72. Yan, Fusang 185; Lost Daughter 225.
 73. Yan, Fusang 231; Lost Daughter 189.
 74. Yan, Fusang, 184; Lost Daughter 224.
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Da Yong right before his execution, derives from her intuitive understanding 
of the contradictory and traumatic nature of this desire. Her social position 
as a racialized, sexualized object and her refusal to be coopted by socially 
instituted desire enable her to personify a new mode of subjectivity and 
relationality. Although Fusang’s rejection of normative subjectivity does not 
immediately produce an ideal alternative within or outside the text, she at 
least suggests a condition of possibility for approaching this ideal.
A Chinese Peasant Woman
We should certainly not read Fusang only through the scrim of literary and 
cultural theories produced in the United States. The author, in fact, has made 
it clear that the novel, to her mind, engages with multiple cultural contexts. 
In an interview she gave in 2003, Yan Geling indicates that she has become 
aware of the critical resistance to and appropriations of the novel. She takes 
pain to distinguish the figure Fusang from the more well-known prostitute 
figures in Chinese and Western literary canons, including, in particular, 
Dumas’s Camille, who is remembered for her “helplessness and sacrifices.”75 
Fusang, by contrast, embodies a new form of feminism. As the author puts 
it, “Fusang is a feminist with strength that surpasses men’s. She embodies a 
modern ethos—she values freedom, refuses to bind herself to one man, and 
is completely open to physical pleasure.”76 Fusang is a figure who “transcends 
reality” in a politically meaningful way, the author adds, implicitly refut-
ing the Anglo-American critics’ comment that the character comes across 
as pointlessly opaque.77 In the same interview, Yan also indicates that she is 
apprised of some Chinese critics’ complaint that the novel made them “feel 
uneasy,” speculating that this may be a reaction to her dispiriting description 
of the male Chinese immigrants.78 In her own defense, she describes the char-
acterization of Fusang as a deliberate critique of a kind of reactionary mind-
set that fuels some of the “senseless resentment” that the Chinese sometimes 
display against Westerners.79 The character is meant to frustrate the national-
ist sentiments of many Chinese and provide a corrective to their oscillation 
between “excessive pride” and “excessive shame” in perceiving themselves 
vis-à-vis the West.
 75. Ya fei, “Zai haiwai xiezuo: zuojia yan geling fangtanlu, zuojia Yan Geling fangtan lu” 
[Writing from overseas: An interview of Yan Geling].
 76. Ibid.
 77. Ibid.
 78. Ibid.
 79. Ibid.
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 Though Fusang should not be read as an embodiment of a unified, tri-
umphant Chinese nation, she speaks to an important strain in contemporary 
Chinese literature. Another point the author makes in the interview is that, 
while the character is surreal, she is solidly grounded in the author’s under-
standing of what a “sturdy Chinese peasant woman” might look and think 
like. Fusang’s peasant origin (she is literally born a peasant girl in Canton in 
the novel) suggests the novel’s possible affinity with the concept of minjian 
proposed by Chinese critic Chen Sihe, who, not coincidentally, has written 
some of the most widely cited critical essays on Yan. Chen defines the con-
cept of minjian, which translates literally as the “sphere of the people,” as the 
cultural customs, sentiments, and aesthetic preferences of the lower strata 
of people in rural and ethnic areas, over which state power has weakened or 
incomplete control. The most important characteristic of minjian is its rela-
tive freedom from dominant ideologies and mores, although it can generate 
its own, sometimes extremely oppressive, power structures. Minjian figures 
in contemporary Chinese literature as “invisible structures” that slyly throw 
into question its more politically conformist elements.80 Chen’s idea of min-
jian resonates with some of the subversive tactics that have been identified 
in American literature, including critical reappropriation, signifying, and, 
as I invoked earlier, critical mimicry. The passages deleted from the English 
translation of Fusang can be aptly described as manifestations of minjian in 
the novel, as they present unconventional modes of pleasure and resistance 
that belie the novel’s superficial resemblance with an allegory of China’s strug-
gles against the West. Disrupting the master narratives of official, postcolo-
nial Chinese nationalism, the novel Fusang runs in the same vein as Xinling 
Shi, where the idea of minjian also registers. Chen explicitly associates Yan’s 
portrayal of Fusang with his conception of minjian in his comments on Yan’s 
2006 novel Dijiuge guafu [The ninth widow], which portrays a Fusang-like 
character in a rural part of Henan, a province in central China. The peasant 
woman Wang Putao weathers the series of political movements during the 
second half of the twentieth century in the same way that Fusang weathers 
her various sexual encounters, that is, with indiscriminating openness and 
tenacious simple-mindedness. For Chen, Wang Putao represents an exten-
sion of the indomitable, undisciplined life force already present in Fusang.81
 80. For Chen, representations of minjian became self-conscious with the rise of the “roots-
seeking” writers in the 1980s. The politics and aesthetics of minjian reached a new level in the 
1990s, when many writers turned to minjian for new forms of idealism that do not derive from 
state ideologies. See Chen, Zhongguo xiandangdai wenxueshi jiaochen [History of modern and 
contemporary Chinese literature], 12–14. 
 81. Chen Sihe, Ziji de shujia [My own bookshelf].
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 Drawing from and addressing cultural coordinates in both the United 
States and China, Fusang is an appropriate work with which to end my discus-
sion of the two multiculturalisms. In the novel, moments of violence become 
a plea for narrative and intellectual labor aiming to uncover new grounds 
for radical, noncomplicitous responses to power. The character Fusang, a 
product of this labor, bodies forth a self-subtracting, nonaggressive mode 
of subjectivity shaped in the active accommodation of a web of otherness. 
Simultaneously one and many, Fusang can be read as a study of the subjective 
conditions for the construction of functional but maximally heterogeneous 
collective identities, whether ethno-racial or national. The novel, therefore, 
helps imagine and broker a radical kind of pluralist universalism, an ideal 
shared, albeit imperfectly, by Kuo, Zhang, and Alameddine alike.
AS A glObAl PrOJeCT,  multiculturalism’s search for work-  able formulas for balancing national coherence and ethnic jus-
tice is always already characterized by cross-national comparisons 
and borrowing. Even as they propose expansive models of multicul-
turalism, the authors studied in this book help bridge, consciously 
or unconsciously, the imagined chasm between two multiculturalist 
projects. In other words, they translate between two national con-
texts against the grains of existing modes of translation. Herein lies 
the crux of this study. The double critique that it performs does not 
simply intervene in two different cultural and political processes 
simultaneously; it also revises the comparative discourses that have 
emerged between them. The existing comparative discourses, as 
I pointed out throughout this study, are mostly marked by a con-
servative impulse toward self-justification. This impulse is visible 
whether the other country (as opposed to one’s own) is criticized 
for minority rights violations or exalted as a commendable example 
of cultural tolerance. When U.S. liberal multiculturalism is affirmed 
and embraced in China as an instructive precedent, as we saw in 
the chapter on Kuo, it usually works slyly to legitimize the privi-
leging of the national over the ethnic in China’s own ethnic policy. 
The literary readings offered here counter the banal universalism—
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“excusing one bad deed by pointing to another,” that is, in colloquial terms—
entailed in such self-defensive modes of comparison.
 The double critique framework determines the specific interpretative 
tactics employed in each of the literary chapters, which examine how the 
literary narratives at hand interact with political, cultural, and theoretical 
discourses emanating from a particular national context and the ways in 
which they mediate between two different national contexts. It also shapes 
the structure of the entire study, destabilizing the boundaries between dia-
sporic Chinese American literature and U.S.–Chinese comparative litera-
ture. If authors inhabiting the liminal space between the United States and 
China can be resituated in both national contexts, then those working more 
squarely within one national context can be paired together and read as com-
mentaries on what happens in between the two nations.
 Over the past decade, Chinese investments in Western multiculturalisms, 
especially the U.S. variety, have been on the rise. New U.S.–China compari-
sons have emerged in discussions of possible antidotes to the more recent 
upheavals in Tibet and Xinjiang. In an immediately catchy turn of phrase, 
sociologist Ma Rong has put forth an argument for the “depoliticization of 
ethnic minority issues” in China. Ma faults the regional autonomy model 
and its Soviet antecedent for institutionizing, or politicizing, group differ-
ences and destabilizing national identity. For an alternative, he turns to the 
kind of pluralism that he personally experienced as a doctoral student at 
Brown University in the 1980s. Echoing the U.S. Ethnicity School of the 
1980s, Ma portrays American multiculturalism as a de-essentializing, “cul-
turalist” approach to conceptualizing ethnic difference that can be instruc-
tive for China’s battle against ethnic conflicts.1 Ma’s call for depoliticization 
recalls the Habermasian subordination of ethno-cultural communities to 
an inclusive national community. One may regard it as a Chinese variation 
upon, indeed a belated translation of, Western liberal criticisms of official 
multiculturalism and state-sanctioned ethnic identities. Ma’s concern with 
the Chinese state’s manufacturing and consolidation of minority identi-
ties does not lack parallels in new U.S. studies of the Chinese ethnic policy. 
Benedict Anderson’s Foreword for Thomas Mullaney’s Coming to Terms with 
the Nation claims explicitly that the more populous minorities in China—
Tibetans and the Uyghurs, for example—develop their ethnic self-awareness 
and antagonism against the Han as a reply to the state’s “incessant ‘Who are 
you?’”2
 1. Ma Rong, “Lijie minzu guanxi de xinsilu” [New Approaches to Understanding Ethnic 
Relations], 126–27.
 2. Benedict Anderson, Foreword to Coming to Terms with the Nation, xx.
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 While Ma Rong invokes the American model as a liberal alternative to 
China’s official multiculturalism, critic Wang Hui warns against adopting the 
narrow culturalism of the liberal “politics of recognition,” which obscures the 
nonlocalizable material processes at work in the shaping of ethnic relations 
in China.3 In an implicit response to the rhetoric of depoliticization, Wang 
offers an analysis of the history of Tibet–Han conflicts, suggesting that it 
cannot but be a political issue. What truly “depoliticizes” the Tibet issue is 
the reduction of ethnic differences to purely cultural and religious divisions, 
as we can see in Western condemnations of religious suppression in Tibet, a 
conceptual error that has long acquired the name of “orientalism.” Instead, 
the social upheavals and religious revival in Tibet have to be situated in the 
development of a market economy in China over the last few decades, which 
have created new social inequities that deprive many poor and rural Tibetans 
of opportunities to compete effectively within this economy. This, for Wang, 
has reversed the many policies, implemented before the 1990s, geared toward 
integrating Tibet economically with the rest of the nation. Only by recogniz-
ing the material underpinnings of ethnic differences in China, can the Chi-
nese version of the “politics of respect” have a real possibility for living up to 
its purpose of facilitating the advance of the socialist revolution in both Han 
and non-Han areas and creating a shared (though not necessarily narrowly 
nationalist) identity among the inhabitants of these different areas. Wang’s 
argument against the “depoliticization” of ethnic relations resonates strongly 
with my argument against conciliatory multiculturalism. The reframing of 
“the politics of respect” is a critique of tepid culturalist conceptions of eth-
nic justice that has assumed a kind of global traction, traveling from the 
United States to China, to say the very least, and setting severe limits for the 
multicultural projects in both places, among other parts of the world. This 
recent intellectual discussion of the “depoliticization” of ethnic policy helps 
illustrate, yet again, the need for a transnational, comparative framework for 
any new studies of the configurations and politics of multiculturalism.
 Comparative critique, however, is by necessity a collective, collaborative 
project. Let me conclude my envoi, then, with the hope that this book will 
pass through the minds of others and give rise to ideas that eventually return 
to me, unrecognizable yet familiar.
 3. Wang Hui, “Dongfang zhuyi, minzuquyu zhengzhi he zuiyan zhengzhi” [Orientalism, 
ethnic regional autonomy, and the politics of respect].
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